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HANDBOOK  OF  PSYCHOLOGY '^^'^ 


Jcuscs  autX  %nUlUct 


/ 

JAMES  MAEK  BALDWIN,  Ph.D. 

PROFESSOR    OF    PHILOSOPHY    IN   LAKE  FOREST   UNIVERSITY 


NEW  YORK 
HENEY  HOLT  AND   COMPANY 

1889 


Copyright,  1889, 

BY 

Henry  Holt  <S  Co. 


Dbummond  &  NBtr, 

Electrotypers, 

1  to  7  Hague  Street, 

New  York. 


PREFACE. 


The  justification  of  another  handbook  of  Psychology 
is  readily  found  in  the  present  state  of  the  science,  a 
state  of  such  enthusiastic  and  productive  specialism  that 
it  is  to  be  hoped  no  book  will  hereafter  meet  the  require- 
ments of  higher  education  for  more  than  a  generation. 
Whatever  labor  this  may  entail  upon  mental  scientists 
and  educators,  whose  business  it  is  to  systematize  and 
present  results  as  they  are  established,  they  should  be 
the  first  to  hail  with  joy  the  rapid  growth  of  psychology 
as  of  immediate  advantage  to  the  philosoj)hy  and  prac- 
tice of  education. 

But  apart  from  the  facts  of  the  science  itself — the 
new  facts  which  must  be  interpreted  in  a  system  for 
educational  purposes — I  think  it  is  exceedingly  neces- 
sary that  new  philosophical  conceptions  of  the  sphere 
and  function  of  psychology  should  be  embodied  in 
special  works.  This  is  the  more  imperative  at  present, 
since  the  conception  now  prevalent  is  widely  different 
from  that  of  twenty  years  ago,  when  many  of  the  works 
were  written  which  are  yet  used  as  introduction  and 
strong  support  to  the  philosophy  taught  in  the  universi- 
ties :  the  new  conception,  namely,  that  psychology  is  a 
science  of  fact,  its  questions  are  questions  of  fact,  and 
that  the  treatment  of  hypotheses  must  be  as  rigorous 
and  critical  as  competent  scientists  are  accustomed  to 
demand  in  other  departments  of  research. 

The  question  of  the  relation  of  psychology  to  meta- 
physics, over  which  a  fierce  warfare  has  been  waged  in 


IV  PREFACE. 

recent  years,  is  now  fairly  settled  by  the  adjustment  of 
mutual  claims.  It  is  in  the  interests  of  this  adjustment, 
which  I  believe  to  be  part  of  the  true  philosophy  of 
science  in  general,  that  this  book  is  written.  We  have 
already  in  English,  treatises  which  reflect  respectively 
the  standpoints  of  the  metaphysical  and  agnostic  schools ; 
books  which  not  only  serve  their  legitimate  purpose  as  a 
propaedeutic  to  general  philosophy,  but  which  contain,  en 
germe,  the  systems  which  they  are  supposed  to  introduce. 
The  works  of  Dewey  and  Bowne  on  the  one  hand,  of 
Bain  and  Ribot  on  the  other,  illustrate  this  subordina- 
tion of  scientific  psychology  to  the  supposed  demands  of 
a  broader  philosophic  construction. 

The  terms  of  the  adjustment  of  which  I  speak  are 
briefly  these :  on  the  one  hand,  empirical  investigation 
must  precede  rational  interpretation,  and  this  empirical 
investigation  must  be  absolutely  unhampered  by  fetters 
of  dogmatism  and  preconception ;  on  the  other  hand, 
rational  interpretation  must  be  equally  free  in  its  own 
province,  since  progress  from  the  individual  to  the  gen- 
eral, from  the  detached  fact  to  its  universal  meaning, 
can  be  secured  only  by  the  judicious  use  of  hypotheses, 
both  metaphysical  and  speculative.  Starting  from  the 
empirical  we  run  out  at  every  step  into  the  metempiri- 
cal ;  and  it  is  as  destructive  of  sound  results  to  omit 
the  theory  of  the  universal  as  to  neglect  the  observation 
of  the  particular.  It  is  in  this  latter  respect,  I  think, 
that  Mr.  Sully's  otherwise  most  excellent  work  is  defec- 
tive. 

Consequently,  while  giving  most  especial  attention  to 
the  rich  and  popularly  little  known  results  of  the  new 
methods — in  psychometry,  psychophysics,  and  neurology 
— I  endeavor,  wherever  hypotheses  of  their  ground  and 
bearing  upon  the  mental  life  have  been  advanced,  to 
suggest  and  estimate  them.  Inasmuch,  however,  as  the 
rational  treatment  of  the  data  of  the  science  constitutes 


PREFACE.  V 

a  special  department  of  metaphysics,  empirical  psychol- 
ogy must  be  concerned  chiefly  with  the  first  of  these 
tasks,  and  with  the  latter  only  as  far  as  rational  infer- 
ences can  be  confirmed  empirically  in  the  stage  of  de- 
velopment reached.  Tims  with  the  establishment  of 
hypotheses,  the  science  of  fact  will  become  broader  and 
more  profound  and  the  reasoned  conclusions  of  meta- 
physics will  become  the  conclusions  also  of  a  sound  and 
thoroughgoing  induction. 

The  present  volume  is  the  first  part  of  a  general  view 
of  the  mind  in  its  three  aspects,  the  Emotions  and  Will 
being  treated  separately  in  a  second  volume  which  I 
hope  to  publish  in  the  near  future.  In  the  mean  time  it 
gives  me  pleasure  to  suggest  the  use  of  Dr.  McCosh's 
admirable  work.  The  Motive  Poivers,  in  connection  wdth 
the  present  book  in  class-room  instruction.  By  throw- 
ing the  more  difficult  and  abstract  points  of  discussion 
into  smaller  print  in  the  text,  I  have  endeavored  to  draw 
a  line  of  demarcation  for  a  more  general  or  a  more  de- 
tailed course  of  instruction,  as  the  earlier  preparation  of 
the  student  may  make  advisable.  The  "Further  Prob- 
lems for  Study,"  at  the  end  of  each  chapter,  are  in- 
tended to  indicate  partially  unexplored  fields  in  which 
students  may  engage  themselves  in  an  original  way. 

Besides  the  acknowledgments  made  freely  in  the 
text,  I  wish  to  express  especial  thanks  to  my  friend  Dr. 
McCosh  for  the  instruction  and  personal  training  I  owe 
to  him.  My  greatest  indebtedness  is  to  Prof.  Wundt  of 
Leipzig  and  to  Prof.  Kabier  of  Paris.  I  have  also  to 
acknowledge  many  profitable  suggestions  made  by  Prof. 
A.  T.  Ormond  of  Princeton. 

J.  M.  B. 

Lake  Forest,  III.,  July,  1889. 


CONTENTS. 


INTRODUCTION. 

CHAPTER  I. 
Nature  of  Psychology. 

PAGES 

§  1.     Definition. — Subject-matter  of  psychology. — Distinc- 
tion between  psychological  and  physiological  facts. —      ^ 
True  relation  of   psychology  to  physiology.— Defini- 
tion of  psychology, 1-8 

§  2.  Difficulties  and  Errors  in  Psychology. — Use  of  reflec- 
tion.— Means  of  remedying  these  difficulties  :  supple- 
mentary psychological  sources, 8-11 

§  3.  External  Sources  and  Aids. — Enumeration  of  external 
sources. — Advantages  derived  from  external  observa- 
tion,       12-18 

§  4.     Unity  of  Psychological  Sources  in  Consciousness,         .     18-19 

CHAPTER  II. 
Psychological  Method. 

^  1.     Principles  of  Scientific  Method. — In  general,         .         .  20-22 

§  3.  Application  of  Scientific  Method  to  Psychology. — Psy- 
chological observation, 23-25 

§  3.  Experiment  in  Psychology. — Limitations  of  the  experi- 
mental method, 35-31 

§  4.     Psyclwlogical  Hypotheses. — General  conclusion,  .        .  31-34 

CHAPTER  III. 

Classification  and  Division. 

§  1.     Three  Great  Classes, 35-36 

§  3.     Justification  of  this  Classification,       ....     36-40 
§  3.     Unity  of  the  Three  Classes  in  Conscio^isness,        .         .     40-41 

S  4.     Division  of  the  Subject, 41-43 

vii 


vm  CONTENTS. 

PAET  I. 

GENERAL  CHARACTERISTICS  OF  MIND. 

CHAPTER  IV. 
Consciousness. 

PAGES 

§  1,     Nature  of  Consciousness^ 43-45 

§  2.  Consciousness  and  the  Unconscious. — Meaning  of  the 
term  unconscious. — Arguments  for  the  unconscious. 
— Conclusion, 45-58 

§  3.  Relative  Theory  of  Consciousness. — Consciousness  as  a 
feeling  of  difference. — Consciousness  as  a  feeling  of 
relation  between  subject  and  object,  .        .        .     58-63 

§  4.  Area  of  Consciousness. — Degrees  or  forms  of  conscious- 
ness.— Apperception, 63-66 

§  5.     Decelopment  of  Consciousness, 66-68 

CHAPTER  V. 

Attention. 

§  1.  Definition  of  Attention.— Mteniion  as  mental  energy. 
— Reflex  or  involuntary  attention. — Voluntary  atten- 
tion,       69-73 

§2.  Bearings  of  Attention  in  the  Mental  Life. — Relation 
of  attention  to  sensation. — To  movement. — To  the  in- 
tellect.—To  feeling.— To  the  bodily  functions,  .        .     72-77 

§  3.     Eclucational  Bearings  of  the  Doctrine  of  Attention. — 

Training  of  the  attention. — Habits  of  attention,        .     77-79 

PAET  II. 

INTELLECT. 

CHAPTER  VI. 

Division  of  the  Intellectual  Functions. 

§  1.     The  Apperceptive  Function, 80 

§  2.     The  Rational  Function, 81 


CONTENTS. 


IX 


THE  APPERCEPTIVE  FUNCTION". 

PRESENTATION 

CHAPTER  VII. 

Sensation. 

PAGES 

§  1.  General  Nature  of  Sensation. — Distinction  between 
sensation  and  impression. — Atfective  and  presenta- 
tive  elements  in  sensation, 83-85 

§  2.     Characters  of  Sensation, 85 

§  3.  Quality  of  Sensation. — Smell. — Taste. — Organic  or 
systemic  sensations. — Muscular  sense. — Presentative 
element  in  muscular  sensations. — Hearing. — Presen- 
tative elements  in  sensations  of  sound. — Sight. — 
Touch. — Temperature  sense, 85-97 

§  4,     Proof  of  Speciflc  Qualities  of  Sensation. — Theory  of 

unity  of  composition  of  mind,  ....     98-106 

§  5.     Quantity    of  Sensation  :     Psychophysics. — Weber's 

law. — Extensive  or  massive  sensations,    .         .         .  106-109 

§  6.  Duratio7i  of  Sensation  and  Thought :  Psychometry. 
— Effect  of  attention  upon  the  duration  and  quan- 
tity of  sensation. — Effect  of  duration  upon  the  in- 
tensity of  sensation, 109-114 

§7.     Tone  of  Sensation, 114 

§  8.     Cerebral  Localization, 114-115 

CHAPTER  VIII. 


Perception. 

§  1.     Definition  of  Perception, 116-117 

§2.     Analysis  of  Perception, 117-118 

§  3.     Differentiation, 118-120 

§  4.  Localization. — The  perception  of  space. — Data  for  the 
perception  of  space. — Synthesis  of  data :  tactual 
space. — Visual  perception  of  space. — Presentation 
of  foreign  body. — Visual  perception  of  distance. — 
Localization  of  sounds  in  space. — Feeling  of  equilib- 
rium from  the  ear. — Ideal  product  of  localization  : 
idea  of  space, 120-133 


X  CONTENTS. 

PAGES 

§  5.     Theories  of  Space-perception. — Nativism  of  product : 

'     Kant. — Empiricism,  ......  133-137 

§  6,  Intuition. — Motor-intuition. — Ideal  product  of  intui- 
tion.— Sense-perception  and  the  unconscious. — De- 
ceptions of  sense-perception, 138-143 

§  7,     Reflection   or  Self -consciousness. — Ideal    product   of 

reflection  :  idea  of  self, 143-144 


REPRESENTA  TION. 

MEMORY. 

CHAPTER  IX. 
Retention  and  Reproduction 

§  1.  General  Nature  of  Memory. — Nature  of  revived 
states. — Difference  between  presentation  and  repre- 
sentation.— Distinctness  of  image. — Definition  of 
memory, 145-152 

§  2.  Retention. — Theories  of  retention. — Physiological 
theory.— Pathological  proof  of  physiological  dispo- 
sitions.— Physical  basis  of  memory. — Mental  condi- 
tions of  retention, 153-164 

§  3.  Reproductio7i. — Its  primary  condition. — Supplemen- 
tary condition. — Secondary  aids  to  reproduction. — 
Power  of  imaging. — Development  of  the  organic  in 
memory. — Retention  and  reproduction  as  mental 
growth,    164-171 

CHAPTER  X. 

Recognition  and  Localization, 

§  1.  Recognition. — Feeling  of  familiarity. — Distinction  be- 
tween recognition  of  an  object  and  of  an  image. — 

Theories  of  recognition, 172-17& 

§2.     Ideal  Product  of  Recognition  :  Personal  Identity.,     .  179 

§  3.  Localization  in  Time. — Data  for  the  reconstruction 
of  time. — Intensity  as  an  indication  of  time. — 
Movements  of  attention  as  indicating  position  in 
time. — Units  of  duration. — Perception  of  time  by 
the  ear, 179-18&. 


CONTENTS.  xi 

PAGES 

§  4.     Ideal  Product  of  Temporal  Localization :  Idea  of 

Time, 188 

§5.     Kinds  of  Memori/ :  Local,  Logical,     ....  189-190 

COMBINATION. 

CHAPTEPw  XI. 

Association. 

§  1.  General  Nature  of  Association. — Definition.— Ground 
or  reason  of  association  :  the  preceding  idea. — Re- 
lation of  association  to  memory. — Physiological 
basis  of  association, 191-194 

§  2.  Laws  of  Association. — Particular  or  secondary  laws. 
— Association  by  contrast. — Universal  or  primary 
law. — Law  of  correlation. — Preference  as  influenc- 
ing association, 194-203 

§  3.  Forms  of  Association. — Forms  of  coexistent  or  simul- 
taneous association. — Complex  associations,    .        .  208-210 

§  4.     Force  of  Association. — Continuance  of  the  suggesting 

idea, 210-212 

CHAPTER  XII. 
Imagination. 

§  1.     Passive  Imagination. — Material  of  the  imagination. 

— Presuppositions  :  memory  and  association,  .        .  213-217 

§2,  Modes  of  Passive  Imagination. — Dissociation. — Com- 
position,    218-220 

§  3.  Laws  of  Passive  Imagination. — Contiguity  and  re- 
semblance.— Principle  of  preference,        .         .         .  220-224 

§  4.     i^awc?/.— Relation  of  fancy  to  reality,  .        .        .  224-226 

§  5.     Active  or  Constructive  Imagination. — Definition,       .  226-227 

§  6.  Analysis  of  Constructive  Imagination.— 'i^ntural  im- 
pi;lse  or  appetence. — Law  of  native  talent  or  prefer- 
ences.— Intention. — Selective  attention. — Feeling  of 
fitness, 227-234 

§  7.  Kinds  of  Constructive  Imaglnatioti. — Finisfied  imag- 
ination.— Scientific  imagination. — Relation  of  scien- 
tific imagination  to  reality  :  scientific  hypotheses. — 
Esthetic  imagination 234-240 


xii  CONTENTS. 

PAGES 

§  8.     Relation  of  Imagination  to  Thought. — Law  of  con- 
structive imagination  :  correlation,  .         .         .  240-242 
§9.     Ideal  Product  of  the  Imagiiiatiun  :  the  Infinite,         .  242-243 

CHAPTER  XIII. 
Illusions. 

§  1.  Nature  of  Illusion. — Relation  of  illusion  to  mental 
pathology. — General  character  of  illusion. — Relation 
of  illusion  to  belief. — Representative  nature  of  illu- 
sional  states. — Illusion  due  to  interpretation,  .        .  244-249 

§  2.  Grounds  of  Illusion. — Similarity  of  presentations  and 
representations. — Absence  of  internal  stimulus. — 
Intra-organic  stimulus  :  physical  change. — Mental 
predisposition  to  illusion,         .....  249-254 

§  3.  Kinds  of  Illusion. — Illusion  proper. — Physical  aspect 
of  illusion  proper. — Elements  of  reality  in  illusion 
proper. — Hallucination, 255-259 

§  4.  Range  of  Illusion. — Illusions  of  presentation. — Illu- 
sions of  representation. — Illusions  of  thought,         .  259-265 

§  5.  Detection  and  Rectification  of  //Zi^^/oji.— Diminished 
intensity. — Absence  of  definite  locality. — Inappro- 
priate escort, 266-269 

ELABORATION. 

CHAPTER   XIV. 

Thought. 

§  1.  Nature  of  Thought. — General  character  of  the  think- 
ing process. — Stages  in  the  thinking  process,  .         .  270-272 

§  3  Conception. — Process  of  conception. — Abstraction. — 
Generalization. — Products  of  conception. — Concep- 
tion as  discovery  of  relations. — Language  in  its  re- 
lation to  conception. — The  use  of  images  in  concep- 
tion.— Relation  of  conception  to  reality  and  belief. 
— Unity  of  the  concept :  development  of  the  idea 
of  identity. — Belief  in  the  reality  of  the  concept,     .  272-283 

§  3.     Judgment. — Its  nature. — Law  of  identity. — Unity  of 

the  judgment. — Parts  of  the  proposition,         .        .  283-288 


CONTENTS.  xiii 

PAGES 

§  4.  Possible  Relations  asserted  in  Judgment :  the  Predic- 
aments.—Fsyehologicid  predicaments. — Metaphysi- 
cal predicaments, 288-291 

§  5.  Kinds  of  Judgment. — According  to  intension. — Ac- 
cording to  belief  :  categorical  judgments. — Law  of 
sufficient  reason. — Hypothetical  judgments. — Rela- 
tion of  these  forms  to  one  another,  .  .  .  292-299 
§  6.  Reasoning. — Its  nature  and  kinds. — Deduction  :  the 
syllogism. — Conceptual  interpretation  of  the  syllo- 
gism.— Meaning  of  the  premises. — Kinds  of  syllogism. 
— Value  of  the  syllogism. — Scientific  hypothesis,  .  299-307 
§  7,     Induction. — Relation  of  induction  and  deduction,      .  307-309 

§  8.     Proof, 309-310 

§  9.     Ideal  Product  of  Thought, 310 

THE   EATIONAL  FUNCTION". 

CHAPTER  XV. 

Reason. 

§  1.     Definition  :  Reason  as  Constitutive  of  Mind,     .         .  312-313 
§2.     Reason  as  Regulative  of  Mi7id,           ....  313-314 
§  3.     Reason  as  Knowledge  :  Intuition. — Intuition  as  men- 
tal act, 314-316 

§  4.     Intuition  as  Mental  Product, 316-318 

§  5.  Sphere  and  Kinds  of  Intuition. — Universal  intuition  : 
Being. — Intuitions  of  sense  :  percepts  or  cognitions. 
— Intuitions  of  intelligence  :    concepts  or  beliefs. — 

Judgments, 318-323 

§  6.     Final  Objects  of  Intuition. — Intuition  of  the  world. — 

Of  self.— Of  God, 323-325 


INTRODUCTION. 


CHAPTEE  I. 

NATURE  OF  PSYCHOLOGY. 

§  1.  Definition/ 

Subject-matter  of  Psychology : — Principal  Source.  The 
treatment  of  psychology  iu  general  may  be  either  em- 
pirical or  rational.  Approaching  it  strictly  from  the 
empirical  or  experiential  side,  we  find  it  to  be,  like  the 
physical  sciences,  a  science  of  fact.  The  one  question 
upon  which  the  justification  of  the  science  depends  is 
this:  Is  there  a  separate  order  of  mental  facts?  Ra- 
tional psychology  goes  further  in  asking :  What  is  the 
nature  of  the  principle  which  affords  a  rational  explana- 
tion of  these  facts'?  With  this  empirical  psychology 
has  nothing  to  do,  except  in  so  far  as  its  results  afford 
data  for  rational  interpretation.  Whether  mental  facts 
find  their  ultimate  basis  iu  an  independent  mental  sub- 
stance or  in  the  brain,  the  facts  and  the  science  of  the 
facts  remain  the  same.  Rational  psychology  alone,  in 
the  latter  case,  would  be  suppressed. 

The  question  of  empirical  psychology — "Is  there  an 
order  of  mental  facts  apart  from  the  phenomena  of  the 
physical  sciences  and  especially  physiology?" — is  some- 
times answered  negatively.     Psychology,  we  are  told  by 

'  On  this  chapter  and  Chapter  IT,  compare  the  excellent  treatment 
of  Rabier  in  Leroiu  de  Philosophie,  I,  Psychologie,  chap,  iii-v;  also  Bren- 
tano,  Psychologie  vom  empirischen  Standpunkte,  cap.  ii-v. 


2  NATURE  OF  PSYCHOLOGY. 

tlie  materialists,  is  properly  a  brancli  of  physiology : 
since  physiology,  as  the  science  of  the  functions  of  tlie 
bodily  organs — the  lungs  in  respiration,  the  heart  in  cir- 
culation— includes  the  function  of  the  brain,  which  is 
thought.  Psychology  thus  becomes  a  special  chapter 
in  physiology.' 

This  identification  of  mental  facts  with  organic  and 
vital  facts  is  wrong.    There  exists  between  the  two  orders 
•of  facts  a  radical  opposition  in  several  particulars. 

Distinction  between  Psychological  and  Physiological 
Facts.  The  opposition  between  these  two  classes  of  facts 
takes  several  distinct  phases.  We  may  first  consider  it 
as  an  opposition  in  the  nature  of  the  functions  of  mind 
and  body. 

I.  Relation  to  3Iovement.  The  organic  functions  are 
simply  movements  of  the  organs  of  the  body,  that  is, 
movements  of  matter  in  space.  The  functions  of  diges- 
tion and  circulation  are  the  physical  activity  of  their 
respective  organs,  and  the  science  of  such  functions  is 
nothing  more  than  the  complete  knowledge  of  these 
movements.  With  thought  or  feeling  the  case  is  very 
different.  Without  doubt  thought  has  some  of  its  con- 
ditions in  the  brain, — indeed,  to  make  the  argument 
stronger,  we  may  say  all  its  conditions,— and  yet  we  can- 
not say  that  thought  is  movement.  The  most  that  can  be 
said,  by  the  most  advanced  materialism,  is  that  thought 
is  an  efi'ect  or  result  of  cerebral  movement.  Let  the 
movement  be  what  it  may  and  let  the  mental  fact  be 
what  it  may,  there  is  nothing  in  common  between  them. 
Something  must  be  added  to  movement  to  give  it  feeling. 
The  two  classes  of  facts  could  not  be  farther  removed 
from  each  other.  Mr.  Huxley  says  -^  "  Let  us  suppose 
the  process  of  physical  analysis  pushed  so  far  that  one 

'  Comte,  Maudsley. 

'  Art.  "  Science  and  Morals,"  Fortnightly  Review,  Dec.  '86. 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  AND  PHTSIOLOOICAL  FACTS.        3 

could  view  the  last  link  of  the  chain  of  molecules,  watch 
their  movements  as  if  thej  were  billiard-balls,  weigh 
them,  measure  them,  and  know  all  that  is  physically 
knowable  about  them ;  .  .  .  we  should  be  as  far  from 
being  able  to  include  the  resulting  phenomena  of  con- 
sciousness, the  feeling  of  redness,  within  the  bounds  of 
physical  science  as  we  are  now.  It  would  remain  as  un- 
like tlie  phenomena  we  know  under  the  names  of  matter 
and  motion  as  it  is  now."  The  fullest  knowledge  of  the 
brain  would  not  lead  us  to  suspect  the  existence  of  such 
a  thing  as  thought  if  we  did  not  know  it  already  in  con- 
sciousness. If  an  animal  for  example,  says  M.  Rabier, 
experienced  sensations  quite  different  from  any  we  know, 
the  most  exact  knowledge  of  what  takes  place  in  the 
brain  of  the  animal  would  throw  no  light  upon  their 
nature  ;  just  as  full  knowledge  of  the  auditory  and  visual 
apparatus  gives  no  idea  of  sound  and  color  to  the  man 
born  deaf  or  blind. 

Consequently,  if  we  seek  for  the  exact  counterpart  in 
the  brain  of  the  movements  which  constitute  the  func- 
tions of  the  heart  and  lungs,  we  shall  iind  it  in  the  mo- 
lecular movements  of  the  cerebral  substance  and  not  in 
thought.  The  whole  circle  of  consciousness  is  an  added 
fact  to  that  of  movement. 

For  this  reason,  we  cannot  speak  of  thought  as  occu- 
pying space  or  as  having  exact  locality.  All  such  forms 
of  expression  will  be  seen  upon  examination  to  refer 
properly  to  the  physiological  accompaniment  of  thought. 
For  example,  we  speak  of  the  localization  of  speech  in 
Broca's  convolution ;  but  it  is  the  cerebral  modifica- 
tion which  accompanies  verbal  symbolism  in  thought 
that  is  there  located.  Suppose  all  o;ir  words  were  im- 
pressed upon  the  brain,  making  it,  as  some  seem  to  con- 
sider it,  a  kind  of  magazine  of  photographic  plates,  still 
the  great  mental  essential,  consciousness,  would  be  v*ant- 
ing. 


4  NATURE  OF  PSYCHOLOGY. 

II.  Relation  to  measurement:  mental  facts,  unlike 
physical  facts,  cannot  he  directly  measured.  For  the 
measurement  of  external  magnitudes  extension  affords 
us  at  once  definite  and  constant  standards ;  but  for  in- 
ternal magnitudes  we  have  no  such  exact  means  of  pro- 
cedure. The  very  fact  that  such  measurements  are 
subjective  in  their  nature  makes  them  liable  to  all  the 
uncertainties  of  subjective  estimation.  This  difficulty  is 
further  enhanced  by  the  consideration  that  the  mental 
fact  is  always  associated  with  a  physical  fact,  and  it  is 
impossible  to  isolate  the  former.  This  is  seen  in  both 
the  cases  in  which  physical  measurements  seem  to  be 
most  successful :  in  the  measurement  of  the  duration  of 
mental  acts  and  of  the  quantity  or  intensity  of  sensations. 
In  the  former  case  we  proceed  upon  the  supposition  that 
time  standards  can  be  employed  for  mind  as  space  stand- 
ards for  body :  but  the  time  occupied  by  the  cerebral 
event  is  so  interwoven  with  that  of  the  mental  that  it 
has  proved  impossible  to  separate  them.  And  as  regards 
intensities,  the  law  announced  pretends  to  give  only 
relative  measurement,  this  again  being  subject  to  revision 
when  more  is  known  of  the  relation  between  peripheral 
stimuli  and  their  central  effects.^ 

Besides  this  distinction  between  the  two  orders  of 
facts  in  their  nature,  we  find  also  another  striking  proof 
of  their  separateness. 

III.  llental  states  are  distinguished  frojn physical  states 
in  the  means  through  which  they  are  knoivn.''  As  modi- 
fications of  matter,  physical  facts  are  known  through 
the  senses.  Bodily  functions  are  thus  laid  open  to  the 
gaze  of  the  physician  and  the  anatomist.  The  brain 
itself  may  be  observed  in  its  activities  after  the  opera- 
tion of  trepanning.     But  mental  states  escape  all  such 

I  Weber's  Law.     See  Chap.  VII,  §§  5  and  6. 

*  Cf .  McCosh,  Cognitive  Powers,  I.  p.  7  ;  also  Lotze,   Metapliysic,  p. 
421. 


PSTCHOLOQICAL  AND  PHY8I0L0QICAL  FACTS.        5 

observation.  Tliey  are  known,  on  the  contrary,  in  an 
immediate  way  through  the  consciousness  of  the  individ- 
ual. And  while  we  are  able  to  observe  and  analyze  the 
physical  processes  of  others,  our  immediate  knowledge 
of  mind  is  limited  to  ourselves. 

Yet  we  cannot  say  that  all  psychological  data  are 
presented  at  once  and  immediately  known  in  conscious- 
ness ;  for  the  field  of  consciousness  is  presented  in  adult 
life  as  a  mature  and  developed  continuity.  Many  of  our 
states  of  consciousness  are  products,  not  simple  elements, 
though  consciousness  does  not  afford  us  this  informa- 
tion; and  even  when  by  analysis  the  component  elements 
are  revealed,  they  may,  in  certain  circumstances,  be  be- 
yond the  range  of  conscious  presentation.  In  the  absence 
of  attention  we  are  unconscious  of  states  which  become 
distinctly  conscious  when  attended  to.' 

IV.  The  most  essential  characteristic  of  mental  states  is 
their  subjective  naiure ;  what  we  may  call  their  inner 
aspect,  in  the  phraseology  of  late  science.  By  this  is 
meant  that  relation  to  a  self  or  subject  that  makes  them 
what  they  are  in  distinction  from  outer  phenomena, 
which,  as  far  as  we  know,  have  an  existence  apart  from 
such  a  reference.  This  distinction  is  admitted  even  by 
those  who  reduce  the  two  classes  of  phenomena  ulti- 
mately to  a  single  principle,  and  it  is  emphasized  in  the 
name  their  theory  prominently  bears.^  This  fact  of  a 
self  affected  becomes  in  developed  mental  states  a  mat- 
ter of  reflection  and  differentiation  from  the  not-self ;  a 
distinction  arising,  as  will  appear,  within  the  inner 
aspect,  and  impossible  without  such  an  essentially  sub- 
jective initiation. 

Y.  The  method  of  mental  activity  is  quite  distinct  from 
that  of  the  physical  forces.     As  we  proceed  we  shall  find 

'  See  discussion  of  the  unconscious,  Chap.  IV,  §  2,  and  Volkmann, 
Lehrbuch  der  Psychologie,  §  3. 

^  "Double  Aspect  Theory,"  Lewes,  Huxley,  Wundt. 


6  NATURE  OF  PSYCHOLOGY. 

a  constantly  recurring  fact  of  mental  synthesis  wliereby, 
by  purely  internal  activity,  the  detached  and  isolated 
states  of  consciousness  are  gathered  and  unified  in  new 
products  themselves  apparently  simple  and  original. 
In  the  physical  world  we  find  no  such  unifying  force  as 
that  known  in  psychology  as  the  activity  of  appercep- 
tion.' 

True  Relation  of  Psychology  to  Physiology.  These 
two  orders  of  facts  lead  us  to  two  distinct  sciences — • 
equally  sciences  of  fact  or  natural  sciences.  Psychology 
cannot  be  a  chapter  of  physiology  because  the  methods 
and  results  of  physiology  do  not  reach  nor  involve  sub- 
jective data.  One  is  a  subjective  science  and  the  other 
is  an  objective  science,  and  the  difference  is  strictly  ex- 
periential. 

The  absolute  separation  of  psychology  from  physi- 
ology, however,  in  point  of  matter  does  not  imply  their 
independence  of  each  other  in  point  of  fact.  They  are 
united  in  fact  by  a  bond  which  finds  analogy  only  in 
that  which  unites  the  science  of  the  inorganic,  chemis- 
try, with  that  of  life,  biology.  Life  introduces  a  new 
series  of  phenomena  into  nature,  but  the  morphological 
changes  it  produces  are  accomplished  immediately 
through  the  processes  of  inorganic  or  chemical  change. 
So  psychology,  while  introducing  a  new  order  of  phe- 
nomena, proceeds  immediately  upon  the  data  of  physio- 
logical change.  The  connection  of  the  two  is  as  real  as 
their  separation.  The  physiologist  often  finds  the  causes 
of  organic  modification  (facial  expression)  in  the  move- 
ments of  the  mind,  and  the  psychologist  likewise  finds 
causes  for  mental  modification  (sensation)  in  states  and 
functions  of  the  body. 

Further,  this  connection  between  psychology  and 
physiology  opens  up  to  us  a  means  of  approach  to  meu- 

'  See  Chap.  IV,  §  4.  On  this  coutrast,  see  Lotze,  Microcosmus,  I.  pp.. 
261-2. 


TRUE  RELATION  OF  PSTCEOLOQT  TO  PHYSIOLOGY.  7 

tal  facts  by  wliich  the  reports  of  consciousness  may  be 
confirmed  and  modified,  i.e.  experiment.  If  the  bond  and 
method  of  connection  between  body  and  mind  be  uni- 
form, artificial  conditions  and  states  of  mind  may  be 
produced  by  the  modification  of  physiological  conditions 
and  studied  with  care  and  exactness.  Sensations  of 
color,  for  examjjle,  may  be  made  the  object  of  research 
by  the  actual  production  of  these  sensations  under  arti- 
ficial circumstances.' 

While  psychology  in  its  procedure  as  a  natural  science 
may  thus  be  regarded  as  co-ordinate  with  the  other  sciences, 
yet  from  the  point  of  view  of  its  subjective  principle  it  takes 
precedence  of  them  all.  The  external  world  is  known  to  us 
only  through  our  presentations,  yet  in  natural  science  the  pres- 
entation is  not  itself  the  object  of  study,  as  in  psychology  :  it 
is  but  the  means  of  reaching  things,  and  while  the  laws  of 
psychology  are  observed,  they  may  yet  be  quite  unknown.  It 
is  the  external  cause  and  not  the  subjective  effect  which  the 
physicist  sets  before  him  as  the  object  of  pursuit.  The 
knowledge  he  arrives  at  of  these  causes  is  distinct  in  kind 
from  that  of  psychology  and  constitutes  an  independent 
order  of  science. 

The  relation  of  psychology  to  metaphysics  is  a  question 
more  widely  discussed  and  of  more  importance  in  the  light  of 
the  history  of  psychology.  If  it  be  considered  strictly  as  a 
natural  science,  it  must  bear  the  same  relation  to  meta- 
physics that  the  other  sciences  do.  Yet  its  relative  independ- 
ence is  more  to  be  emphasized  from  the  fact  that  this  position 
is  new  comparatively,  and  that  there  is  a  large  class  of  thinkers 
who  fail  to  distinguish  the  empirical  from  the  rational  treat- 
ment of  mind.  Yet  the  treatment  of  empirical  psychology  is 
often  made  exclusive  and  extreme.^  The  absolute  divorce  of 
psychology  from  metaphysics  is  impossible,  as  the  divorce  of 
physics  from  metajihysics  is  impossible.  In  the  former  case, 
as  in  the  latter,  there  are  at  least  two  necessary  presupposi- 
tions :  first,  that  there  is  an  actual  thing  called  mind,  whether 
we  regard  it  as  substantial  being  or  merely  as  the  ensemble 
of  the  inner  life.  The  natural  scientist  assumes  a  something 
called  matter  which  is  metaphysical  whether  he  adopt  the 
substantive  or  the  dynamic  theory  of  it.     Such  a  postulate 

'  For  the  consideration  of  the  physiological  method,  see  Chiip.  II. 
^  Ribot,  German  Psychology,  Introduction. 


8  NATURE  OF  PSYCHOLOGY. 

seems  necessary  to  give  unity  to  the  phenomena  nnder  inves- 
tigation and  afford  a  point  of  departure.  AVe  shall  find  in 
considering  method  that  it  is  necessary  there.'  As  the  in- 
vestigation proceeds,  its  results  give  greater  definiteness  to 
this  assumption  and  prepare  the  way  for  rational  psychology. 
And  second,  it  is  necessary  to  assume  that  mental  phenomena 
are  subject  to  law.  If  this  were  not  true  there  could  he  no 
such  science.  There  could  be  no  induction  in  mental  states 
without  the  law  of  mental  uniformity.  Like  all  the  other 
sciences,  also,  psychology  must  hand  in  its  results  to  higher 
thinking  for  the  construction  of  a  developed  world-theory.^ 

Definition  of  Psychology.  We  may,  accordingly,  de- 
fine psychology  as  the  science  of  the  plienomena  of  con- 
sciousness, being  careful  to  include  consciousness  where- 
ever  and  in  whatever  stages  it  be  found ;  or,  if  we 
emphasize,  not  so  much  the  facts  with  w^hich  we  deal, 
as  the  mode  of  our  knowledge  of  these  facts,  and  its 
entire,  separateness  from  abstract  theory,  as  tlie  science  of 
mind  as  we  know  it. 

§  2.  Difficulties  and  Errors  in  Psychology. 

It  has  already  been  said  that  consciousness  is  the 
one  characteristic  of  what  we  denominate  mental.  The 
difficulties  and  errors,  therefore,  that  arise  in  psychology 
must  be  difficulties  and  errors  either  in  the  reports  or  in 
the  interpretation  of  consciousness.  There  can  be  no 
doubt  that  there  are  such  difficulties  and  errors,  for 
otherwise  the  science  would  long  ago  have  been  com- 
pleted. They  cannot  arise  in  the  actual  reports  of  con- 
sciousness, for  by  its  intimate  nature  as  immediate 
knowledge  of  inner  states  it  reveals  what  actually  is  and 
happens.  The  question  of  the  veracity  of  consciousness, 
as  discussed  by  Hamilton,  is  the  question  as  to  whether 
the  real  state  in  consciousness  corresponds  to  a  real 

'  See  Chap.  II.  Cf.  Herbart,  Psych,  als  Wissenschaft,  ed.  Hartenstein, 
p.  264,  etc.;  also  Waitz,  LeJirhuch,  §  7. 

'^  See  the  author's  article  Postulates  of  Physiological  Psychology, 
Presbyterian  Review,  July,  '87. 


DIFFICULTIES  AND   ERRORS:  REFLECTION.  9 

state  witliout  consciousness,  otherwise  it  seems  to  have 
no  definite  meaning.  Considered,  then,  as  arising  from 
the  interpretation  or  elaboration  of  the  data  of  con- 
sciousness, several  sources  of  error  may  be  pointed  out. 

I.  Difficulty  of  distinguishing  Consciousness  from  Asso- 
ciation and  Inference.  The  primitive  data  of  conscious- 
ness are  no  longer  presented  simply  in  adult  life,  but 
carry  with  them  a  mass  of  complex  and  derived  material. 
"  Hardly  has  consciousness  spoken,"  says  Mill,  "  when 
its  testimony  is  buried  under  a  mountain  of  acquired 
notions."  The  fact  that  there  is  a  higher  and  lower  in 
the  mental  life — a  development  from  first  things — is 
sufficient  to  show  the  reason  of  this  confusion.  For 
example,  we  shall  find  in  studying  sense-perception  that 
the  localization  of  things  in  space,  which  seems  to  be  an 
immediate  act  of  consciousness,  is  really  due  to  a  very 
complicated  construction  from  physiological  data,  and 
the  general  process  of  reproduction  carries  with  it  an 
instinctive  belief  in  the  reality  of  our  images,  due  largely 
to  association,  which  leads  us  often  into  illusion.  So 
marked  do  these  difficulties  and  confusions  become  in 
the  higher  processes,  that  some  additional  safeguard 
must  be  resorted  to  :  some  method  of  reducing  complex 
mental  states  to  the  simple  data  of  consciousness.  This 
resort  is  found  in  Conscious  Reflection. 

Use  of  Reflection.  Even  though  the  necessity  spoken 
of  did  not  exist,  still  simple  consciousness,  however  abso- 
lute, would  not  be  sufficient  for  science.  Consciousness 
is  knowledge  of  present  states,  presentative  and  repre- 
sentative, and  gives  us  only  a  play  of  observed  con- 
ditions. The  scientific  observation  of  mind  demands 
more  than  this.  It  demands  the  turning  back  of  the 
powers  of  thought  and  reason  upon  our  immediate 
knowledge  for  its  examination,  testing,  systematization, 
and  rationalization.     Simple  observation  does  not  suf- 


10  NATURE  OF  PSTCEOLOOT. 

fice  for  the  science  of  physics,  nor  will  it,  for  the  same 
reason,  for  the  science  of  psychology. 

By  reflection,  therefore,  consciousness  itself  becomes 
a  matter  of  consciousness.  To  observe  consciousness  I 
must  stand  aside,  so  to  speak,  apart  from  myself  and 
report  what  takes  place  in  myself.  If  it  is  attention 
which  I  wish  to  observe,  I  must  attend  to  the  act  of 
attention,  in  order  to  describe  it.  There  is  in  such 
reflection  a  species  of  secondary  or  subordinate  con- 
sciousness, from  the  ground  of  which  we  look  in  upon 
our  primary  self.  This  apparent  doubleness,  or  the 
effort  to  place  ourselves  beyond  the  range  of  our  own 
states  in  reflection,  leads  to  new  sources  of  difiiculty. 

II.  Disturbing  E^ff^ects  of  Re/lection.  Reflection,  con- 
sidered as  the  turning  in  of  the  mental  processes  upon 
themselves,  necessarily,  by  a  great  law  of  attention,' 
exerts  a  disturbing  influence.  All  our  mental  states 
are  rendered  more  intense  by  the  attention :  conse- 
quently as  soon  as  the  state  observed  comes  within 
the  range  of  fruitful  observation,  it  is  changed,  both  in 
its  own  integrity  and  in  its  relative  importance  in  the 
mental  life.  A  pain  attended  to,  for  the  express  pur- 
pose of  estimating  its  intensity,  becomes  more  intense. 
Operations,  also,  which  demand  close  application  or 
successive  mental  efforts,  are  completely  suspended  by 
reflection.  A  difficult  logical  problem  or  musical  per- 
formance becomes  more  difficult  or  impossible  of  accom- 
plishment, when,  by  reflection,  we  note  the  stages  of  the 
process.  Mental  effectiveness  seems  to  require  a  single 
direction  of  consciousness.  On  the  other  hand,  also,  cer- 
tain states  of  mind  make  reflection  impossible,  their  tem- 
porary importance  in  consciousness  being  overpowering  : 
such  as  strong  fear,  anger,  and  the  emotions  generally. 
But  psychology,  as  a  science,  cannot  dispense  with  the 

Chap.  V,  J5  3. 


SUPPLEMENTARY  PSTCHOLOQICAL  SOURCES.        11 

complete  knowledge  of  sucli  states,  since  they  are  some- 
times most  important  and  enlightening.  Indeed  aggra- 
vated states,  especially  when  they  become  manifestations 
of  mental  disease,  are  generally  most  instructive  of  the 
normal  processes  from  which  they  rise.' 

Means  of  Remedying  these  Difficulties:  Supplementary 
Psychological  Sources.  In  view  of  these  limitations,  the 
psychologist  is  thrown  back  upon  any  other  means  he 
may  command  to  correct,  comiDlemeut,  and  enlarge  the 
scope  of  reflection.  In  general  these  supplementary 
sources  of  information  are  internal  and  external. 

I.  Infernal  Source:  Memory.  The  errors  of  inter- 
nal reflection  which  arise  from  the  deranging  efiects  of 
attention  may  be  remedied  in  large  part  by  memory. 
Mental  states  which  cannot  be  made  the  object  of  im- 
mediate examination  in  the  present,  may  be  recalled  from 
the  past  and  held  before  the  attention  as  reproduced 
images.  The  facility  with  which  the  mind  does  this  is 
quite  remarkable.  Frequently  an  experience  which  is 
obscure  or  meaningless,  an  unknown  sound,  an  unrec- 
ognized face,  a  vision,  is  thus  recalled  and  given  a 
rational  explanation.  The  psychologist  often  catches 
himself  just  emerging  from  a  state  before  unconscious, 
which,  being  brought  back  in  vivid  detail,  is  of  especial 
value  and  fruitfulness  for  his  psychological  theory. 

This  fact  of  memory  is  farther  strengthened  by  the 
phenomenon  of  after  images  or  after  sensations — traces 
left  in  the  mental  life  after  the  actual  stimuli  have 
ceased  to  act.     Of  these  we  shall  speak  more  in  detail.* 

'  On  account  of  this  disturbing  result  of  reflection,  Brentano  protests 
against  the  use  of  the  word  observation  for  the  process  of  inner  knowl- 
edge and  insists  that  it  is  only  inner  perception  which  avails  for  the 
science.  Yet  when  the  nature  of  reflection  is  considered,  it  is  really 
observation,  and  the  original  act  of  consciousness,  in  its  immediatcness, 
differs  as  much  from  perception  us  from  observation. 

•'  Chap.  VII,  §  3,  Sirjht. 


12  NATURE  OF  PSYCHOLOGY. 

Tliere  is  a  Yibratorj  persistence,  in  the  nervous  organ- 
ism, of  peripheral  shocks,  which  tends  to  continue  the 
central  process  and  its  accompanying  mental  state.  And 
the  same  residuum  or  after  effect  is  also  probably  a  men- 
tal necessity,  since  time  is  needed  for  the  shifting  move- 
ments of  attention  in  its  transition  to  new  experiences : 
during  this  period  there  is  nothing  to  drive  the  former 
experience  from  consciousness  and  it  persists  a  notice- 
able time. 

Yet  even  when  the  conditions  of  mental  observation  are 
most  favorable,  errors  are  incident  to  the  process  from  the 
necessary  artificiality  which  the  fact  of  observation  tends  to 
create.  The  absolute  unity  between  consciousness  and  its 
object  which  we  call  with  great  insight,  in  popular  language, 
unconsciousness — as  in  the  sentence,  *'  lie  is  natural  and  rm- 
conscious,"  i.e.  of  himself — is  greatly  impaired,  and  the  re- 
lation between  subject  and  object  arises.  Memory  may  be 
rendered  faulty  by  tiiis  consciousness  of  the  effort  to  remem- 
ber correctly,  or  by  the  desire  of  discovery.  Hence,  while  at 
first  psychology  seems  to  have  in  consciousness  an  extraor- 
dinary advantage  over  other  sciences,  yet  in  actual  operations 
tliis  advantage  is  found  to  be  very  small. 

II.  We  are  thus  led  to  look  without  and  inquire  what 
external  classes  of  facts  or  methods  of  treatment  may 
render  ser%dce  in  the  construction  of  psychological 
science. 

§  3.  ExTERiS^AL  Sources  axd  Aids. 

If  it  is  impossible  with  the  positi^^st  to  deny  the 
utility  of  inner  observation,  it  is  almost  equally  danger- 
ous to  depend  upon  it  exclusively.  Failure  to  resort 
unceasingly  and  repeatedly  to  external  observation  at 
every  stage  of  our  study  leads  to  the  most  chimerical 
subjective  systems  and  the  most  one-sided  views  of  life. 
So  evident  is  this  that,  even  when  most  strongly  empha- 
sizing the  inner  source  of  data,  psychologists  have 
always  laid  hold  upon  whatever  pathological  or  certi- 
fied records  of  others'  experience  they  found  available, 
and  held  them  up  as  valuable.     This  is  true  especially 


SUPPLEMENTARY  PSYCHOLOGICAL  SOURCES.        13 

of  the  Scottish  psj-chologists,  who  have  availed  them- 
selves, when  possible,  of  the  data  of  physiology. 

In  addition  to  the  points  already  mentioned  at  which 
a  resort  to  external  aids  is  seen  to  be  necessary,  several 
general  reasons  for  it  may  be  urged. 

1.  External  confirms  and  corrects  Internal  Observa- 
tion. As  has  already  been  intimated,  the  develoj^ment 
of  the  inner  life  in  its  complex  forms  gives  rise  to  varied 
mistakes  of  observation.  As  shall  appear  in  detail  in 
the  chapter  on  Illusions,'  the  great  and  often  the  only 
means  of  separating  the  true  and  false  is  by  an  ap- 
peal to  external  fact.  Reality  must  be  made  the  test 
of  truth.  In  the  minds  of  others,  in  the  products  of 
human  thought,  the  truest  psychological  realities  are 
made  known,  and  they  often  correct  the  individual  move- 
ments of  the  inner  life  and  substitute  for  them  the  uni- 
versal. The  true  scientist  in  other  departments  is  never 
satisfied  with  the  proof  of  his  discovery,  but  taxes  his 
ingenuity  to  change  the  conditions,  reverse  the  stages, 
improve  the  instruments  of  his  research  :  why  should 
the  psychologist  do  less? 

2.  Intei^nal  Observation  lacks  Generality.  The  contri- 
butions which  may  be  drawn  also  from  observations 
beyond  the  circumscribed  area  of  one's  own  conscious- 
ness give  generality  and  breadth  to  one's  interpretations 
which  they  would  otherwise  lack.  There  are  phases  of 
intellectual  life  which  are  controlling  in  one  individual 
and  almost  wanting  in  another  ;  differences  in  tempera- 
ment, taste,  and  talent,  of  wide  significance  in  the  inner 
world — differences  which  if  uncorrected  in  our  theoret- 
ical interpretations  would  make  every  man  his  own  psy- 
chologist. Environment,  race  culture,  education,  habit, 
all  are  more  or  less  individual,  and  all  of  their  variations 
must  be  included  in  our  finished  theory.     This  necessity 

1  Chap.  XIII. 


14  NATURE  OF  PSFCEOLOGT. 

for  generalizing  the  principles  of  psychology  is  one  of 
its  greatest  hindrances,  and  presents  one  of  its  profound- 
est  problems  to-day,  the  problem  of  the  psychology  of 
races. 

3.  Without  External  Observation  Psychology  ivouM  he 
entirely  Descriptive.  This  arises  from  the  fact  that  it  is 
only  after  a  comparatively  advanced  age  has  been  at- 
tained that  inner  observation  is  possible.  It  is  only 
when  the  higher  intellectual  powers  are  mature  that 
reflection  can  seize  and  rationalize  the  facts  of  experience. 
But  when  this  is  attained,  the  movements  of  the  inner 
life  have  become  so  fixed  and  regular  that  no  genetic 
explanation  of  them  Avould  be  practicable.  Conscious- 
ness could  attain  no  knowledge  of  the  rise,  growth,  and 
interaction  of  the  powers  in  childhood  if  limited  to  ob- 
servation of  itself.  This  necessity  for  early  study  is 
especially  noticeable  in  psychology  because  of  the  ex- 
ceedingly complex  and  involved  conditions  of  adult  life  ; 
for  the  nature  of  a  mental  process  or  fact  is  best  explained 
by  throwing  light  upon  its  origin.  Science  demands 
explanations,  reductions,  causes,  more  than  descriptions. 

This  danger  of  considering  the  data  of  the  developed 
consciousuess  as  the  ultimate  and  original  forms  of  mental 
activity  has  an  important  bearing  upon  the  theory  of  knov/1- 
edge  and  upon  general  philosophy.  It  results  in  the  multi- 
plication of  first  principles  and  destroys  the  best  means  of 
testing  them — an  appeal  to  the  beginnings  of  mental  life.  It 
is  no  gain  to  an  intuitive  philosophy  to  multiply  irreducible 
principles  ;  on  the  contrary,  it  is  in  the  interest  of  truth,  from 
whatever  side  we  approach  it,  to  take  account  of  the  element- 
ary processes  of  the  formation  and  development  of  our  mental 
equipment.  The  idea  of  space  is  a  good  example  of  such  a 
notion,  and  Kant's  psychological  arguments  for  its  subjective 
interpretation  illustrate  the  danger.  The  very  existence  of 
''first  principles,"  the  determination  of  the  barest  woof  and 
warp  of  thought  itself,  is  a  matter  of  origins,  as  the  evolution- 
ists claim,  and  the  problem  should  be  approached,  as  well 
from  the  side  of  infant  and  comparative  psychology,  as  from 
the  side  of  the  observation  of  developed  reiison. 


SUPPLEMENTARY  PSYCHOLOOICAL  SOURCES.       15 

Enumeration  of  Extex-nal  Sources.  The  external  means 
of  approach  to  the  human  mind  apart  from  experiment 
upon  the  body,  to  which  we  have  ah-eady  referred,  fall 
into  four  general  classes,  gi\ing  as  many  distinct  branches 
of  the  science. 

1.  Folk-Psycliology.^  This  is,  in  the  first  place,  the 
study  of  mind  in  its  products  in  society,  the  state,  relig- 
ion, customs,  and  institutions.  It  accepts  all  the  results 
of  anthropology  and  views  them  from  the  subjective 
side.  It  examines  ancient  philosophies,  cults,  and  civil- 
izations ;  literatures,  history,  laws,  mythologies,  tradi- 
tions, the  sources  from  which  the  human  mind  has  drawn 
its  culture  in  all  ages.  It  values  the  reports  of  travellers, 
in  respect  to  savages,  heathen,  and  degenerate  races ; 
the  conditions  of  social  life  everj^where.  For  in  all  these 
manifestations  of  the  life  of  the  human  mind,  we  have 
direct  information  respecting  its  nature  and  capacities.* 

2.  Animal  or  Comparative  Psychology.  As  might  be 
expected,  the  study  of  animals  is  of  extreme  imjiortance 
for  our  science  ;  for  animals  show  striking  evidences  of 
the  phenomena  of  consciousness  both  in  its  lower  and 
many  of  its  higher  forms.  It  is  perhaps  destined,  judg- 
ing from  the  contributions  it  has  already  made  to  some 
departments  of  research,  to  throw  as  much  light  ujDon 
human  psychology  as  comparative  anatomy  has  upon 
human  physiology.  As  is  the  case  with  many  physical 
functions,  so  certain  intellectual  states  are  seen  in  ani- 
mals in  a  less  developed  and  complex  state,  or  in  a  more 
sharpened  and  predominant  state,  than  in  man  ;  and  thus 
the  necessity  for  a  genetic  study  of  these  states  is  met 
to  a  greater  or  less  degree.  Instinct,  for  example,  attains 
its  most  perfect  form  in  animals,  memory  is  often  re- 


1  The  VolkerpsycJiologie  of  the  Germans. 

'  Consult  the  table  of  conteats  of  Zeitschrift  fur  VolkerpsycJiologie, 
vols.  I-III. 


16  NATURE  OF  PSTCEOLOGT. 

markably  developed,  and  certain  of  tlie  senses  sliow  a 
degree  of  acuteness  which  we  would  never  expect  the 
corresponding  human  senses  to  possess.  And  the  study 
of  animals  for  psychological  purposes  is  not  limited  to 
observation  of  their  habits,  productive  as  such  observa- 
tion is  ;  but  the  physiological  method  is  capable  of  much 
more  extended  use  than  in  experiment  upon  man.  Con- 
demned animals  may  be  directly  used  for  purposes  of 
neurological  research.  The  variety  of  problems  which 
may  thus  be  reached  is  limited  only  by  our  ability  to 
state  them  and  our  ingenuity  in  planning  the  exj^eri- 
ment.' 

3.  Infant  Psycliology.  The  importance  of  the  early 
study  of  mind  has  already  been  insisted  upon.  By  it 
mental  facts  are  reached,  as  far  as  they  ever  can  be,  at 
their  origin  and  in  their  simplest  form.  It  is  more  im- 
portant to  know  what  mind  is  than  what  it  becomes. 
The  child  serves  to  correct  the  reports  of  adult  life  by 
opening  up  object  lessons  in  the  growth  of  mind.  At  the 
outset  the  child  mind  is  lower  than  the  highest  animal 
mind,  since,  while  its  human  possibilities  have  not 
emerged,  its  instinctive  equipment  is  not  as  varied  as 
that  of  animals  :  but  in  its  raj^id  development,  it  exhib- 
its the  unfoldings  of  organic  mental  growth  in  corre- 
spondence with  the  growth  of  the  bodily  system,  an 
advantage  found  in  none  of  the  other  fields  of  observa- 
tion. 

4.  Abnormal  Psychology :  PsycMatry.  As  in  the 
former  sources  of  information  we  deal  with  mental  phy- 
siology, here  we  come  to  consider  its  Pathology  :  that 
is,  we  look  to  all  abnormal  or  diseased  conditions  of  the 
mental  life  for  light  upon  its  nature  and  upon  its  legiti- 
mate operations.  It  includes  all  cases  of  variation  from 
the   normal   and   healthy   activity  of   conscious   mind : 


'  From  both  these  standpoints,  Animal  Psychology  has  made  irreat 
advances  in  the  last  few  years:  see  references  at  the  end  of  Chap.  II. 


ADVANTAGES  OF  EXTERNAL  OBSERVATION.        17 

somnambulism,  dreams,  insanity  in  its  multiplied  forms, 
amnesia,  aphasia,  hypnotism,  idioc}',  hallucination,  dis- 
turbances of  consciousness.  All  these  variations  afford 
— as  such  variations  in  any  science  afford^ — instructive 
vieAvs  into  the  workinijj  of  mind  in  its  most  intimate  char- 
acter.  And  the  reason  for  this  is  plain.  Such  cases 
offer  immediate  occasion  for  the  application  of  the  logi- 
cal method  of  difference,  which  consists  in  removing  part 
of  a  cause  or  effect  and  observing  the  consequent  varia- 
tion in  the  corresponding  effect  or  cause.  This  proced- 
ure enables  us  to  attach  an  effect  to  its  true  cause.  One 
most  general  result  of  the  study  of  mental  disease,  for 
example,  is  this,  that  we  have  learned  to  seek  its  cause 
in  diseased  conditions  of  the  body,  rather  than  in  ob- 
scure mental  movements  or  supernatural  influences.  It 
has  been  well  said  that  a  man  deprived  of  one  of  his 
senses  from  birth  is  a  subject  especially  prepared  by 
nature  for  the  application  of  this  canon  of  induction. 
The  science  of  mental  disease  and  its  cure  is  called  Psy- 
chiatry.' 

Advantages  derived  from  External  Observation.  The 
advantages  to  be  derived  from  all  these  external  sources 
of  information  are  well  summed  up  by  M.  Kabier  as^ 
follows  :  "  1st.  The  testimony  of  consciousness  is  held 
in  control.  Consciousness,  for  example,  reveals  as  art 
essential  element  of  our  nature  certain  religious  and 
moral  feelings.  Ethnology  finds  analogous  feelings- 
among  all  peoples  in  every  degree  of  civilization.  Pre- 
historic anthropolog}^  finds  in  the  tombs  of  races  now 
disappeared,  evidence  of  similar  beliefs.  What  could 
be  stronger  or  safer  than  this  threefold  witness  ?  2d. 
We  reach  the  psychology,  not  of  an  individual  or  race, 
black,  white,  or   civilized,  but   the   psychology  of   the 

'  Work  done  in  France  and  Germany  has  been  especially  rich  in  this 
department :  for  particular  references,  see  Chap.  XIII. 


18  NATURE  OF  PSYCHOLOGY. 

Human  Species.  3d.  The  observation  of  children,  ani- 
mals, and  peoples  more  or  less  barbarous,  shows  us  the 
mind  at  its  origin  and  in  the  different  stages  of  its  de- 
velopment :  how  it  arrives,  in  its  progressive  advance,  at 
the  state  of  comparative  perfection  it  exhibits  in  civilized 
peoples  ;  and  in  what  original  principles  the  diversity 
and  complexity  which  it  hnally  shows,  take  their  rise. 
If  we  consider,  for  example,  the  language  of  the  Greeks 
in  the  age  of  Pericles,  or  that  of  France  under  Louis 
XIV.,  it  is  hard  to  believe  that  such  an  instrument  is 
not  a  divine  gift  or  a  revelation  of  natural  instinct.  But 
when  we  consider  the  stammerings  of  the  child,  the  rude 
and  changing  dialects  of  the  savage,  the  long  periods  of 
growth  which  are  necessary  to  the  development  of  lan- 
guage, we  are  more  readily  convinced  that  it  is  a  crea- 
tion of  man  and  rests  upon  the  well-known  faculties 
which  underlie  his  other  creations  in  industry,  science, 
and  art."  And  we  may  add  :  4tli.  By  the  study  of 
mental  pathology,  we  are  able  to  eliminate  the  action  of 
causes  which  are  not  mental,  and  arrive  at  a  purified 
conception  of  mind. 

§  4.  Unity  of  Psychological  Soukces  in 
Consciousness. 

Prom  the  external  standpoint,  psychology  stands 
upon  a  level  with  the  other  sciences  of  observation  :  but 
by  the  addition  of  inner  experience  it  attains  a  unity 
they  do  not  possess.  The  medium  of  all  observation  of 
nature,  consciousness,  which  is  foreign  to  the  content 
of  other  sciences  and  often  acts  as  a  hindering  cause, 
here  serves  within  the  circle  of  the  science  itself  a  use- 
ful and  important  role.  The  subjective  interj^retation 
of  facts,  called  in  science  the  "  personal  equation,"  is  in 
psychology  an  act  of  essential  value,  since  data  for  psy- 
chology can  be  systematized  only  under  the  form  of  in- 
ner modification.  In  short,  external  observation,  which 
is  necessarily  of  the  physical,  and  of  the  mental  only 


MENTAL  EXPERIENCE.  19 

through  the  physical,  must  be  translated  into  the  forms 
of  our  own  inner  life.  The  ultimate  basis,  therefore,  of 
psychological  interpretation  and  construction  is  the  men- 
tal experience  of  the  individual^  in  so  far  as  it  has  uni- 
versal meaning. 


CHAPTER  II. 

PSYCHOLOGICAL  METHOD. 

§  1.  Principles  of  Scientific  Method. 

In  GeneraL  The  question  of  method  is  an  important 
preliminary  to  all  scientific  construction.  It  involves  the 
two  great  necessities  of  procedure,  first  the  destination, 
and  second  the  road  to  the  destination.  In  the  preceding 
chapter,  in  the  consideration  of  the  subject-matter  of  Psy- 
chology, the  former  has  been  considered.  It  remains  to 
inquire  into  the  latter :  through  what  means  or  by  what 
kind  of  procedure  shall  we  investigate  the  matter  before 
us  in  order  to  reach  the  most  general  and  exhaustive  re- 
sults ? 

This  problem  is  practically  solved  for  us  in  the  method 
of  the  objective  sciences.  For  if,  as  has  been  said, 
psychology  is  a  science  of  fact,  as  they  are,  and  is  de- 
pendent on  observation  of  a  given  phenomenal  content, 
as  they  are,  then  the  tried  method  of  procedure  which 
they  employ,  will  be  most  productive  here. 

Of  the  two  great  historic  methods, Deduction  and  Induc- 
tion,' recent  investigation'^  has  shown  that  neither  alone 
is  exclusively  productive  of  great  results  in  the  way  of 
discovery  or  construction,  though  in  their  general  char- 
acteristics and  predominant  importance,  induction  may 
be  said  to  be  the  method  of  discovery  and  deduction 
the  method  of  construction.  Considering  natural  science 
under  both  these  essential  aspects,  we  may  call  its  true 
method  the  Joint  Inductive  and  Deductive  or  the  Synthetic 
method. 

'  See  their  psychological  treatment,  Chap.  XIV. 
"^  Especially  Jevons,  iu  Principles  of  Science. 

20 


PSTCHOLOQICAL  METHOD,  IN  GENERAL.  21 

The  general  cliaracteristics  and  logical  develoi^ment 
of  this  method  may  be  set  forth  in  the  three  following 
processes,  the  first  two  of  which  belong  more  properly 
to  Induction.  First,  Ohservation  ;  by  which  is  meant  the 
widest  possible  appeal  to  fact,  by  way  of  an  actual  under- 
standing of  the  cases  in  hand.  It  must  be  extended  to 
include  all  reliable  testimony.  The  broad  defining  marks 
of  the  scientific  content  become  thus  apparent  and  great 
classes  are  reached.  This  constitutes  natural  history, 
rather  than  natural  science  ;  since  its  results  are  descrip- 
tive and  not  explicative.  Second,  Experiment;  which 
consists  in  the  variation  of  the  conditions  of  phenomenal 
succession  and  the  discovery  of  essential  reasons  or 
causes.  It  j)roceeds  by  certain  subordinate  methods  or 
canons  of  its  own,  called  since  Mill  "  canons  of  induction." 
The  product  of  experimental  research  is  the  Hypothesis 
or  Empirical  Law ;  a  more  or  less  probable  conjecture, 
based  upon  the  results  of  experimentation',  as  to  the 
true  cause  operating  in  the  case  in  hand.  This  is,  in 
«o  far,  no  longer  a  description  merely,  but  an  explanation. 
Phenomena  are  referred  to  a  great  mental  principle,'  and 
are  capable  of  no  further  reduction  when  their  causes  are 
pointed  out.  The  hypothesis  goes  beyond  the  facts  it 
Tests  upon,  and  its  accuracy  must  be  tested  and  confirmed 
by  further  application  to  the  data  of  experience.  Third, 
Deduction :  which  is  the  final  stage  in  scientific  method. 
By  it,  the  truth  of  the  general  princij^le  set  forth  in  the 
liypothesis  is  made  applicable  to  successive  individual 
cases,  and  by  a  new  appeal  to  experience,  the  truth  of 
this  application  is  made  sure.  Each  such  successful 
application  tends  to  establish  the  hypothesis  more 
firmly  until  it  reaches  the  rank  of  a  principle  or  Law  of 
Nature. 

Upon  this  brief  summary  of  scientific  method  the  fol- 

'  Sufficient  Reason,  see  Chap.  XIV. 


22  PSYCHOLOGICAL  METHOD. 

lowing  remarks  may  be  made,  as  useful  to  us  in  the  ap- 
plication of  these  general  principles  of  method  to  psy- 
chology. 

1.  In  proceeding  from  a  case  of  real  discovered  causa- 
tion to  all  cases  of  the  same  kind,  past  and  future,  it  is 
assumed  that  thei'e  is  a  necessity  in  the  connection  be- 
tween cause  and  effect  in  nature ;  that  is,  there  is  a 
regularity  in  nature's  proceedings.  This  is  called  gener- 
ally the  law  of  the  Uniformity  of  Nature. 

2.  It  is  to  be  noted  that  no  confirmation  is  possible  to 
an  empirical  law  or  hypothesis  except  by  a  direct  appeal 
to  nature  to  establish  the  truth  of  our  deductive  infer- 
ence ;  that  is,  the  last  as  well  as  the  first  appeal  is  to 
observed  fact. 

§  2.  AppLiCATioif  OF  Scientific  Method  to  Psychology. 

The  application  of  the  principles  of  Method  just  men- 
tioned to  Psychology  is,  in  the  main,  clear  :  yet  many 
questions  of  lively  debate  arise  in  consistently  carrying 
them  out.  The  two  great  spheres  of  their  operation  are 
the  two  sources  of  psychological  data,  internal  and  ex- 
ternal observation. 

Psychological  Observation.  I.  Internal.  The  neces- 
sity of  internal  observation  has  already  been  spoken  of. 
It  is  apjDroached  in  this  connection  from  the  standpoint 
of  psychological  method.  As  a  means  of  access  to  the 
phenomena  of  mind  we  find  it  available  in  three  distinct 
ways.  In  the  first  place,  the  simple  fact  of  Consciousness ^ 
that  inner  aspect  which  makes  mental  facts  what  they 
are,  in  its  primitive  form,  is  at  once  awareness  of  the 
states  of  self.  However  vague  and  indefinite  this  j^rimi- 
tive  presentation  is  at  first,  it  is  still  a  beginning.  No 
experience  in  conscious  life  leaves  absolutely  no  trace  of 
itself  in  the  continuity  in  which  it  was  mentally  present. 
It  is  recognized  as  an  experience  of  one's  self,  a  modifi- 


PSTCHOLOGICAL  OBSERVATION.  23 

cation  of  one's  own  subjectivity,  and  so  gives  ground  for 
the  developed  act  of  inner  observation.  The  first  fleet- 
ing sensations  of  the  child,  when  there  is  no  subject  or 
object,  no  store  of  memory  images,  no  idea  of  self,  ex- 
hibit in  isolation  the  kind  of  primitive  consciousness  that 
lies  at  the  basis  of  all  knowledge  of  self.  In  adult  life 
these  experiences  are  at  once  assimilated  to  the  developed 
forms  of  intellect  and  their  separate  meaning  is  lost. 
But  in  this  category  are  included  the  vast  number  of 
first  experiences  as  they  pass  steadily  on  in  time,  some- 
thing every  moment,  and  all  the  information  we  glean 
from  them  before  we  recall,  examine,  and  reflect  upon 
them.  Second,  internal  observation  takes  the  form  of 
Memory,  that  is,  unconscious  and  involuntary  memory. 
The  immediate  past,  as  has  been  said,  hangs  around  us  as 
a  line  of  trailing  cloud  on  the  horizon  of  consciousness. 
So  speedy  and  involuntary  is  this  presence  of  the  shortly- 
past  that  it  is  sometimes  held  to  be  the  first  stage  of  our 
inner  observation :'  yet  this  cannot  be  held  in  the  sense 
of  denying  the  immediate  awareness  of  the  primitive 
consciousness.''  For  example  a  loud  noise,  or  a  spoken 
word,  is  unintelligible  until  its  quick  recall  enables  us 
to  recognize  it.  We  had  the  "  immediate  awareness  "  of 
the  first  affection,  but  the  examination  of  the  revived 
image  added  much  to  the  scientific  value  of  the  ex- 
perience. This  instantaneous  act  of  memory  is  to  be 
distinguished  from  the  conscious  voluntary  memory 
spoken  of  as  a  corrective  of  reflection.  Third,  we  reach 
Reflection,  or  rational  observation.  By  reflection  is 
meant  the  direct  exercise  of  self-consciousness'  in 
the  interpretation  of  the  events  of  the  inner  world  in 

'  Sully. 

^  Brentano's  distinction  between  perception  and  observation  may  per- 
haps apply  respectively  to  these  two  stages :  all  that  is  not  strictly  im- 
mediate being  observation. 

3  See  Chap.  VIII,  §  7. 


'24  PSYCHO  LOGICAL  METHOD. 

the  liglit  of  the  rehition  of  subject  and  object.  •  It  is  the 
highest  form  of  internal  observation.  It  brings  to  bear 
upon  the  isolated  data  of  the  mind,  the  logical  powers  of 
conception,  generalization,  and  judgment,  and  we  pass 
from  a  multitude  of  details  in  present  consciousness  or 
memory,  to  a  class  concept,  law  of  succession,  or  princi- 
ple of  association.  That  is.  Reflection  is  the  rationaliz- 
ing of  inner  experience  in  the  forms  of  hypothesis, 
which  constitutes  the  second  stage  of  the  finished  scheme 
of  method. 

II.  External  Observation.  Under  the  method  of  ex- 
ternal observation,  it  will  be  at  once  seen,  must  be  ap- 
]3roached  the  various  external  sources  of  psychological 
data  mentioned  in  the  last  chapter.  The  closed  nature 
of  the  individual  consciousness  makes  it  impossible  that 
the  consciousness  of  others  should  be  reached  except 
through  the  interpreted  meaning  of  external  signs.  All 
the  products  of  human  genius  and  culture  become  thus 
the  objects  of  observation,  Avith  a  view  to  arranging  the 
detached  parts  of  truth  thus  discovered  under  the  com- 
mon rubrics  of  our  individual  experience.  So  also,  the 
observation  of  children  and  animals  brings  its  rich  con- 
tribution. In  psychology,  this  external  observation  is 
analogous  to  testimony  in  physical  science. 

By  simjDle  observation,  however,  in  psychology  more 
than  in  the  material  sciences,  we  do  not  reach  below  the 
surface  of  mental  things.  Many  claim  that  this  is  all 
that  we  can  do,  and  that  a  description  of  mental  facts  is 
the  true  aim  of  the  science.  Yet,  as  rare  as  true  descrip- 
tion is  in  this  field,  and  as  broad  a  field  for  analysis  as 
simple  observation  aflbrds,  we  find  ourselves  asking :  Is 
there  no  means  of  breaking  the  complex  groups  of  mental 
states,  of  detaching  individual  mental  movements  from 
the  enormous  mass  of  interwoven  threads  which  our  adult 
thought  presents  ?  In  short,  is  there  no  field  for  experi- 
ment, either  internal  or  external,  in  psychology  ?      We 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  EXPERIMENT.  25 

answer,  as  recent  research   is   answering,  that   there  is, 
"but  with  important  conditions  and  qualifications. 

§  3.    EXPEKIMENT    IN    PSYCnOLOGY. 

The  need  of  experiment  in  psychology  is  exceedingly 
great.  When  we  remember  that  in  the  search  for  causes 
in  the  natural  Avorld,  the  difficulties  are  vastly  enhanced, 
by  the  concourse  of  causes,  and  that  it  is  the  function  of 
experiment  so  to  eliminate  elements  in  the  causal  com- 
plex, that  isolated  agencies  may  be  observed  at  work ; 
and  when  we  further  reflect  that  no  single  function  of 
mind  is  ever  found  operating  alone,  but  that  all  accom- 
pany and  modify  each, — the  futility  of  simple  observation 
in  this  field  becomes  apparent.  A  sense  stimulation,  for 
example,  may  arouse  an  intellectual  train,  an  emotional 
outburst,  a  course  of  action  :  are  all  these  the  efiects  of  a 
single  cause  ?  A  course  of  action,  conversely,  may  result 
from  an  emotion,  a  thought,  a  memory,  an  association,  a 
sensation,  an  aspiration  :  can  the  simple  description  of 
the  resulting  action  indicate  which  is  its  cause  ?  Ante- 
cedents and  consequents  are  thrown  into  the  mental 
life  in  inextricable  confusion.  External  or  bodily  causes, 
an  odor,  a  spoken  word,  a  pain,  an  internal  organic  move- 
ment, may  start  a  train.  This  train  may  be  hindered  or 
advanced  by  a  thousand  considerations  or  emotions  ; 
other  bodily  or  mental  causes  may  modify  it.  And  all 
together  make  up  the  cause  or  complex  antecedent  state  ; 
Avhile  vague  analogies  of  thought  and  feeling,  such  as 
temperament,  heredity,  education,  make  variations  be- 
tween individuals,  and  the  present  condition  of  the  brain 
and  nerve  centres  makes  variations  in  the  same  individ- 
ual. How  can  we  single  out  the  cause,  in  this  net- 
work, by  observation  ?  It  is  as  vain  as  to  endeavor  to 
discover  the  cause  of  a  conflagration  from  examining 
the  blaze  :  was  it  a  match,  lightning,  friction,  chemical 


26  PSYCEOLOQICAL  METHOD. 

composition  ?  Only  one  step  can  determine  :  the  recon- 
struction, under  artificial  circumstances,  of  the  con- 
ditions, and  the  exhibition  of  a  single  isolated  cause. 
This  is  experiment.  "VVe  may  look  at  the  case,  as  before, 
from  the  points  of  view  of  the  internal  and  external  ap- 
proach to  mind. 

I.  Internal  Experiment.  The  range  of  internal  experi- 
ment is  very  contracted,  from  the  fact  that  it  is  hard  to 
induce  artificial  states  of  mind  entirely  from  within.  Yet 
we  can  often  suggest  things  to  ourselves  that  change  the 
course  of  our  thought  and  give  us  a  plainly  isolated 
effect.  We  can  force  ourselves  into  lines  of  thought  or 
emotion  by  holding  given  images  fixedly  before  the 
mind — such  as  a  shocking  murder  or  the  death  of  a  close 
friend, — and  watch  the  result  in  the  flow  of  emotion. 
On  a  larger  scale  one  can  subject  himself  to  a  series  of  in- 
tellectual influences  and  note  the  change  it  works  in  his 
habits  of  thought  and  feeling.  The  actor  has  thus  con- 
stantly to  experiment  with  his  emotional  states,  cultivat- 
ing those  which  adequately  portray  the  character  he 
represents.  All  such  intentional  manipulation  of  con- 
sciousness, however,  demands  a  high  degree  of  mental 
control  and  concentration,  great  delicacy  of  observation, 
and  fidelity  of  description,  to  be  of  use  for  the  general 
science. 

Experiment  of  this  kind,  however,  is  more  efi'ective 
upon  others  than  upon  ourselves.  The  whole  possi- 
bility of  suggestion  to  others  is  here  open  to  our  touch, 
and  we  may  plaj^  upon  their  emotions,  hopes,  ambitions^ 
plans,  ideas,  as  upon  the  keyboard  of  an  instrument. 
AVe  are  all  more  or  less  skilled  in  such  experiment :  we 
suit  our  advice  to  the  man — off'ering  a  money  induce- 
ment to  one,  a  position  of  honor  to  another.  So  educa- 
tional methods  proceed  upon  experimental  knowledge 
of  others :  the  awarding  of  prizes,  the  use  of  object 
lessons,  appeals  to  individual  manliness,  corporeal  pun- 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  EXPERIMENT.  2'/ 

isliment ;  indeed  all  discrimiuation  iu  the  treatment  of 
children  proceeds  upon  such  exjDerimental  knowledge. 
In  the  hypnotic  state,  an  unlimited  range  of  suggestion 
is  open  to  the  investigator,  and  in  sleep  the  same  kind  of 
influence  is  possible  to  a  much  more  limited  degree. 

II.  External  Experiment.  The  possibility  just  spoken 
of,  of  finding  that  a  bodily  or  external  cause  has  been  the 
determiuing  factor  in  a  mental  result,  opens  up  to  our 
view  the  sphere  of  external  experiment.  We  are  at  once 
led  to  see  that  a  series  of  experiments  upon  the  body 
may  be  devised  and  the  results  ascertained  which  follow 
in  the  conscious  life :  that  is,  reversing  the  relation 
of  cause  and  effect  which  ordinarily  obtains,  we  may 
consider  bodily  modifications  cause  and  their  accom- 
panying mental  modifications  effects,  thus  isolating 
mental  facts  through  artificial  and  single  physiological 
stimuli. 

That  such  a  procedure  is  justified  is  seen  from  the 
fact  that  our  daily  lives  are  full  of  inferences  of  this  kind. 
The  connection  between  the  physical  and  the  mental  is 
so  close  and  unquestioned  that  Ave  never  fail  to  take  it 
into  account.  Many  states  of  mind  are  treated  as  arising 
directly  from  states  of  the  body.  The  whole  treatment 
of  mental  disease  proceeds  upon  this  basis ;  and  sen- 
sations, the  material  of  knowledge,  are  known  to  arise 
from  direct  sense  stimulation.  The  effects  of  alcoholic 
stimulants  upon  the  mind  are  plain.  The  elevation, 
however,  of  this  rough  sense  of  connection  between  mind 
and  body  into  a  law  of  scientific  method  involves  the 
assumptions  which  we  have  found  necessary  to  the  true 
method  in  natural  science,  but  which,  when  stated  in  their 
generality,  seem  more  questionable  here.  The  rapid 
growth  of  physiological  psychology,  however,  which  is 
simply  "  psychology  approached  from  a  physiological 
(external  experimental)  point  of  view,"  '  has  given  them 


28  PSTCEOLOOICAL  METHOD. 

full  confirmation.      They  may  be  stated  in   the  follow- 
ing propositions  : 

1.  The  connection  betiveen  body  and  mind  rmist  he  a  con- 
stant and  uniform  one  ;  that  is,  there  is  a  uniform  psycho- 
physical connection.  The  necessity  for  this  assumption  is 
the  same  as  for  that  of  the  uniformity  of  nature  in  general 
induction.  If  the  connection  is  not  uniform,  all  obser- 
vation and  experiment  based  upon  bodily  states  are 
alike  vain.  If,  for  example,  in  one  individual  or  at  one 
time,  loss  of  memory  be  due  to  brain  lesion  and  in 
another  individual  or  at  another  time,  such  lesion  do 
not  produce  loss  of  memory,  our  method  has  given  us 
no  generality  of  result,  and  is  useless,  both  theoretically 
and  practically. 

2.  It  must  further  he  assumed  that,  in  thus  admitting  the 
method  of  experiment,  its  results  are  to  he  tested  only  hy  ex- 
perience itself.  This  was  remarked  above  upon  general 
induction  in  the  external  sciences,  and  it  must  be  insisted 
upon  as  strenuously  here.  It  will  not  do  to  admit  ex- 
periment only  so  far  as  it  tends  to  give  experimental  con- 
firmation to  our  earlier  theories  of  the  inner  life,  or  so 
far  as  the  generalizations  of  experiment  can  be  d  priori 
rendered  probable  ;  but  its  iitterances  must  be  treated 
rigidly  as  scientific  h3'potlieses  and  confirmed  by  the  test- 
ing of  fact  in  the  psychoph^'sical  domain.  As  illustrating 
both  these  dangers,  the  doctrine  of  free-will  has  been 
used,  first,  to  discourage  and  to  disj^rove  the  validity  of 
this  method  altogether,  on  the  suj^position  that  the  will 
is  a  factor  beyond  calculation  in  the  psychophysical  con- 
nection ;  and  second,  the  same  free-will  has  been  used 
to  confirm  the  experimental  hypothesis  of  nervous  in- 
hibition.' The  phenomena  of  free-will  are  certainly  ex- 
periential and  valid,  bvit  our  preconcejjtions  as  to  their 


'  Beaunis;  see  the  author's  article,  Contemp.  PMlos,  in  France  (edi- 
torial) in  Xcw  Princeton  Review,  Jan.  '87,  p.  141. 


LIMITATIONS  OF  THE  EXPERIMENTAL  METHOD.    29 

value  in  the  physical  world  should  not  be  intruded  on 
one  side  or  the  other. 

Limitations  of  the  Experimental  Method.*  While  thus 
admitting  the  validity  of  experiment  in  psychology,  we 
find  it  necessary  to  set  forth  its  limits  in  a  very  unmis- 
takable way.  Its  value  consists  in  its  being,  as  has  been 
said,  the  means  of  separating  between  physical  and 
mental  causes  in  complex  internal  effects  ;  and  in  this 
very  service  its  limitations  are  seen. 

1.  The  impossibility  of  experimental  approach  to  the 
higher  poivers.  In  actual  fact  the  range  of  experiment 
has  been  very  contracted.  The  most  definite  results 
have  been  obtained  in  dealing  with  the  sense-function 
of  mind,  since  there  the  direct  physical  avenue  of  connec- 
tion with  the  mind's  states  is  knoAvn.  In  general  terms, 
it  is  only  where  the  mental  states  can  be  shown  to  have 
an  immediate  dependence  upon  the  nervous  system  that 
experiment  can  do  service.  The  higher  processes,  those 
which  constitute  the  rational,  emotional,  volitional  life, 
the  synthetic  activities  of  apperception  even  in  their 
direct  operation  upon  the  data  of  sense,  have  been 
approached  only  in  a  way  so  conjectural  as  to  carry  no 
scientific  weight.  This  is  admitted  by  the  most  extreme 
partisans  of  the  physiological  method.^  Even  the  repre^ 
sentative  operations,  which  are  removed  only  one  step 
from  the  sense-function,  exhibit  the  greatest  difficulties, 
for  theories  of  their  physical  basis,  which  must  pre- 
cede the  application  of  this  method,  are  still  quite 
hypothetical. 

Again,  the  possibility  of  approach  to  the  higher  op- 
erations rests  upon  the  assumption  that  all  mental  pro- 

'  See  Dr.  McCosh's  statement  of  these  liraitatious  in  bis  preface  to 
Ribot's  Oerman  Psychology  of  To-day. 

"^  "In  all  tbat  concerns  these  phenomena  (the  higher)  experimental 
research  is  necessarily  useless." — Ribot,  Ibid.,  Introduction. 


30  PSTCHOLOGICAL  METHOD. 

cesses  have  a  definite  phj^siological  basis  ;  a  proposition 
wliicli  is  presumably  true,  but  which  cannot  be  proved, 
at  least  until  the  resources  of  physiology  are  much  more 
extended  than  they  now  are.  In  the  words  of  Mill, 
"  To  reject  the  resource  of  psychological  analysis  and 
construct  the  theory  of  the  mind  solely  on  such  data  as 
physiology  at  present  affords,  seems  to  me  an  error  in 
princijDle  and  an  even  more  serious  one  in  practice. 
Imperfect  as  is  the  science  of  the  mind,  I  do  not  scruple 
to  affirm  that  it  is  in  a  considerably  more  advanced 
state  than  the  portion  of  physiology  that  corresponds 
to  it :  and  to  discard  the  former  for  the  latter  appears 
to  me  an  infringement  of  the  true  canons  of  inductive 
philosophy,  which  must  produce,  and  which  does  pro- 
duce, erroneous  conclusions." ' 

2.  Many  of  the  positive  results  of  this  method  are  subject 
to  criticism  from  the  standpoint  of  exact  method.  The  varia- 
tions due  to  individual  differences,  to  lack  of  delicacy  in 
apparatus,  to  the  abnormal  mental  condition  into  which 
the  very  fact  of  experiment  usually  throws  the  subject, 
the  repressing  and  exaggerating  effects  of  self-observa- 
tion already  spoken  of, — all  these  limitations  tend  to  give 
the  results,  especially  of  experiment  on  the  intensity  and 
duration  of  sensation,'  only  an  average  and  tentative 
value. 

3.  The  greatest  limitation,  hoivever,  to  the  method  of 
external  experiment  is  its  necessary  subordination  to  the 
results  of  internal  observation.  The  physiological  ap- 
proach to  mind  is  a  consequence  of  the  preceding  exami- 
nation of  mind  from  pure  observation,  and  the  attempt 
to  usurp  the  place  of  consciousness  is  suicidal  and  ab- 
surd. And  this  for  two  reasons.  First,  observation 
through  consciousness  is  direct  and  immediate  ;  external 
experiment  is  indirect  and   mediated  through  the  ner- 

'  Logic,  Book  VI,  chap,  iv,  §  2.  '  See  Chap.  VII. 


LIMITATIONS  OF  THE  EXPERIMENTAL  METHOD.    31 

Tous  system.  Second,  external  experiment  assumes 
ilirect  observation  in  arriving  at  its  results ;  for  if  the 
organic  as  cause  gives  the  mental  as  effect,  this  effect 
can  only  be  estimated  from  within,  through  observation. 
Consequent]}-  any  attempt  to  elevate  experiment  to  the 
exclusive  claim  of  pyschological  method  must  end  in  the 
subversion  of  the  science  altogether  ;  that  is,  it  becomes 
a  chapter  of  physiology.  The  question,  says  Maudsley, 
"is  not  a  question  of  psychological  or  physiological 
method,  but  of  the  existence  of  the  science  itself." 

It  is  necessary  that  the  function  of  experiment,  and  in  gen- 
eral of  the  physiological  method,  should  be  clearly  defined  since 
there  is  a  tendency,  born  of  novelty  and  of  the  great  advance 
lately  achieved  through  this  positive  attitude,  to  the  depre- 
ciation of  the  introspective  study  which  must  precede  and 
condition  it  all.  The  greater  portion  incomparably  of  mental 
phenomena  can  only  be  approached  by  the  methods  of  the 
old  psychology,  and  in  no  case  has  experiment  contradicted 
its  established  principles.  Tlie  relation  of  physiological  psy- 
chology to  the  general  study  of  mind  is  shown  in  the  following 
diagram : 

Psychology 


Empirical  (Inductive)  Rational  (Deductive) 


Descriptive  (Analytic)       Experimental 


I  I  I  I 

Internal    External    External    Internal 


Cause  to  effect 


Cause  to  elfect 


Hypnotism 
Dreams 
I  Insanity 

Physiological  Mental  Pathology,  etc. 


Keuro-psychology  Psychophysics  Psychometry 

§  4.  Psychological  Hypotheses. 

By  the  procedure  already  described,  psychological 
hypotheses  are  reached  which  sum  up  the  results  gath- 
ered from  experience.     The  process  of  passing  from  in- 


32 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  METHOD. 


dividuals  and  tlieir  relations  of  cause  and  eifect,  to  tlieir 
generalized  principles,  is  the  rational  aspect  of  induction. 
Tliese  principles  are  stated  in  general  form  and  tlien 
applied  to  further  experiences  for  confirmation.  This 
process  is  very  difficult  in  psychology,  indeed  we  may 
say  that  most  mental  laws  are  no  more  than  statements 
of  empirical  generalization,  which  owe  their  probability 
to  wide  experience.'  This  is  due  to  the  unheard-of 
complexity  of  mental  states  and  the  futility  of  observa- 
tion and  subjective  analysis  in  breaking  them  up. 

Hence  it  follows  that  where  physiological  ex2)eriment 
is  able  to  penetrate  and  establish  a  causal  ground  for 
mental  phenomena,  in  this  explanation  of  mental  facts 
we  reach  confirmation  of  our  empirical  laws.  Here  the 
experimental  metliod  renders  very  great  service.  For 
example,  what  could  more  perfectly  establish  the  princi- 
ple that  some  mental  processes  require  a  certain  amount 
of  time,  than  the  fact  that  the  physiological  processes 
which  they  invariably  accompany  require  time  ?  Or 
what  could  more  perfectly  confirm  the  hypothesis  that 
mental  diseases  arise  from  physical  causes,  than  the  dis- 
covery of  certain  well-marked  disorders  of  the  brain  in 
each  case  of  a  peculiar  mental  disease  ?  For  this  reason, 
as  Brentano  remarks,  any  treatment  of  psychology  which 
does  not  include  its  physiological  bearings  is  wanting 
in  the  most  important  means  of  confirming  and  extend- 
ing its  laws. 

The  ultimate  laws  of  psychology  must,  therefore,  find  their 
completion  in  tlie  psychophysical  connection,  since  a  complete 
explanation  of  a  phenomenon  must  include  its  cause  and  essen- 
tial conditions.  This  being  true,  and  the  law  of  conservation 
of  energy  holding  in  brain  activities,  we  are  led  to  the  high 
probability  that  all  mental  acts  have  a  physical  basis.  The 
purely  mental  in  consciousness  is  therefore  psychoj)hysical  in 
fact,  and  the  subjective  law  of  such  phenomena  must  yield  in 
generality  to  the  psychophysical  laws  which  include  all  mental 

'  Cf.  Bain,  Logic,  p.  514. 


GENERAL  CONCLUSION.  38 

phenomena  in  fact.  With  any  other  supposition,  we  destroy 
the  unity  of  mind,  since,  with  the  lower  operations  governed 
by  laws  of  mind  and  body  in  their  relation,  and  the  higher 
by  laws  of  mind  without  relation  to  body,  how  could  the  two 
systems  of  laws  be  held  in  harmony  ?  Wundt,  for  example, 
forfeits  unity  in  the  mental  life  and  finds  three  problems  on 
his  hands  instead  of  one  :  first,  to  account  for  the  purely 
mental ;  second,  to  account  for  the  psychophysical ;  and  third, 
to  account  for  this  duality.  Assuming  the  universal  physi- 
cal basis  to  all  mental  acts,  we  have  only  the  duality  of  mind 
and  not-mind. 

General  Conclusion.  We  are  thus  led  to  the  following 
general  conclusion  as  to  the  nature  and  method  of  psy- 
chological inquiry :  There  is,  first  of  all,  in  conscious- 
ness a  free  intelligent  activity  which  affords  at  once  the 
necessity  a^nd  justification  of  a  higher  science,  which  is 
inductive,  internal,  descriptive,  and  analytic ;  that  its 
method  is  that  of  direct  observation  ;  and  that  inasmuch 
as  the  phenomena  of  which  it  is  cognizant  are  purely 
mental  it  must  precede  and  embrace  those  branches  of 
the  science  which  deal  with  the  phenomena  of  body. 
Second,  these  mental  phenomena  sustain  an  universal  and 
uniform  connection  with  the  bodily  organism,  through 
which  physiological  experiment  becomes  possible,  carry- 
ing with  it  a  twofold  utility :  the  causal  analysis  of 
phenomena  and  the  confirmation  of  their  empirical  gen- 
eralizations. And  third,  the  science  can  never  reach 
completion  or  its  laws  reach  their  widest  generalitj'  until 
all  mental  facts  are  interpreted  in  the  light  of  this  con- 
nection with  body  or  shown  to  be  independent  of  it. 

On  the  nature  and  method  of  psychology,  consult  :  in  general, 
Volkmann,  Lehrbuch  der  Psychologies  Einleitung  ;  AVaitz,  Lehr- 
buch  d.  Psychologic,  |^  1-3  ;  Drobisch,  Empirische  Psychologic, 
Einleitung  ;  Maudsley,  Physiology  of  Mind,  eh.  I ;  Hickok,  Mental 
Science,  pp.  1-61  ;  Lewes,  Study  of  Psycliology,  ch.  I,  v,  and  vi ; 
Hamilton,  Mttap]tysi<%s,  Lect.  VIII-IX  ;  Thompson,  System  of  Psy- 
chology, pp.  74-89  ;  Fortlage,  System  der  Psychologie,  §  2  ;  Porter, 
Human  Ldellect,  pp.  5-29  and  51-61  ;  Rosmini,  Psychologie,  pt.  1, 
ch.  I ;  Brentano,  Psychologie,  pp.  1-100  ;  (Observation)  Beaussire, 
Revue  Philosophique,  xx.  p.  580  ;  Bailey,  Letters  on  the  PJii!>'S.  of  the. 


34  PSYCHOLOGICAL  METHOD. 

Human  Ilind,  li-v  ;  Jouffroy,  Nouveaux  Melanges,  pp.  223-279  ; 
Boaillier,  Lepiincipe  vitale,  ch.  xxv ;  Enctjc.  Britann.,  Qih.  ed., 
arts.  Metaphysics,  PTdlosopluj. 

On  the  relation  of  mind  and  body :  Carpenter,  Mental  Physi- 
ology, ch.  i-ii  ;  Brentano,  Psychologie,  pp.  100-130  ;  Ladd,  Physi- 
olog.  Psychology,  pp.  633-667;  Taine,  Intelligence,  pt.  1,  bk.  4; 
Volkmann,  loc.  cit.  jj  14-16  ;  Waitz,  Grundlegung  der  Psychologie, 
p.  100;  Maudsley,  loc.  cit.  ch.  ii ;  Groom  Robertson,  Mind,  in.  p.  24  ; 
Lotze,  Microcosmns,  bk.  3,  ch.  i-iii. 

On  child  psychology :  Perez,  First  Three  Years  of  Cliildhood, 
and  Child  from  Three  to  Seven  Years ;  Prayer,  The  Ilind  of  the 
Child;  Darwin,  Mind,  ii.  285;  Kussmaul,  Untersuchungen  iiber 
das  Seelenleben  des  neugebornen  Menschen. 

On  animal  psychology :  Romanes,  Mental  Evolution  in  Ani- 
mals, and  Animal  Intelligence  ;  Espinas,  Animal  Societies  ;  Lindsey, 
Mind  in  the  Lower  Animals  ;  Vignoli,  Saggio  di  psicologia  coni- 
parata  ;Wedtz,  Grundleguny  der  Psychologie,  pp.  139-201  ;  Lewes, 
Problems,  3d  series,  p.  118;  Lubbock,  Ants,  Bees,  and  Wasps; 
Schneider,  TJiierische  Wille ;  Perty,  Revue  Philosojyhiciue  ;  Wundt, 
Essays,  vii  ;  Rabier,  ch.  xlviii  ;  Perty,  Die  Seelenlehre  der  Thiere ; 
Lotze,  Microcosintis,  i.  pp.  556-561. 

On  race  psychology :  Zeitschrift  fitr  Volkerpsychologie  (through- 
out) ;  Ribot,  German.  PsycJiology,  ch.  in ;  Spencer,  Descriptive 
Sociology  ;  Waitz,  Ifuturvolker  ;  Bastmn,  Menscli  in  der  Geschichte  ; 
Mill,  Logic,  bk.  4,  ch.  v  ;  Lazarus,  Das  Leben  der  Seele,  v.  567 ; 
Maine,  Village  CommunitieJi,  and  Early  History  of  Institutions. 

Histories  of]}sychology  are  :   Siebeck,  Geschichte  der  Psychologie 
(incomplete) ;    Harms,  Geschichte  der  Psychologie  ;  Hamilton,  His- 
torical Notes  on  Reid  (in  edition  of  Reid's  works)  ;  Volkmann,  loc 
cit.,  historical   notes  throughout  ;   Ribot,  English  Psychology,  and 
German  Psychology  of  To  day. 


CHAPTEE  III. 

CLASSIFICATION  AND  DIVISION. 

§  1.  Three  Geeat  Classes. 

Besides  their  common  cliaracteristic,  consciousness, 
mental  facts  have  special  characteristics  which  distin- 
guish them  from  one  another  and  by  which  they  may  be 
divided  into  great  classes.  The  necessity  of  this  classi- 
fication is  seen  in  the  great  multiplicity  and  variety  of 
these  facts.  In  the  beginning  of  every  science,  the  state- 
ment is  necessary  of  the  natural  knowledge  of  resem- 
blances and  differences,  which  we  may  use  as  a  starting 
point  for  investigation.  In  this  classification,  two  great 
dangers  are  to  be  avoided.  First,  many  psychologists, 
neglecting  real  resemblances,  have  made  too  many  divi- 
sions or  faculties,  in  a  measure  dividing  the  mind  into 
independent  principalities  and  losing  sight  of  the  unity 
of  nature  which  underlies  all  phenomena  of  mind.' 
Again,  others  go  to  the  other  extreme  in  excessive  oppo- 
sition to  the  "  faculty  theory,"  especially  in  recent  years, 
and  fail  to  recognize  essential  differences  in  mental 
states.' 

In  the  main,  however,  it  is  agreed  that  there  are  three 
great  classes  of  facts  in  the  mental  life,  however  strongly 


'  Reid,  Stewart,  Jouffroy. 

*  Herbart,  Ribot.  The  word  faculty  seems  to  carry  a  somewhat 
metaphysical  meaning,  as  involving  the  cause  rather  than  the  simple 
class;  properly  restricted,  it  is  synonymous  -with,  function. 

35 


36  CLASSIFICATION  AND  DIVISION 

tlie  attempt  to  reduce  tliem  further  may  be  urged.  Tliese 
three  classes  express  the  result  of  three  (Xi^imci functions 
of  the  mind :  Intellect,  Feeling,  and  Will.  They  may  be 
called:  1st,  Representative,  or  intellectual  states;  2d, 
Affective,  or  states  of  feeling  ;  and  3d,  Volitional,  or  states 
of  will.  These  great  departments  of  mental  fact  are 
shown  in  the  very  distinct  propositions,  "I  feel  some- 
how," "I  know  something,"  "I  do  something."' 

§  2.  Justification  of  this  Classification-. 

I.  In  Experience  it  is  complete.  The  grounds  of  this 
classification  are  found  in  immediate  consciousness,  and 
it  can  find  its  justification  only  in  an  appeal  to  direct 
experience.  The  representative  states  have  as  their 
common  characteristic  their  reference  to  a  thing  or  ob- 
ject. Knowledge  is  a  function  of  mind  only  as  there  is 
some  thing  to  be  known,  and  in  the  higher  forms  of  its 
operation  its  states  are  taken  to  represent  or  signify 
objects.  In  its  earliest  beginnings  also,  in  sensation, 
the  objective  bearing  of  knowledge,  as  affording  us  a 
reference  away  from  ourselves  to  a  something  which 
is  presented  to  consciousness,  is  its  distinguishing 
feature. 

The  affective  states,  on  the  contrary,  as  states  of  feel- 
ing, lack  this  element  of  objectivity  and  carry  with  them 
only  reference  to  self :  that  is,  they  are  states  in  which 
consciousness  is  itself  affected  primarily  (pain,  fear). 
They  may  be  entirely  lacking  in  the  presentative  or 
knowledge  element,  or  the  two  may  be  combined  in  any 
degree  of  connection.  They  extend  from  the  simplest 
bodily  feelings  to  the  highest  emotions,  and  include  im- 
pulses, temperaments,  and  personal  tendencies  of  all 
kinds. 

'  Ward,  Encyc.  Britannica,  art.  Psychology. 


CLASSIFICATION:  ITS  JUSTIFICATION.  37 

In  strong  contrast  to  these  well-marked  divisions  the 
third  class,  volitional  states,  stand  out  in  consciousness 
distinguished  by  a  characteristic  foreign  to  the  other 
two,  the  sense  of  effort  or  exertion.  It  takes  the  forms 
of  mental  attention,  choice,  and  resolution.  The  other 
orders  of  mental  facts  may  or  may  not  exhibit  this  will- 
element.  I  may  be  passively  affected  by  pain  or  emo- 
tion, or  I  may  be  conscious  of  a  free  play  of  presenta- 
tions with  no  effort  of  my  own  to  control  or  direct  them. 
This  last  phase,  therefore,  may  be  set  apart  as  a  third 
class,  and  as  representing  a  third  function. 

It  is  held  by  some  that  all  our  conscious  states  and  acts 
cannot  be  brought  into  these  classes.  Language  is  sometimes 
said  to  require  a  separate  division.  But  it  is  difficult  to  see 
how  the  symbolism  of  language  differs  from  tlie  symbolism  of 
the  notion  which  it  represents.  The  notion  itself  represents 
a  generalization  from  other  representative  states.  And  the 
organic  power  of  speech  cannot  be  considered  mental.  The 
activity  of  cdnscience  also  is  in  dispute.  It  is  held  that  con- 
science has  both  a  cognitive  (representative)  and  a  motive 
(emotional  and  volitional)  function.  But  as  its  representative 
activity  is  admitted  to  be  in  the  presentation  of  relations  of 
good  and  evil,  its  motive  force  is  only  that  which  attaches  to 
all  relations,  except  that  it  is  the  most  powerful.  Intellectual 
considerations  of  all  kinds  affect  the  will  as  motives,  and  it  is 
as  motives  that  considerations  of  right  and  wrong  affect  the 
will :  these  motives  are  most  powerful  because  they  are  con- 
siderations of  conduct,  and  conduct  is  the  sphere  of  the  will; 
but  they  are  nevertheless  considerations.  So  we  may  class 
conscience  as  far  as  its  content  is  concerned  in  the  represen- 
tative function  of  mind,  and  find  in  itself  and  its  relation  to 
will  a  reason  for  its  volitional  importance.  Another  point  of 
confusion  in  regard  to  conscience  arises  from  the  fact  that  an 
appetence  or  primary  instinct  of  our  nature,  also,  is  love  for 
good  and  aversion  to  evil,  this  love  and  aversion  being  in  the 
affective  class.  This  adds,  certainly,  new  and  very  greatly  in- 
creased force  to  the  motive  or  volitional  value  of  moral  dis- 
tinctions. If  by  conscience  we  understand  the  entire  reason 
for  conduct,  then  conscience  is  derived  from  the  threefold 
activity  of  mind  taken  together;  but  if  by  it  we  mean  the 
power  by  which  we  distinguish  good  and  evil,  it  is  represen- 
tative. 


38  CLASSIFICATION  AND  DIVISION. 

II.  This  classification  does  not  admit  of  further  reduction.^ 
Besides  the  general  consideration  already  spoken  of, 
that  the  quality  of  representation  is  absent  from  feeling 
and  will  considered  alone,  we  find  the  distinction  strongly 
brought  out  in  the  independent  vai'iatio'iis  of  which  we 
are  conscious  in  the  case  of  each.  The  facts  of  intellect 
and  of  feeling,  for  example,  are  observable  in  diiferent 
degrees  of  connection  with  each  other.  States  of  con- 
sciousness seem  sometimes  to  have  no  distinct  feeling  of 
pleasure  or  pain.  And  some  states  of  pleasure  and  pain 
convey  no  knowledge.  Our  internal  and  organic  sensa- 
tions, loud  abrupt  noises,  give  us  no  knowledge  except 
the  general  location  of  our  bodily  organs,  while  the  per- 
ception of  a  printed  page  may  convey  no  positive  feeling 
wdtli  it.  The  demonstration  of  a  geometrical  truth  may 
vary  in  its  emotional  quality  from  high  pleasurable  ex- 
citement to  complete  indifierence.  All  this  shows  that 
the  two  classes  of  facts  can  exist  together;  or  that  one 
may  vary  while  the  other  does  not,  even  to  limits  at 
which  either  element  seems  to  disappear. 

It  should  be  noted,  however,  that  this  mobility  and 
changeableness  is  greatly  in  excess  in  the  case  of  feeling. 
The  rational  principles  of  representation  remain  fixed  in 
their  characteristics,  and  vary  only  in  the  degree  of 
vividness  which  they  present.  This  fixity  makes  science 
possible.  In  every-day  exjoerience  our  ideas  become 
common  property  with  a  fixed  meaning  to  diiferent 
minds.  But  affective  states  are  not  so.  In  the  same 
individual,  feelings  and  tastes  change  constantly.  And 
in  different  men,  these  differences  are  exceedingly  great. 
For  example,  in  the  matter  of  dress,  form  and  color  are 
kept  within  given  limits,  but  within  these  limits  there  is 
every  degree  of  individual  taste.  Different  persons  also 
have  characteristic  casts  of  character,  as  being  intellect- 

1  Cf.  Rabler,  loc.  cit.  pp.  83-87. 


CLASSIFICATION :  ITS  JUSTIFICATION,  39 

ual  or  emotional ;  the  latter  are  movable  and  in  constant 
change  ;  the  former  fixed  in  their  purposes,  methodical 
and  regular  in  their  life.' 

The  opposition  between  representative  and  affective 
states  is  also  shown  in  the  influence  they  exert  upon  each 
other.  On  one  hand,  the  affective  states  hinder  and 
interrupt  the  order  of  intellectual  states.  Pleasure  and 
pain  when  intense,  forbid  all  continuous  activity  of  mind. 
The  habit  of  indulgence  in  pleasant  states  enervates  the 
intellect.  On  the  other  hand,  intellectual  states  seem  to 
hinder  the  emotions.  This  is  seen  in  the  proverbial 
coldness  of  highly  educated  people.  In  the  same  soci- 
ety, the  instructed  and  uninstructed  classes  are  strongly 
contrasted  in  this  respect.  The  ignorant  classes  are  im- 
petuous in  their  emotions  :  they  move  in  masses  carried 
away  by  a  common  feeling,  political  or  social :  so  much 
so  that  it  has  been  said  that  the  "  excesses  of  political 
revolutions  are  in  inverse  ratio  to  the  intellectual  devel- 
opment of  the  people."  ' 

The  connection  between  these  two  classes  of  states 
and  the  will  is  perhaps  more  intimate,  because  every  act 
of  will  involves  both  an  idea  of  the  end  in  view  and  a 
native  impulse  or  appetence  to  its  accomplishment.  But 
it  is  still  true  that  they  can  be  clearly  distinguished.  A 
great  number  of  thoughts  and  feelings  in  certain  circum- 
stances have  no  bearing  on  our  volitional  life.  They  are 
matters  of  indifference  to  us.  The  reading  of  a  historical 
narrative,  for  example,  may  be  accompanied  with  great 
pleasure,  and  yet  have  no  apparent  effect  upon  my  course 
of  life.  The  developed  forms  of  will  are  in  conscious- 
ness quite  distinct  from  the  motives  which  lead  to  voli- 
tion. And  as  has  been  said  of  intellectual  and  emotional 
temperaments,  so  also  men  differ  in  their  volitional  cast. 
All   these   differences   are    traced  back   to   the   funda- 


^  Paffe,  Considerations  sur  la  Sensibilite,  p.  55.  ^  Ibid.,  p.  103. 


40  CLASSIFICATION  AND  DIVISION. 

mental  one  already  pointed  out,  that  in  strong  will  there 
is  the  massing  or  concentrating  of  the  mental  nature  in 
an  effort  accompanied  with  a  feeling  of  the  expenditure 
of  force.' 

§  3.  Unity  of  the  Three  Classes  iisr  Consciousness. 

With  the  distinction  of  the  three  classes  of  mental 
fact  and  the  three  functions  they  represent  clearly 
brought  out,  it  must  still  be  remembered  that  the  latter 
are  merely  functions.  They  are  not  three  psychological 
lives  which  lie  parallel  with  one  another.  They  are  a 
single  life.  Their  unity  in  a  single  principle  may  be 
seen  under  several  aspects. 

I.  They  have  unity  of  end.  The^y  are  functions  of  a 
common  mental  organism  and  minister  to  its  develop- 
ment. The  unity  of  the  body  is  realized  in  the  unity  of 
the  functions  of  the  different  organs.  The  end  of  all  is 
the  conservation  and  development  of  the  whole.  So  the 
intellectual  functions  are  one,  in  their  tendency  to  pre- 
serve the  independence  of  the  self  and  accomplish  its  des- 
tiny. "  By  intelligence  we  conceive  the  end  of  conduct, 
by  sensibility  we  are  excited  to  produce  it,  and  by  will  we 
govern  these  impulses  in  the  light  of  reason  and  assure 
the  victory  of  the  best.  Without  intelligence,  man  is 
blind  ;  without  feeling,  he  is  inert ;  without  will,  he  is  a 
Slave. 

II.  They  are  one  in  their  collective  activity.  Each 
seems  to  depend  on  the  others  in  an  essential  way.  At- 
tention is  necessary  to  all  thought,  and  feeling  is  often 
necessary  to  direct  or  is  effectual  in  preventing  the  direc- 
tion of  the  attention.  In  its  reflex  activity',  attention 
seems  to  be  a  representative  or  relating  function,  but  it 
has  the  fundamental  quality  of  will  in  its  active  exer- 

'  See  Chap.  V. 

*  Kabier,  loc.  cit.     Compare  throughout  this  section. 


DIVISION  OF  THE  SUBJECT.  41 

cise  as  mental  eflfort.  A  volition,  as  has  been  said,  pro- 
ceeds upon  ideas  and  appetences  to  such  an  extent  that 
one  school  of  psychologists  reduce  will  to  the  conflict  of 
ideas  and  another  make  it  a  conflict  of  feelings.'  Feel- 
ing also  involves  images  or  ideas,  through  memory  or 
imagination,  or  arises  from  association,  and  all  of  these 
are  representative.  And  it  seems  possible,  sometimes, 
to  originate  the  train  from  which  feeling  arises  by  a 
powerful  act  of  will. 

III.  They  find  their  formal  unity  in  consciousness.  The 
completed  view  of  the  mind  ends,  as  it  began,  with 
consciousness,  as  the  necessary  background  and  formal 
unity  of  the  whole.  Consciousness  besj^eaks  the  unit 
being,  the  subject  of  this  threefold  activity,  and  in  its 
heathfulness  or  derangement,  under  normal  stimulation 
of  this  threefold  order,  the  proper  balance  and  end  of 
the  whole  is  accomplished. 

§  4.  Division  of  the  Subject. 

In  view  of  the  above  classification,  the  subject-mat- 
ter of  psychology  falls  into  convenient  parts  for  treat- 
ment. In  addition  to  the  three  great  classes  of  facts 
spoken  of,  the  form  or  mark  which  is  common  to  them 
all,  consciousness,  must  be  considered.  There  are  ac- 
cordingly the  following  four  great  divisions : 

Part      I.  General  Characteristics  of  Mi7id. 

Part    II.  Intellect, 

Part  III.  Feeling. 

Part  IV.  Wm. 

'  Herbart  and  Bain  respectively. 


42  CLASSIFICATION  AND  DIVISION. 

On  classification  and  division,  consult  :  Porter,  Human  Intel- 
lect, pp.  40-51 ;  Waitz,  Lehrbuch  der  Fsychologie,  ^  4  ;  (History) 
Drobisch,  Psychologies  §§  123-138 ;  Herbart,  Lehrbuch  der  Psy- 
chologies pp.  38-90  ;  Brentano,  Psyfiliologie,  I.  pp.  233-306  ;  Bailey, 
Letters  on  the  Philosophy  of  the  Human  Mind,  vi  ;  Jouffroy, 
Melanges  Philosophiques,  p.  312  ;  Lotze,  Microcosmus,  II.  ch.  ii  ,- 
Patton,  Presbyterian  Review,  1887,  p.  771  ;  Ward,  Encyc.  Britan- 
nica,  art.  Psychology  ;  Sully,  Outlines  of  Psychology,  ch.  ii ;  Rabier, 
Psychology,  ch.  viii  ;  Spencer,  Psychology,  II.  ch.  ii  and  ix. 

Further  Problems  for  Study  : 

History  of  classification  in  psychology  ; 
Principles  of  logical  classification. 


PART  I. 

GENERAL    CHARACTERISTICS    OF  MIND. 


CHAPTER    IV. 

CONSCIOUSNESS. 

In  the  foregoing  chapters  the  term  consciousness  has 
been  used  withovit  explanation.  Familiarity  with  it  in 
the  general  significance  it  bears  in  ordinary  discourse 
has  been  assumed.  It  is  necessary,  however,  at  the  out- 
set, to  inquire  more  fully  into  its  nature  and  position  in 
the  science. 

§  1.  Nature  of  Consciousness. 

Definition.  Disregarding  less  important  varieties,  we 
may  say  that  two  general  views  of  the  nature  of  conscious- 
ness prevail  among  psychologists.  On  the  one  hand,  it 
is  held  that  consciousness  is  itself  a  capacity,  function,  or 
faculty  of  mind,  an  inner  sense  for  the  perception  of  the 
mind  and  its  states,  as  sight  and  hearing  are  outer  senses 
for  the  perception  of  body.'  This  view  rests  upon  the 
fact  of  reflection,  the  developed  means  of  observation  of 
inner  states,  which  has,  in  common  with  sense-perception, 
the  relation  of  subject  and  object  within  itself  ;  but  not 
upon  the  original  awareness  which  we  have  of  our  first 
experiences.  This  latter  bears  no  analogy  whatever  to 
external  perception.      Locke,  who  is  looked  to  as  the 

'  Reid,  Stewart,  Jouffroy. 

43 


44  CONSCIOUSNESS. 

great  defender  of  the  inner  sense,'  makes  this  distinction, 
since  it  is  of  attentive  reflection  that  he  speaks,  distin- 
guishing it  from  simple  consciousness.  Ideas  of  reflec- 
tion are  later  than  those  of  sensation,  he  says,  "  because, 
though  they  pass  continually,  yet  like  floating  visions 
they  make  not  deep  impressions  enough  to  leave  in  the 
mind  clear,  distinct,  lasting  ideas,  till  the  understanding 
turns  inward  upon  itself,  reflects  upon  its  own  opera- 
tions, and  makes  them  the  objects  of  its  own  contempla- 
tion." This  doctrine  of  consciousness  as  distinguished 
from  reflection,  makes  it  not  essential,  but  accidental,  to 
mind,  an  added  thing,  which  may  be  wanting,  as  external 
senses,  memory,  imagination,  may  be  wanting ;  and  ad- 
mits the  supposition  of  unconscious  mind. 

The  opposing  view  is  this,  that  consciousness  is  the 
common  and  necessary  form  of  all  mental  states  :  with- 
out it  mind  is  not  and  cannot  be  conceived.^  It  is  the 
point  of  di^dsion  and  differentiation  between  mind  and 
not-mind. 

From  the  empirical  point  of  view  we  may  make  the 
following  observations  : 

1.  Consciousness  is  not  a  potver  or  energy  of  mind.  It 
does  not  involve  the  conscious  eflbrt  of  attention.  In  a 
state  of  reminiscence,  or  revery,  the  states  of  mind  are 
uncontrolled  and  come  and  go  with  no  let  or  hindrance 
from  the  mind.  We  are  then  fully  conscious  of  this  play 
of  states,  but  of  no  exercise  of  mental  efi'ort  accompany- 
ing it. 

2.  Consciousness  is  not  an  organ  of  the  mind,  to  be  used 
by  the  inner  subject  in  perceiving  his  states.  It  is  not 
an  inner  sense,  since  it  accompanies  the  exercise  of  all 
the  senses  and  is  necessary  to  their  function.  The  senses 
have  specific  physical  basis  also,   while  consciousness 

'  It  "  might  properly  enough  be  called  internal  sense."    Essay,  hk. 
2,  chap.  I.  sect.  4. 

2  Aristotle,  Mill,  Hamilton,  Ward. 


co:n'sciousness  and  the  unconscious.        45 

depends  upou  tlie  healthy  and  normal  activity  of  the 
sensorium  as  a  whole. 

3.  Consciousness  is  the  one  condition  and  abiding  char- 
acteristic of  mental  states.  The  possibility  of  the  sejDara- 
tion  of  consciousness  from  mental  states  is  held  by 
many  psychologists  of  the  present  day,  and  it  is  neces- 
sary to  examine  in  some  detail  the  grounds  for  the  claim 
of  the  existence  of  unconscious  mental  pJienomena. 

§   2.    COXSCIOUSNESS    AND    THE   UNCOXSCIOUS. 

Meaning  of  the  Term  Unconscious.  Unconscious  men- 
tal phenomena  play  a  great  part  in  contemporary  philos- 
ophy, and  have  since  Leibnitz.  It  is  necessary  carefulW 
to  distinguish  the  strict  psychological  meaning  of  the 
term  from  its  philosoiDhical  and  metaphysical  meanings, 
since  it  is  only  with  the  former  that  we  have  to  do.  We 
find  attached  to  the  word  unconscious  no  less  than  three 
different  significations. 

1.  By  unconscious  mind  is  often  meant  the  hidden 
suhstratum  of  the  soul  which  underlies  all  conscious 
manifestations,  yet  is  never  open  to  our  inner  gaze  in  its 
ov/n  essential  nature.  It  is  held  to  be  the  unifying 
something  beneath  intellect,  feeling,  and  will,  the  sub- 
stantial spirit.  This  is  a  metaphysical  doctrine  and  does 
not  concern  us  here,  being  one  of  the  legitimate  prob- 
lems of  rational  psychology.' 

2.  The  word  unconscious  may  again  be  applied  to 
facts  of  least  consciousness  ;  that  is,  to  mental  states  which 
lapse  from  a  state  of  conscious  presentation  into  a  region 
of  such  obscurity  that  they  are  practically  lost  to  the 
conscious  life.  Such  states  may  also  arise  from  weak 
or  habitual  excitations,  which  do  not  ordinarily  appeal  to 
the  attention.^     In  this  sense  the  reality  of  unconscious 

'  So  Hartmann,  Schopenhauer,  and,  in  psychology,  Maine  deBiran. 
'  So  Kant,  Leibnitz,  and  the  Scottish  psychologists. 


46  COWSCIOUSIiESS. 

states  is  undoubted,  though  some  other  term  would 
better  designate  them,  as  distinguished  from  facts  which 
have  no  mental  reference  whatever.  However  insensibly 
consciousness  nia}^  shade  away  to  its  extreme  limit, 
there  must  be  a  state  in  which  it  entirely  disappears, 
and  our  phraseology  should  cover  this  distinction.  Yet 
it  is  just  here  that  the  discussion  before  us  may  be  said 
to  turn  ;  upon  the  interpretation  of  states  at  one  time 
below  the  threshold  of  the  conscious  life,  but  yet  capable 
of  emerging  at  any  moment  into  clear  conscious  value. 

3.  Closely  allied  to  the  last  position  is  the  thorough- 
going psychological  doctrine  of  unconscious  mental  mod- 
ifications. According  to  it,  states  which  are  at  one 
time  conscious  may  be  at  another  time  entirely  uncon- 
scious, while  still  remaining  mental.  They  preserve  their 
mental  nature,  but  lose  consciousness.  This  doctrine 
may  be  kept  strictly  within  psychological  bounds '  or 
it  may  run  into  the  metaphysical  doctrine  spoken  of 
above.*  Its  psychological  implications  and  truth  alone 
concern  us  here.  The  arguments  upon  wliich  it  is  based 
will  be  considered  in  turn. 

Arguments  for  the  Unconscious:  I.  From  the  Principle 
of  Causation.  The  argument  oftenest  used  is  based  upon 
the  law  of  causation,  and  takes  a  twofold  form. 

a.  It  is  argued  that,  if  any  cause  produce  a  given  effect, 
'part  of  that  cause  must  produce  part  af  the  same  effect  : 
hence,  if  certain  ph^^sical  excitations  produce  a  mental 
effect,  a  diminished  excitation  of  the  same  kind  must 
also  produce  a  mental  effect.  But  diminished  sense  ex- 
citations produce  no  conscious  effect,  hence  their  mental 
effects  must  be  unconscious.  "  I  hear  the  noise  of  the 
sea,"  says  Leibnitz,  "  but  I  do  not  hear  the  noise  of  each 
wave  alone ;  yet  the  noise  of  each  wave  must  produce 
a  mental  effect,  otherwise  the  whole  together  would  pro- 

'  Lotze,  Taine,  Wuudt.  '  Hartmann,  Herbart. 


CONSCIOUSNESS  AND   THE   UNCONSCIOUS.  47 

duce  no  mental  effect."  "  Suppose  we  take  a  wheel," 
says  Taine,  "  with  a  hundred  teeth,  each  tooth  coming  in 
contact  with  a  bar  as  the  whole  revolves,  and  remove  all 
the  teeth  except  two,  contiguous  to  each  other.  We 
will  now  have  two  shocks  occupying  .001  sec.  and  giving 
distinct  appreciable  sound.  But  if  we  take  away  an- 
other tooth  the  sound  is  no  longer  audible.  Yet  it 
must  still  be  heard,  for  the  conscious  sensation  produced 
by  the  two  shocks  was  made  up  of  the  two  elementary 
sensations."  '  *'  In  the  same  way  an  optical  sensation 
which  lasts  a  second  is  made  up  of  about  451  billions  of 
unconscious  sensations  -^  because  at  the  right  of  the  solar 
spectrum  where  the  vibrations  of  ether  succeed  each 
other  most  slowly,  there  are  yet  451  billions  per  second." 
"  Every  minimum  visihile,^'  says  Hamilton,  "  is  made  uj)  of 
parts  still  smaller,  which  do  not  appear  in  consciousness, 
but  have  none  the  less  produced  a  real  modification  in 
us."  "  When  we  look  at  a  forest  from  a  distance,  we  do 
not  see  the  separate  leaves  or  even  the  single  trees  ;  but 
the  green  of  the  forest  is  made  up  of  the  green  of  the 
leaves,  that  is,  the  total  impression  of  which  we  are  con- 
scious is  made  up  of  an  infinite  number  of  small  impres- 
sions of  which  we  are  not  conscious."  ^ 

Particular  Answer.  In  the  first  place,  we  may  say 
that,  assuming  the  principle  that  part  of  a  cause  must 
produce  part  of  the  effect  of  that  cause,  it  is  contra- 
dicted by  the  conclusion  in  this  case  ;  for  if  the  whole 
effect  is  a  fact  of  consciousness,  the  partial  effect  must 
be  a  fact  of  consciousness  also.  If  a  given  cause  pro- 
duces a  sensation,  and  by  this  we  mean  a  conscious  sen- 
sation, we  must  understand  it  to  mean  conscious  sensa- 


'  De  I' Intelligence,  1st  ed..  vol.  i.  p.  208,  quoted  by  Rabier,  loc.  cit. 
p.  55  and  fol. 
«  Ibid.,  p.  237. 
3  Cited  by  Mill,  PJiilos.  of  Hamilton. 


48  co:n'scious]S'ess. 

tion  also  when  we  draw  the  conclusion  that  part  of  the 
cause  will  produce  part  of  the  sensation.  If  the  effect  is 
not  conscious,  we  can  only  say  that  it  is  not  due  to  part 
of  the  same  cause.  So  on  this  principle  we  can  reach 
an  infinite  subsidence  of  sensation,  but  not  the  uncon- 
scious. 

h.  The  same  principle  is  used  in  another  way  to  prove 
unconscious  states  :  if,  we  are  told,  the  intensity  of  con- 
sciousness depends  upon  the  intensity'  or  the  degree  of 
change''  of  the  phenomena  it  accompanies,  then  we 
would  expect  that  when  either  the  intensity  of  these 
phenomena  or  their  degree  of  change  is  very  slight,  con- 
sciousness would  be  wanting  altogether. 

Particular  Ansiver.  Again,  admitting  the  principle  of 
cause  and  effect,  as  stated  above,  this  does  not  follow ; 
for  if  a  certain  intensity  of  the  i^sychological  phenome- 
non, say  pain,  produces  consciousness  and  a  part  of  the 
same  cause  produces  a  portion  of  the  same  effect,  then 
any  degree  of  pain,  however  slight,  would  produce  a  posi- 
tive degree  of  consciousness.  If  the  external  excitation 
as  cause  produces  a  given  interna]  fact  as  effect,  then, 
on  the  same  principle,  this  internal  fact  as  cause  should 
produce  a  conscious  fact  as  effect,  when  it  becomes  in 
turn  the  excitation. 

General  Ansiver.  But  further  than  this,  the  princi- 
ple upon  which  both  these  arguments  rest  is  not  true  ; 
i.e.,  that  part  of  a  cause  must  have  part  of  the  effect  of 
the  whole  cause.  It  is  true  that  part  of  a  cause  must 
have  some  effect,  but  it  cannot  be  said  necessarily  to 
have  the  same  effect  in  kind  as  the  cause  of  which  it  is  a 
part.  For  the  effect  may  be  of  such  a  kind  that  a  cer- 
tain amount  or  intensity  of  the  causal  energy  is  neces- 
sary to  produce  it  at  all.  If  a  certain  velocity  of  wind 
is  necessary  to  blow  down  the  Tower  of  Pisa,  can  we  say 

'  Beneke.  *  Bain. 


CONSCIOUSNESS  AXB   TEE   UNCONSCIOUS.  49 

that  a  wind  of  slight  velocity  blows  it  partly  down  ?  Or 
if  a  certain  force  exerted  in  a  blow  on  a  percussion  cap 
causes  an  explosion,  does  it  follow  that  a  lighter  blow 
produces  a  slighter  explosion?  In  these  cases  part  of 
the  cause  produces  no  effect  whatever  of  the  specific  kind 
in  question.  There  is  a  minimum  of  cause  necessary  to 
the  beginning  of  the  efiect.  Now  the  excitation  of  the 
nervous  system  is  a  cause  of  just  this  nature,  considered 
with  reference  to  mental  effects.  A  certain  strength  of 
central  stimulus  is  necessary  to  produce  such  an  effect 
at  all,  and  any  action  less  than  this  produces  no  mental 
moditication.  The  real  cause  is  the  central  process,  and 
as  Hartmiinn  himself  says,  "  a  certain  energy  of  cerebral 
excitation  is  necessary  to  provoke  a  mental  reaction." 
The  sound  of  a  single  wave,  therefore,  and  the  color  of 
a  single  leaf,  in  the  cases  quoted,  produce  a  physical  ef- 
fect, but  not  a  mental.  Either  they  may  not  suffice  to 
move  the  sense  organ,  or  if  they  do,  they  may  not  suffice 
to  stimulate  the  central  process. 

This  explanation  holds  also  of  cases  in  which  the  par- 
tial excitations  are  successive,  as  in  the  case  of  Savart's 
wheel,  cited  by  Taine.  By  a  property  of  the  nerves,  the 
successive  stimuli  overlap  and  strengthen  one  another, 
and  so  amount  to  a  single  intense  excitation — as  the  waves 
of  the  sea  and  the  leaves  of  the  forest.  The  sounds  of  the 
successive  teeth  of  the  wheel  do  not  reach  consciousness 
in  succession  but  simultaneously  ;  consequently,  we  can- 
not say  that  each  has  produced  a  portion  of  the  effect. 
Let  us  sujjpose,  for  example,  three  sviccessive  sounds,  a,  h, 
c,  following  each  other  at  an  interval  of  a  thoiisandth  of  a 
second.  The  stimulus  a  reaching  the  auditory  centre 
does  not  suffice  to  cause  a  conscious  reaction,  but  its  phy- 
siological effect  persists  more  than  two  thousandths  of  a 
second;  consequently  when  the  stimulus  &  reaches  the 
centre  it  reinforces  a,  doubling  the  central  stimulus  ;  this 
again  persists  until  reinforced  further  by  the  action  of  c, 


50  CO^'^SCIOUSNESS. 

and  tlie  cerebral  activity  thus  augmented  suffices,  for  the 
first  time,  to  cause  a  mental  reaction.'  The  same  case 
of  accumulated  stimulus  is  seen  in  the  fact  that  when 
Savart's  wheel  revolves  so  slowly  that  the  contact  of  a 
single  tooth  is  audible,  and  then  so  swiftly  that  two 
teeth  are  heard  as  one,  the  latter  sound  is  louder  than 
the  former/  And  it  is  further  supported  by  experiments 
in  psychometry  which  show  that  when  excitations  follow 
one  another  in  such  quick  succession  that  sufficient  time 
is  not  given  for  the  central  nervous  changes,  difierent 
sensations  are  not  distinguished  in  consciousness,  but  a 
single  confused  sensation  is  experienced  due  to  the  com- 
bined excitations. 

II.  Argument  from  the  Attention.  Another  class  of 
arguments  for  the  unconscious  in  the  mental  life,  is 
drawn  from  the  activity  of  attention.  Excitations  of 
sense,  we  are  told,  which  seem  to  have  no  mental  effect, 
may  be  made  conscious  simply  by  directing  the  atten- 
tion to  them.  The  ticking  of  the  clock  is  not  noticed 
except  when  the  attention  is  directed  especially  to  it. 
The  roar  of  the  sea  to  the  sailor,  or  the  noise  of  his  mill 
to  the  miller,  are  never  heard  under  ordiuarj'  circum- 
stances. Yet  these  sounds  must  have  mental  counter- 
parts, otherwise  how  could  the  attention  serve  to  bring 
them  forward?  An  experience  often  cited  is  that  of 
walking  :  we  are  not  conscious  of  our  steps  until  we 
think  upon  the  muscular  and  tactual  sensations  actually 
involved.  And  in  general,  close  attention  to  any  part  of 
our  bodies  brings  out  innumerable  slight  sensations  of 
which  we  were  before  absolutely  unconscious. 

Ansioer.  The  best  interpretation  of  these  and  simi- 
lar facts  cited  below  seems  to  be  gained  by  the  study  of 
attention  itself.     These  facts  certainly  are  true  :  whether 

1  On  such  phenomena  in  sight,  see  Wundt,  Phys.  Psychologie,  2d  ed., 
vol.  I.  p.  435  and  fol. 

^  Exner,  in  Pfi'tger's  Archiv,  vol.  xi 


CONSCIOUSNESS  AND  TEE  UNCONSCIOUS.  61 

vre  call  them  unconscious  or  conscious  is  only  a  matter  of 
words.  Tbey  are  of  extreme  value  for  psychology  just 
for  this  reason,  that  they  cast  great  light  upon  conscious- 
ness and  its  active  form  as  attention.'  There  is  certainly 
a  region  of  such  extreme  indistinctness  in  the  conscious 
field,  that  when  the  attention  is  concentrated  in  another 
portion  of  that  field,  the  former  region  is  quite  beyond  su- 
pervision. Whether  it  becomes  merely  physical  change, 
as  no  doubt  is  the  case  in  retention,  or  whether  it  retains 
some  slight  degree  of  consciousness,  which  is  capable, 
as  we  see  in  the  more  active  forms  of  mental  function, 
of  all  degrees  of  intensity,  is  a  question  only  of  area  for 
empirical  psychology.  We  know  that  the  withdrawing 
of  attention  does  weaken  the  intensity  of  consciousness, 
and  that  this  weakening  is  proportionate  to  the  in- 
tensity of  attention  elsewhere  ;  so  when  the  attention  is 
fixed,  concentrated,  we  would  expect  extremely  slight 
degrees  of  consciousness  in  other  portions  of  the  field. 
Or  the  depletion  of  mind  may  be  so  great  that  the  physi- 
cal process  is  no  longer  sufficient  to  excite  a  mental  reac- 
tion at  all.  In  this  case  it  is  a  ph^'sical  fact  and  not  a 
mental  fact,  and  is  not  of  psychological  value  except  as 
all  physical  processes  are  of  value  as  conditioning  the 
rise  of  mental  phenomena. 

It  is  probable,  therefore,  that  in  such  cases  we  have 
a  condition  of  extremely  diffused  or  weak  consciousness. 
That  we  do  hear  the  ticking  of  the  clock,  that  the  sailor 
is  really  conscious  of  the  noise  of  the  waves,  and  the 
miller  of  the  sound  of  his  mill,  is  proved  by  the  fact  that 
the  cessation  of  these  sounds  is  at  once  known.  The 
child  asleep  in  church  wakes  when  the  preacher  stops. 
This  shows  that  the  preceding  state  of  consciousness 
really  included  the  prolonged  excitation  whose  cessation 
is  remarked,  unless  we  hold  with  Bain  that  conscious- 

'  See  Chap.  V. 


52  COJVSCIOUSNESS. 

ness  itself  is  change.  So  also  with  the  sensations  of 
walking.  However  unconscious  they  may  seem  to  be, 
we  notice  immediately  any  change  in  them,  as  when  we 
step  upon  different  material.  The  sensations  which  arise 
in  a  limb  when  it  is  strongly  attended  to,  are  probably 
excited  by  the  attention  itself,  and  are  due  to  impulses, 
to  movement,  since  the  connection  between  attention  and 
movement  is  so  close  that  it  is  often  impossible  to  sepa- 
rate them  entirely.  Sensations  of  blushing,  for  example, 
arise  entirely  from  an  inner  feeling.  These  states  do  not 
seem  to  require,  therefore,  the  doctrine  of  unconscious 
mind.  The  doctrine  of  "  least  consciousness  "  explains 
them  sufficiently. 

III.  Arguments  drawn  from  Synthetic  Sense-perceptionJ' 
The  argument  for  the  unconscious  drawn  from  perception 
turns  upon  the  co-ordination  of  sensations  in  the  ideal  pro- 
ducts, especially  space  and  time.  The  intuition  of  per- 
cepts affords  no  basis  for  the  doctrine,  since  the  sensations 
upon  which  it  proceeds  are  clearly  conscious.  We  may 
take  the  visual  perception  of  space,  therefore,  as  affording 
the  most  plausible  case.  As  we  shall  see  in  considering 
the  perception  of  space,'  the  synthetic  activity  of  mind,  in 
the  reconstruction  of  space,  proceeds  upon  two  classes  of 
physiologica,l  data.  Both  are  presumed  by  this  argu- 
ment to  have  a  mental  value  since  the  resulting  percept 
space  is  mental.  But  we  are  not  conscious  of  these  sen- 
sation or  their  co-ordination ;  consequently'  in  them  we 
have  unconscious  mental  states.  The  resulting  product 
is  a  conclusion  or  inference  made  unconsciously.^ 

Ansiver.     In  answer  to  this  argument  it  may  be  said  : 

a.    That  if  this  explanation  of  the  perception  of  space 

be  offered  from  an  experiential  point  of  ^dew,    i.e.,    on 

the  ground    that  these   sensations   are   all   that  is   re- 


'  See  discussion  of  perception,  Chap.  VIII,  especially  §  4. 
^Helmholtz,  Zollner. 


co]S'scious:^Ess  and  the  unconscious.        53 

quired,  through  associative  co-ordination,  to  account  for 
the  perception  of  space,  then  from  the  very  fact  that  the 
process  is  unconscious,  we  may  argue  that  this  is  not  the 
true  theory  of  the  origin  of  the  notion  of  space.  Granted 
that  there  are  these  physical  data  to  any  degree,  local 
signs  conscious  or  unconscious,  muscular  movements  of 
the  eye,  feelings  of  central  innervation,  yet  it  is  diificult 
to  see  how  these  intensive  states  can  by  simple  co-ordi- 
nation give  extension.  "  Admitting  differences  in  quality, 
we  are  asked  to  draw  differences  in  position.  A  qualitative 
or  quantitative  difference  in  reds  does  not  serve  to  locate 
one  on  the  left  and  the  other  on  the  right."  '  The  notes 
of  an  orchestra,  which  form  an  intensive  series,  are  not 
arranged  in  space.  And  it  does  not  help  matters  to  add 
any  number  of  concomitant  sensations,  conscious  or  un- 
conscious, such  as  Lotze's  slight  sensations  in  the  neigh- 
borhood of  the  point  affected,  and  Wundt's  "  feelings  of 
innervation."  For  if  spacial  co-ordination  can  arise  from 
a  second  intensive  series,  it  could  as  well  arise  from  the 
first ;  and  if  not,  wherein  does  the  hypothesis  help  us  ? 
The  advocates  of  the  unconscious  say,  this  process  takes 
place,  therefore  there  are  unconscious  mental  states  ;  we 
may  say,  on  the  contrary,  we  are  conscious  of  no  such 
process,  therefore  it  does  not  take  place. 

b.  Again,  if  we  maintain  that,  while  there  are  physi- 
cal stimuli  which  react  mentally  under  the  form  of  space 
and  these  data  are  the  same  sensational  elements  as  those 
held  by  the  empiricists  in  this  connection,  there  is  above 
this  a  native  mental  synthesis  or  reconstruction  of  these 
data  ;  we  are  still  not  shut  up  to  the  hypothesis  of  uncon- 
scious mind.  For  even  though  we  admit  that  we  are 
not  conscious  of  these  empii-ical  elements,  the  law  of  ac- 
cumulated excitation  already  cited  may  serve  us  here. 
That  is,  physical  data  of  a  certain  complexity  and  strength 

'  Rabier. 


54  CONSCIOUSNESS. 

may  be  necessary  to  tlie  mental  reaction  for  si3ace,  just  as 
the  physical  stimulus  for  sight  must  have  a  certain  com- 
plexity and  strength.  This  requirement  being  unfulfilled, 
the  stimulus  remains  physical  and  for  that  reason  un- 
conscious. It  does  not  enter  the  domain  of  mind  at  all. 
Yet,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  we  cannot  admit  that  the  empiri- 
cal elements  of  sj)ace  perception  are  quite  unconscious. 
It  is  only  by  means  of  our  conscious  sensations  that  we 
have  been  able  to  determine  these  elements.  Sensations, 
of  movement  are  qualitatively  conscious,  apart  entirely 
from  their  local  character ;  and,  for  all  we  know,  sensa- 
tions arising  from  specific  points  in  the  skin  and  retina, 
called  local  signs,  may  have  the  same  conscious  value. 
To  say  that  after  the  formation  of  the  space  notion  these 
sensations  do  not  stand  out  in  consciousness  alone,  is. 
not  at  all  to  deny  their  essential  conscious  nature.  The 
generalized  concept  arises  also  from  individual  empirical 
data,  and  the  characteristics  of  the  individual  disaj^pear 
from  consciousness  in  the  product ;  yet  who  would  say 
that  because  the  general  notion  tree  does  not  bring  into 
consciousness  all  the  indi^ddual  trees  of  our  exj)erience, 
the  original  sensations  of  trees  had  been  unconscious  ? 
The  difiiculty,  of  course,  is  to  go  behind  the  formation  of 
the  spacial  j)ercept  and  see  the  data,  as  we  can  in  the  case 
of  the  general  concept ;  but  until  this  is  done,  who  can 
assert  that  these  data  are  unconscious  ? 

IV.  Arguments  draiunfrom  the  Phenomena  of  Memory.. 
A  variety  of  empirical  facts  drawn  from  the  varied  as- 
pects of  the  representative  function  are  urged  in  support 
of  the  hypothesis  of  unconscious  mind,  facts  which 
find  a  complete  explanation  in  the  proper  understanding 
of  the  physical  process  which  underlies  the  revival  of 
presentations.  These  facts  may  be  classed  under  sev- 
eral heads. 

1.  Facts  of  Memory.  It  is  urged  that  presentations 
are  unconscious  between  their  experience  and  their  rep- 


CONSCIOUS]!^ESS  AND  THE  UNCONSCIOUS.  55 

resentation.  "The  larger  part  of  our  mental  riches," 
says  Hamilton,  "  is  hidden  away  in  the  obscure  recesses 
of  the  mind."  These  facts  find  complete  explanation 
in  the  physical  theory  of  retention.'  The  reproduced 
image  is  not  the  original  presentation,  but  a  new  pro- 
duction, a  re-creation,  depending  upon  the  re]3etition 
of  the  ph^'sical  and  mental  conditions  of  the  original 
presentation.  Consequently,  during  the  intervening  time 
between  the  two  experiences  the  mental  state  has  simply 
not  existed. 

2.  Facts  of  Association.  It  is  often  the  case  that  an 
association  between  states  of  mind  is  accomplished  with- 
out conscious  links  of  connection  ;  consequently  the 
links  of  connection  must  have  been  unconscious.  Also 
that^  states  are  revived  in  consciousness  of  which  we 
have  had  no  conscious  experience.  Hence  their  first  men- 
tal experience  must  have  been  unconscious.  Further,* 
the  brain  must  be  the  occasion  of  unconscious  sensa- 
tions, whenever  the  activity  is  reinstated  which  has  al- 
ready had  a  conscious  accompaniment.  Under  all  these 
forms  of  statement,  and  many  others,  the  error  already 
pointed  out  is  plain.  The  assumption  is  made  that  a 
physical  process  of  weakened  intensity  must  produce  a 
mental  efi^ect,  if  the  same  process  of  heightened  intensity 
produces  a  mental  effect.  On  the  contrary,  we  hold  that 
the  weakened  physical  process  produces  no  mental  effect 
whatever ;  though  it  may  serve,  through  its  physical 
connections,  to  reinstate  mental  states.  The  missing 
links  in  broken  chains  of  associations  may  be  supplied 
from  dynamic  connections  in  the  cerebral  substance. 
The  reproduction  of  the  physical  conditions  of  the  last 
emerging  image  is  suflicient  to  account  for  the  revival  of 
that  image,  by  whatever  means  this  physical  reinstate- 

1  See  Chap.  IX. 

'^  Lewes,  Problems  of  Life  and  Mind,  3d  series,  p.  55. 

3  Ibid.,  p.  165. 


56  COJS'SCIOUSI^ESS. 

ment  be  brouglit  about :  whether  by  a  cerebral  process 
carrying  consciousness  with  it,  or  not.  Indeed,  as  Mr. 
Mill  conjectured,  the  successive  modifications  of  the 
physical  series  may  occur  so  rapidly  that  sufficient  time 
is  not  given  for  the  regular  appearance  of  the  subjective 
series  and  some  links  are  dropped  out.  This  conjecture 
is  sustained  by  a  law  of  psychometry,  that,  in  such  cases, 
the  physiological  process  occupies  less  time  than  the 
mental.'  The  production  of  new  states,  also,  in  old 
chains  of  association,  is  accounted  for  on  the  supposi- 
tion that,  in  the  revival,  the  physical  basis  of  the  new 
states  is  sufficient  for  consciousness,  while  in  the  first 
experience  it  was  not.  And  there  is  no  necessity  what- 
ever for  Mr.  Lewes'  position  that  every  subsequent  rein- 
statement of  a  physical  state  once  accompanied  by  con- 
sciousness must  carry  a  sensation  :  it  is  only  true  when 
the  reinstatement  is  strong  enough  to  produce  conscious- 
ness. 

3.  Facts  of  Habit.  Further,  habit  is  said  to  be  a  con- 
stant process  of  relegating  to  the  unconscious  acts  which 
demanded  at  first  conscious  consideration  and  volition  ; 
as  piano-playing,  reading.  All  such  cases  are  accounted 
for  by  a  further  development  of  the  physical  basis  of  re- 
production. The  simple  fact  that  repetition  of  a  given 
phj^sical  performance  tends  to  establish  physical  dispo- 
sitions which  become  automatic  and  mechanical,^  gives 
us  at  once  a  physical  explanation  of  such  habits.  Voli- 
tion, instead  of  being  unconscious,  is  entirely  wanting. 
Why  bring  it  in  when  the  physical  mechanism  is  sufii- 
cient  for  the  required  act  ? 

The  inherent  contradiction  in  terms  of  the  expression 
''unconscious  mental  activity"  is  evident  on  its  surface,  and 
another  name  may  be  given  to  the  large  class  of  facts  which  it 
covers.    Dr.  Carpenter's  "  unconscious  cerebration ''  ^  is  better, 

'  See  p.  110. 

«  Cf.  Wuudt,  loc.  cit.,  11.  pp.  203-5. 

'  Humaii  Physiology,  Pbila.  1868,  p.  589. 


COJS'SCIOUSJS'ESS  AND  THE  UNCONSCIOUS.  57 

if  we  understand  cerebration  to  refer,  not  to  the  cerebrum  sim- 
ply, but  to  the  sensorium  as  a  wliole.  This  empliasizes  the 
physical  nature  of  the  process — which  is  really  the  only  aspect 
under  which  we  know  anything  about  these  facts.  This  whole 
field  in  its  relation  to  cousciovisness  lias  been  well  called  the 
sul-conscioio^,  from  the  fact  that  images  formerly  in  conscious- 
ness have  now  fallen  below  the  threshold,  but  may  again  arise 
either  when  the  stimulation  of  the  centres  is  suflficient  to  draw 
attention  or  when  the  freeing  of  the  attention  from  the  point 
to  which  it  was  directed  removes  an  impeding  obstacle  to  the 
appearance  of  the  image.  Experiments  by  Fechner  show  that 
there  is  a  point  of  lov/est  consciousness  for  each  of  the  senses: 
a  least  perceptible  light,  sound,  etc.  This  is  called  the  thresh- 
old value  of  the  sensation.  Let  excitations  of  less  strength 
be  considered  as  uncojiscioiis  or  purely  physical,  all  states 
■which  have  appeared  or  may  appear  in  consciousness  as  snh- 
conscious,  and  all  states  at  present  before  the  mind  as  cmi- 
Kciousj  and  for  practical  purposes  this  will  serve  to  classify 
all  the  phenomena. 

A  further  beariug  of  the  law  already  indicated — that  the 
organism  tends  toward  activities  already  performed — should  be 
remarked.  By  this  law  the  results  of  experience,  mental  as 
well  as  physical,  are  turned  aside  from  the  supervision  of  the 
mind  and  passed  over  to  the  body,  in  the  sliape  of  refinements 
of  nervous  structure.  The  mind  is  freed  from  masses  of  de- 
tailed activities  which  become  organic  and  reflex.  What  was 
once  pure  intelligence  now  becomes  mechanism.  This  results 
in  permanent  modifications  of  structure  which  are  handed 
down  by  heredity.' 

It  is  difficult  to  see  the  utility  of  the  hypothesis  of  uncon- 
scious mental  states  in  psychology.  It  may  have  metaphysical 
value  in  two  very  distinct  ways:  1st,  as  "favoring  a  material 
theory  of  mind:  for  if  the  mental  can  ever  be  unconscious,  why 
may  not  the  unconscious  be  ultimately  the  ground  of  all  the 
mental?  And  this  is  more  clearly  seen  in  the  open  view  that 
such  phenomena  are  distinctly  organic  although  so  closely  in- 
terwoven with  the  mental.  2d.  If  all  facts  which  form  links 
in  mental  processes  or  produce  mental  products — as  trains  of 
unconscious  cerebration  ending  in  a  conscious  conclusion,  or 
flights  of  musical  or  poetical  genius — can  be  called  uncon- 
scious cases  of  mental  action,  why  may  not  the  principle  be 
extended  to  instinct,  and  design  and  adaptation  in  nature, 
and  the  conclusion  of  Hartmann  follow? 

Mr.  Lewes'  argument  for  the  unconscious  is  based  upon 

'  Cf.  Spencer,  Psydiology,  §  192. 


58  CONSCIO  U8NESS. 

a  different  conception  of  the  matter  of  psychology.  The 
essence  of  the  mental  to  him  is  sentience,^  the  capacity  of 
tissue  to  react  against  external  stimulus.  Wherever,  there- 
fore, we  find  sentient  reaction,  there  is  mind,  whether  it 
be  conscious  or  not,  and  whether  it  be  in  the  human  cere- 
brum or  in  the  leaf  of  the  sensitive  plant.  All  reflex  and 
automatic  action  is  mental.  This  emphasis  laid  upon  sen- 
tience leads  him  to  urge  that  the  general  condition  of  the  sen- 
sorium  or  nervous  system  is  often  the  determining  factor  of 
our  mental  states.  This  last  inference  seems  to  be  true,  and 
needs  reiteration.  The  entire  nervous  system  is  a  single  organ 
of  sensation,  and  its  present  state  is  a  history  of  its  life  and 
the  life  of  its  progenitors.  Generations  of  unconscious  expe- 
rience are  stored  up  in  its  present  form.  And  unconsciously 
to  us  it  gives  tone  and  cast  to  our  first  impulses,  directs  the 
revival  of  images,  and  determines  the  effect  of  feelings. 

Conclusion.  From  the  foregoing  we  conclude  in  har- 
mony with  our  definition  of  psychology,  that  conscious- 
ness is  the  "  necessary  condition  and  abiding  character- 
istic of  mind."  Phenomena  called  "unconscious  mental 
states"  may  be  accounted  for  partly  from  the  physical 
side,  as  excitations  inadequate  to  a  mental  effect,  and 
partly  from  the  mental  side,  as  states  of  least  conscious- 
ness. Where,  in  the  progressive  subsidence  of  con- 
sciousness, these  two  classes  of  fact  come  together  we 
have  no  means  whatever  of  knowing.  The  phenomena 
are  given  their  full  psychological  value,  in  the  follow- 
ing pages,  as  we  proceed.  As  Biuet  says,  if  there  be 
unconscious  mental  phenomena  "  we  know  absolutely 
nothing  about  them."  ^ 

§  3.  Kelative  Theory  of  Consciousness. 

In  the  light  of  what  precedes,  a  wide-spread  but 
erroneous  theory  of  consciousness  may  be  examined  ;  the 
theory  of  the  Bdativity  of  Conscioimiess. 

'  Lewes,  loc.  cit.,  III.  chap.  w\i. 

^  Open  Court,  Jan.  34,  '89.  In  addition  to  the  references  given  in 
the  course  of  the  discussion  and  on  p.  68  below,  consult  the  articles  by 
Pierre  Janet  in  recent  numbers  of  the  Revue  Philosophique. 


CONSCIOUSNESS  AS  A  FEELING   OF  DIFFERENCE.   59 

Considered  in  its  strict  bearing  upon  consciousness 
and  not  in  its  implications  for  the  general  theory  of 
knowledge,'  this  doctrine  takes  a  twofold  form :  first, 
consciousness  is  considered  as  a  Feeling  of  Difference  or 
Change,  and  second,  it  is  considered  as  a  Feeling  of  Re- 
lation betiveen  Suhjex^t  and  Object. 

I.  Consciousness  as  a  Feeling  of  DifEerence.'^  Bain 
says^  "we  are  never  conscious  at  all  without  experi- 
encing transition  or  change,"  "  we  know  nothing  in  itself, 
we  know  only  the  difference  that  exists  between  it  and 
something  else,"  and  "  a  change  of  impression  is  an  in- 
dispensable condition  of  our  being  conscious,  .  .  .  every 
mental  experience  is  necessarily  twofold,  ...  in  every 
feeling  there  are  two  contrasting  states."  ^  "Conscious- 
ness," says  Spencer,  "  is  the  continuous  differentiation  of 
its  constitutive  states." 

While  resting  upon  a  large  class  of  facts,  this  theory 
is  not  necessary  for  their  explanation.  It  goes  too  far. 
It  is  undoubtedly  true  that  change  is  a  stimulus  to  con- 
sciousness. Stimuli  long  prolonged  without  change  be- 
come less  intense,  and  gradually  so  habitual  that  they  are 
not  observed  ;  but  as  has  been  already  said,  we  cannot 
call  them  unconscious.  Change  in  such  conditions  tends 
to  revive  the  state  and  make  it  intense.  The  most  that 
can  be  said  is  that  change  or  difference  varies  the  degree 
of  consciousness,  not  that  it  constitutes  it.  If  the  latter 
were  true  we  would  never  be  conscious  of  a  prolonged 
sense  stimulus ;  for  however  consciousness  might  be 
sustained  in  reference  to  other  changing  stimuli,  it 
would  not  be  sustained  in  reference  to  the  particular 
stimulus  which  persists  unchanged.     But  we  are  con- 

'  See  Mill,  Examination  of  Hamilton. 
^  Bain,  Spencer,  George,  W.  Hagcn. 
3  Senses  and  Intellect,  3d  ed.,  p.  321. 
*  Hid.,  p.  9. 


€0  CONSCIOUSNESS. 

scious  of  such  jDrolonged  states  :  the  falling  of  the  rain, 
the  ticking  of  the  clock,  a  fixed  stare  upon  a  motionless 
scene. 

Again,  this  theory  confounds  consciousness  with  its 
content,  or  that  of  which  we  are  conscious.  Granted 
that  change  is  a  law  of  consciousness,  we  ask  :  change  of 
what?  Of  sensations.  Then  sensation  existed  before 
the  change  and  sensations  are  conscious.'  If  it  be  re- 
plied that  the  sensations  are  unconscious,  then  we  ask : 
how  do  you  know  that  the}'  are  not  physical  ?  And  if 
it  be  replied  again  that  consciousness  is  a  function  of 
j^hysical,  cerebral,  change,  we  ask  again  :  how  can  con- 
sciousness be  change  when  the  change  is  not  conscious  ? 
As  a  matter  of  fact  the  examples  cited  in  support  of  this 
theory  are  changes  in  consciousness,  that  is  from  one 
conscious  state  to  another.  If  this  be  meant,  then  con- 
sciousness could  never  have  begun  except  through  dif- 
ferent simultaneous  sensations.  For  example,  we  could 
not  be  conscious  of  the  change  in  color  from  red  to  blue 
unless  we  already  were  conscious  of  red,  except  when 
the  difference  arose  from  their  coexistence,  an  alterna- 
tive from  which  Mr.  Bain,  at  least,  is  cut  off.  But  even 
that  alternative  does  not  heljj  the  case,  since  granted  a 
difference  between  two  sensations,  how  do  we  reach  a 
sensation  of  their  difference  ? — a  question  to  be  urged  in 
speaking  of  the  higher  forms  of  consciousness.  A  real 
difference  is  not  the  same  as  a  perceived  difference.'  We 
can  conceive  a  consciousness  in  which  real  differences 
might  not  be  perceived ;  the  destruction  of  memory 
would  accomplish  this  for  successive  states.  Therefore 
if  we  are  not  conscious  of  the  states  that  differ,  how  can 
we  arrive  at  a  consciousness   of  their  difference?     The 

•  Cf.  Lotze,  Logic,  p.  20. 

-  A  distinction  partially  recognized  by  Mr.  Spencer,  Psychology,  i. 
in>.  ir,4-Fi. 


RELATIVE  THEORY  OF  CONSCIOUSNESS.  61 

feeling  of  difference  is  the  content  of  consciousness,  not 
consciousness  itself. 

The  facts  on  which  this  theory  rests  seem  to  be  ex- 
plained by  what  has  already  been  said  about  the  uncon- 
scious. An  excitation  long  persisting  tends  to  become 
unconscious  both  from  the  withdrawal  of  attention,  and 
the  weakening  of  the  central  processes  from  exhaustion. 
It  is  difficult  to  keep  the  attention  fixed  steadily  on  one 
subject.  It  is  soon  drawn  off,  and  as  the  mind  becomes 
absorbed  elsewhere,  the  former  image  falls  into  the 
subconscious.  The  organism,  also,  experiment  readily 
shows,  loses  the  elasticity  of  the  first  reaction,  and  its 
functioning  is  greatly  enfeebled  from  the  continued  ex- 
penditure. A  change  in  the  conditions,  however  slight, 
draws  the  attention,  at  the  same  time  brings  new 
physical  elements  into  play,  and  so  stimulates  conscious- 
ness. This  is  seen  in  the  unconsciousness  of  ordinary 
sleep.  It  is  produced  by  exhaustion  of  the  body  or  by 
monotonous  mental  conditions  which  diffuse  the  atten- 
tion. But  slight  stimulations  are  sufficient  to  produce 
dreams  or  even  to  awake  the  individual,  and  it  is  possi- 
ble that  a  low  state  of  consciousness  persists  during 
sleep.'  In  ordinary  forms  of  hypnotism,  the  fixed  mo- 
notony of  impression  produces  semi-unconsciousness  for 
the  same  reason.  Even  in  lethargy  where  consciousness 
seems  completely  suspended,  it  returns  at  a  single  phy- 
sical excitation.  If  change  at  all  be  at  the  basis  of  con- 
sciousness, it  is  physical  change  ;  but  still  it  is  absurd 
to  say  that  this  change  is  consciousness. 

2.  Consciousness  as  the  Feeling  of  a  Relation  between 
Subject  and  Object.  The  second  form  which  the  general 
doctrine  of  the  relativity  of  consciousness  takes,  is  as 
follows :  every  state  of  consciousness  is  a  felt  relation 
between  the  presenting  subject  and  the  presented  object. 

'  See  observations  by  Radestock,  Schlafund  Trauni,  pp.  102-108. 


'62  CONSCIOUSNESS. 

"Consciousness,"  says  Mansel,  "is  possible  only  under 
the  form  of  relation.  There  is  no  consciousness  without 
the  union  of  two  factors  ;  and  in  this  union,  each  is  what 
it  is  only  in  virtue  of  its  relation  to  the  other."  ' 

This  form  of  the  relational  theory  is  likewise  erro- 
neous. It  overlooks  the  beginning  of  consciousness  in 
child  life  and  interprets  only  the  contents  of  the  adult 
mind.  We  have  already  seen,  in  speaking  of  method, 
that  the  early  stages  of  consciousness  differ  from  the 
later  reflective  stages  in  this  respect,  that  there  is  a  lack 
of  the  presentative  or  relational  quality :  a  distinction 
which  we  find  running  through  all  conscious  sensation. 
These  states  of  pure  subjective  modification,  having  no 
reference  to  an  object,  such  as  simjjle  feelings  of  pain, 
hunger,  smell,  are  called  affective  as  distinguished  from 
jpresentative  states."*  Of  these  states,  this  theory  ofi'ers  us 
no  explanation  whatever.  The  earliest  child  conscious- 
ness is  probably  simply  a  mass  of  aftective  states  or  a 
condition  of  general  organic  feeling,  with  no  distinction 
between  the  me  and  the  not-me.  From  this  state  the 
diiferentiatiug  process  of  perception,  by  means  of  the 
presentative  element  of  sensation,  leads  to  the  develop- 
ment of  the  consciousness  of  self  and  not-self.' 

But  this  theory  also  confuses  the  necessity  of  real 
relation,  with  the  supposed  necessity  of  a  felt  relation. 
In  order  to  sensation  at  all  there  is  of  necessity'  a 
subject  and  an  object,  and  they  must  be  related :  but 
this  relation  does  not  enter  into  consciousness  until  the 
subject  consciousness  looks  in  upon  itself,  with  its  difi'er- 
entiating  scrutiny.  The  distinction  between  early  and 
late  consciousness  becomes  emphatic  in  the  lower  ani- 
mals. The  snail  and  oyster  probably  have  no  conscious- 
ness of  self  as  different  from  not-self.     From  this  simple 

^  See  Renouvier,  Easais  de  Critique,  I.  cli.  in  ;  also  Spencer. 

2  See  Chap.  VII,  §  1. 

3  See  Chap.  VIII. 


RELATIVE  THEORY  OF  CONSCIOUSNESS.  63 

state  of  feeling  in  the  young  child,  the  human  self-con- 
sciousness is  built  up  by  known  laws  of  mental  growth. 
The  two  stages  of  consciousness  may  be  called  therefore 
respectively  simple  and  reflective  consciousness. 

The  theory  that  consciousness  is  a  relation  is  part  and 
basis  of  the  theory  of  the  relativity  of  knowledge  in  general. 
If  what  we  know  in  consciousness  is  a  relation,  what  guarantee 
have  we  as  to  our  knowledge  of  objects  out  of  this  relation  ? 
The  mental  li-fe  becomes  the  closed  circuit  of  reality. 

But  if,  on  the  contrary,  we  see  in  consciousness,  as  the 
foregoing  justifies,  an  individual  knowledge  of  real  states,  that 
is,  not  a  feeling  of  relation,  but  a  simple  presentation,  be  it 
thing  or  relation,  it  follows  that  every  phenomenon  of  con- 
sciousness is  a  concrete  reality,  positive,  original,  single. '  It 
is  just  as  we  know  it,  and  is,  for  us,  absolute.  The  absolute 
is  that  which  really  is,  and  a  sensation  really  is  what  it  is  felt 
to  be.  Nothing  in  the  world  could  be  more  real,  not  the  so- 
called  things  in  themselves.  Our  psychic  life  is  real  and  not  a 
dream. 

The  fact  that  in  the  developed  or  reflective  consciousness 
the  differentiation  of  subject  and  object  is  always  present,  that 
is,  self-consciousness  is  distinguished  from  the  consciousness 
proper  of  things,  leads  us  to  look  upon  consciousness  as  an  in- 
dividual possession.  My  consciousness  is  my  own  and  no  one's 
else;  and  we  know  of  no  consciousness  which  includes  all  in- 
dividual consciousnesses.  "Universal  consciousness"  does 
not  exist  as  far  as  empirical  psychology  is  concerned.  If 
used  at  all,  it  means  only  what  is  common  to  individual 
consciousnesses.  So  reflective  consciousness  is  the  differentia 
of  self ,  that  which  distinguishes  me  from  all  other  thinking 
beings.  It  embraces  simply  the  circumscribed  area  of  my  own 
experience  considered  in  reference  to  myself. 

§  4.  Aeea  of  Consciousness. 

The  area  of  consciousness  is  the  sum  of  the  presen- 
tations at  any  time  in  consciousness,  whether  they  be 
distinct  or  vague.  Experiments  show  that  twelve  to 
fifteen  strokes  of  a  pendulum  can  be  held  in  con- 
sciousness at  once  without  counting  or  grouping.  If 
they  be  grouped  by  fives,  as  many  as  forty  may  be  re- 

'  Cf.  McCosh,  Cognitive  Powers,  pp.  21,  22. 


64  CONSCIOUSJS'ESS. 

tained.  The  most  favorable  interval  betweu  tliem  is  .2  to 
.3  second.'  Consciousness  may  be  likened  to  the  visual 
field  in  which  objects  are  scattered,  those  being  most 
clearly  seen  which  are  in  the  line  of  direct  vision  or  centre 
of  the  field,  and  those  which  lie  near  the  circumference 
most  indistinct.  Between  these  limits  there  are  all  degrees 
of  distinctness.  So  ideas  are  distinct  or  vague  in  con- 
sciousness according  as  they  are  in  the  line  of  mental 
vision,  or  attention.  The  idea  attended  to  is  most  dis- 
tinct, those  connected  closel}^  with  it  in  any  way  less  so, 
and  those  which  are  accidentally  present  and  quite  un- 
observed actively,  least  so.  According  as  they  lie  in  one 
or  other  locality  of  this  general  distribution,  conscious- 
ness of  them  is  said  to  have  different  degrees  or  forms . 

Degrees  or  'Forms  of  Consciousness.  These  may  be 
illustrated  by  an  example.  As  I  write,  the  noise  of  my 
pen  is  quite  unnoticed.  By  the  laAv  of  change,  already 
spoken  of,  it  tends  to  become  indistinct.  If  continued 
some  time,  it  is  no  longer  heard  and  is  said  to  be  suhcon- 
scious.  If,  however,  I  am  sufi'ering  Avitli  headache  and 
noises  irritate  me,  the  scratch  of  the  pen  becomes  pain- 
fully noticeable.  The  same  is  the  case  if  the  pen  is  a 
poor  one  and  scratches  more  as  used.  But  absorbed  in 
my  thought,  I  continue  to  write  though  conscious  of  the 
disturbing  noise.  It  is  then  said  to  be  in  a  state  of 
passive  consciousness.  Thus  a  thousand  things  around 
us,  the  table,  chair,  books,  are  present  to  our  minds,  but 
we  are  passive  in  regard  to  them.  If  now  I  am  led  to 
direct  my  attention  to  the  noise  of  my  pen  and  to  exam- 
ine the  point  in  order  to  remedy  it,  there  is  an  active 
putting  forth  of  mental  energy — a  conscious  expenditure 
of  inner  force.  This  is  active  consciousness  or  attention, 
and  the  process  by  which  the  attention  is  concentrated 
upon  the  image  is  apperception. 

'  Dietze,  Phil.  Siudien,  in.  p.  884.     Cf.  Ladd,  loc.  cit.  p.  494. 


APPERCEPTION.  65" 

It  is  well  to  note  the  play  of  ideas  tlirougli  all  these 
forms  of  transition,  from  the  dark  region  of  subcon- 
sciousness, to  the  brilliant  focus  of  attention.  Images 
pass  both  ways  constantly,  acting  varyingly  upon  one 
another  and  making  up  the  wonderful  kaleidoscope  of 
the  inner  life. 

Apperception.  Apperception  is  the  highest  and  most 
comprehensive  form  of  active  consciousness.  By  it  is 
meant  that  activity  of  synthesis  hy  which  mental  data  of  any 
kind  (sensations,  percepts,  concepts)  are  constructed  into 
higher  forms  of  relation  and  the  perception  of  things  which 
are  related  becomes  the  perception  of  the  relcdion  of  things. 
"  The  two  presentations  a  and  6,"  says  Lotze,'  "  constitute 
simply  occasions  vv^hereby  the  reaction  of  a  spiritual  ac- 
tivity is  aroused,  through  which  new  presentations,  such 
as  similarity,  identity,  contrast,  arise,  presentations  which, 
would  not  be  possible  without  the  exercise  of  this  new 
spiritual  activity."  The  relation  of  percepts  is  not  the 
same  as  the  perception  of  relation.  Apperception  is 
the  comprehensive  "  power  of  discovering  relations" 
(McCosh) ;  but  is  not  limited  to  the  operations  of 
thought.  It  is  the  essential  mental  act,  as  shall  appear, 
in  the  three  great  stages  of  mental  generalization,  j^ercep- 
tion,  conception,  and  judgment." 

The  use  of  the  word  apperception  in  recent  psychological- 
treatises  to  express  the  broadest  act  of  mental  relation,  is  of 
great  importance  and  value.  The  treatment  of  the  very  dis- 
tinct and  familiar  act  of  mind  in  attention,  of  grasping  de- 
tails, detached  and  meaningless,  and  relating  them  to  one 
another  in  a  new  mental  product,  has  heretofore  been  con- 
fined to  its  special  operations,  as  perception,  conception^ 
judgment,  to  each  of  whicli  a  different  name  was  given.  The 
plirase  apperception  singles  out  that  act  of  mind  which  is 
common  to  them  all — the  relating  activity  of  attention — and 

•  Outline  of  Psychology ,  §  23. 

^  Cf.  Martineau,  Siudy  of  Religion,  p.  194,  and  Laurie's  distinction 
between  attuition  and  intuition;  Metaphysica  nova  et  vetusta. 


66  CONSCIOUSWESS. 

thus,  by  its  general  application,  emphasizes  the  nnity  of  the 
intellectual  function  as  a  whole.  In  general,  we  may  say, 
whenever  by  an  act  of  attention  mental  data  are  tmified  into 
a  related  whole,  this  is  an  act  of  apperception. ' 


§  5.  Development  of  Consciousness. 

The  beginnings  of  consciousness  are  enveloped  in  great 
obscurity.  Shortly  after  birth  a  child  begins  to  show 
signs  of  memory  and  of  the  power  of  connecting  impres- 
sions. But  both  the  memory  and  power  of  association 
are  very  weak  and  depend  ujiou  intense  degrees  of  ex- 
citation, as  a  very  bright  light  or  a  very  loud  noise. 
When  the  child  is  several  months  old,  a  familiar  person 
is  forgotten  after  a  week's  absence.  Gradually  attention 
is  discovered,  at  first  vague  and  discontinuous,  and  after 
a  few  weeks,  voluntary.'^  This  is  shown  earliest  for  sight 
and  touch,  the  two  senses  which  discover  space  rela- 
tions. It  is  probable  that  the  earliest  consciousness  is  a 
mass  of  touch  and  muscular  sensations  experienced  in 
part  before  birth,  and  that  it  is  only  as  the  special  senses 
become  adapted  to  their  living  environment  and  sensi- 
tive to  their  peculiar  forms  of  excitation,  that  the  general 
organic  condition  is  broken  up  and  the  kinds  of  sensa- 
tion differentiated.  The  power  of  visualizing  or  forming 
permanent  images  in  memory  for  sight  is  developed  from 
the  fifth  to  the  seventh  year.'  This  process  of  differen- 
tiation of  the  sensations  of  touch  and  the  muscular  sense 
gives  us  very  early  the  form  of  our  own  body,  and  the  lo- 
calit}-  of  its  parts,  and  this  serves  as  point  of  departure 
for  the  placing  of  external  objects.  The  movement  of  the 
body  contributes  largely  to  the  apprehension  of  the 
dimensions,  forms,  and  areas  of  things  in  space.  The 
movements  of  the  body  are  at  first  random  and  without 

'  On  apperception,  in  general,  see  Wundt,  loc.  cit.  p.  219. 

-  Perez,  First  Three  Years  of  Childhood,  p.  25. 

^  Cf.  Jastrow,  Princeton  Review,  Jan.  '88,  art.  Dreams  of  the  Blind. 


DEVELOPMENT  OF  CONSCIOUSNESS.  67 

coutrol,  arising  from  nervous  discharge  under  conditions 
of  physical  discomfort.  They  gradually  take  on  a  pur- 
posive character,  but  even  after  two  or  three  3'ears  it 
is  difficult  for  the  child  to  execute  any  given  combina- 
tion of  movements.  This  fact  of  control  of  the  body 
seems  to  be  the  first  beginning  of  the  exercise  of  will.  It 
involves  a  subjective  reference  more  distinct  and  pecu- 
liar to  itself  than  any  of  the  purely  affective  sensations, 
and  leads  to  the  notion  of  the  /  and  so  to  5e?/'-conscious- 
ness. 

The  development  of  consciousness  is  largely  dependent 
upon  the  development  of  the  physical  organism.  The  senses 
must  Ijo  awake  to  their  functions  before  the  mind  can  exhibit 
its  functions.  Not  till  the  eyes  are  open  and  in  proper  move- 
ment can  the  impressions  of  that  sense  begin  to  play  their 
very  great  role  in  the  forms  of  external  perception.'  So  also 
must  the  centres  become  accustomed  to  their  reactions.  If 
we  liken  the  elective  activities  of  the  developed  nervous  sys- 
tem to  lines  of  least  resistance,  we  may  say  that,  for  the  very 
young  child,  such  organic  pathways  are  entirely  wanting  and 
they  must  be  established  and  maintained  by  actual  exercise. 
These  early  physical  modifications  becoming  more  and  more 
definite  and  multiplied,  the  more  complex  forms  of  mental 
function  are  made  possible.  Like  other  organs  of  the  body, 
also,  the  brain  grows  in  size  and  complexity.  It  attains  its 
largest  developnunit.  in  size  at  about  the  end  of  the  seventh 
year  ;  but  its  structural  development,  which  consists  in  tlie 
differentiation  of  parts  for  special  functions  and  the  estab- 
lishment of  various  connections  throughout  its  bulk,  is  then 
hardly  begun.  The  basal  ganglia  seem  to  develop  their  ac- 
tivities earlier  than  the  cerebral  hemispheres.  This  is  to  be 
expected,  since  they  are  connected  with  the  organic  and  es- 
sential processes  of  the  body. 

On  consciousness,  consult:  iu  general,  McCosh.  Cognitive  Powers., 
bk.  1,  ch.  H;  Hamilton,  Metaphysics,  Lect.  IX,  XI-XIII,  and  XV; 
Fortlage,  System  d.  Psychol.,  §§  6-13  and  93-94,  also  Beitrcif/e  znr 
Psychologic,  ^  15;  Drobisch,  Psychologie,  ^§  55-57  and  §  29;  Waitz, 
Lehrhiick  cl.  Psychol.,  §j  57-58;  Volkmunn,  Lehrbuch  d.  Psychologie, 
^  105-116;  Ladd,  Physiolog.  Psychol.,  p.  585;  Porter,  Human  In- 
tellect, pp.  83-119;  George,  Lehrhuch  d.  Psychol.,  pp.  222-234; 
Brentano,  Psychologie,  bk.  2,  ch.  n-iv;  Wundt,  Physiolog.  Psychol., 

'  See  Chap.  VIII. 


68 


COIfSCIOUSJS'ESS 


ell.  XV;  Mansel,  Metaphysics,  pp.  33-66  and  183;  Lotze,  Microcos- 
7nus,  bk.  2,  ch.  i  ;  Rabier,  Psychologie,  chap,  vi  and  vii  ;  Bain, 
/Senses  and  Intellect,  pp.  325-339 ;  (area  of)  Paulhau,  in  Revue  Sci- 
entiflque,  May  28,  '87. 

On  consciousness  and  the  unconscious :  Carpenter,  Mental  Phys- 
iol., chap.  XIII ;  Bventano,  Psychol.,  bk.  2,  chap,  ii  (of  especial 
value);  Lewes,  Problejns,  3d  series,  pp.  143-196;  Fortlage,  Beitrdge 
zur  Psychol.,  p.  164;  Porter,  Human  Intellect,  §  87;  Hamilton, 
Metaphysics,  Lect.  XVIII;  Ardigo,  liivista  di  filosofia  scientifica, 
Jan.  '88;  Colsenet,  La  vie  inconscient  de  V esprit;  Janet,  Revue 
philosophique,  xxii.  p.  577;  Sergi,  Psychologie  Physiologique,  bk.  3, 
chap,  i;  Mill,  Examination  of  Hamilton,  chap,  viii-ix,  also  chap. 
XV;  Hartmann,  Philosophy  of  the  Unconscious,  0;  Lipps,  Orund- 
thatsachen  des  Seelenlebens,  p.  125;  Kadestock,  Schlaf  und  Traum, 
pp.  284-287. 

Furtlier  Problems  for  Study  : 

Eise  of  consciousness; 
Animal  consciousness; 
Theories  of  consciousness; 
Higher  forms  of  consciousness. 


CHAPTER  Y. 

ATTENTION. 

§  1.  Definition"  of  Attention. 

In  the  consideration  of  consciousness,  a  difference 
"was  found  in  its  general  aspect  according  as  a  number 
of  presentations  were  loosely  scattered  about  its  field 
or  as  some  one  held  the  mind  directed  to  itself.  Con- 
sciousness is  thus  passive  or  active.  Active  consciousness 
is  in  general  attention.  It  is  the  act  of  holding  a  pres- 
entation before  the  mind.  It  is  in  all  cases  a  conscious 
act.  What  goes  on  in  the  relating  of  this  presentation 
to  others,  in  their  combination,  dissolution,  arrangement, 
is  due  to  the  activity  of  apperception,  which  is,  in  a 
large  measure,  mechanical  and  subconscious  :  but  the  at- 
tention which  makes  the  activity  of  apperception  possible 
is  known  at  once. 

Attention  as  Mental  Energy.  The  most  essential  pe- 
culiarity of  attention  is  the  feeling  of  expenditure  which 
its  exercise  occasions  in  the  mental  life.  Mental  ex- 
haustion and  fatigue  invariably  follow  a  more  or  less 
prolonged  stretch  of  the  attention.  Mental  states  may 
play  for  an  indefinite  period  in  consciousness  without 
impairing  our  mental  freshness  and  vigor,  provided  the 
attention  is  not  directed  to  them.  Further,  it  may  be 
said,  indulgence  in  air-castles,  day-dreaming,  and  ram- 
bling meditation,  is  a  means  of  recovering  intellectual 
freshness  after  a  strong  effort  of  attentive  thought. 
This  results  from  the  diffusing  of  the  attention  over  a 
very  wide  field  and  relaxing  control  of  the  flow  of  ideas. 

69 


70  ATTENTION. 

This  fact  in  its  bearings  upon  the  mental  life,  as  they 
shall  appear  in  the  course  of  our  exposition,  leads  us  to 
see  in  attention  the  only  exhibition  of  mental  energy  as 
distinguished  from  mental  states  :  and  in  the  conscious- 
ness of  this  abiding  energy  we  find  the  ground  of  men- 
tal unity  and  personality: 

Keflex  or  Involuntary  Attention.  Upon  observation 
of  ourselves  we  find  that  attention  may  be  stimulated 
either  from  some  foreign  and  unexpected  source  or  from 
the  will.  A  loud  noise,  a  violent  contact,  a  disagreeable 
odor,  at  once  attract  the  attention  without  our  volition 
or  even  against  it.  This  is  reflex  or  involuntary  attention. 
In  the  normal  state  of  the  consciousness,  attention  is  con- 
stantly open  to  appeals  of  this  kind.  Minds  with  little 
power  of  will  live  under  control  of  such  external  excita- 
tion. The  attention  is  drawn  hither  and  thither  in  rapid 
transition  with  no  fixed  concentration  upon  any  sen- 
sation or  idea.  In  such  minds,  as  we  shall  see  later,  the 
functions  of  apperception  are  disturbed,  and  its  prod- 
ucts unstable.  This  state  of  inability  to  hold  the  atten- 
tion against  other  solicitations  is  called  distraction :  the 
attention  is,  as  it  were,  drawn  apart  in  its  efibrts  at 
adaptation  to  different  conditions. 

Another  form  of  involuntary  attention  is  found  in 
cases  of  insistent  ideas.'  It  very  frequently  occurs  in 
normal  life  that  a  single  idea,  either  by  reason  of  a 
strong  association  or  of  a  feeling,  or  because  of  previous 
attention,  or  even  in  consequence  of  the  very  efi'ort  of 
the  will  to  banish  it  from  consciousness,  remains  before 
the  mind  and  holds  the  attention.  This  is  called  an  in- 
sistent or,  in  its  more  intense  forms,  Jixed  idea.  It  is 
generally  removed   by  a  change  of  scene,  companions, 

1  Called  in  German  Zwangvorstellung  :  from  Kraff t-Ebing.  See  art. 
on  Attention  by  Ribot,  Revue  Philosophique,  Feb.  '88.  Cf.  George, 
Lekrbuch  d.  Psychologic,  p.  374  and  f  ol. 


VOLUNTARY  ATTENTION.  71 

and  surroundiugs,  the  old  association  being  broken  or 
new  ideas  claiming  the  attention.  As  an  idea  becomes 
fixed  or  imperative,  it  gathers  round  it  other  ideas  in 
growing  associations  and  connections,  which  soon  give  a 
morbid  tone  to  the  entire  mental  life.  This  is  the  be- 
ginning frequently  of  monomanias  and  permanent  delu- 
sions,' which  become  chronic  in  insanity.  Frequently 
also,  it  is  supposed,  the  primary  tendency  to  some  form 
of  nerve  disturbance  or  brain  disease,  due  to  heredity, 
gives  occasion  and  strength  to  such  derangement. 

The  mechanical  nature  of  involuntary  attention  and 
its  intimate  relation  to  all  physical  and  mental  states  is 
seen  in  the  acts  of  a  patient  in  a  state  of  hypnotic  hallu- 
cination. Here  it  seems  that  the  element  of  will  is  en- 
tirely eliminated.  The  patient  has  absolutely  no  con- 
trol over  either  body  or  mind,  and  any  suggestion  either 
phj'sical  or  mental  from  the  hypnotizer  is  immediately 
realized  in  action.  It  seems  only  necessary  that  the  at- 
tention should  be  secured,  to  start  the  entire  train  of 
apperceptive  processes  with  the  physical  changes  which 
are  associated  with  them :  or  a  physical  attitude  or 
movement  may  be  forced  upon  the  patient,  only  to  be 
followed  by  all  the  emotional  and  intellectual  states  it 
suggests.  In  these  states,  the  intellectual  life  seems 
quite  normal  and  the  emotions  are  very  excitable  and 
facile  in  their  play  ;  but  all  inner  control  is  lost.  Action 
results  with  complete  necessity.  The  important  fact  in 
this  form  of  hypnotism  then  seems  to  be  the  fixing  of  an 
idea  till  it  becomes  imperative,  with  the  general  subjec- 
tive state  unchanged  by  the  substitution  of  ideas  which, 
it  brings  about. 

Voluntary  Attention.  In  strong  opposition  to  this  is 
voluntary  attention  or  attention  proper.  It  may  be  de- 
fined  as  a  state,   of  active  consciousness  due  to  voluntary 

^  See  case  described  by  Cowles,  Amer.  Jour,  of  Psych.,  Feb.  '88. 


72  ATTENTION. 

mental  exertion  or  effort.  Here  a  distinctly  new  element 
enters  into  consciousness,  mental  effort.  In  voluntary 
attention  we  find  the  first  exhibition  of  will.  It  is  the 
beginning  of  all  control  over  the  mental  life.  A  thou- 
sand things  may  appeal  to  me  for  consideration  and  I 
may  refuse  them  my  attention.  I  may  give  mj^self  to  a 
train  of  thought  and  be  substantially  unconscious  of 
sounds,  sights,  contacts  which  would  ordinarily  excite 
my  attention.  It  is  thus  in  the  familiar  condition  of  ah- 
straction  or  absent-mindedness.  This  peculiar  outgoing  of 
the  self  is  the  something  we  call  consent,  in  the  mental 
life.  From  it  we  first  arrive  at  consciousness  of  self,  by 
a  reference  of  what  we  do,  to  ourselves  as  doing  it.  It 
makes  possible,  as  will  appear  later,  the  fixing  and  con- 
nection of  ideas  in  the  higher  forms  of  thought. 

The  frequent  or  prolonged  exercise  of  attention  to  the 
same  presentation  or  idea  tends  to  bring  it  involuntarily 
before  the  mind.  Its  repetition  in  varied  circumstances 
establishes  various  associations  by  which  it  may  be  re- 
vived. Insistent  and  fixed  ideas  usually  become  so  from 
voluntary  thought  upon  them — from  what  we  call 
"  brooding  "  over  a  subject.  Thus  the  line  between  re- 
flex and  voluntary  attention  is  changed  and  much  that 
was  before  a  matter  of  choice  becomes  automatic  and 
necessary. 

§  2.  Beakings  of  ATTEXTioisr  iisr  the  Mental  Life. 

In  its  relation  to  the  great  classes  of  mental  facts,  the 
attention  is  of  the  first  importance.  In  general  it  may 
be  said  that  attention  intensifies  a  mental  state.  It  may 
be  considered  more  particularly  and  in  detail. 

I.  Relation  of  Attention  to  Sensation.  There  is  a  two- 
fold or  reactive  relation  between  attention  and  sensation. 
On  the  one  hand,  increased  intensity  of  sensation  draivs 
the  attention.     The  change  in  intensity  of  the  sensation  is 


RELATION  OF  ATTENTION  TO  MOVEMENT.         73 

a  direct  stimulus  to  the  attention,  by  forcing  its  appear- 
ance in  consciousness  :  and  the  attention  in  this  case  is 
reflex.  On  the  other  hand,  attention  directed  to  a  sensa- 
tion increases  its  intensity.  We  have  already  seen  that 
many  sensations  may  lie  in  consciousness  almost  unfelt, 
while  tlie  attention  is  otherwise  occupied.  It  is  only 
necessary  to  direct  the  attention  to  them  to  give  them 
their  full  force.  But  more  than  this,  the  attention  may 
give  them  increased  and  very  acute  intensity.  By  fixing 
the  attention  upon  bruises  and  burns,  we  increase  the 
pain  they  give  us.  Hence  the  efforts  we  make  to  divert 
a  sick  man's  attention  from  the  seat  of  his  disease,  by 
fixing  his  attention  on  some  new  artificial  sensation,  or 
by  interesting  him  in  another  topic  of  conversation. 
Hot  cloths  relieve  headache,  by  producing  a  counter- 
irritation.  This  effect  of  the  attention  is  especially  great 
in  nervous  diseases.  Paralysis  has  been  cured  or  driven 
from  limb  to  limb  in  hypnotic  patients  by  a  mere  sug- 
gestion, which  so  completely  occupied  the  attention  as 
to  induce  belief  in  the  effect.  So  insomnia  and  some- 
times dyspepsia  and  other  diseases  may  be  cured.' 

Attention  has  an  influence  also  upon  the  time  occu- 
pied by  a  sensation.  Experiments  show  that  a  certain 
time  is  necessary  for  the  feeling  of  an  excitation  from 
any  of  the  sense  organs  and  the  reaction  in  the  move- 
ment of  the  organ.  This  time  is  greatly  reduced  when 
the  excitation  is  expected.^  A  certain  time  seems  to  be 
necessary  for  the  adjustment  of  the  attention  to  the 
nature  and  source  of  the  stimulus,  and  this  is  reduced 
when  the  idea  is  present  beforehand  and  the  attention  is 
already  partially  adjusted. 

II.  Relation  of  Attention  to  Movement.  The  move- 
ment of  the  members  of  the  body  is  very  closely  connect- 

'  See  Albert,  Beitrag  zur  therapeutischen  VerwertJning  des  Hypnotis- 
mus,  and  Amer.  Jour,  of  Psychol.,  II.  2,  sect,  on  Hypnotism. 
-  For  details,  see  section  on  Fnychometry   (Chap.  VII,  §  6). 


74  ATTENTION. 

ed  with  corresponding  ideas.  No  voluntary  movement 
takes  place  without  its  idea  in  the  mind  :  and  often  tha 
idea  produces  the  movement  without  any  voluntary  im- 
pulse or  even  contrary  to  it.'  The  imitative  faculty  of 
children  shows  this  tendency  to  carry  out  all  movements 
thought  of.  We  often  find  ourselves  following  the 
movements  of  the  hands  or  lips  of  a  speaker  with  slight 
movements  of  our  own.  It  is  probable  that  no  word 
comes  into  the  mind  without  its  partial  formation  by  the 
vocal  chords,  as  is  seen  in  the  movements  of  the  lips  by 
many  in  reading  to  themselves  and  in  our  thinking 
aloud.  No  doubt  the  physical  association  involved 
plays  a  great  role  in  all  such  cases.  The  thought  of  a 
movement  has  preceded  and  led  to  the  movement  so 
often,  that  there  is  a  positive  tendency,  at  the  nervous 
centres,  to  the  discharge  of  the  energy  necessary  to  the 
accomplishment  of  the  act,  along  the  proper  courses. 
The  act  of  will,  then,  seems  to  be  selective  and  directive 
of  this  energy  of  nervous  discharge. 

This  tendency  to  movement  is  greatly  increased  by 
the  exercise  of  attention.  The  attention  tends  to  bring^ 
the  idea  more  distinctly  before  the  mind  and  thus  re- 
moves all  competing  ideas  Avhich  should  incite  to  differ- 
ent movements.  This  is  especially  the  case  when  the 
attention  dwells  upon  the  organ  or  on  the  thought  of 
movement.  There  is  then  a  twofold  effect  due  to  the 
attention.  It  tends  to  develop  latent  sensations,  as  we 
saw  above,  in  the  organ,  and  these  sensations  lead  to 
movement  for  their  relief  or  continuance  ;  or  it  produces 
movement  by  the  distinct  purpose  to  perform  an  act 
thought  of.  For  example,  if  the  picture  is  vividly  pre- 
sented of  a  workman  who  has  his  thumb  crushed  by  a 
hammer,  we  make  instinctive  movements  to  protect  the 
thumbs,  by  folding  them  in  the  hands. 

'  Fere  claims  that  every  sensory  excitation  at  first  induces  an  aug- 
meutation  of  motive  force  which  is  measurable  on  the  dynamometer. 


RELATION  OF  ATTENTION  TO  THE  INTELLECT.      75 

The  facts  of  hypnotic  suggestion  already  spoken  of 
show  the  automatic  connection  between  an  idea  strongly 
attended  to  and  its  physical  performance.  The  absence 
of  will  does  not  destroy  the  power  to  perform  the  action, 
but  only  the  power  to  prevent  or  direct  it.  The  con- 
sciousness is  so  contracted  in  this  state  that  each  idea 
in  turn  is  held  in  the  focus  of  attention.' 

III.  Relation  of  Attention  to  the  Intellect.  Attention, 
either  voluntary  or  reflex,  is  directly  involved  in  the 
operations  of  the  intellectual  functions.  It  is  the  merit 
of  the  French  philosophers  of  the  spiritualistic  school  to 
have  brought  out  the  fact  that  volition  enters  in  the 
most  primitive  forms  of  intellectual  synthesis.*  In  gen- 
eral, it  may  be  said  that  attention  increases  the  vividness 
of  representative  states  and  thus  renders  more  definite 
and  lasting  the  apperceptive  activities  of  synthesis, 
analysis,  relation,  as  seen  in  memory,  association,  judg- 
ment, and  reasoning.  It  is  necessary,  first,  to  the  reten- 
tion of  images.  The  capacity  to  retain  mental  pictures 
depends  upon  tiie  intensity'  of  the  original  presentation, 
and  the  clearness  of  its  relations ;  and  this  intensity  and 
clearness  are  enhanced  by  the  attention.  The  supply  of 
materials  which  we  have  for  use  in  the  higher  forms  of 
thought  depends  at  once  upon  our  attentiveness  to  what 
passes  before  us  in  our  every-day  life.  When  we  wish 
to  retain  any  event,  we  press  it  upon  the  attention  and 
note  its  surroundings.  Second,  attention  increases  the 
intensity  of  the  reproduced  image  in  the  same  way.  If 
we  recall  the  face  of  a  friend,  it  is,  at  first,  dim  and  indis- 
tinct, but  by  holding  it  closely  before  us  and  scrutiniz- 
ing it,  we  can  bring  it  clearly  out  in  more  detail.  The 
attention  shifts  rapidly  from  point  to  point  upon  the 

'  On  the  motor  accompaniments  of  attention,  and  its  affective  bases, 
see  Ribot,  PsycJiologie  de  l' Attention. 
2  Cf.  Part  IV,  on  the  Will. 


76  ATTENTION. 

image.  Tliird,  tlie  duration  or  time  of  all  mental  states, 
as  of  simple  sensation,  is  made  shorter  by  attention,  as  is 
seen  in  experiments  on  the  association  of  ideas  and  esti- 
mation of  differences.' 

In  the  view  of  some,  the  higher  processes  of  the  intel- 
lect, depending  as  they  do  upon  the  active  principle  of  atten- 
tion, are  forms  of  the  activity  of  attention.^  So  Prof.  Wundt 
in  his  doctrine  of  ajiperception  as  a  relating  activity,  which  is 
at  once  a  form  of  will.  It  cannot  be  doubted  that  it  is  only 
in  and  through  attention  that  mental  synthesis  and  elabora- 
tion take  place,  yet  it  seems  truer  to  the  facts  to  separate 
voluntary  attention  from  this  process.  Apperception  can 
then  be  used  for  the  generic  activities  of  synthesis  and  rela- 
tion, which  take  place  through  either  reflex  or  voluntary 
attention.  Wimdt  fails  to  discriminate  sufficiently  between 
reflex  and  voluntary  attention  in  his  doctrine  of  ajjperception.^ 

IV.  Relation  of  Attention  to  Feeling.'*  Attention  has 
the  same  intensifying  influence  upon  the  affective  states 
in  general  as  upon  sensation.  Emotion  is  heightened 
when  the  attention  is  directed  to  it.  Hope,  joy,  fear, 
anger,  grow  very  greatly  in  intensity  when  thought  of, 
and  as  quickly  die  down  when  dismissed  from  the  atten- 
tion. With  the  higher  emotions  it  is  very  difficult  to 
control  the  attention,  so  thoroughly  do  they  usurp  the 
field  of  consciousness.  So,  also,  pleasure  and  pain, 
called  the  tone  of  feeling,  are  increased  by  being  attended 
to  and  diminished  when  the  attention  is  withdrawn. 

The  especial  relation  existing  between  the  attention 
and  the  feeling  of  interest  has  often  been  remarked  by 
psychologists.  This  feeling  of  interest  is  often  akin  to 
that  of  personal  advantage  or  indi\'idual  preference, 
■which  we  find  playing  an  important  part  in  the  flow  of 
our  associated  ideas.     It  gives  a  spontaneousness  and 

1  See  Cbap.  VII,  §  6. 

«  See  Lotze,  Metaph.,  %  273. 

3  Cf.  Volkmann,  Psych.,  pp.  191-2. 

*  Attention  as  a  form  of  will  is  treated  under  Will. 


TRAINING  OF  THE  ATTENTION.  77 

ease  to  the  attention  which  renders  the  latter  more  affec- 
tive and  less  wearisome  to  the  inner  life.  Attention  to 
that  which  interests  us  does  not  demand  the  outgo  of 
mental  effort. 

V.  Relation    of   Attention    to  the  Bodily  Functions. 

Attention  long  directed  tends  to  derange  the  automatic 
functions  of  the  body.  The  automatic  functions  are 
those  which  go  on  unconsciously  to  ourselves.  The 
action  of  the  heart  is  accelerated  by  being  closely  at- 
tended to.  The  digestive  apparatus  may  be  deranged 
by  being  watched,  and  so  also  m&j  the  breathing  pro- 
cess. Attention  is  also  accompanied  by  certain  attitudes 
of  the  bod}',  such  as  turning  the  ear  or  eye  in  a  given 
direction,  bending  forward,  frowning,  and  other  muscular 
contractions.  A  feeling  of  tension  also  is  felt  in  the  end 
organ.  This  tends  to  show  that  it  is  the  motor  elements 
of  the  brain  which  are  involved  in  attention,  while  the 
effect  it  works  upon  the  sensation  shows  a  sensory  modi- 
fication following  upon  the  other.' 

§  3.  Educational  Bearings  of  the  Doctrine  of 
Attention." 

Training  of  the  Attention.  The  considerations  al- 
ready advanced  tend  to  show  the  importance  of  the 
attention  in  education.  The  secret  of  the  case  rests 
upon  making  attention  completely  voluntary.  Strength 
of  thought  depends  very  largely  upon  the  voluntary  con- 
trol or  concentration  of  attention,  in  such  a  way  as  to  pre- 
vent distraction  from  accidental  and  unexpected  influ- 
ences. This  training  of  the  attention  should  begin  at 
the  earliest  possible  period.  The  child  should  be  taught 
to  observe  continuously  some  thing  that  interests  him, 

'  Cf.  Ladd,  Phys.  Psycliology,  pp.  538  and  542,  and  l^\xndA,Ibid.,  ii.  p, 
210. 

2Cf,  Sully,  Outlines  of  Psychology,  p.  103. 


78  ATTENTION. 

and  encouraged  to  ask  questions  about  objects  and  their 
relations.  In  very  early  life  these  things  should  be  left 
to  his  own  selection,  until  the  laws  of  apperceptive  syn- 
thesis are  develoj^ed,  that  is,  until  he  learns  somewhat 
to  connect  things  and  events  and  see  their  bearings. 
Otherwise  the  forcing  of  the  will  may  interfere  with  the 
development  of  the  emotions,  which  are  then  the  control- 
ling factor.  But  as  soon  as  practicable,  the  teacher  should 
attract  and  hold  the  child's  attention,  at  first  to  pleasant 
things  and  afterward  to  indifferent  things.  Great  care 
should  be  exercised  in  the  general  surroundings.  All 
distractions,  such  as  open  windows,  pet  animals,  play- 
things, should  be  guarded  against :  they  practically  call 
upon  the  child  to  attend  to  several  things  at  once.  Care 
should  be  taken  also  not  to  fatigue  the  attention.  The 
periods  of  study  had  better  be  too  short  than  too  long ; 
for  if  the  child  grows  tired,  the  effort  becomes  painful 
and  the  subject  distasteful.  Frequent  recesses  should 
be  given  and  recitations  should  not  be  longer  than  fif- 
teen to  twenty  minutes,  for  children  under  twelve  to  four- 
teen years  of  age.  The  child's  interest  should  never  be 
allowed  to  flag. 

Habits  of  Attention.  In  this  way  regular  habits 
of  attention  may  be  formed  very  early,  which  have  the 
same  force  in  life  as  all  other  habits.  Attention  thus 
becomes  application,  which  is  voluntary  and  agreeable  : 
and  with  this  basis  the  student  has  no  trouble  in  devot- 
ing himself  to  subjects  of  thought  for  longer  periods. 

A  caution  is  perhaps  in  order,  as  to  sameness  in  the 
kinds  of  instruction  given  in  early  life.  It  is  well  that 
the  same  general  cast  of  thought  should  not  engage  too 
much  of  the  early  attention  of  the  student.  It  gives  a 
bent  to  all  his  subsequent  development.  John  Stuart 
Mill  is  a  good  example  of  this.  It  is  especially  danger- 
ous when  it  involves  the  emotional  side  of  our  nature. 


HABITS  OF  ATTENTION.  79 

Religious  teachers  use  this  fact  not  only  properly  to 
instruct  in  morality  and  religion,  but  also  to  excite  early 
prejudices  and  repulsions  which  can  never  be  shaken 
off.  Nurses  often  give  children  associations  of  fear  which 
persist  through  life.  This  is  the  origin,  frequently,  of 
the  insistent  ideas  spoken  of,  which  intrude  themselves 
upon  us  and  make  many  of  us  to  a  degree  hobbyists  and 
monomaniacs. 

On  the  attention,  consult :  "Wundt,  Physiologische  Psychologic, 
II.  p.  205  ;  Carpenter,  Mental  Physiology,  ch.  iii ;  George,  Psychol- 
ogie,  pp.  84  and  538-543  ;  Waitz,  Lehrbuch  d.  Psychologie,  §  55  ; 
Hickok,  Mental  Science,  pp.  66-72;  Fortlage,  System  d.  Psychologie, 
p.  100  and  §§  46-47  ;  Ribot,  Psychologie  deV Attention  ;  Ohev&iemQV, 
Brain,  I.  p.  439  ;  Cappie,  Brain,  ix.  p.  196  ;  Sully,  Outlines  of 
Psychology,  ch.  iv  ;  Dewey,  Psychology,  ch.  iv.  §  5  and  his  references, 
pp.  154-5  ;  Ladd,  Pliys.  Psychology,  pp.  538-42  ;  Stewart,  Philos- 
ophy of  the  Human  Mind,  pt.  1,  ch.  ii  ;  Lewes,  Problems  of  Life 
and  Mind,  3d  series,  p.  184  ;  Bradley,  Mind,  July,  1886. 

On  apperception  :  Waitz,  Brundlegung  d.  Psych. ,  p.  77  ;  Wundt, 
loc.  cit.  ch.  XVI,  and  LogiTi,  I.  pt.  1,  ch.  ii  ;  Erdmann,  Vierteljahr- 
schriftfilr  wissenschaftliche  Philosophic,  x.  p.  320  ;  Lange,  Philoso- 
phisclic  Studien,  iv.  3  ;  Dewey,  Psychology,  pp.  85-90  ;  Ribot,  6*^?'- 
7nan  Psychology,  p.  220 ;  Lotze,  Metaphysic,  bk.  3,  ch.  m  ;  Staude, 
Philosophische  Studien,  i.  p.  149  ;  Volkmann,  Lehrbuch  d.  Psycho- 
logie, f§  110-114. 

Further  Probletns  for  Study : 

Physical  accompaniments  of  attention  ; 
Affective  or  emotional  basis  of  attention  ; 
Accommodation  of  the  attention  to  its  object ; 
Relation  of  voluntary  attention  to  will. 


PART  II. 

INTELLECT, 


CHAPTER  VI. 

DIVISION  OF  THE  INTELLECTUAL  FUNCTIONS. 

The  Intellect  is  the  faculty  of  knowledge.    It  includes 
tlie  following  functions : 

I.  The  Apperceptive  Function,  which  in  turn  com- 
prises : 

1.  Presentation  or  Acquisition,  being 

a.  Sensation ; 
h.  Perception. 

2.  Representation,  being 

a.  Conservation  or  Memory ; 
h.  Combination ; 
c.  Elaboration. 

II.  The  Rational  Function. 

§1.    DeMARKATION   of  the   FUITCTIONS. 

I.  The  Apperceptive  Function.  Under  this  function 
are  included  all  those  operations  which  take  place  under 
the  activity  of  apperception  ;  those  which  owe  their  jDro- 
duct  to  an  active  spiritual  synthesis.* 

The  function  of  Presentation  or  Acquisition  is  that 
by  which  the  material  of  knowledge  is  gained.    It  covers 

'  See  the  definition  of  apperception,  Chap.  IV,  §  4, 

80 


DIVISION  OF  THE  FUNCTIONS.  81 

the  tAvo  sources  of  our  knowledge  in  experience,  Sense- 
perception  and  Self -consciousness. 

The  function  of  Representation,  as  the  word  implies, 
is  that  by  which  the  material  acquired  in  Presentation  is 
retained,  reproduced,  and  intelligentl}^  used  in  the  pro- 
cesses of  mind.  Its  operations  are  considered  under 
three  great  heads  :  a.  Conservation  or  Memory,  which  in- 
cludes the  Retention,  Reproduction,  Recognition,  and  Local- 
ization in  time,  of  Representations ;  h.  Combination,  which 
is  the  disposition  of  these  reproduced  states  in  the  new 
forms  of  the  Imagination,  the  law  of  its  disposition  being 
Association  ;  c.  Elaboration,  which  is  the  function  of 
intellect  projoer,  constituting  the  operations  of  ThougJit. 
Under  it  we  find  again  three  mental  stages.  Conception, 
Judgment,  Reasoning. 

The  Elaborative  function  is  further  distinguished 
from  the  other  apperceptive  functions  as  being  discur- 
sive, rather  than  sensitive.  The  sensitive  operations  are 
more  closely  connected  with  the  known  conditions  of  the 
bodily  organism  and  are  common  to  man  and  the  ani- 
mals. The  Elaborative  and  Rational  functions,  on  the 
contrary,  show  a  free  development  of  mind  away  from 
the  data  of  sense  and  thus  seem  to  distinguish  man  from 
animals. 

II.  The  Rational  Function.  All  the  foregoing  opera- 
tions, both  presentative  and  representative,  are  subject 
to  a  law  of  universal  validity,  the  law  of  Identity  or  Non- 
contradiction. And  the  intelligence  when  exercised  upon 
things  in  general  is  governed  by  the  principle  of  Suffi- 
cient Reason.  As  judgments  these  principles  are  also 
apperceptive,  but  they  are  not  contingent  upon  experi- 
ence, as  other  judgments  are.  These  with  other  prin- 
ciples of  the  same  nature,  as  causation,  right  and  wrong, 
run  through  all  knowledge  and  constitute  the  Reason. 


THE   APPERCEPTIVE   FUNCTION. 

PRESENTATION. 


CHAPTEK  YII. 

SENSATION. 

§  1.    General  Nature  of  SEiyrsATio]sr. 

Sensations  are  the  primary  events  of  tlie  mental  life. 
They  are  so  called  because  they  arise  through  the  senses. 
We  use  the  word  in  its  usual  sense,  as  meaning  the  great 
body  of  psychological  phenomena,  both  affective  and 
presentative,  which  result  within  the  mind  immediately 
from  impressions  upon  the  senses.  The  presentations  of 
moisture  and  resistance  which  follow  from  contact  with 
a  piece  of  iron,  and  the  pain  felt  in  case  it  is  hot,  are 
equally  sensations. 

Tliere  are  several  meanings  given  to  the  word  sensation, 
two  of  which  are  strongly  upheld  in  opposition  to  the  meaning 
given  above.  Sometimes  it  is  applied  to  phenomena  purely 
phAfsical,  that  is,  phenomena  without  consciousness.  Claude 
Bernard  and  Lewes  speak  of  the  sensibility  of  living  tissue, 
meaning  to  express  the  fact  that  living  tissue  has  tlie  property 
of  contracting  under  excitation.  Mr.  Lewes'  says  tliat  ''reflex 
action  is  a  sentient  process,"  and  Gerdy°  defines  sensation  as 
"the  change  that  takes  place  in  the  organ  affected  under  the 
influence  of  an  excitation."  But  the  use  of  the  words  sensa- 
tion and  sensibility  in  this  sense  is  quite  iinwarraiited.  L^sage 
requires  the  limitation  of  these  words  to  the  facts  of  conscious- 

'  P)'ob.  II,  3d  series,  chap.  viii. 
'  Les  Sens  et  I' Intelligence. 

83 


I 


BISTUWTION  BETWEEN  SENSATION  AND  IMPRESSION.  83 

ness.  To  apply  them  to  facts  of  tlie  physical  order,  to  desig- 
nate by  them  a  property  of  unconscious  matter,  is  to  enlarge 
the  domain  of  psychology,  with  Lewes,  until  it  loses  all  charac- 
teristic limits  and  becomes  a  department  of  biology.  For  such 
phenomena  the  words  impression,  contraction,  contractility, 
may  be  used,  but  not  the  word  sensation. 

But  even  with  this  limitation,  another  meaning  is  often 
given  to  sensation;  it  is  used  to  designate  jyleasure  and  jt>«{?i, 
as  they  follow  the  excitation  of  the  sense-organs.  In  this  case 
the  Avord  perception,  which  is  contrasted  with  it,  is  used  to 
signify  the  qualitative  element,  as  sound,  color,  which  results 
from  the  impression.  In  this  sense,  sensation  is  exclusively 
an  affective  and  never  a  presentative  phenomenon.  The  dis- 
tinction is  a  true  one,  in  fact,  and  is  always  to  be  made  ;  but 
we  cannot  use  the  word  sensation  to  designate  pleasure  and 
pain  alone.  We  shall  find  another  term,  as  used  in  current 
discussion,  to  cover  this  distinction.' 

From  whatever  standpoint  we  approach  the  subject,  it  is 
universally  confessed  that  experience  gives  us  the  first  ele- 
ments of  knowledge.  Sensations  are  the  beginning  of  experi- 
ence, and  it  is  by  sensation  that  we  must  begin  the  study  of  the 
intelligence. 

Distinction  between  Sensation  and  Impression.  Sensa- 
tion being  thus  defined,  it  must  be  carefully  distinguished 
from  the  physical  phenomenon  which  precedes  or  accom- 
panies it.  The  impression  is  the  modification  of  the 
organ,  especially  of  the  nerves  and  nervous  centres,  which 
arises  from  an  external  stimulus ;  as  the  vibration  of 
ether  or  air.  The  nature  of  the  different  sense  impres- 
sions is  not  well  understood  ;  but  in  each  case  they  are 
some  form  of  movement.  They  liave  all  the  charac- 
teristics of  physical  phenomena :  tliey  can  be  localized, 
measured,  apprehended  b}'  the  senses.  Sensation,  on 
the  other  hand,  both  affective  and  presentative,  cannot 
be  compared  wdtli  movement  of  any  kind.  The  differ- 
ence between  them  is  plainly  seen  in  the  fact  that  an  im- 
pression may  take  place  without  any  sensation.  The 
impression  may  be  too  feeble,  or  too  prolonged,  or  too 

'  For  the  different  meanings  of  the  word  sensation,  see  Hamilton  s 
Beid,  Note  D. 


84  SENSATIOm 

often  repeated,  as  tlie  irritatiou  of  our  clotliing,  to  w]iiclx 
we  are  habituated :  or  the  attention  may  be  occupied,  so 
that  the  impression  does  not  produce  its  usual  sensation. 

Affective  and  Presentative  Elements  in  Sensation.  In 
most  sensations  there  is  a  distinct  knowledge  element 
over  and  above  the  intensive  subjective  state,  which  con- 
stitutes the  sensation  proper.  There  is  an  element  of 
knowledge  of  things  without  us  or  of  our  own  bodies. 
This  is  the  presentative  or  perception  element  in  sensa- 
tion. It  is  often  called  "original  perception"  in  distinc- 
tion from  the  "  acquired  " '  or,  as  we  shall  say,  synthetic 
perception  of  objects  in  their  completeness  in  space. 
There  are  great  differences  in  sensations  in  this  respect. 
And  it  seems  proper  to  divide  the  senses  into  three  classes, 
according  as  the  presentative  element  is  prominent  or 
not."  First  the  sensations  of  the  inner  organs  of  the 
body,  called  organic  sensations,  and  of  passive  touch  and 
temperature ;  then  sensations  of  taste  and  smell ;  and 
finally  sensations  of  hearing,  sight,  and  active  touch.  In 
the  first  class  the  affective  element  j)redominates  and 
seems  to  constitute  the  whole  sensation.  In  the  transi- 
tion to  the  second  class,  and  finally  to  the  third,  this 
element  disappears  by  degrees,  while  the  presentative 
element  increases.  In  the  organic  sensations,  we  have 
no  appreciable  knowledge,  but  in  sight  and  hearing  we 
may  have  much  knowledge  and  very  little  feeling.  Ham- 
ilton announced  the  law,  already  anticipated  by  Kant,' 
that  the  two  elements  vary  in  inverse  ratio — which  is  true 
in  a  very  rough  way." 

The  question  as  to  where  perception  begins  in  distinction 
from  sensation  is  very  difficult.     It  seems  to  be  true  that  in 

'  See  McCosh,  Psychology,  vol.  i.  p.  28. 

'  J.  Lacbelier,  Cours  inedit. 

3  Antlmqwlogie,  p.  139. 

■»  Metaphysics,  vol.  ii.  xxiv. 


I 


CHARACTERS  OF  SENSATION:   QUALITY.  85 

most  sensations  tliere  is  an  immediate  perception  of  a  not-self, 
to  which  the  sensation  is  referred,  as  opposed  to  self. '  Under 
this  aspect  we  call  the  phenomenon  perception;  while  consid- 
ered as  a  modification  or  experience  of  the  self  alone,  it  is 
sensation.  It  is  really  the  same  fact  looked  at  in  two  ways, 
M.  Rabier's  limitation  of  the  affective  element  to  pleasure  and 
pain  cannot  be  upheld;  since  a  sound  may  be  purely  affective 
Avhether  pleasurable  or  painful  or  neither,  as  a  loud  unlocal- 
ized  and  unrecognized  sound.  Pleasure  and  pain  are  purely 
affective,  but  they  are  not  the  whole  of  the  affective  quality  of 
sensation.  The  relation  of  the  two  elements  in  the  different 
senses  will  be  spoken  of  under  the  various  kinds  of  sensation 
respectively. 

§  3.  Chakactees  of  Seksation. 

All  sensations  have  certain  general  characters,  whicli 
are  subjected  to  investigation.  These  characters  are  four 
in  number. 

I.  Quality :  that  property  by  which  sensations  are 
distinguished  as  coming  from  different  senses,  such  as 
color,  sound,  taste. 

II.  Quantity  :  meaning  intensity  or  mass  of  sensation. 
Investigations  in  intensity  constitute  Psychophysics.' 

III.  Duration:  the  time  occupied  by  the  sensitive 
function  with  its  accompanying  physical  and  volitional 
processes.  Investigations  in  this  field  constitute  Psy- 
choinetry."^ 

IV.  Tone:  the  pleasure  or  pain  which  accompanies 
all  sensation.     These  characters  are  considered  in  order. 


§  3.  Quality  of  Sensatioist. 

There  is  much  uncertaint}^  as  to  the  proper  classifica- 
tion of  the  sensations.  It  appears  very  easy  to  discover 
at  once  what  is  immediately  given  as  a  pure  and  simple 
sensation.  But  it  is  not  so.  At  the  age  of  maturity, 
when  one  is  able  to  make  an  analytical  study  of  his  sen- 

'  Hamilton,  Metaphysics,  vol.  I.  p.  193.  ^  See  table-p.  31. 


86  SENSATION. 

sitive  states,  lie  finds  tliem  no  longer  in  tliat  pure  and 
primitive  state  which  he  would  wish.  They  have  under- 
gone a  twofold  alteration.  In  the  first  place,  all  our 
senses  act  together,  and  different  sensations,  by  virtue  of 
the  laws  of  association,  are  integrated  as  one.  And 
further,  by  virtue  of  the  same  laws,  intellectual  ele- 
ments are  superposed  upon  our  sensations,  making  them 
much  more  complex.  These  associations  become,  after 
time  has  made  them  habitual,  almost  indissoluble.  So 
that  it  is  very  difiicult  to  isolate  the  different  sensations 
from  one  another,  or  the  great  body  of  sensitive  data  from 
the  contributions  of  reason  and  experience.  Hence  ob- 
servation is  not  sufficient.  As  we  have  already  seen, 
recourse  must  be  had  to  experiment  for  the  production  of 
artificial  conditions  ;  and  to  abnormal  cases,  such  as  when 
one  of  the  senses  is  wanting  from  heredity,  disease,  or 
accident. 

Smell.  The  complication  of  data  spoken  of  may  be 
illustrated  in  the  sense  of  smell.  The  pure  sensation 
cannot  be  isolated  :  it  involves  both  intellectual  data  and 
a  multitude  of  other  sensations.  Among  the  acquired 
notions  which  a  given  odor  involves,  is  the  representa- 
tion of  the  object  from  which  the  odor  proceeds,  an 
association  extremely  serviceable  to  man  and  animals  in 
finding  and  testing  food ;  the  more  or  less  exact  notion  of 
the  direction  and  distance  of  the  object ;  and  finally  the 
idea  of  the  organ  of  the  body  which  is  afl^ected.  The  local- 
ization of  smell  in  the  nostrils  is  very  vague  and  gives 
us  little  knowledge.  On  the  other  hand  the  concomitant 
sensations  with  which  this  sense  is  connected  are  very 
numerous  and  complicated.  First,  there  are  organic  and 
vital  sensations  arising  from  the  digestive  and  respiratory 
tracts.  We  distinguish  between  appetitive  odors  and 
nauseating  odors.  The  odor  of  meat  excites  the  appe- 
tite of  carnivorous   animals,  and  that  of  a  full  pantrj 


SMELL:   TASTE.  87 

moves  our  own.  And  in  relation  to  respiration,  odors  are 
fresh,  as  that  of  Cologne-water,  which  excites  a  feeling 
of  freedom  in  breathing ;  or  suffocating,  as  that  of  a 
long-shut-up  house,  which  seems  to  hinder  respiration. 
Second,  we  find  sensations  of  taste  always  associated 
with  those  of  smell.  The  organs  of  taste  and  smell  seem 
to  act  in  sympathy.  "We  speak  of  delicious  odors  as 
giving  us  a  taste  of  the  object  beforehand.  Third,  sen- 
sations of  touch  are  associated  with  smell  in  the  mucous 
lining  of  the  nostril,  as  in  impressions  which  involve  a 
tickling  sensation.  Fourth,  there  are  also  muscular  sen- 
sations arising  from  the  movement  of  the  nostrils  in 
breathing  in  odorous  vapors.  Fifth,  to  these  we  add 
sensations  of  temperature,  heat  and  cold.  The  odor  of 
camphor  seems  cold  and  that  of  alcohol  warm. 

It  has  been  found  impossible  to  isolate  pure  sensa- 
tions of  smell  for  classification  or  description.  The 
most  we  can  do  is  to  throw  them  into  general  classes,  as 
aromatic,  fragrant,  pungent,  which  a.re  not  at  all  exhaust- 
ive. This  applies  in  a  measure  also  to  the  other  sensa- 
tions, though  in  a  less  degree  in  the  higher  senses,  sight, 
touch,  and  sound. 

Taste.  Taste  is  involved  in  the  same  obscurity.  We 
only  know  that  it  has  its  organ  in  elements  on  the  sur- 
face of  the  tongue,  called  gustatory  bulbs  or  flasks,  which 
communicate  with  the  sensorium  by  the  lingual  and 
glossal  nerves.  The  intimate  connection  with  smell  is 
seen  in  the  fact  that  the  impairment  of  smell  by  disease 
or  cold  injures  the  power  of  taste.  Tastes  are  infinite  in 
their  variety  and  cannot  be  classified.  Certain  classes 
of  tastes  are  well  discriminated  in  experience,  such  as 
sweet,  bitter,  sour  ;  but  they  are  very  few  compared  with 
the  vast  number  which  remain  undescribed.  The  pre- 
sentative  element  in  sensations  of  taste  is  very  slight. 
We  have  an  indefinite  feeling  of  the  locality  of  the  sensa- 


88  SENSATION. 

tion,  but  this  arises,  in  the  main,  from  feelings  of  touch 
upon  foreign  substances  in  the  mouth,  and  from  the 
muscular  movement  of  the  organs  inyolved  in  eating 
or  drinking.  No  knowledge  of  the  object  affecting  us  is 
given  immediately  in  either  taste  or  smell,  since  the 
stimulating  agent  is  in  gaseous  or  soluble  form. 

Organic  or  Systemic  Sensations.  There  are  through- 
out the  body  various  organic  sensations  which  are  quite 
internal  and  only  indefinitely  localized.  Such  are  the 
visceral  sensations,  respiratory  sensations,  feelings  of 
bodily  comfort  or  discomfort  in  general.  Their  most 
marked  characteristic  is  their  tone  value,  the  high  de- 
gree of  pleasure  or  pain  which  they  contain.  These 
sensations,  however  vague  and  general,  are  of  great  im- 
portance to  the  mental  life.  They  are  the  background 
of  our  emotional  condition — since  they  indicate  an  ele- 
vated or  depressed  condition  of  bodily  vitalit}^ — and  give 
general  cast  to  our  state  of  mind.  The  dyspeptic  soon 
becomes  unreasonable  and  gloomy,  and  biliousness  in- 
terferes with  the  normal  activity  of  the  mind.  The  gen- 
eral condition  of  the  sensorium  as  a  whole  is  often  a 
determining  factor  in  thought  and  conduct.  It  is  notice- 
able that  changes  in  climate  and  weather  have  a  great 
influence  upon  these  organic  feelings,  largely  through 
the  elevation  or  depression  of  the  respiratory  function. 

Muscular  Sense.  The  earliest  of  the  senses  in  its  de- 
velopment is  the  muscular  sense.  By  it  is  meant  feelings 
of  the  activity  of  the  muscles  of  the  body  as  concerned  in 
movement.  As  to  the  existence  of  such  a  class  of  sensa- 
tions, as  seen  in  lifting,  pushing,  straining,  and  in  the  weari- 
ness that  follows  muscular  exertion,  there  is  no  doubt. 
Many  psychologists,  however,  attempt  to  resolve  them 
into  sensations  of  touch,' or  consider  them  as  an  "assem- 
'  So  Rabier,  PsycJwlogie,  pp.  103-108. 


MUSCULAR  SENSE.  89 

blage  of  sensations  of  different  categories." '  The  former, 
liowever,  cannot  be  held,  since  such  sensations  remain 
after  complete  destruction  of  the  sensibility  of  the  skin 
and  in  cases  of  anaesthesia  of  the  limbs.  Beaunis  finds 
that  a  singer  retains  control  over  the  vocal  chords,  after 
their  sensitiveness  to  touch  has  been  destroyed  by  co- 
caine." Clinical  cases  show  the  same  for  the  limbs.  This 
indicates  that  the  skin  is  not  the  organ  of  muscular  sen- 
sations unless'  motor  habit  be  so  established  that  the  skin 
is  no  longer  necessary,  though  at  first  involved.  But, 
further  than  this,  the  muscular  sensations  have  charac- 
teristics peculiar  to  themselves.  There  are  two  distinct 
elements  involved  in  voluntary  movements  of  the  mus- 
cles: first,  db  feeling  of  effort,  and  second,  a,  feeling  of  resist- 
ance. The  feeling  of  effort  arises  from  the  expenditure 
of  nervous  energy  at  the  centres,  and  is  called  &\^o  feeling 
of  innervation.  The  feeling  of  resistance,  on  the  other 
hand,  seems  to  have  its  seat  in  the  muscle  affected.  It 
is  the  sense  of  opposition  to  muscular  movement,  and  is 
connected  with  sensations  of  pressure  spoken  of  later  on. 
Both  of  these  seem  to  be  involved  in  muscular  sensa- 
tions, though  either  may  be  present  without  the  other. 
In  cases  of  paralysis  and  muscular  anaesthesia,  there  is 
the  feeling  of  effort  with  no  corresponding  muscular 
movement ;  and,  on  the  other  hand,  if  the  hand  or  arm 
be  contracted  by  galvanism,  in  contact  with  a  solid  body, 
we  have  the  feeling  of  resistance  or  pressure  without 
that  of  effort."  The  feeling  of  effort  accompanies  the 
exercise  of  will  in  the  adult  consciousness ;  but  in 
child  life  it  arises  as  soon  as  the  limbs  are  moved  and 


'  Ferrier  aud  James.  For  theories  of  the  physical  basis  and  classi- 
fication of  these  sensations,  see  Wundt,  Theorie  der  Sinneswahrnelimxmg, 
p.  376. 

''  Mind,  July,  1887,  p.  430. 

^  Lewes. 

*  So  Bernhardt;  of.  Ladd,  Phys.  Psyeh.,  p.  345. 


90  SENSATION. 

encounter  resistance,  and  tlie  idea  of  self  as  active  prob- 
ably conies  tbrough  tbis  feeling.  Around  it  tlie  begin- 
nings of  attention  arise.  Feelings  of  resistance  also 
arise  equally  early  in  child  experience  and  are  exceed- 
ingly important  as  giving  the  first  knowledge  of  the  ex- 
ternal world.'  We  are  conscious  of  opposing  force,  and 
thus  arrive  at  the  first  condition  of  matter.  It  is  well 
to  repeat  that  it  is  through  muscular  sensations,  with 
the  attention  and  will  which  they  involve,  that  we  have 
the  idea  both  of  mental  and  of  physical  force. 

As  to  the  mechanism  of  the  nuiscular  sense,  great  obscurity 
envelops  the  whole  subject.  Three  distinct  theories  of  tlie 
nervous  accompaniment  of  these  sensations  are  held,  each  by 
eminent  authorities  in  physiology  and  psychology.  It  is  held 
by  some  that  the  feelings  of  muscular  activity  arise  from  the 
pulling  and  crushing  which  the  muscles  occasion  in  the  neigh- 
boring parts — the  skin,  joints,  ligaments,  tendons — and  that 
they  are  transmitted  to  the  brain  by  the  ordinary  sensor  courses. 
This  may  be  true,  even  in  the  face  of  the  fact ''  that  muscular 
movement  is  unimpaired  when  the  posterior  or  sensor  roots  of 
the  spinal  cord  are  cut ;  since  the  control  of  muscular  move- 
ment can  be  shown,  in  frogs,  to  be  independent  of  muscular 
feeling.  The  difficulty  with  tliis  view  is  that  the  ordinary 
sensor  nerve  endings,  being  largely  external,  do  not  seem  suffi- 
ciently distributed  to  report  muscular  activity.  The  feeling 
of  muscular  pain  and  weariness  also  persists  after  all  activity 
and  seems  to  issue  from  the  body  of  the  muscle  itself.  Con- 
sequently, it  is  held  by  many,^  that  there  are  distinct  sensor 
nerve  fibrils  in  the  muscles,  which  are  either  continuous 
and  parallel  with  the  motor  courses,  or  are  branches  of  the 
main  sensory  nerves."  This  theory  is  probably  true,  but  it 
accounts,  however,  only  for  the  feeling  of  resistance — actual 
sensations  in  the  muscles, — not  for  the  feeling  of  effort.  The 
latter  may  be  entirely  absent.    Hence  a  third  general  view,"  that 

'  On  the  iraportance  of  feelings  of  resistance,  see  Spencer,  Psycltol- 
ogy,  II.  ch.  x\ai. 

'■'  Brown-Scqiiard. 

3  E.  H.  Weber,  Sachs. 

*  For  evidence,  see  G.  S.  Hall,  Mind,  iii,  The  Muscular  Perception  of 
Space. 

5  Bain,  Wuudt. 


MUSCULAR  SENSE.  91 

the  muscular  sensations  are  essentially  feelings  of  movement 
and  have  their  seat  entirely  in  the  motor  apparatus.  The  sense 
of  effort  is  due  to  the  voluntary  liberation  of  motor  energy 
upon  the  courses:  it  is  entirely  central.  The  degrees  of  feel- 
ing of  movement  vary  with  the  inner  estimate  of  this  expen- 
diture or  innervation.  This  explains  the  feeling  of  effort  and 
is  the  only  explanation  of  it,  but  it  takes  no  account  of  the 
distinctive  muscular  sensations  which  result  from  movement. 
These  Bain  admits  arise  from  the  "sensitive  filaments."'  It 
is  therefore  probable,  on  the  whole,  that  the  feeling  of  effort  or 
cause  arises  from  central  motor  innervation,  and  the  feeling  of 
resistance  or  effect,  from  a  sensor  apparatus,  either  ordinary  or 
special.  This  is  supported  by  the  close  automatic  connection 
between  sensation  and  motion  in  general.  The  clear  distinc- 
tion between  the  two  classes  of  sensations  is  seen  in  a  case 
reported  by  Demeaux"  of  a  woman  who  had  lost  all  muscular 
sensibility,  both  deep  and  superficial,  and  while  the  power  of 
voluntary  movement  remained,  was  yet  ignorant  of  the  actual 
movement,  and  the  position  of  the  limbs.  The  sense  of  effort 
remained,  but  the  sense  of  resistance  was  gone. 

It  is  largely  due  to  3Iaine  de  Biran,  the  eminent  French 
philosopher,  that  the  feelings  of  effort  and  resistance,  as  under- 
lying the  idea,  of  will  and  force,  are  prominent  in  psychology. 
He  held  that  in  the  fundamental  act  of  effort  accompanied  by 
resistance,  there  are  immediately  given  self  and  not-self,  the 
will  and  the  external  world.  This  is  seen  to  be  true  as  a 
growth  in  child  life.  Prof.  Bain  calls  it  the  most  "vital  dis- 
tinction within  the  sphere  of  mind."  Hence  M.  Rabier's  crit- 
icism of  Maine  de  Biran  ^  is  mistaken.  He  analyzes  the  feel- 
ing of  effort  into  will  and  external  resistance,  and  says  both 
are  presupposed,  forgetting  that  this  analysis  is  made  after 
the  feeling  is  complete,  and  that  neither  knowledge  of  will 
nor  of  body  is  present  or  possible  before  the  union  which 
gives  the  feeling  of  effort. 

Presentative  Element  in  Muscular  Sensations.  Com- 
bined with  touch,  the  muscular  sense  affords  us  knowl- 
edge of  extension  and  space.  Sensations  of  contact,  as 
shall  be  seen  below,  repeated  on  successive  portions  of 
the  skin  or  by  the  same  portion  on  different  parts  of  the 
object,  present  data  for  the  projection  of  a  fiat  surface. 

'  Senses  and  Intellect,  p.  77  ;  also  see  quotation  from  Ludwig,  p.  79. 

2  Brain,  Mar.  '87,  p.  11. 

^  Psycliologie,  pp.  104  and  105. 


92  SENSATION. 

It  is  bj  pressure  adclecl  to  these  sensations  that  we  come 
to  apprehend  depth.  It  is  sufficient  to  remark  tliis  here, 
reserving  its  further  discussion  for  the  section  on  the 
perception  of  space.'  Mr.  Spencer,  speaking  of  the  sen- 
sation of  resistance  as  involving  feelings  of  eft'ort,  says : 
*'  This  sensation  is  at  the  bottom  of  our  concejition  of  the 
material  universe,  for  extension  is  (as  apprehended)  only 
a  combination  of  resistances  ;  movement  is  the  generali- 
zation of  a  certain  order  of  resistances ;  and  resistance  is 
also  the  substance  of  force."  * 

Taken  alone  the  muscular  sensations  give  us  little 
knowledge.  We  know  from  them  the  location  and  move- 
ments of  larger  or  smaller  masses  of  the  body:  but  even 
this  knowledge  is  very  vague,  since  without  touch  and 
sight  these  movements  cannot  be  coordinated,  nor  their 
amounts  estimated. 

Hearing.  Sensations  of  sound  have  a  specific  quality 
which  is  known  through  the  ear.'  The  psychological 
value  of  these  sensations  consists  in  the  fact  that  they 
occur  purely  in  time  and  have  no  spacial  quality.  A 
series  of  sounds  is  the  type  of  pure  temporal  succession. 

Presentative  Elements  in  Sensations  of  Soiind.  The 
three  most  presentative  classes  of  sensations,  we  have 
said  above,  are  those  of  sound,  sight,  and  touch.  In  the 
case  of  sounds,  we  find  peculiar  properties  upon  which 
exact  methods  of  research  may  be  brought  to  bear. 
These  properties,  therefore,  are  presentative,  in  that 
they  can  be  construed  by  the  intelligence.  Like  other 
sensations,  sounds  may  be  distinguished  in  intensity  in  an 
exact  wa}^''     This  intensity  depends  upon  the  amplitude 

1  Ch.VIII,  §4. 
^  Loc.eit. 

2  For  the  mecbanism  of  hearing,  see  Bernstein,  Five  Senses  of  Man. 
«See§5. 


HEARING.  93 

of  tlie  vibrations  of  the  sonorous  body.  Further,  they 
are  distinguished  iu  their  timbre,  which  depends  upon 
the  addition  to  the  vibrations,  which  produce  the  funda- 
mental tone,  of  other  vibrations  twice,  three  times,  .  .  . 
as  rapid.  This  difference  in  timbre  gives  its  charac- 
teristic sound  to  different  materials,  as  metallic,  vege- 
table, and  thus  corresponds  to  the  difference  in  kind  of 
odors  and  tastes.  But  the  special  peculiarity  of  sounds 
in  this  particular  is  found  in  what  is  called  tone  as  dis- 
tinguished from  noise.  This  quality  of  the  tone  or  note 
is  tonality  or  height,  depends  upon  regular  periodical 
vibrations,  and  varies  with  their  number.  There  is 
nothing  corresponding  to  this  iu  smell  or  taste.  We 
cannot  make  up  a  scale  or  gamut  of  tastes  as  we  can  of 
notes.  Upon  this  peculiarity  of  sound,  having  its  basis 
of  sensation  probably  in  the  fibres  of  Corti  in  the  coch- 
lea of  the  ear,  or  in  the  fibres  of  the  basilar  membrane 
to  which  they  are  attached,  the  whole  science  of  music 
is  built  up.'  There  is  probably,  in  the  inner  ear,  a 
series  of  vibrating  elements  which  correspond,  though 
more  minutely,  to  the  intervals  of  the  musical  scale. 
The  perception  of  distance  and  direction  by  the  ear  is 
largely  acquired  by  association." 

Sensations  of  sound  are  singularly  free  from  the  dis- 
turbing influence  of  other  sensations,  and  for  this  reason 
they  are  directly  accessible  to  experimental  researches 
of  all  kinds.  We  shall  find  this  the  case  in  speaking  of 
the  other  characters  of  sensation. 

Sight.3  Sight  is  perhaps  the  most  presentative 
sense.     It  gives  us   direct   knowledge   of   the   external 

'  See  Cournot,  Du  Fondement  de  nos  Connaissances,  i.  p.  215. 

*  On  the  function  of  the  semicircular  canals  as  giving  balance  in 
space,  see  Chap.  VIII,  §  4. 

*  For  the  mechanism  and  general  facts  of  sight,  see  Bernstein,  loc.  cit., 
and  Le  Conte,  Sight. 


94  SENSATION. 

world.  Its  affective  qualities  consist  in  tlie  pure  inten- 
sity of  tlie  light  sensation — as  the  light  of  one  candle 
or  two — and  in  the  distinct  order  of  sensations  known 
as  color.  The  sensations  of  color  arise  from  the  rapid- 
ity of  vibration  of  particles  of  luminous  ether.  These 
different  rapidities  give  an  ascending  scale  through 
the  seven  colors  of  the  rainbow,  from  the  red  to  the 
violet,  similar  to  the  scale  in  sound  sensations,  though 
not  as  extended  or  exact.  The  colors  shade  off  into  one 
another  with  no  regular  law  of  change.  Sensations  of 
color  have  intensity,  saturation,  and  tonality.  The  in- 
tensity, says  Helmholtz,  depends  upon  the  quantity  of 
light.  Saturation  is  the  relative  j)urity  of  a  color.  De- 
grees of  saturation  are  known  as  shades,  as  pink  in  its 
relation  to  scarlet.  Tonality  is  the  quality  of  the  color 
as  determined  by  its  position  in  the  scale  of  the  spec- 
trum, as  blue,  green,  yellow. 

The  spacial  form  of  the  objects  of  sight  is  one  of  the 
most  interesting  of  its  presentative  properties.  This 
will  be  discussed  in  the  treatment  of  s]3ace  form.'  The 
fact  that  there  are  two  eyes  contributes  to  this  result, 
especially  in  the  perception  of  the  third  dimension.  It 
is  difficult  to  isolate  pure  sensations  of  sight  from  the 
muscular  and  tactual  sensations  which  are  always,  in 
actual  life,  associated  with  them,  and  it  is  probable,  as 
will  appear  later,  that  these — especially  the  muscular 
sensations — are  also  concerned  in  the  formation  of  the 
notion  of  space. 

In  regard  to  the  process  of  the  perce^Dtion  of  color  through 
the  eye,  two  principal  theories  have  been  advanced,  assuming 
that  the  retina  is  distinctively  the  locus  of  this  process.  We 
find,  in  the  retina,  distinctly  differentiated  and  minute  nervous 
elements  called  rods  and  cones  which,  it  is  thought,  react  locally, 
thus  making  possible  the  picture  of  the  object  seen.  But  as 
to  the  color  sense  proper,  the  case  is  more  uncertain.  Accord- 
ing to  the  Young-Helmholtz  theory,  there  are  three  different 

'  Chap.  VIII,  §  4. 


SIGHT.  95 

kinds  of  nerve  fibre,  each  of  which  reacts  to  one  of  the  three 
fundamental  colors,  red,  green,  and  violet:  the  other  colors 
are  complex  and  result  from  their  combined  action.  Tliis 
theory  is  very  generally  accepted.  Among  other  objections 
to  it,  it  is  urged  that  the  microscope  reveals  no  such  differen- 
tiation of  fibre,  and  the  smallest  sensation  which  can  be  per- 
ceived by  the  eye  is  of  white  light,  which  involves  all  these  ele- 
ments.' The  other  theory  is  that  of  E.  Hering,  who  supposes 
that  there  are  two  kinds  of  elements  each  capable  of  two  dif- 
ferent reactions,  thus  giving  four  fundamental  colors,  red, 
^reen,  blue,  and  yellow.  This  theory,  however,  has  also  grave 
difficulties  to  face."  Yellow  can  be  produced  by  the  combi- 
nation of  red,  green,  and  violet. 

The  phenomena  of  color-blindness  support  the  general 
view  of  the  differentiation  of  structure  or  function  in  the 
nerve  elements  of  the  retina.  This  is  the  inability  of  about 
one  person  in  twenty  to  distinguish  certain  colors.  Blindness 
for  red  is  most  common.  It  is  thought  tliat  all  cases  can  be 
reduced  to  blindness  either  for  red  or  green ;  though  there  are 
cases  in  which  only  different  degrees  of  gray  are  distinguished. 
To  the  latter,  all  objects  seen  are  like  the  photographs  of 
the  same  objects.  Different  regions  of  the  retina  have  differ- 
ent degrees  of  sensibility  to  color;  this  sensibility  growing  less 
as  we  go  outward  from  the  central  part.  The  outer  rim  of 
the  retina  is  normally  insensitive  for  red,  but  reacts  for  the 
other  colors.  This  shows  that  there  are  special  fibres  which 
react  only  to  red.' 

A  further  phenomenon,  that  of  after-images,  is  especially 
noticeable  and  important  in  sight.  After-images  are  the  per- 
sistence of  sensations  after  their  peculiar  stimuli  have  ceased 
to  act.  Look  at  a  bright  window  and  then  close  tlie  eyes,  and 
the  after-image  is  seen.  This  is  called  a  positive  after-image, 
and  is  due  to  the  dying  out  of  the  nervous  process.  If  the 
bright  object  be  colored,  its  after-image  plays  between  that 
color  and  its  complementary  (the  color  needed  to  make  white 
in  composition  with  it).  This  is  due  to  the  exhaustion  of  the 
nervous  elements  involved  in  the  original  color,  by  wliich  white 
light  is  broken  up  and  only  the  complementary  elements  act. 
This  persistence  of  sensation  in  the  organism  is  important  as 
explaining  compound  and  intensive  forms  of  excitation.     As 

'  Fick. 

^  On  these  theories  see  Le  Conte,  SicjM,  and  Wundt,  PTiys.  Psych., 
2d  ed.,  I.  p.  460;  and  in  criticism  of  Hering,  see  Kries,  Arch.  Anat, 
andPhys.,  1887,  p.  113. 

2  On  color-blindness,  see  Fick,  Zur  Theorie  der  Farbenhlindheit. 


96  SENSATION. 

Fechuer  has  pointed  out,  the  after-image  has  onl}^  two  dimen- 
sions and  thus  differs  both  from  the  actual  percept  and  its  re- 
vived image. 

Touch.  Sensations  of  touch  constitute  the  base  of  a 
variety  of  sensations  which  we  distinguish  ordinarily  as 
qualitatively  different.  We  have  seen  that  an  element  of 
touch  enters  in  sensations  of  muscular  movement,  both 
from  external  contact  and  from  the  rubbing  of  the  inner 
parts  against  one  another.  Besides,  we  distinguish  sen- 
sations of  the  rough,  smooth,  coarse,  polished,  damp 
and  sticky ;  but  physiologists  have  shown  that  they  are 
not  s]3ecial  sensations,  as  Beid  believed,  but  acquired 
judgments  based  upon  modifications  of  touch,  combined 
with  the  feeling  of  resistance  already  spoken  of.  The 
importance  of  touch,  as  being  capable  of  so  man}^  modi- 
fications, as  having  its  end  organs  over  all  parts  of  the 
body,  and  as  acting  in  conjunction  with  other  sensations 
in  their  peculiar  organs,  is  seen  to  be  very  great. 

The  presentative  quality  of  touch,  considered  quite 
alone,  is  space,  as  it  is  built  uj)  from  the  recognition  of 
the  locality  of  the  parts  of  our  own  body.' 

The  nerve  elements  of  touch  or  pressure  are  clearly  de- 
fined. They  are  corpuscles  situated  in  the  skin,  which  com- 
municate directly  with  the  great  sensor  nerves  by  I'amifying 
fibrils.  These  corpuscles  are  distributed  in  varying  number 
in  different  parts  of  the  skin.  The  experiments  of  E.  H. 
Weber  showing  this  are  celebrated.  He  employed  dividers 
opened  at  varying  degrees,  the  minimum  distance  felt  between 
the  points  being  the  diameter  of  the  smallest  "sensation- 
circle."  The  tip  of  the  tongue  and  the  red  of  the  lips  have 
great  delicacy  of  touch  ;  while  the  back  of  the  neck  is  very 
insensible.  The  circles,  however,  are  not  the  smallest  units  of 
tactual  sensation  and  must  contain  many  nerve  elements;  for 
it  has  been  shown  that  there  are  distinct  and  very  minute 
pressure  spots  within  these  circles."  The  same  is  seen  in  the 
marvellous  capacity  of  this  sense  to  become  more  delicate  with 

•  See  Chap.  VIII,  §  3,  n. 

^  Goldschneider. 


TOUCH:    TEMPERATURE  SENSE.  '         97 

exercise.     In  the  hypnotic  state,  also,  delicacy  of  discrimina- 
tion by  touch  is  greatly  exaggerated/ 

From  the  universal  presence  of  touch  and  its  immediate 
reference  to  the  external  world,  it  is  of  great  importance  in 
cases  of  appeal  from  the  other  senses,  and  in  cases  of  lialluci- 
nation.  When  in  doubt  about  the  objects  of  vision  or  sound, 
Ave  feel  after  them  with  the  hand.  For  this  reason,  touch  is 
called  the  '^controlling"  sense. 

Temperature  Sense.  The  last  of  the  senses,  in  order 
of  mention  as  in  order  of  discovery,  is  the  temperature 
sense.  Like  touch,  it  is  a  universal  sense  and  has  its 
end  apparatus  in  the  skin.  Minute  points  called  "  tem- 
perature spots  "  which  react,  some  for  heat  and  others 
for  cold,  are  scattered  over  the  skin  in  varying  degrees 
of  nearness  to  one  another.  They  have  been  j^lotted  on 
the  backs  and  palms  of  the  hands  and  on  the  arms.  Of 
the  ditierent  nerve  terminations  in  the  skin — elements  of 
Krause,  Paccini,  and  Meissner — it  is  impossible  to  tell 
which  belong  to  touch  and  which  to  temperature.  The 
varying  number  of  these  spots  in  different  localities  and 
the  consequent  variations  in  delicacy  of  perception  of 
heat  and  cold,  make  quantitative  measurements  for  this 
sense  very  difficult.  These  sensations  have  a  \erj  slight 
presentative  element  in  their  vague  reference  to  bodily 
iocalit}'.'' 

From  this  general  survey  of  sensation,  in  respect  to 
quality,  the  distinction  between  affective  and  presenta- 
tive elements  in  sensations  is  more  clear.  In  each 
sense,  when  the  affective  element  is  strong  the  presen- 
tative is  faint.  When  a  very  bright  light  strikes  the 
eye,  it  produces  a  strong  affective  sensation,  but  vision 
is  indistinct.  On  the  contrary,  when  we  read  printed 
words,  they  represent  thought,  but  are  only  slightly  af- 
fective.    The  case  is  the  same  with  sound  and  touch. 


>  Binet  and  Fere,  Animal  Magnetism,  p.  135. 

'^On  the  temperature  sense,  see  Donaldson,  in  Mind,  No.  XXXIX. 


98  SENSATION. 


§  4.  Proof  of  the  Specific  Nature  of  Sensations  as 
RESPECTS  Quality.' 

The  sjDecific  diflerences  in  sensations  are  denied  bj  a 
school  of  psychologists,  who  hold  that  the  seven  orders 
of  facts  found  here  can  be  reduced  to  a  single  principle 
of  sensibility.  This  tendency  to  unity  is  the  dominating 
characteristic  of  modern  science  and  finds  as  bold,  if  not 
as  successful,  an  application  here  as  in  the  external  sci- 
ences. 

Theory  of  "Unity  of  Composition "  of  Mind.  In  the 
reduction  of  mental  phenomena  to  unity,  three  stages  of 
the  process  ma}'  be  distinguished.  The  first  stej)  is  that 
of  the  sensationists,  who  reduce  all  mental  facts  to  sen- 
sations. Ail  the  facts  of  consciousness,  intellectual,  af- 
fective and  volitional,  are  transformed  sensations.  The 
second  stage  consists  in  the  reduction  of  ail  sensations 
of  a  given  class,  as  color,  to  a  single  generic  sensation  of 
that  class,  as,  for  example,  a  single  color,  which  serves  as 
basis  for  the  derivation  of  all  the  colors.  And  the  third 
stage  is  reached  when  all  these  generic  sensations  are 
reduced  to  a  single  form  for  all  classes,  a  truly  primitive 
form  of  consciousness.  This,  while  having  no  deter- 
mined and  definable  quality  of  its  own,  yet  produces  by 
composition  with  itself,  first,  the  generic  sensations,  then 
the  different  species  or  kinds  under  these  general  quali- 
tative divisions,  and  then  the  whole  mental  life  in  its 
liigher  forms.  First,  the  mental  life  is  reduced  to  sen- 
sation, then  to  generic  sensations,  and  finally  to  one  ele- 
mentary sensation.  It  is  the  second  and  third  of  these 
steps  which  concern  us  here. 

The  arguments  in  favor  of  this  hypothesis  of  unity 
are  of  three  kinds  :  first,  analogies  based  upon  the  mate- 

'  The  development  of  this  paragraph  follows  substantially  Rabier, 
loc.  cit.  chap.  xi. 


THEORY  OF  UNITY  OF  COMPOSITION  OF  MIND.      99 

rial  sciences  ;  second,  inductions  drawn  from  tlie  analy- 
sis of  psychological  phenomena  themselves  ;  and  third, 
the  argument  from  the  fact  that  this  hypothesis  succeeds 
in  explaining  many  perplexities  in  psychology. 

I.  Analogies:  a.  deduction  of  the  Physical  Forces  to 
Unity.  Two  arguments  based  upon  the  ph^-sical  sci- 
ences seem  at  first  sight  to  render  the  hypothesis  of 
unity  probable. 

All  the  physical  forces  are  being  resolved  into  move- 
ment, although  in  ajopearauce  nothing  could  be  more 
difterent  than  sound,  light,  and  heat.  In  experience  we 
find  nothing  in  common  between  the  sound  of  a  bell  and 
the  color  of  flowers,  between  the  heat  of  the  sun  and  the 
fall  of  a  stone.  And  in  the  old  physics,  each  of  these 
was  looked  upon  as  a  different  principle.  But  the  great 
discovery  of  the  transformation  of  forces  has  taught  us 
that  these  different  forces  are  in  reality  one  and  the 
same,  and  that  all  their  phenomena  represent  but  a  sin- 
gle fact,  movement.  If  this  is  so,  we  have  by  analogy  a 
strong  presumption  that  the  corresponding  psychological 
phenomena  may  be  reduced  to  unity  also.' 

Beply^  The  force  of  this  analogy  is  based  upon  a 
misconception  of  the  true  meaning  of  the  law  of  conser- 
vation of  energy,  or  transformation  of  force.  It  is  not  true 
that  force  is  transformed  at  all,  it  is  only  true  that  there 
are  no  distinct  forces  to  be  transformed,  that  our  old 
conception  of  separate  forces  was  mistaken.  So  there  is 
no  reduction  of  things  which  are  different  to  unity.  It 
is  only  shown  that  one  cause,  motion,  underlies  many 
specifically  different  manifestations,  or  takes  on  many 
specifically  difierent  forms  or  degrees.  And  as  far  as  this 
is  concerned,  we  may  admit  the  same  of  the  different 
sensations,  referring  them  to  a  general  principle  of  sensi- 
bility which  takes  on  specifically  difierent  forms.     This  is 

'  See  Mantegazza,  Transformation  desfwces  psychiques,  Rev.  Philoso- 
pliiquc,  !Mar.  '78. 


100  sensation: 

wliat  is  meant  when  we  say  that  all  sensations  are  affect- 
ive states  ;  that  in  them  all,  our  subjective  sensibility  is 
aroused.  But  this  does  not  in  the  least  degree  affect  the 
fact  that,  as  mental  states,  as  data  of  the  inner  life,  the 
sensations  of  the  different  senses  are  specifically  different. 

This  parallel,  tlius  understood,  is  further  emphasized  by 
the  fact  that  recent  work  in  neurology  shows  all  nervous  en- 
ergy to  be  essentially  the  same,  and  further  to  be  a  form  of 
motion.  The  nerve  courses  are  functionally  indifferent  :  any 
nerve  stretch  might  serve  for  any  sense,  and  the  motor 
nerves  substituted  for  the  sensor  and  vice  versa.  It  is  prob- 
able that  the  end  organs  impart  to  the  courses  distinct  forms 
of  motion,  which  are  due  to  the  form  of  the  stimulus  in  each 
case,  and  that  these  forms  are  interpreted  in  their  specific 
sensations  through  the  reaction  of  the  general  sensibility.' 

h.  Chemical  composition  of  simple  substances  in  a 
compound  of  unique  proj^erties,  affords  a  second  anal- 
ogy. It  may  be  stated  in  the  words  of  Mr.  Spencer. 
"Multitudinous  substances,"  says  he,"  "that  seem  to 
be  homogeneous  and  simple  prove  to  be  really  het- 
erogeneous and  compound,  and  many  that  seem  to  be 
unrelated  are  shown  by  analysis  to  be  near  akin.  .  .  . 
Moreover,  there  is  reason  to  suspect  that  the  so-called 
simple  substances  are  themselves  compound,  and  that 
there  is  but  one  ultimate  form  of  matter  out  of  which 
the  successively  more  complex  forms  of  matter  are  built 
lip.  .  .  .  (From  this)  we  conceive  the  possibility  that  the 
multitudinous  forms  of  mind  known  as  different  feelings 
may  be  composed  of  simpler  units  of  feeling  and  even 
of  units  fundamentally  of  one  kind."  ^ 

Reply.  This  analogy  is  subject  to  the  same  criticism 
as  the  foregoing.  It  does  not  distinguish  actual  things 
in  nature  from  our  mental  pictures  of  these  things.     In 

'  This  parallel  is  used  to  prove  that  mental  force  is  also  a  form  of 
motion,  but  without  sufficient  ground. 

■■'  Princ.  of  Psychology,  vol.  i.  pp.  155  and  156. 

^  See  a  similar  argument  in  Leibnitz,  Nouveaux  Essais,  vol.  ii.  eh.  i, 
§15. 


THEORY  OF  UNITY  OF  COMPOSITION  OF  MIND.      101 

order  to  make  the  analogy  liold,  we  would  have  to  con- 
sider presentations  as  substantial  things  with  properties 
of  their  own,  capable  of  uniting  and  dividing  by  their 
own  force.  They  would  have  to  be  entities  with  difler- 
ent  properties,  like  ox^-gen  and  hydrogen.  But  this  is 
not  at  all  the  case.  Mental  facts  are  simple  states  and 
they  are  nothing  independently  of  the  mind  whose  states 
they  are.  They  are  the  expression  of  the  activity  of 
mind  which  is  one  and  the  same  in  its  different  opera- 
tion. So  any  conception  according  to  which  these  states 
unite  by  their  own  inherent  force  and  form  a  complex  is 
definitively  ruled  out.  If  there  be  a  complex  of  these 
simple  forms,  as  we  shall  see  there  is,  it  must  itself  be 
due,  as  they  are,  to  an  activity  of  mind ;  it  must  be  also 
a  function,  not  a  thing  or  substance,  and  must  owe  its 
properties  to  the  mind  and  not  to  simpler  mental  states. 

Further  than  this,  it  may  be  said  tliat  this  analogy  rests 
upon  a  false  interpretation  of  the  fact  of  chemical  composi- 
tion. It  is  not  true  in  fact  that  the  union  of  oxygen  and 
hydrogen  gives  a  substance  whose  properties  differ  absolutely 
from  those  of  the  constituents.  It  is  an  apparent  sensible 
difference,  not  an  absolute  one.  The  difference  between  the 
liquid  water  and  the  gases  which  compose  it  is  only  a  differ- 
ence in  the  position  of  the  atoms  and  in  the  extent  and  direc- 
tion of  their  movements.  In  tlie  molecule  of  sulphuric  acid, 
which  is  composed  of  one  atom  of  sulphur  and  three  of  oxy- 
gen, there  is,  to  use  the  figure  of  Ampere,  a  small  planetary 
system,  in  Avhicli  these  atoms  are  arranged  in  a  definite  order 
and  move  with  a  definite  rhythm.'  Now  in  this  combination, 
the  atoms  have  not  lost  their  properties,  nor  lias  the  whole 
taken  on  any  new  properties.  So  the  difference  between  the 
compound  and  its  constituents  is  not  a  real  difference  in  the 
things  as  things.  But  the  difference  between  the  sensations  as 
sensations  is  a  real  difference.     As  soon  as  we  attempt  to  re- 

'  Wundt  says  :  "  There  e.xists  in  the  molecule  a  certain  equilibrium 
of  oscillating  movements  whose  interruption  at  any  point  destroys  the 
whole  until  the  equilibrium  be  again  established." — Phys.  Psychologie, 
:2d  ed.,  ii.  463.     C£.  Clerk  Maxwell,  Rev.  Sckntifique,  xii.  p.  367, 

-  Spencer,  ihid.     Cf .  on  Cornposition  of  Mind,  Taine,  loc.  cit. 


102  SENSATION. 

duce  these  differences,  we  go  beyond  the  range  of  sensation 
altogether. 

II.  Arguments  Draion  from  Psychological  Analysis. 
The  attempt  is  also  made  to  base  the  theory  of  the 
unity  of  composition  of  mind  upon  psychological  analysis. 
Are  there  any  cases  of  the  transformation  of  psychic 
force,  or  of  mental  synthesis  ?  If  so,  this  seems  to  afford 
a  solid  basis  for  the  hypothesis.  It  is  admitted  at  the 
outset  that  observation  gives  us  no  facts  of  this  kind  \ 
but  it  is  held  that  by  different  physical  and  physiologi- 
cal experiments  sensations  have  been  decomposed.  The 
results  of  such  exj^eriments  have  been  formulated  in  two 
great  laws,  which,  if  true,  are  as  important  for  the  science 
of  mind  as  Kepler's  laws  for  the  science  of  the  heavens. 
1st.  A  sensation  which  is  simple  and  undecomposable  in. 
consciousness  may  be  in  reality  decomposed  into  more 
elementary  sensations  which  may  themselves  also  be 
composite.  Sometimes  the  composing  elements  are  con- 
scious :  but  oftener,  although  they  are  real,  they  escape 
consciousness  absolutely.  2d.  Two  sensations  which  ap- 
pear in  consciousness  to  be  quite  independent  of  each 
other  and  of  absolutely  different  quality,  may  differ, 
really,  only  in  the  number,  intensity,  or  order  of  their 
composing  elements  :  differences  in  quantity  in  the  ele- 
ments may  become  differences  in  quality  in  the  con- 
scious sensations. 

Spencer  and  Taine '  may  be  quoted  in  support  of 
these  laws.  From  the  use  of  the  wheel  of  Mivart  re- 
volving once  in  a  second  and  having  a  thousand  teeth 
which  strike  successively  upon  a  metallic  tongue  and 
give  a  continuous  sound,  while  a  single  tooth  is  not 
heard  unless  immediately  followed  by  a  second,  Taine 
argues  that  the  sensation  of  sound  lasting  a  second  is 
made  up  of  a  thousand  minute  sensations.     So  the  sen- 

'  Spencer,  loc.  cit.;  Taine,  Intelligence. 


THEORY  OF  UNITY  OF  COMPOSITION  OF  MIND.      103 

sation  of  light  which  lasts  a  second  is  composed  of  a 
million  sensations  of  the  retina.  This  confirms  the  first 
law.  It  is  true  and  very  important,  provided  we  under- 
stand that  the  unconscious  components  are  not  sensa- 
tions in  any  mental  sense,  and  that  conscious  sensation 
arises  only  when  the  accumulated  nerve  excitation  is 
sufficiently  great  to  occasion  the  mental  reaction.' 

In  support  of  the  second  law,  it  is  said  again,  that 
sensations  of  color  may  be  reduced  to  three  j)rincipal  or 
fundamental  colors,  and  that  the  timbre  of  an  instru- 
ment has  only  recently  been  resolved  into  added  tones 
of  a  lower  intensity  than  the  fundamental.  From  the 
former  fact,  says  Taine,  "  nothing  hinders  our  conclud- 
ing that  the  elementary  colors  are  themselves  composite 
sensations :"  "  so  the  innumerable  sensations  which  we 
refer  to  the  same  sense  may  arise  from  a  single  elemen- 
tary sensation  for  each  sense."  And  "  from  the  princi- 
ples stated,  we  conclude  that  the  elementary  sensations 
of  the  five  senses  may  be  themselves  complexes  of  the 
same  original  elements.  ...  In  this  case,  we  would  have 
only  one  elementary  sensation  of  different  rhythms.''  This 
primordial  sensation  Mr.  Spencer  considers,  vaguely 
enough,  a  "nervous  shock."" 

Beply.  First,  as  to  the  analysis  of  the  facts  of  mind, 
we  may  say  that  no  state  of  consciousness,  as  such,  is 
composite  unless  it  is  perceived  to  be  so.     The  state  of 

'  See  discussion  of  the  unconscious,  Chap.  IV,  §  2. 

'^  "  The  subjective  effect  produced  by  a  crack  or  noise  that  has  no 
appreciable  duration  is  little  else  than  a  nervous  shock.  Though  vv^e 
distinguish  such  a  nervous  shock  as  belonging  to  what  we  call  sounds, 
yet  it  does  not  differ  very  much  from  nervous  shocks  of  other  kinds. 
An  electric  discharge  sent  through  the  body  causes  a  feeling  akin  to 
that  which  a  sudden  loud  report  causes.  A  strong  unexpected  im- 
pression made  upon  the  eyes,  as  by  a  flash  of  lightning,  similarly  gives 
rise  to  a  start  or  shock.  ...  It  is  probable,  then,  that  something  of  the 
same  kind  as  that  which  we  call  a  nervous  shock  is  the  ultimate  unit 
of  consciousness."  {Loc.  cit.,  pp.  150,  151.)  "  The  substance  of  the  soul 
is  resolvable  into  nervous  shocks"  (156). 


104  SSJVSATION. 

consciousness  depends  upon  the  nature  of  the  excitation, 
at  the  centre,  whether  continuous  and  single,  or  discon- 
tinuous and  complex.  A  musical  chord,  for  example,  is 
composite  and  is  seen  to  be  so.  In  a  sensation  of 
sound  from  an  organ-pipe  32  feet  in  length,  one  can  dis- 
tinguish the  elementary  sounds  of  which  it  is  composed. 
But  we  cannot  say  that  in  every  sensation  of  sound  last- 
ing a  minute  there  are  a  thousand  minute  sensations, 
since  the  thousand  external  excitations  of  Mivart's  wheel 
do  not  reach  consciousness  as  a  thousand  excitations, 
but  as  one.  To  establish  the  position,  two  things  would 
have  to  be  proved :  1st.  That  the  minimum  duration  of 
the  impression  in  the  end  organs  does  not  exceed  the 
duration  of  the  external  stimulus.  It  is  quite  possible 
that  an  external  stimulus  which  lasts  a  thousandth  of  a 
second,  corresponds,  in  the  organ,  to  a  movement  which 
occupies  a  hundredth  or  a  fiftieth  of  a  second.  This 
possibility  is  maintained  as  a  fact  by  many  physiologists. 
'2d.  It  would  have  to  be  proved  that  the  minimum  dura- 
tion of  the  sensation  does  not  exceed  that  of  the  organic 
impression.  It  is  quite  possible  that  in  the  time  which 
is  occupied  by  a  thousand  organic  impressions  there  is 
only  time  for  a  hundred  or  for  fifty  sensations.  Fech- 
ner's  law '  shows  a  disproportion  between  the  intensity 
of  sensation  and  its  external  stimulus  ;  why  should  there 
not  also  be  disproportion  in  their  duration  ?  The  fact 
of  the  persistence  of  images — in  sight,  at  least  an  eighth 
of  a  second — is  overlooked.  These  persistent  images 
tend  to  form  a  single  continuous  excitation,  as  is  seen  in 
the  circle  of  light  made  by  swinging  a  torch.  So  of 
these  two  presuppositions,  we  may  say  that  the  second 
is  unproved,  and  the  first  is  false. 

Further,  as  to  the  reduction  of  the  different  sensa- 
tions of  a  given  sense  to  a  single  type  or  to  simpler 
forms,  few  facts  are  advanced,  and  these  may  be  explained 

'  See  below,  §  5. 


TEEORT  OF  UNITY  OF  COMPOSITION  OF  MIND.      lOo 

by  a  reference  again  to  tlie  physical  basis  of  sensation. 
The  fact  is  cited  that  the  colors  of  the  spectrum  united 
give  Avhite,'  and  that  when  a  toothed  wheel  is  turned 
rapidly  the  sound  of  its  impacts  is  higher  than  when  it 
turns  more  slowly:  the  conclusion  being  that  the  sensa- 
tion white  is  the  synthesis  of  all  the  sensations  of  color, 
and  that  of  high  tones  the  synthesis  of  lower.  But  there 
is  no  evidence  that  in  the  case  of  white  there  is  any  sen- 
sation of  color  at  all.  On  the  theory  of  different  ele- 
ments in  the  retina  which  react  for  the  fundamental 
colors,  it  is  readily  seen  that  the  combined  reaction  of 
them  all  will  be  a  form  of  motion — or  chemical  product 
—different  from  that  of  any  one  of  them  taken  sepa- 
rately. When  the  colors  are  seen  successively,  as  in 
the  revolution  of  a  segmented  wheel,  the  persistence  of 
images  causes  all  the  elements  to  be  excited  simultane- 
ously. The  result  is  the  stimulus  for  white.  There  is  no 
stimulus  present  at  all  for  the  colors,  and  so  no  sensa- 
tions of  color.  The  same  for  the  sound  of  the  toothed 
wheel  since,  as  has  been  seen,  the  height  of  the  tone  de- 
pends at  once  upon  the  number  of  vibrations  of  the 
sonorous  body.  In  these  cases,  the  fact  is  a  substitution 
of  sensations  and  not  a  synthesis. 

Additional  arguments  in  support  of  the  theory  of  "^the 
unity  of  composition  of  mind  "  are  drawn  by  analogy  from 
the  general  growth  of  body  and  mind  together  and  the  reduc- 
tion of  body  to  atoms.  It  also  serves  Mr.  Spencer  in  his  gen- 
eral doctrine  of  evolution,  since  if  mind  be  developed  it  must 
be  from  a  single  principle.  The  evolution  of  mind  is  the  pro- 
cess by  which  "t\\e  numerous  and  different  forms  of  feeling 
arise  from  a  simple  and  primitive  sensibility."  But  if  evolu- 
tion is  to  be  used  to  prove  "^  unity  of  composition,"  it  must 
first  be  proved,  and  this  is  impossible  since  mental  facts  are 
an  important  province  for  the  establishing  of  general  evolu- 
tion. °     If  unity  of  composition  fails  here,  it  goes  so  far  to  dis- 

'  See  J.  S.  Mill,  Logic,  bk.  6,  ch.  iv,  and  bk.  3,  ch.  vi ;  also  Leib- 
nitz, Nouv.  Essais.  bk.  2,  ch.  ii. 

'^  M.  Rabiersays,  Mr.  Spencer  here  attempts  to  demonstrate  obscurum 
per  obscurius. 


106  SENSATION. 

prove  general  evolution.  Prof.  Wuudt's  effort  also  to  estab- 
lish "  unity  of  composition  "  in  the  mental  life,  proceeds  upon 
the  hypothesis  of  "unconscious  mental  elements/'  which  has 
already  been  examined.  More  recently '  he  emphasizes  the 
"  unity  of  apperception/'  as  if  this  were  sufficient  to  account 
for  the  specific  forms  of  apperceptive  activity,  perception,  con- 
ception. Judgment.  This  gives  rise  to  the  difficulty  already 
encountered,  in  accounting  for  the  specific  forms  of  sensation 
by  the  general  fact  of  sensibility. 


§  5.  Quantity  of  Sensation:   Psychophtsics. 

Weber's  Law.  By  quantity  is  meant  intensity  or 
mass.  Until  quite  recently  it  was  considered  impossible 
to  measure  intensities  in  sensation,  from  the  fact  that 
they  are  subjective  entirely  and  we  have  no  abiding  in- 
ternal measure  to  which  to  refer  them.  This  difficulty 
has  been  overcome  by  establishing  an  external  unit  of 
measurement,  and  comparing  sensations  through  it  with 
one  another.  A  relative  measurement  is  in  this  way 
attained.  This  external  standard  is  the  quantity  of  stim- 
ulus agreed  upon  as  producing  a  unit  of  sensation.  The 
external  excitation  thus  becomes  the  means  of  approach 
to  the  measurement  of  the  internal  fact.  For  example, 
if  the  sensation  given  by  the  weight  of  one  gram  on  the 
back  of  the  hand  be  taken  as  the  unit  of  sensation  for 
pressure,  other  sensations  can  be  compared  with  it,  in 
relation  to  their  respective  excitations.  This  procedure 
has  actually  been  carried  out  in  those  of  the  senses  most 
accessible  to  experiment  and  the  following  law  formu- 
lated, known  as  Weber's  laio :  In  order  that  any  sensation 
may  increase  by  quantities  always  equal,  the  excitation  must 
be  increased  by  a  constant  fraction  of  the  excitation  itself;  or, 
Ihe  excitation  must  groiv  in  geometrical  progressioyi  (1,  2,  4, 
8),  in  order  that  the  sensation  grow  in  arithmetical  progres- 

'  See  Ribot's  exposition,   German  Psychology^  p.  214 ;  also  Wundt, 
Plxys.  Psych.,  2d  cd. 


THEORY  OF  UNITY  OF  COMPOSITION  OF  MIND.      107 

sion  (1,  2,  3,  4) ;  or  yet  again,  tlie  sensation  varies  as  the 
logarithm  of  the  excitation.' 

In  arriving  at  this  law,  it  was  necessary  to  show  that  the 
smallest  perceptible  difference  between  two  sensations  of  the 
same  sense,  requires  a  constant  fractional  increase  of  tlie 
smaller  excitation.  This  has  been  shown  with  reasonable 
exactness  for  moderate  degrees  of  intensity  of  sensations  of 
sight  (yiTr)?  touch  {\),  and  sound  {I).  In  dealing  with  high 
intensities,  the  proper  working  of  the  organ  is  deranged  and 
the  results  vitiated;  as  with  very  bright  lights.  In  the  case 
of  taste  and  smell,  the  difficulties  of  isolating  the  sensation 
and  measuring  the  amount  of  the  stimulus  have  been  almost 
insurmountable.  Three  distinct  methods  of  arriving  at  the 
smallest  perceptible  difference  of  sensation  are  em^^loyed,  all 
of  which  depend  upon  the  subjective  estimate  of  the  person 
experimented  with  as  to  the  equality  of  two  stimuli,  such  as 
weights  or  lights.^ 

The  scale  of  sensation  values  has  its  zero  or  vanishing 
point  at  the  smallest  ferceptihle  sensation  for  each  of  the 
senses.  Hence  the  necessity  of  instituting  another  series  of 
experiments  on  all  the  senses  to  discover  this  value.  The 
point  at  which  a  growing  excitation  first  begins  to  be  felt  as  a 
sensation  is  called  the  tlireshold  value  of  the  excitation  and 
the  sensation  is  said  to  be  at  the  threshold.^  This  point  varies 
very  greatly  according  to  the  conditions  of  the  senses  as  to 
exhaustion,  and  the  state  of  the  mind,  as  preoccupied  or 
attentive.  ^ 

'  Fechner. 

2  See  Ladd,  loc.  cit.  p.  364. 

^  This  expression  was  introduced  into  Psychology  bj^  Herbart. 

•*  Upon  these  two  classes  of  data,  smallest  perceptible  difference  of 
sensations  and  smallest  perceptible  sensation,  the  logarithmic  law  of 
Fechner  is  based.  Assuming  that  the  diilerences  of  sensation  to  be 
barely  perceived  are  infinitesimal  quantities,  and  that  the  difference  in 
the  excitation  is  also  infinitely  small,  as  compared  with  the  whole  stim- 
ulus, we  may,  by  the  calculus,  equate  differentials  and  write  (making  d^ 
increment  of  sensation,  de  increment  of  excitation,  and  k  the  propor- 
tional constant)  , 

ds  =  k — , 

e 

whence,  by  integration,  8  =  k  log  e  ; 

or,  the  sensation  varies  as  the  logarithm  of  the  excitation.     The  thresh- 
old value  then  being  given,  the  scale  is  built  up. 


108  SENSATIOK 

Besides  its  application  to  the  regular  sense  perceptions, 
Weber's  law  applies,  with  the  same  limitations,  to  the  estima- 
tion of  linear  distance  '  and  to  the  judgment  of  the  flight  of 
small  portions  of  time.''  In  order  that  I  may  judge  a  line 
twice  as  long  as  another,  it  must  be  really  more  than  twice  as 
long;  and  in  estimating  five  seconds  I  make  the  time  too  short 
by  about  one  fourth.' 

The  distinction  between  the  affective  and  presentative 
elements  in  sensation  is  strongly  brought  out  by  these  re- 
searches in  respect  to  quantity.  From  the  nature  of  this  dis- 
tinction, we  would  expect  that  exact  research  could  be  applied 
to  sensation  only  in  the  degree  and  aspects  in  which  it  is  pre- 
sentative, i.e.  capable  of  appreciation  in  terms  of  objective 
reference.  The  affective  element,  on  the  contrary,  is  a  purely 
subjective  quantity  and  is  beyond  all  scientific  approach. 
This  is  borne  out  in  fact.  The  senses  which  confirm  Weber's 
law  are  sight,  toucli,  and  hearing,  ancl  these  have  been  seen 
to  be  most  presentative.  But  the  law  is  not  proved  for  taste, 
smell,  organic  sensation,  which  are  most  aSective.  And  this 
relation  is  further  confirmed  by  the  fact  that  in  the  presenta- 
tive sensations  the  law  does  not  hold  for  high  intensities;  since 
then  there  is  a  powerful  reaction  of  the  affective  element,  as 
pain  under  bright  light,  or  shock  when  a  loud  sound  is  heard. 
That  is,  the  law  holds  of  the  presentative  senses  only  when 
they  are  most  presentative.  So  the  criticism  that  quantitative 
measurement  of  sensation  is  impossible,"  is  true  only  for  sen- 
sation proper  as  distinguished  from  sense  perception.  The 
same  is  true  also  as  regards  the  duration  of  sensation.^ 

The  interpretation  of  Weber's  law  has  occasioned  much 
discussion.  How  are  we  to  construe  the  fact  that  the  sensa- 
tion, which  must  be  considered  as  effect,  does  not  increase 
proportionally  to  the  stimulus,  Avhicli  is  cause?  Three  differ- 
ent views  are  held:  first,  that  this  relation  is  an  ultimate  law 
of  the  relation  of  body  and  mind; "  second,  that  the  dispropor- 
tion is  due  to  the  activity  of  apperception  and  is  strictly  psy- 

'  Cf.  Bully,  Sensation  and  Intuition,  pp.  50-60. 

^  See  Glass,  PJtilos.  Studien,  iv.  p.  433;  also  James,  Jour,  of  Specu- 
lative Philos.,  Oct.  1886. 

^  This  can  be  readilj'  shown  by  counting  seconds  with  the  eyes  on 
the  second  hand  of  a  watch,  and  then  attempting  to  repeat  it  with  the 
eyes  closed.     Below  1  sec,  the  time  is  judged  too  long. 

*  Kant,  Bering,  Delbceuf. 
5  Cf.  §  6,  below. 

*  Fechner. 


EXTENSIVE  OR  MASSIVE  SENSATIONS.  109 

chological ; '  and  third,  that  the  disproportion  is  due  to  the 
loss  of  excitation  energy  in  the  physiological  processes  involved, 
the  processes  of  transmission  by  the  nerves  and  central  stimu- 
lation. This  makes  the  central  process  the  cause  of  the  sen- 
sation, instead  of  the  perijaheral  process,  and  the  law  of  causa- 
tion holds.    This  is  on  many  accounts  the  best  interpretation.^ 

Extensive  or  Massive  Sensations.  The  quantity  of  sen- 
sation, considered  as  intensity  or  intensive  mass,  is  to  be 
distinguished  from  its  quantity  considered  as  extensify  or 
extensive  massiveness.  If  I  paste  one  postage  stamp  on 
mj  hand  and  then  another  beside  it,  the  sensation  is  in- 
creased in  the  second  case  in  extensive  massiveness,  but 
not  in  intensity.  This  distinction  in  quantity  is  possible 
for  all  the  senses,  but  only  when  there  are  coexistent 
sensations  of  the  same  sense  which  do  not  coalesce  to 
produce  a  higher  intensit3^  It  seems  to  depend  upon 
an  extensive  organ  of  stimulation,  skin,  retina,  which  is 
stimulated  over  a  more  or  less  extended  area.  It  is  ex- 
perienced in  putting  the  hand  in  water,  or  in  hearing,  at 
the  same  time,  a  continued  musical  note  and  a  harsh 
noise.  The  difference  between  the  two  kinds  of  increase 
in  sensation  is  distinct  enough  to  require  separate  men- 
tion. 

§  6.    DuKATiox  OF  Sensation  and  Thought  : 

PSYCHOMETllY." 

The  measurement  of  the  duration  of  mental  acts  was 
begun  by  Donders  about  1861.  Before  his  time,  it  was 
generally  admitted  that  psychic  processes  must  be  con- 
strued in  time,  and  the  question  of  the  rapidity  of  thought 

^  Wundt:  defended  by  Grotenfelt,  Das  Webersche  Oesetz. 

"^  See  my  five  reasons  in  support  of  this  position  in  Presbyterian  Be- 
view.  July,  '87,  pp.  437-438 :  supported  b}'  work  of  F.  C.  Miiller ;  see 
Amer.  Jour,  of  Psych.,  vol.  i.  p.  185 ;  cf.  also  Ward,  in  Mind,  i.  p.  452. 

^  The  substance  of  the  text  of  this  paragraph  was  written  for  Dr. 
McCosh's  Psychology  (vol.  i.  pp.  147-8),  and  is  republished  with  his 
consent. 


110  SENSATION. 

was  discussed  from  the  standi^oiut  of  general  conscious- 
ness. We  are  conscious  of  tliinlcing  sometimes  faster, 
sometimes  more  slowly.  But  this  subjective  estimation 
of  time  was  vague,  just  as  that  of  quantity  was  vague, 
for  want  of  a  constant  measure  in  the  inner  life.  Since 
the  discoveries  of  Helmholtz  and  others,  as  to  the  ve- 
locity of  nerve  transmission,  it  has  become  possible  to 
arrive  at  a  determinate  expression  for  the  time  necessarj^ 
for  different  sensations  and  for  some  of  the  simpler  ap- 
percejDtive  functions. 

I.  Beginning  with  simple  sensation,  the  case  is  briefly 
this :  let  the  skin  of  a  man  in  normal  conditions  be 
pricked  and  let  him  sjjeak  as  soon  as  the  pain  is  felt,  or 
let  a  word  be  spoken  and  let  the  subject  press  a  button 
as  soon  as  he  hears  it.  The  period  that  elapses  be- 
tween the  two  events,  in  any  such  exj)eriment  arranged 
for  two  senses,  is  called  the  simple  reaction  time  and  va- 
ries from  -g-  to  ^  sec.,'  according  to  the  individual  and 
according  to  the  conditions  of  the  experiment. 

Upon  consideration,  it  is  readily  seen  that  this  period 
may  be  divided  into  three  parts  :  first,  sensor  nerve  trans- 
mission to  the  brain  centre  ;  second,  the  mental  process  of 
sensation  and  volition  ;  and  third,  motor  transmission  to 
the  organ  moved.  Now  since  the  velocit}-  in  both  the 
motor  and  sensor  nerves  is  known,  we  reach  by  subtrac- 
tion the  time  of  the  mental  act.  Instruments  are  used 
by  means  of  which  differences  to  the  ten-thousandth  of 
a  second  are  noted.  By  this  analysis  of  the  simple 
reaction  time,  we  arrive  at  two  general  princijDles  : 

a.  The  simplest  mental  act  occupies  an  appreciable  period 
of  time. 

b.  The  purely  physiological  or  transmission  time  is  less 
than  half  of  the  entire  reaction.'^     Consequently  the  time 

'  The  result  of  four  buudred  experiments  upon  myself,  after  consid- 
erable practice,  was  .125  (^)  sec. 

-  This  was  conjectured  by  Darwin  from  the  fact  that  we  wink  the 


PSTCHOMETRY.  Ill 

taken  ujo  by  the  sensation  and  motor  impulse  varies 
slightly  either  way  from  J^  sec.  This  cannot  be  called 
purely  mental  time,  however,  for  the  central  physical 
change  goes  on  at  the  same  time. 

II.  Passing  from  sensation  to  the  reproduction  of 
ideas  as  memory  pictures,  it  is  concluded  from  experi- 
ments conducted  similarly  : 

«.  The  time  occupied  in  the  reproduction  of  a  state  of  con- 
sciousness is  longer  than  the  time  of  its  production. 

b.  The  time  of  reproduction  depends  upon  the  degree  of 
attention  given  (1)  to  the  original  sensation,  (2j  to  the  repro- 
duction.^ 

III.  A  third  operation  on  which  many  experiments 
have  been  made  is  that  of  distinction  or  discrimination. 
To  experiment  ujdou  sight,  let  two  colored  lights  be 
shown,  the  subject  understanding  that  he  is  to  react  by 
speaking  or  pressing  a  button  only  when  he  sees  the 
color  agreed  upon  beforehand.  This  involves  first  a 
comparison  and  then  a  judgment,  with  volition.  By  an 
easy  process,  the  purely  physiological  time  is  elimi- 
nated, and  the  duration  of  the  mental  act  is  found  to 
be  -gig  sec.  (Kries)  to  yL  sec.  (Wundt).  The  discrimina- 
tion is  easier  when  the  sensation  is  of  high  intensity ; 
and  since,  in  all  reactions,  the  signal  must  be  discrimi- 
nated from  other  sensations  in  consciousness,  we  have 
the  principle  that  the  duration  varies  inversely  as  the 
strength  of  the  stimulus. 

IV.  Experiment  has  rendered  service,  also,  in  defin- 
ing and  confirming  the  laws  of  association.  The  time  of 
a  simple  association  is  found  to  be  f  sec.  to  |  sec.  KeiDe- 
tition  greatly  shortens  the  time  by  strengthening  the 
association. 

V.  A  fifth  class  of  experiments  relates  to  the  logical 

eyes  without  having  a  change  of  sensation  from  light  to  darkness. — 
Zoonomia,  i.  p.  24. 

'  On  the  general  effects  of  attention,  see  below. 


112  SENSATION. 

judgment  of  subordination,  i.e.  from  genus  to  species. 
It  is  found  that  the  time  is  longest  when  the  subject 
is  abstract  and  the  predicate  a  more  general  notion  (man 
is  intelligent),  shortest  when  the  subject  is  concrete  and 
the  predicate  a  less  general  notion  (the  house  is  red). 
The  average  of  a  great  number  of  experiments  gives  the 
time  about  1  sec.  This  is  imjjortant  as  illustrating  the 
growth  of  the  general  and  abstract  notion  from  the 
concrete,  and  indicates  that  the  order  of  instruction  of 
children  should  be  the  same. 

It  should  be  said  that  these  results  are  true  only  in  an 
average  sense  and  under  normal  conditions  ;  and  further,  that 
they  represent  only  a  single  type  of  our  every-day  mental  pro- 
cesses, that  of  more  or  less  concentrated  attention.  The  fact 
that  the  subject  of  the  experiment  must  take  part  in  the  ar- 
rangements and  concert  hisactionswith  those  of  others,  makes 
it  impossible  to  obtain  results  without  the  attention.  In  life, 
however,  most  of  our  actions  are  not  foreseen,  and  our  attention. 
is  draAvn  to  sensations  by  their  occurrence,  not  beforehand. 
The  degree  of  attention,  however,  may  be  somewhat  varied 
and  the  results  noted.  The  bodily  states  also  greatly  influ- 
ence the  duration  of  mental  acts.  Fatigue  and  other  unusual 
physical  conditions  tend  to  lengthen  the  reaction  time.  The 
senses  with  which  the  most  exact  results  have  been  obtained 
are  sight,  hearing,  and  touch,  the  most  representative  senses  : 
Avith  taste  and  srnell  the  mechanical  difficulties  are  very  great. 
In  dreams,  the  ascertained  durations  do  not  seem  to  hold, 
since  the  flow  of  presentations  then  takes  on,  in  many  cases, 
enormous  rapidity.' 

Effect  of  Attention  upon  the  Duration  and  Quantity  of 
Sensation.  We  have  already  noted  the  general  law  that 
attention  increases  the  intensity  of  sensations.^  It  is  at 
once  seen  that  this  principle  interferes  with  the  applica- 
tion of  Weber's  law,  since  a  given  stimulus  is  felt  more 
strongly  if  attended  to  than  otherwise  :  so  that  in  com- 

'  For  attempts  to  determiue  the  perception,  apperception,  and  will 
time  separately,  see  references  given  by  Ladd,  Phys.  Psych.,  cli.  viii. 
This  chapter  of  Ladd's,  with  its  references,  is  the  latest  and  finest 
English  summary  in  this  department. 

2  Chap.  V,  §  2. 


PSYCHOMETRY.  IVS 

paring  sensations  by  their  excitations  it  is  necessary 
to  keep  the  attention  constant  in  the  two  cases.  The 
effects  of  attention  uj)on  the  duration  of  sensations  is 
even  more  marked.  In  general,  attention  diminishes  the 
time  necessary  for  the  reaction.  The  shortest  times  are  ob- 
tained by  concentrating  the  attention.  To  such  an  extent 
may  this  give  rise  to  expectation  of  the  excitation,  that 
it  is  sometimes  anticipated,  the  reaction  of  the  hand,  for 
example,  being  given  before  the  signal  is  made.  In 
the  hypnotic  state,  where  the  attention  is  strongly  fixed, 
the  time  is  shortened.  Further,  if  the  attention  be  fixed 
upon  the  reacting  sense  rather  than  upon  the  receiving 
sense,  the  time  is  shorter.'  This  concentration  is  esj)e- 
cially  necessary  at  first,  before  the  muscular  reaction 
becomes  automatic.  The  function  of  attention  as  a  com- 
paring and  relating  activity,  that  is,  as  apperception,  is 
strongly  seen  in  the  experiments  to  determine  the  dis- 
tinction time,  where  very  great  variations  are  due  to 
changes  in  the  energy  of  attention.  The  shortening  of 
the  reaction  time  by  attention  has  evident  pedagogical 
applications. 

Effect  of  Duration  upon  the  Intensity  of  Sensation. 
Within  short  periods,  the  intensity  of  a  sensation  is  di- 
minished if  its  stimulus  be  continued.  This  arises  from 
the  accommodation  of  the  organ  to  the  stimulus.  It  ap- 
plies especially  to  slight  pleasurable  or  painful  stimuli. 
Long-continued  stimulation,  however,  from  exhaustion 

'  This  I  found  in  my  own  experiments  before  seeing  reference  to 
N.  Lange,  by  Cattell,  Mind,  Jan.  '88,  or  Wundt's  3d  ed.  It  is 
probably  due  to  the  fact  that  when  the  attention  is  directed  to  the  re- 
ceiving sense,  the  idea  of  movement  becomes  dim  and  the  attention 
must  be  recalled  to  it,  that  the  movement  may  follow  :  while,  in  the 
other  case,  the  idea  of  the  proper  movement  is  kept  in  apperception, 
while  the  signal,  if  distinct,  carries  its  own  discrimination,  by  what 
Mr.  ^\i\\j  Q?i\\?,  preperception  {Outlines,  p.  227),  without  the  readjustment 
of  attention.  Lange 's  work  is  now  published  in  Philos.  Studieii,  iv.  4  ; 
see  also  Amer.  Jour,  of  Psych.,  May,  '88,  p.  531. 


114  SENSATION. 

of  the  organ,  becomes  increasingly  intense  and  painful ; 
and  sensations  at  first  pleasurable  become  painful  under 
this  condition. 

§  7.    Tone  of  Sensation. 

By  tone  of  sensation  is  meant  the  feeling  of  pleasure 
or  pain  which  accompanies  it.  It  represents  somewhat 
in  all  sensations,  and  in  the  higher  senses  almost  entirely, 
the  aflfective  element.  Pleasure  and  pain  are  onlj^  and 
wholly  afi'ective.  Our  whole  sensational  exj)erience  is 
accompanied  by  pleasure  and  pain  and  so  has  tone.' 

§  8.    Localization  of  the   Sense  Functions  in 

THE  BkAIN. 

The  question  as  to  v.hether  there  are  local  areas  in 
the  cortex  or  gray  matter  of  the  brain,  which  are  espe- 
cially active  in  the  exercise  of  the  sense  and  motor  activi- 
ties, is  of  great  importance  for  general  psychology.  Ex- 
periments have  been  very  conflicting  in  their  results,  but 
it  is  now  generally  admitted  that  there  are  a  limited 
number  of  well-ascertained  areas.  The  motor  functions 
are  grouped  around  the  fissure  of  Rolando,  though  it  is 
impossible  to  tell  whether  the  failure  in  movement  which 
accompanies  destruction  of  this  region  is  due  strictly  to 
impairment  of  motor  power,"  or  of  tactile  and  muscular 
sensibility,'  or  of  both.  The  speech  centre  is  the  third 
of  the  frontal  gyres  of  the  left  lobe.  The  areas  con- 
cerned in  the  sense  functions  are  in  more  doubt. 

Oil  Sensation,  consult :  in  general,  Wundt,  Pliysiologische  Psy- 
cliologie,  ch.  vn-x ;  McCosh,  Cog.  Powers,  bk.  1,  ch.  i ;  Carpenter, 
Ilental  Physiology,  ch.  iv  ;  George,  Psychologie,  p.  51  ;  Porter,  Hu- 
Qnan  Intellect,   ch.  iv ;    Ladd,    Physiolog.    Psydiol. ,    pp.  303-355  ; 

'  Pleasure  and  pain  come  up  for  full  discussion  in  the  treatment 
of  feeling.  The  much-discussed  question  of  the  "indifference"  of 
some  mental  states  to  either  pleasure  or  pain  is  also  deferred. 

-  Ferrier. 

3  Munk,  Schiff. 


CEREBRAL  LOCALIZATION.  115 

Volkmann,  Lehrhuch  der  Psychol.,  §§  33-48  ;  "Waitz,  Lehrhttcli  der 
Psi/ch. ,  §^  8-10,  and  Grundlegung  der  Psychol. , })}).  1 02-1 1 1 ;  Drobisch, 
Psychologie,  §§4-13;  Fortlage,  System  der  Psychol.,  §§  78-80; 
Stumpf,  Tonpsychologie ;  Scrgi,  Psychologie  Physiologique,  I.  ch. 
lii-vi ;  Kichet,  Recherches  snr  la  SensibiliU ;  (Temperature  Sense) 
Donaldson,  Mind,  x.  399;  Bernstein,  Five  Senses  of  Man  ;  Morell, 
Elements,  ch.  lil ;  Delboeuf,  Tlieorie  generale  de  la  Sensibilite ; 
Sully,  Psychology,  ch.  v ;  Rabier,  Psychologie,  bk.  2,  ch.  ix-xi; 
Bain,  Senses  and.  Intellect,  p.  117.  For  references  on  the  individual 
senses,  see  Dewey,  Psychology,  pp.  78-80. 

On  Psychometry :  Wundt,  Phys.  Psych.,  ch.  xvi ;  Ladd,  Phys. 
Psych.,  pp.  468-497;  Ribot,  Germ.  Psych.,  ch.  vii ;  Sully,  Sensation 
and  Intuition,  III,  A,  I ;  Sergi,  Psych.  Phys.,  bk.  3,  ch.  iv  ;  Cattell, 
Psycho metrische  Untersuchungen  ;  Philosophiscfie  Studien  (numer- 
ous articles). 

On  Psyclioph.ysi.es :  Wundt,  Phys.  Psych.,  ch.  viii ;  Ladd,  Phys. 
Psych.,  pp.  356-381  ;  Ribot,  Germ.  Psych.,  ch.  v;  Sully,  Sens,  and 
Int.,  Ill,  A,  II ;  Grotenfeldt,  Das  Webersche  Gesetz ,\Tix\\\\evY,  Revue 
Pliilosophique,  xxi.  386  and  xvii.  lo  ;  Delboeuf,  Elements  de  Psy- 
chop.  and  La  Loi  Psychophysique  ;  Fechner,  In  Sachen  d.  Psychop. 
and  Revision  d.  Hauptpunkte  d.  Psychop.  ;  G.  E.  Miiller,  Grundleg- 
ung  d.  Psychop.  ;  Fechner,  Eleynente  d.  Psychophysik  ;  F.  A.  Miiller, 
Das  Axiom  d.  Psychojyhysik ;  Philosophische  Studien  (numerous 
articles). 

On  Cerebral  Localization  :  Ladd,  Phys.  Psych.,  pp.  239-302  (with 
references);  Calderwood,  Mind  and  Brain,  ch.  iv;  Sergi,  Psych. 
Phys.,  ch.  iii-vi ;  Charcot,  Legons  sur  les  Localizations ;  (Aphasia) 
Huylings-Jackson,  ^rawi,  1.304  and  ii.  203  and  323;  Luciani,  Brain, 
VII.  145. 

Further  Problems  for  Sttidy : 

Methods  of  psycho-physical  study; 
Experimental  approach  to  the  senses  of  smell  and  taste; 
Application  of  mathematics  to  psychology ; 
Education  of  the  senses. 


CHAPTEE  VIII. 

PERCEPTION. 

§  1.  Definition  of  Perception. 

The  theory  of  perception  is  perhaps  the  most  impor- 
tant as  well  as  the  most  difficult  problem  of  psychology. 
The  interpretation  of  the  higher,  processes  of  mind  rests 
upon  it  and  it  underlies  the  bod}^  of  our  general  philosoph3\ 
The  great  philosophies  of  the  world  take  their  rise  from 
initial  differences  in  the  method  of  construing  perception. 
Lea\ing  the  general  problems  of  the  theory  of  knowledge 
to  metaphysics,  we  have  to  do  only  with  the  process  of 
perception,  considered  as  an  operation  of  mind  in  at- 
taining knowledge  of  the  external  world.  That  is,  we 
have  to  answer  the  simple  question,  "  How  do  we  arrive 
at  the  knowledge  of  individual  objects  localized  in  sj)ace 
and  time  ?"  In  viev,'  of  the  terms  of  this  question  and  of 
the  analysis  which  follows,  we  may  define  perception  in 
a  general  way. 

Perception  is  the  apperceptive  or  synthetic  activity  of 
mind  loherehy  the  data  of  sensation  take  on  the  forms  of  rep- 
resentation in  space  and  time  :  or  it  is  the  process  of  the  con- 
struction of  our  representation  of  the  external  world. 

Psychologists  have  generally  been  accustomed  to  distinguish 
between  two  forms  of  perception,  as  simple  and  acquired: 
meaning  by  simple  perception,  the  presentative  or  knowledge 
element  in  sensation,  and  by  acquired  perception  the  derived 
and  synthetic  products  of  tlie  apperceptive  faculty.  This  dis- 
tinction is  a  true  one,  since  tlie  essential  fact  in  both  cases  is 
that  of  presentation.  Yet  while  recognizing  this  truth,  it  is 
difficult  to  separate  simple  perception  from  sensation.  Indeed, 
as  has  been  seen,  the  former  is  only  the  form  of  some  sensa- 
tions, not  an  independent  thing,  and  it  is  more  satisfactory  to 

116 


AlfALTSJS  OF  PERCEPTION.  117 

treat  it  in  that  connection.  Perception,  then,  is  limited  in 
this  chapter  to  the  higher  or  synthetic  process  as  it  takes 
place  in  apperception.' 

This  has  also  the  further  advantage  of  distinguishing  more 
sharply  the  two  forms  of  knowledge  as  to  their  origin.  The 
presentative  element  in  sensation  is  as  immediate  as  the  affec- 
tive and  the  two  should  be  treated  in  the  same  category. 
Knowledge  thus  finds  its  bases  as  original  just  as  sensation 
does.  And  synthetic  perception  only  indicates  knowledge  in 
•a  more  advanced  stage. 

§  2.  Analysis  of  PERCEPTioisr. 

A  little  reflection  leads  to  the  conclusion  that  our  per- 
'ceptiou  of  the  external  world  is  a  matter  of  mental  con- 
struction. All  advance  into  the  region  of  mind  must  be 
through  mental  states.  The  characteristic  of  mind  is  con- 
sciousness, and  nothing  can  enter  the  domain  of  mind 
except  through  the  mediation  of  consciousness.  This  is 
seen  in  the  fact  that  our  images  play  in  consciousness  in 
such  a  way  as  sometimes  to  deceive  us  in  regard  to  the 
external  world.  When  the  eye  is  deranged,  the  mind  is 
deceived  in  regard  to  colors  and  distances.  When  we 
have  a  cold,  our  taste  is  impaired.  When  the  hand  is 
amputated,  irritation  of  the  nerve  ends  is  still  localized 
in  the  hand.  This  amounts  to  saying  that  the  mental 
picture  which  in  every  case  is  necessary  to  the  percej)- 
tion  of  the  object,  is  impaired  or  dissipated.  The  nervous 
system  also  intervenes  between  the  mind  and  the  world, 
and  the  proper  activity  of  mind  in  representation  depends 
upon  the  normal  functioning  of  this  system.  This  fact, 
that  the  mind  deals  with  its  images  primarily  and  with 
external  realities  only  through  these  images,  is  best  seen 
when  w^e  consider  that  all  mental  states  are  intensive 
modifications  of  a  thinking  subject,  and  that  the  percep- 

'  Cf .  Sully,  Outlines  of  Psychology,  cliap.  vi.  There  is  undoubtedly 
need  for  some  word  like  Prof.  Laurie's  Attuition  to  designate  the 
original  knowledge  element  in  sensation,  in  distinction  from  the  active 
synthesis  of  Intuition.     See  Laurie's  Metaphysica  nova  et  vetusta,  p.  6. 


118  PERCEPTION. 

tion  of  the  external  world,  liowever  real  that  world  be, 
with  its  conditions  of  space  and  time,  is  possible  only  by 
some  power  of  mind  whereby  these  conditions  can  be 
mentally  reconstructed  and  the  intensive  data  of  expe- 
rience cast  in  the  forms  of  this  reconstruction. 

As  a  process,  perception  proceeds  upon  the  presenta- 
tive  element  already  found  in  sensation.  In  connection 
with  each  sense  this  element  has  been  emphasized,  and 
it  forms  the  basis  of  all  our  finished  perceptions  of 
sense.  For  example,  the  representation  of  extension  in 
the  perception  of  an  orange,  makes  possible  the  synthesis 
of  affective  states,  smell,  taste,  color,  which  the  percept 
involves. 

The  construction  of  the  representation  of  the  external 
world  involves  three  subordinate  but  synchronous  and 
essential  operations,  which  we  may  call,  respectively, 
Differentiation,  LocalizatiGn,  and  Intuition.  And  each  of 
these,  in  the  perceptive  synthesis,  has  reference,  first,  to 
the  perception  of  our  own  body,  that  is,  of  the  intra- 
organic, and  second,  to  the  perception  of  objects  foreign 
to  our  own  body,  that  is,  of  the  extra-organic. 

§  3.  Differentiation. 

The  beginning  of  all  life  experience  is  probably,  as 
has  been  already  said,  a  state  of  general  undifferentiated 
feeling.  The  affective  consciousness,  at  this  earliest  sta,ge, 
may  be  called  an  undifferentiated  sensory  continuum. 
This  has  been  described  briefly  in  the  section  on  the 
groAvth  of  consciousness.  There  are,  at  this  beginning 
of  sensation,  no  distinct  forms  for  the  different  senses,  no 
feeling  of  externality,  no  perception  either  of  one's  own 
body  or  of  things.  It  is  easy  to  imagine  one's  self  in  that 
condition.  All  physical  feeling  is  then  vague,  like  the 
internal  sensations  which  we  cannot  localize  nor  trace  to 
their  causes.  It  is  probable  that  the  muscular  sense, 
with  touch,  constitutes  almost  the  whole  of  this  experi- 


LIFFERENTIATION.  119 

ence.  Tlie  earliest  transition  from  this  state  of  general 
sensation  is  also  probably  due  to  the  muscular  sense, 
through  clififerences  of  intensity  in  feelings  of  resistance, 
and  through  the  sense  of  locality  in  the  body.  The  special 
organs  of  the  other  senses  are  more  complex  and  must 
be  adapted  to  their  function  of  reporting  impressions  from 
without.  Yet  no  step  toward  a  real  differentiation  of 
sensations  can  take  place  till  an  active  reaction  of  mind 
is  possible  in  the  shape  of  attention.  As  has  been  seen, 
definite  sensations  are  unnoticed  and  not  distinguished 
without  attention.  At  first  this  attention  takes  the  form 
of  passive  apperception.  Apperception  is  itself  the  differ- 
entiating and  defining  activity.  By  it  the  unordered  and 
chaotic  mass  of  sensation,  which  is  thrown  upon  the  help- 
less subject,  is  divided  and  distinguished  and  made  dis* 
posable  by  the  further  processes  which  constitute  its 
completed  activity.  As  this  differentiation  proceeds, 
each  sense  becomes  a  distinct  source  of  affective  experi- 
ence, somewhat  in  the  following  order  of  development : 
muscular  sense,  touch,  temperature,  light,  sound,  taste, 
smell,  color.  The  mere  fact  of  differentiation,  however, 
can  give  us  no  feeling  of  difference  between  our  own 
body  and  a  foreign  bodj'.  This  distinction  can  arise  only 
after  we  begin  to  localize  our  states  ;  and  even  then  all 
these  states  are  located  first  in  the  bodily  organ  through 
which  they  arise  in  consciousness. 

It  sliould  be  borne  in  mind  that  these  stages  in  the  process 
of  perception  are  distinguished  logically  and  in  kind,  and  not 
chronologically.  In  a  general  way,  we  may  suppose  that  the 
simplest  facts  of  mind  are  earliest  in  their  development,  from 
the  fact  that  the  more  complex  must  proceed  upon  the  simple. 
Yet  we  find  processes  of  a  higher  order  present  and  necessary 
in  these  early  stages.  For  example,  it  is  difficult  to  see  how 
this  differentiation  of  presentations  can  be  permanent,  as  a 
mental  classification  of  experiences, without  memory  both  in  its 
retaining  and  its  reproducing  function.*    The  divisions  neces- 

1  See  Chap.  IX. 


120  PERCEPTION. 

sary  to  the  treatment  of  the  various  aspects  of  mind  should 
not  lead  us  to  carry  exclusive  divisions  into  the  mind  itself, 

§  4.  Localization". 

The  second  stage  in  the  synthesis  which  is  called 
perception  is  localization.  By  this  is  meant  the  mental 
reference  of  a  sensation  to  a  locality  in  space.  In  the 
finished  product  of  the  perceiving  faculty  we  apprehend 
things  as  in  space.  Here  is  a  new  idea  or  form,  of  which, 
in  the  purely  intensive  character  that  sensation  at  first 
23resents,  we  find  no  intimation.  Whence  does  it  arise, 
and  to  what  factor  in  the  perceiving  process  is  it  due  ? 
This  is  the  question  of  the  origin  of  the  idea  of  space  : 
one  of  the  problems  most  discussed  in  general  philoso- 
j)hy,  and  one  to  which  contemporarj-  psj'cliology  is  fully 
alive. 

The  origin  of  the  idea  of  space  is  more  discussed  than  the 
•origin  of  the  idea  of  time,  because,  in  the  first  place,  it  is  the 
form  of  outer  as  opposed  to  inner  phenomena,  and  according 
as  its  solution  is  idealistic  or  emjiirical,  our  theory  of  the  ex- 
ternal world  finds  its  essential  character.  The  idea  of  time, 
however,  is  bound  up  alike  with  phenomena  of  both  spheres 
of  experience,  and  whatever  its  solution,  no  advantage  is  given 
to  one  sphere  over  the  other.  The  former  question  also  j^re- 
sents  more  richness  and  complexity  of  data,  and  seems  to 
afford  more  chance  for  a  complete  solution,  from  the  very 
fact  that  it  offers  more  varied  alternatives. 

Further,  two  things  should  be  said  in  referenec  to  tiie  true 
manner  of  approaching  this  question.  First,  we  should  bear 
in  mind  that  it  is  tlie  psychological  and  not  the  metaphysical 
problem  with  which  we  have  to  do.  It  is  our  business  to  ask, 
whence  the  idea  of  space ;  not,  what  is  space.  The  meta- 
physical problem  may  remain  unanswered  after  our  psycho- 
logical theory  of  space  is  complete,  except  in  so  far  as  the  ori- 
gin of  the  idea  may  require  a  doctrine  of  external  reality.  In 
this  latter  case,  we  are  Justified  in  using  any  data  which  a  rea- 
soned metaphysic  may  afford,  understanding,  however,  that 
these  data  must  conform  to  the  results  of  our  empirical  analy- 
sis. And  second,  it  must  be  remembered  that  the  question 
of  origin  is  a  question  of  f/e)iesis,  or  lieginnings,  not  a  question 
of  Qiahire,  or  quality.     The  great  difficulty  with  the  older  dis- 


THE  PERCEPTION  OF  SPACE.  121 

cussions  of  this  question  is,  that  space  in  the  abstract  was 
brought  into  court,  as  a  finished  world-form  of  infinite  ex- 
tent: while  in  reality,  psychology  has  to  do  merely  with  con- 
crete perception  and  the  space-form  of  that  perception.  In- 
stead of  starting  with  a  finished  space  and  asking  ourselves 
how  it  is  that  we  perceive  bodies  in  it,  we  must  begin  with 
our  individual  perception  of  body  in  all  its  real  complexity  of 
matter  and  space-form,  and  ask  how  we  can  analyze  this  com- 
plex fact  of  experience  in  such  a  way  as  to  account  for  its 
space-form.' 

The  Perception  of  Space.  It  is  generally  agreed  by 
psychologists  that  our  first  experiences  of  space  are  con- 
nected with  the  muscular  and  touch  sensations  of  our 
own  body.  As  has  been  said,  the  sensory  continuum, 
before  all  differentiation,  is  largely  muscular.  The 
"beginnings  of  difiereutiation  seem  at  once  to  implicate  the 
extensive  or  massive  quality  of  sensation.  There  is  a 
yague  feeling  of  whereness  in  this  early  muscular  sen- 
sation, and  it  becomes  more  definite  as  the  extensive  or 
spread-out  sensations  from  the  skin  become  broken  up 
in  localities.  But  at  this  beginning  of  space-experience 
the  question  confronts  us  :  How  can  excitations  of  the 
skin  and  muscles,  which  are  transmitted  in  the  form  of 
molecular  action  through  a  homogeneous  nerve  substance, 
and  wdiich  have  thereby  lost  their  local  coloring,  report 
their  locality  to  the  subject :  and  further,  how%  if  they 
preserve  this  local  coloring  in  such  a  way  as  to  jDresent 
specific  differences  of  motion  at  the  central  bureau,  can 
these  differences  be  reported  to  the  mind,  which  is  an 
nnextended  thinking  principle  capable  only  of  intensive 
states  ? 

There  is  only  one  answer  which  does  not  either  beg 
the  question  at  issue  or  overlook  some  one  of  its  essential 
conditions  :  i.e.,  The  mind  has  a  native  and  original  capacity 
of  reacting  upon  certain  physical  data  in  such  a  ivay  that 
the  objects  of  its  activity  appear  binder  the  form  of  space. 

'  See  Croom  Robertson,  iii  Mind,  Li.  p.  418. 


123  PERCEPTION. 

In  the  following  paragrapli,  the  relation  which  this  posi- 
tion bears  to  other  theories  will  be  apparent.  Kecent  discus- 
sion '  tends  clearly  to  emphasize  the  fact  that  no  purely  em- 
pirical explanation  is  sufficient  to  account  for  the  extensive 
form  of  sensation.  Be  the  data  what  they  may,  and  be  they 
as  important  and  essentia!  as  external  data  always  are  in  per- 
ception, there  will  yet  remain  the  barrier  between  intensive 
feeling  and  extensive  thing.  This  barrier  can  only  be  broken 
down  by  an  exercise  of  some  form  of  activity  whereby  space 
is  mentally  reconstructed  ^  upon  the  basis  of  the  data  of  sense. 

It  is  objected  to  this  view,  that  it  leaves  the  problem  as 
obscure  as  at  first.  What  is  this  mental  reconstruction? 
This  is  true,  but  the  same  may  be  said  of  any  other  process  of 
mind.  What  is  perception  in  general?  Wliat  is  sensation? 
A  mental  reaction  upon  a  nervous  stimulus.  What  is  space 
perception  ?  The  same  with  the  added  reaction  of  space-form. 
One  is  as  mysterious  as  the  other.  But  while  this  is  true,  this 
view  of  the  case  leaves  the  question  of  the  data  necessary  to 
the  perception  of  space  entirely  open  and  thus  takes  advan- 
tage of  all  the  results  of  the  empirical  treatment  of  the  senses. 
The  mental  reconstruction  may  proceed  upon  its  own  data  in 
each  of  the  senses  which  give  us  space-form,  and  it  is  our 
part,  as  Lotze  says,  to  discover  these  data  and  to  borrow  from 
physiology  all  that  is  attainable  and  useful  in  the  premises. 
What  these  data  are  for  the  different  extensive  sensations,  we 
next  inquire. 

This  is  seen  to  be  a  form  of  nativism,  but  a  nativism 
purely  of  process,  not  of  product.  The  power  to  perceive 
space  is  as  native  as  the  power  to  perceive  anything  else;  but 
this  does  not  mean  that  space  is  native  to  the  mind  any  more 
than  trees  are  or  music.  Objects  are  given  to  us  in  space, 
and  space  is  given  to  us  with  objects;  they  are  inseparable, 
and  both  are,  in  thought,  the  product  of  the  synthetic  activ- 
ity of  apperception. 

Data  for  the  Perception  of  Space.  In  the  perception  of 
space  relations  by  the  muscular  sense,  touch,  and  sight, 
the  three  senses  through  which  this  form  is  presented, 
two  classes  of  data  seem  to  be  involved.  These  data  are 
of  a  physical  kind  and  serve  as  basis  for  the  mental 


'  Lotze,  Wundt,  James. 

"^  "Wiedererzeugung   der  Rilumlichkeit,"    Wuudt,    TJieorie   der   Sin- 
neswahrnchmung,  p.  51. 


DATA  FOE  THE  PERCEPTION  OF  SPACE.  123 

reaction  just  spoken  of.     Tliey  are  muscular  movements 
and  Jocal  signs. 

I.  3Iuscular  Movement.  Under  the  discussion  of  the 
muscular  sense,'  the  twofokl  nature  of  the  sensations  in- 
volved was  spoken  of.  Sensations  of  efibrt  or  motor  in- 
nervation were  distinguished  from  sensations  of  resist- 
ance. The  former  of  these  was  seen  to  be  central  and 
the  latter  peripheral.  The  latter  has  its  anatomical  seat 
in  sensor  fibres  in  the  muscles  or  skin,  thus  assimilating 
this  element  of  the  muscular  sense  to  pure  sensations 
of  touch.  Both  of  these  seem  necessary  to  the  finished 
feeling  of  movement,  though  feelings  of  resistance  play 
a  predominating  role.  We  learn  from  cases  already  men- 
tioned, that  if  the  feeling  of  resistance  be  destroyed,  a 
limb  may  be  moved  voluntarily  with  no  knov/ledge  of  the 
actual  movement,  but,  on  the  other  hand,  the  movement 
of  a  limb  mechanically  is  felt  as  movement  when  there  is 
no  voluntary  motor  discharge.  Hence,  though  we  may 
hold,  with  Spencer,  that  space  is  a  succession  of  resist- 
ances or,  with  Hall,  that  space  is  primitive  in  the  mus- 
cular experience,  we  still  find  the  element  of  muscular 
resistance  in  our  first  sensations  of  localit}'.  We  see 
below  that  movement  enters  also  in  the  perception  of 
tactual  and  visual  space.  Inasmuch  as  feelings  of  resist- 
ance involve  touch  as  well  as  pure  muscular  experience, 
the  second  of  our  data,  the  local  sign,  is  brought  into  jjia}'. 

II.  Local  Sign.  By  local  signs  are  meant  specific 
local  differences  in  the  arrangement  (Lotze)  or  structure 
(Wundt)  of  the  cuticular  substance.  By  these  difteren- 
ces,  localities  partake  in  perception  of  the  position  they 
occupy  in  space.  I  refer  an  excitation  to  my  hand  or 
foot:  why  do  I  give  it  such  a  specific  reference?  Why 
do  I  locate  a  pain  in  my  right  hand  rather  than  in  my 
left?  Simultaneous  sensations  of  a  purely  intensive  na- 
ture, as  tastes,  sounds,  are  fused  together ;  but  simulta- 

KJbap.  VII,  §  3. 


124  PERCEPTION. 

neous  sensations  from  neighboring  points  of  the  skin 
and  retina  preserve  their  peculiar  character  and  rela- 
tion to  one  another.  As  has  been  said,  the  first  idea  of 
our  own  body  results  from  muscular  sensations  which 
accompany  the  feeling  of  effort,  and  these  sensations  are 
vague  and  confused  ;  yet  even  here  the  feeling  of  exten- 
sion is  present,  also  vague  and  confused.  Whence 
comes  it  ?  It  can  only  come  from  initial  differences  of 
some  kind  which  are  perpetuated  through  transmission 
to  the  sensorium.  These  differences,  probably  in  the 
skin  or  sensor  nerves,  and  probably  a  matter  largely  of 
association,  afford  a  second  datum  for  the  localization  of 
sensations  in  different  portions  of  the  body. 

The  theory  of  local  signs  was  first  propounded  by  Lotze, 
who,  however,  varied  it  in  its  application  to  the  several  exten- 
sive orders  of  sensation.  For  sight,  he  made  the  local  sign 
consist  in  the  fixed  amount  of  muscular  movement  which  any 
retinal  point  must  undergo  to  be  brought  into  the  line  of 
clearest  vision.  This  is  a  different  and  definite  quantity  for 
every  point  in  the  retina.  In  the  skin,  the  local  sign,  for 
Lotze,  was  the  combination  of  light  accessory  sensations 
which  are  provoked  in  immediate  connection  with  the  point 
of  contact.  There  would  be  a  varying  amount  of  radiation  of 
stimulus  in  the  skin  according  to  the  varying  structural  con- 
sistency of  the  parts  over  which  the  skin  is  stretched,  as  bone, 
muscle,  ligament.  This  hypothesis  found  development  in  the 
more  natural  position,'  that  the  local  sign  was  an  implanted 
peculiarity  in  the  structure  of  the  skin  itself.  A  further  the- 
ory, very  widely  adopted,  and  suggested  by  Czermak,  makes 
the  local  distinctions  in  the  skin  due  to  the  ramifications  of  the 
spread-out  nerve  fibrils,  each  such  nerve  end  reacting  for  its 
own  position  and  being  thus  a  local  sign.  ^  This  position  is  most 
probable.  It  is  supported  by  the  fact  already  cited,  that  the 
sensibility  of  the  skin  to  local  differences  varies  greatly  in  dif- 
ferent parts  of  the  body,  and  may  be  increased  by  the  fixing 
of  the  attention,  by  exercise,  and  in  the  hypnotic  state. 
These  latter  conditions  tend  to  bring  into  play  finer  elements 
of  the  ramifying  nerve,  and  thus  to  diminish  the  distance  be- 
tween the  sensitive  points.     And  the  same  facts  tend  to  refute 

^  Meissner. 

-  See  Sully,  Outlines,  p.  119. 


DATA  FOE  THE  PERCEPTION  OF  SPACE.  125 

the  theory  that  the  units  of  tactual  feeling  are  found  in  We- 
ber's "circles  of  sensation,"  ' 

Besides  the  general  consideration  that  some  such  hypothe- 
sis as  that  of  local  signs  is  necessary  to  the  case,  there  is  di- 
rect evidence  of  the  existence  of  these  signs.  The  fact  of 
varying  local  discrimination  in  the  skin  has  been  mentioned; 
it  is  also  true  of  the  retina.  The  relative  discrimination  of 
localities  grows  less  delicate  as  we  proceed  from  the  centre  to 
the  edge  of  the  retina/  and  colors  lose  their  intensity  as  they 
are  projected  more  and  more  upon  the  side  of  the  retinal  sur- 
face.' The  quality  of  massiveness  or  extensity  of  sensations  of 
touch  and  sight  depends  upon  the  simultaneous  independent 
excitation  of  units  of  sensation,  and  can  be  accounted  for  only 
on  the  assumption  of  some  characteristic  by  which  these  units 
are  kept  distinct.  If  the  skin  of  the  forehead  be  bent  down 
upon  the  nose  and  grow  there,  its  irritation  is  felt  still  at  the 
forehead.  The  same  is  seen  in  the  retina  in  certain  patholog- 
ical affections,  in  which  the  retinal  elements  are  displaced: 
the  irritating  points  of  light  falling  upon  these  elements  are 
localized  Avhere  they  would  be  seen  by  the  healthy  eye.^ 

But  the  fact  of  local  signs  is  not  sufficient  to  account  for 
the  perception  of  space.  Whatever  these  signs  be,  the  color 
or  local  tone  they  give  is  a  modification  in  quality  alone,  an 
intensive  change  in  the  sensation  in  question,  and  there  still 
remains  the  necessity  for  a  mental  reaction  whereby  this  in- 
tensive sensation,  modification  or  sign  is  construed  in  exten- 
sive form.  How  can  we  infer  differences  of  position  from 
differences  of  pure  feeling  ?  Let  a  sensation  of  red  be  modi- 
fied in  any  way  whatever  as  to  its  redness,  and  we  are  still 
absolutely  in  the  dark  as  to  its  location  on  the  riglit  hand  or 
the  left.  Admitting  the  concomitant  sensations  of  Lotze,  one 
of  two  things  must  be  true:  either  these  concomitant  sensa- 
tions coordinate  themselves  in  space  in  virtue  of  their  own 
quality  or  they  do  not.  If  they  do  thus  coordinate  them- 
selves, why  could  not  the  original  sensations  coordinate  them- 
selves ?  If  they  do  not  thus  coordinate  themselves,  what  help 
are  they  to  us  in  this  coordination  ?  They  must  be  only  data 
by  which  the  coordinating  activity  of  mind  proceeds  m  the 
matter  of  space  perception.  ^ 


'  On  the  geueral  theory  of  Local  Signs,  see  Ribot,  German  Psychol- 
cgy,  chaps,  iii.  and  iv. 

■^  See  Sully,  Sensation  and  Intuition,  p.  54. 
3  Wundt. 

*  Wundt,  Phys.  Psych.,  3d  ed.,  ii.  p.  88. 

*  It  is  not  necessary,  however,  with  M.  Rabier  (p.  63)  to  deuy  the 


126  PERCEPTION. 

Synthesis  of  Data :  I.  Tactual  Space.  The  two  kinds 
of  data  mentioned  are  found  in  all  spacial  localization. 
From  the  fact  that  thej  are  thus  found,  that  they  enter 
necessarily  into  the  nature  and  functions  of  the  sense 
organs  by  which  space  is  reported,  and  that  the  non- 
extensive  sensations  are  wanting  in  the  physical  condi- 
tions which  they  represent,  we  are  led  to  conclude  that 
they  are  at  the  basis  of  the  reconstruction  of  space. 
Upon  this  basis  the  mental  reconstruction  of  spacial 
position  proceeds.  Locality  being  thus  given,  its  defini- 
tion becomes  very  exact  in  experience.  Feelings  at  first 
vaguely  localized  are  given  precise  spacial  position.  This 
is  rendered  easy  by  the  exploring  power  of  active  touch. 
If  left  to  passive  touch  from  external  objects,  it  is  un- 
likely that  v/e  would  ever  arrive  at  a  clear  conception  of 
the  extent  and  form  of  our  own  bodies.  But  hy  free 
movement  of  the  hands,  with  active  touch,  the  relative 
parts  are  explored.  This  is  evident  from  the  fact  that 
localization  is  most  exact  in  the  parts  of  the  body  most 
open  to  active  touch  and  freest  in  movement,  as  the  hand, 
arm,  tongue,  as  contrasted  with  the  back  and  cheeks. 
This  process  is  also  aided  by  our  larger  movements  and 
their  reversal,  and  takes  place  with  rapid  advance  in 
early  childhood. 

It  should  be  noted  that  the  idea  of  our  own  body  is  not 
complete  until  we  already  have  an  idea  of  foreign  body.  Such 
a  complete  idea  involves  the  action  of  one  part  of  the  body 
upon  another,  as  the  feeling  of  one  hand  by  the  other,  to 
which  it  is  really  foreign.  It  is  probable  also  that  sight,  as  of 
the  hand  considered  as  a  foreign  body,  makes  the  idea  of  our 
own  body  more  distinct.  This  is  seen  in  the  very  vague  and 
indistinct  ideas  of  size  and  distance  on  the  part  of  those  who 
are  born  blind. 


utility  of  local  signs,  as  giving  us  only  another  series  of  sensations  to 
explain  ;  for,  liowever  obscure  their  rule  may  be,  they  do  enter  into 
our  perception  of  space,  as  is  seen  in  the  fact  that  sensations  for  which 
there  are  no  such  signs  have  no  space-form. 


VISUAL  PERCEPTION  OF  SPACE.  127 

II.  Visual  Perception  of  Space.  As  lias  been  already 
intimated,  the  same  data  enter  into  the  visual  perception 
of  space,  muscular  movement  and  local  sign.  The  evi- 
dence of  the  presence  of  local  signs  in  the  retina  has  also 
been  adduced.  Ever  since  the  time  of  Berkeley,'  it  has 
been  generally  admitted  that  the  original  perception  of 
the  eye  is  of  a  colored  surface  onl}^ :  that  is,  that  the  eye 
has  no  immediate  perception  of  depth  or  distance.  This 
is  shown  most  decisively  by  cases  in  which  sight  has 
been  restored  to  those  who  were  born  blind.  About  a 
dozen  cases  of  the  removal  of  congenital  cataract  from 
the  eyes  of  persons  of  some  age  are  on  record,''  the  oldest 
and  most  famous  being  the  Cheselden  case.'  In  each  of 
these  cases  the  eiddence  is  very  clear.  When  sight  is 
restored  the  patient  sees  everything  in  the  same  plane  : 
there  is  no  distance,  no  relief,  nothing  but  a  colored  sur- 
face, and  this  surface  seems  to  be  near  the  globe  of  the 
eye.  The  blind  man  on  whom  Cheselden  operated  said 
that  objects  touched  his  eye.  Home's  patient  said  the 
same  of  the  sun  and  of  the  head  of  the  physician.  The 
patients  of  Nunnely  and  Franz  had  the  same  expe- 
rience. 

The  muscular  movements  of  the  eye  are  of  extreme 
delicacy  and  variety.  There  is  for  everj'  point  of  the 
retina  a  fixed  coefficient  of  movement  necessary  to  bring 
that  point  in  the  centre  of  clearest  vision ;  and  when 
such  a  point,  right,  left,  above,  below,  is  excited  there  is 
at  once  a  tendency  to  revolve  the  ball  of  the  eye  in  such 
a  way  as  to  bring  the  line  of  vision  tlirough  this  point. 
This  represents  a  given  degree  of  central  innervation 
or  muscular  strain.  Since  ocular  movement  jjrecedes 
vision,  there  are  no  means  whereby  such  movement  can 

'  Berkeley,  Theory  of  Vision. 
'  See  Naville,  Revue  Scientifique,  1887,  p.  943. 

"  See  details  of  Clieseldeu  and  other  cases  in  ]^TcCosli's  Psychology, 
vol.  I.  p.  45. 


128  PERCEPTION. 

be  eliminated  from  the  data  of  synthetic  activity  of  mind 
whereby  we  see  things  extended  ;  and  further,  the  influ- 
ence it  exerts  in  localization  is  seen  in  the  fact  that  if  one 
of  the  muscles  of  the  eye  be  destroyed,  so  that  no  move- 
ment follows  its  stimulation,  objects  are  localized  as  if 
this  movement  had  taken  place.'  The  necessity  for  such 
a  synthetic  activity  is  the  same  as  in  the  case  of  touch. 
Sensations  from  the  extended  surface  of  the  retina  and 
from  its  movements  over  the  visual  field  can  be  only  in- 
tensive modifications  of  consciousness,  which  are  appre- 
hended under  space-form  by  the  mind's  own  reconstruc- 
tion. The  process  in  this  case  is  the  same  as  in  touch 
and  the  muscular  sense,  though  we  are  no  longer  con- 
cerned with  the  origin  of  the  notion  of  space.  Spacial 
perception  by  touch  and  the  muscular  sense  j)recedes 
spacial  perception  by  sight.  The  idea,  as  a  mental  ac- 
quisition, is  probably  gained  roughly  before  we  see  at 
all.  But  this  does  not  impair  the  fact  of  spacial  per- 
ception by  sight.  Having  the  idea  of  space,  why  do  we 
clothe  the  data  of  sight  with  this  form,  and  why  do  we 
not  thus  clothe  the  sensations  that  do  not  have  it  in  our 
finished  intuition  ?  Evidently  because  sight  offers  also 
the  data  which  we  found  previously  necessary  for  the 
mental  reconstruction  of  space. 

TJie  fact  that  tactual  precedes  visual  space  renders  it  ex- 
ceedingly difficult  to  determine  what  is  peculiar  to  vision. 
We  can  reach  tactual  perception  alone  by  observing  the  blind, 
hut  there  are  no  cases  of  patients  having  sight  but  wanting  in 
skin  and  muscles.     For  this  reason,  those  who  find  in  sight 

'  See  references  given  by  Wundt,  Phys.  PsycJi.,  2d  ed.,  ii.  p.  91, 
and  I.  p.  375:  "For  instance,  one  suffering  from  paresis  of  the  right 
external  muscle  of  the  eye,  where  the  muscle  is  able  by  the  lUmost 
effort  to  effect  a  lateral  movement  of  20°,  locates  an  object,  which  in 
reality  is  only  20°  distant  from  the  median  plane,  at  a  point  as  far  out- 
ward as  corresponds  to  the  utmost  outward  movement  of  the  normal 
eye,  and  when  asked  to  touch  the  object  places  his  finger  far  beyond 
it  to  the  right. " 


PRESENTATION  OF  FOREIGN  BODY.  129 

an  immediate  perception  of  the  third  dimensiou  have  no  data 
of  a  positive  kind  to  prove  their  point.' 

Presentation  of  Foreign  Body.  The  distinction  be- 
tween our  own  and  a  foreign  body  arises  very  early  in 
child  life  and  is  not  subsequent  to  the  completed  idea  of 
our  own  body,  As  we  have  seen,  the  perception  of  our 
own  body  as  extended  involves  both  distance  or  move- 
ment, and  resistance.  In  the  primary  feeling  of  resist- 
ance, we  have  the  beginning  of  the  perception  of  foreign 
body.  The  amount  of  movement  or  distance,  measured 
in  feelings  of  innervation,  indicates  roughly,  at  first,  but 
with  great  precision  later,  the  localities  of  objects  around 
us  in  reference  to  our  ov.-n  body.  This  is  greatlj-  aided 
by  active  touch.  We  feel  round  a  body  and  give  it  the 
third  dimension,  which  we  have  already  found  to  be  an 
attribute  of  our  own  bod}^  The  distinction  between  our 
own  members  and  other  objects  is  further  assisted  by 
the  phenomenon  of  double  touch ;  ^  that  is,  the  two 
sensations  of  touching  and  being  touched,  when  we 
come  in  contact  with  our  own  skin.  In  paralysis  our 
own  limbs  are  to  us  as  foreign  bodies,  inasmuch  as  the 
sensation  of  active  touch  alone  is  present. 

The  general  law  which  regulates  the  localization  of  sensa- 
tion is  this,  that  sensations  localize  themselves  by  association 
with  their  cause  or  condition  in  the  organism.  Consequently, 
tactual  and  visual  sensations  are  at  first  associated  with  their- 
respective  organs.  But,  on  the  otlier  hand,  tactual  and,  as 
shall  appear  later,  visual  sensations  often  involve  movement 
of  the  hands  to  seize  or  feel,  and  of  the  eyes  and  head  to  per- 
ceive distinctly.  This  involves  distance  and  adjustment  to 
that  distance.  So  anothei-  set  of  associations  comes  into  play, 
and  the  sensations  are  referred  secondarily  to  objects  away 
from  the  organism.  This  secondary  association  becomes  the 
controlling  one  from  the  fact  that,  as  our  experience  extends, 

'  James,  Perception  of  Space,  3  articles,  Mind,  '87  ;  also  Hering  and 
Janet. 

2  So  Condillac. 


130  PERCEPTION. 

the  reports  of  the  different  senses  gather  around  these  points 
of  external  reference  and  make  them  permanent. 

Visual  Perception  of  Distance.  The  yisual  percep- 
tion of  distance  or  depth  23roceeds  upon  the  tactual  and 
muscular  perception  of  distance.  It  consists  in  the  ac- 
quired interpretation  of  light  and  color  diiierences  in 
terms  of  distance  already  given  by  the  skin  and  muscles. 
The  original  colored  surface  presented  in  vision  is  pro- 
jected more  or  less  distantly,  according  as  its  lights  and 
shades  are  associated  with  a  greater  or  less  muscular  or 
tactual  coefUcient,  This  is  seen  in  the  fact  that  the 
original  errors  of  sight,  in  respect  to  distance,  are  rec- 
tified by  touch  and  muscular  movement.  In  the  Trin- 
chinetti  case,  the  patient  at  first  "  attempted  to  grasp  an 
orange  with  her  haiid  very  near  the  eye,  then,  perceiving 
lier  error,  stretched  out  her  forefinger  and  pushed  it  in  a 
straight  line  slowly  until  she  reached  her  object."  Other 
patients  have  done  the  same,  when  first  restored  to 
sight.'  This  interpretation  in  terms  of  muscular  and 
tactual  feeling  becomes,  in  later  experience,  a  matter  of 
the  sensitiveness  of  the  eye  itself.  Its  own  mechanism 
of  movement  and  retinal  reaction  gives  data  by  associa- 
tion for  the  perception  of  depth. 

A  number  of  factors  enter  in  the  mechanical  adjustment 
of  the  eye  to  sight  at  different  distances.  Among  them  we 
may  mention:  a.  A  muscular  strain  when  the  object  is  near, 
due  to  the  slight  contraction  of  the  pupil  and  the  swelling 
of  the  anterior  surface  of  the  crystalline  lens.  This  is  called 
the  sensation  of  accommodation,  h.  Difference  in  an  object 
when  seen  near  or  far  with  both  eyes.  The  difference  in  the 
angle  of  vision  of  the  two  eyes,  enables  us  to  see  parts  of  the 
sides  and  thickness  of  the  object  gazed  at,  and  this  datum  of 
depth  varies  with  the  distance,  c.  Strain  arising  from  the 
varying  angle  made  by  the  lines  of  vision  of  tlie  two  eyes. 
When  the  object  is  near,  the  eyes  turn  toward  each  other;  this 
is  known  as  the  sensation  of  convergence,     d.  Dimness  of  out- 

'  See  McCosh,  Cognitive  Powers,  p.  49. 


LOCALIZATION  OF  SOUNDS  IN  SPACE.  131 

line  of  a  distant  object,  tlie  retinal  elements  being  bnt  feebly 
excited,  e.  Diminished  size,  fcAver  of  the  elements  being  ex- 
cited. /.  In  addition,  there  are  more  general  considerations 
which  aid  our  estimation  of  distance,  such  as  the  number  of 
intervening  objects,  the  known  size  of  tl;ie  object,  and  others. 
But  these,  with  the  tv/o  preceding,  partake  more  of  the  na- 
ture of  a  conscious  judgment.  That  the  muscular  movement 
of  the  eye  is  concerned  in  the  estimation  of  depth,  is  proved 
by  the  fact  that  when  any  one  of  the  muscles  is  destroyed,  the 
localization  of  objects  away  from  us  is  mistaken.  This  is  ex- 
plained by  the  consideration  that  the  locality  which  is  asso- 
ciated with  a  given  feeling  of  movement,  is  fixed  upon 
whenever  that  feeling  is  experienced,  uven  though  the  actual 
movement  do  not  take  place. 

The  finer  estimation  of  distance  is  a  matter  of  cultivation 
and  practice.  Indications  entirely  lost  to  the  ordinary  ob- 
server are  unconsciously  taken  into  account  by  the  sailor 
and  artist:  such  as  the  length  of  shadows,  the  air  perspective, 
and  delicate  discrimination  of  colors.  All  this  is  clearly  a 
matter  of  acquired  judgment,  which  may  be  improved  to  an 
endless  degree,  almost,  by  the  exercise  of  trained  attention 
and  study.  In  pictorial  art,  the  process  is  reversed,  the  ob- 
ject being  to  interpret  back  upon  a  plane  surface  those  data 
of  the  perception  of  depth  which  have  been  before  uncon- 
sciously recognized.  So  fixed  do  the  associations  of  distance 
become  that,  while  our  own  sense  experiences  were  sufficient 
to  convert  our  primitive  sensations  of  color  into  a  complex  of 
objects  about  us,  we  need  a  teacher  of  tlie  elements  of  per- 
spective to  enable  us  to  revert  again  to  the  conditions  of  our 
original  perception. 

Localization  of  Sounds  in  Space.  The  position  of 
sounding  objects  in  space  is  roughly  indicated  by  the 
ear,  but  this  rough  localization  proceeds  upon  the  pre- 
vious intuition  of  objects  by  touch  and  sight.  It  is  only 
after  the  surrounding  world  is  tolerably  familiar  and  its 
sounds  alread}^  associated  with  known  objects,  that  the 
sensations  of  hearing  are  definitely  placed.  This  locali- 
zation by  the  ear  involves  distance  and  direction.  The 
distance  of  sounding  bodies  is  judged  from  the  intensity 
of  the  sound,  especially  when  its  normal  sound  is  well 
known!  When  the  hearing  is  impaired,  sounds  are  lo- 
cated farther  away.     The  sense  of  direction  seems  to 


132  PERCEPTION. 

arise  from  several  causes,  tlie  principal  of  wliicli  is  the 
relative  strength  of  the  sound  in  the  two  ears.  The 
sounding  body  is  located  on  the  side  of  the  ear  which  re- 
ceives more  sound  waves.  If  a  sound  be  made  on  the 
median  vertical  line  through  the  head — say  above — it  is 
not  localized,  but  a  slight  variation  on  either  side  the 
line  is  at  once  detected.  Consequently,  we  locate 
sounds  as  right  and  left,  before  and  behind,  much  better 
than  up  and  down.  Again,  there  is  a  tendency  to  locate 
loud  sounds  in  front,  from  the  fact  that  more  sound 
waves  from  that  direction  are  collected  by  the  external 
ear.  Delicate  sensations  of  touch  and  muscular  move- 
ment, also,  in  the  ear,  aid  us  in  localizing  sounds,  though 
to  a  much  less  degree  than  in  the  hearing  of  some  ani- 
mals w^hose  ear  muscles  are  largely  developed. 

Feeling  of  Equilibrium  from  the  Ear.'  Recent  inves- 
tigations have  shown  that  the  feeling  of- equilibrium  of 
the  body  in  space  is  due  to  combined  muscular  and 
auricular  sensations."  The  feeling  of  erectness  arises 
from  muscular  strain  in  the  limbs  and  trunk.  The  feel- 
ing of  direction  involves  also  the  muscles  of  the  e3'e. 
Feelings  of  the  rotation  and  general  position  of  the  head 
in  respect  to  the  body,  are  given  by  the  semicircular 
canals  of  the  ear.  These  canals  are  projected  in  the 
three  dimensions  of  space  to  which  they  seem  to  have, 
respectively',  a  determinate  relation.^ 

^  Sec  Ferrier's  account  in  Functions  of  the  Brain,  2d  ed.,  cli.  iv.  i. 

^  Delage,  Archives  de  Zool.  exper.,  No.  4,  '86,  pp.  535-624  (see 
Amer.  Jour,  of  Psych.,  No.  1,  p.  179). 

^  Cf.  Elie  de  Cyou,  Comptes  Rendus,  1877,  and  Mind,  vol.  in,  by 
whom  the  semicircular  canals  are  considered  to  be  immediate  sense- 
organs  for  the  perception  of  space.  He  finds  in  the  eighth  pair  of  cere- 
bral nerves  two  distinct  sensor  courses,  the  auditor}' nerve  and  the  space 
nerve.  He  also  shows  that  there  is  a  connection  between  the  canals 
and  the  motor  functions  of  the  eye  muscles,  thus  brinsriug  into  the 
problem  the  phenomena  of  ocular  movement,  which  Delage  thinks  suf- 


IDEAL  PRODUCT  OF  LOCALIZATION.  133 

Ideal  Product  of  Localization:  Idea  of  Space.  The 
appreliensiou  of  space  as  thus  treated,  is  acquired  in 
concrete  perception.  Space,  heretofore,  has  meant  ex- 
tension, considered  as  an  attribute  of  objects  extended. 
The  finished  idea  of  space,  as  a  void  continuum,  is 
derived  only  by  a  process  of  abstraction  to  be  consid- 
ered later.  From  the  perception  of  a  body  extended  we 
pass  to  the  conception  of  an  extension  or  sj)ace  which 
ihis  body  fills  :  we  abstract  the  body  and  leave  the  space. 
The  infinite  aspect  under  which  both  this  idea  and  that 
of  time  take  form,  also  comes  up  for  further  exposition. 

§  5.  Theories  of  Space  Perception. 

Two  general  theories  of  space  perception  are  held  by 
psychologists,  and  under  them  may  be  classified  the 
various  attempts  made  to  explain  the  origin  of  this  idea. 
These  are  the  nativist  and  the  empirical  theories.  Em- 
piricists hold  that  presentations  of  extension  (and  time) 
are  derived  through  experience  from  elements  which 
have  not  the  spacial  (and  temporal)  form.  On  the  other 
hand,  nativists  maintain  that  space  and  time  presenta- 
tions cannot  take  their  origin  in  data  of  consciousness 
which  are  simply  intensive ;  consequently  that  these 
presentations  are  primitive  data  of  knowledge,  native, 
innate.     In  other  words,  the  empiricist  asserts  the  re- 


ficient  to  account  for  certain  rotatory  movements  of  the  body  without 
the  canals.  Cyon  advances  the  theory  that  the  canals  have  the  general 
function  of  presiding  over  the  discharge  and  innervation  of  the  motor 
■centres  for  all  the  muscles;  and  of  giving  us  at  once  an  idea  of  space  in 
three  dimensions.  "  This  central  organ  of  the  .sense  of  space  presides 
in  the  distribution  and  graduation  of  the  force  of  innervation  commu- 
nicated to  the  muscles  for  all  the  movements  of  the  globe  of  the  eye,  of 
the  head,  and  of  the  rest  of  the  body." — Comptes  Rendus,  1877,  p.  1285. 
As  a  philosophical  theory  of  the  origin  of  the  perception  of  space,  this 
view  of  a  special  space  sense  is  open  to  the  objections  already  urged 
to  all  strictly  empirical  theories.  See,  also,  experiments  of  Brewer, 
Amer.  Jour,  of  Psych.,  vol.  ii.  p.  333. 


134  PERCEPTION. 

ducibilitj  of  presentations  of  space  and  time,  and  the 
nativist  asserts  their  irreducibilitv. 

Further,  nativism  may  be  considered  as  a  nativism 
of  process,  or  a  nativism  of  product.  The  former  is  the 
theory  already  advocated  and  has  been  sufficiently  ex- 
plained: it  is  held  with  some  differences  of  detail  by 
Wundt  and  Lotze. 

I.  Nativism  of  Product:  Kant.  According  to  the  latter, 
the  idea  of  space  and  time  are  the  necessary  products  of 
the  mind's  activity  in  sense  perception,  and  the  universal 
forms  which  it  contributes  to  the  intuition  of  things. 
Space,  therefore,  is  an  ideal  innate  construction  of  the 
mind  imposed  upon  an  unknown  external  content,  rather 
than  a  synthetic  reconstruction  by  the  mind  by  which 
objects  which  exist,  become  objects  perceived,  known. 
In  objection  to  the  theory  from  a  psychological  stand- 
point it  may  be  said:  a.  It  does  not  account  for  the  dif- 
ference between  the  extensive  and  the  non-extensive  sen- 
sations. If  space  is  a  form  of  mind  in  its  sense  function,, 
why  do  not  all  sensations  show  this  form  ?  h.  The  per- 
ception of  sj)ace  cannot  be  placed  on  the  same  footing 
with  that  of  time,  since  time  is  the  form  of  all  sensation  , 
and  higher  activity.'  c.  Again,  the  idea  of  space  is  not 
given  to  us  as  a  finished  product,  but  is  built  up  from 
tentative  experiences  of  objects.  It  is  a  combination  of 
empirically  derived  localities,  which  owe  their  position 
to  signs  in  the  objects  themselves.  It  is  only  as  essential 
data  to  the  notion  of  space  that  differentiating  local  col- 
oring can  be  effective.      How  could  objects  having  no 

'  The  distiaction  of  Kant,  that  space  is  the  form  of  external  sense 
(sight,  touch)  and  time  the  form  of  internal  sense  (consciousness)  is  not 
exact.  For  color,  feelings  of  touch,  etc.,  are  just  as  much  internal  as 
any  other  facts  of  consciousness.  The  phrase  "external  sense"  can 
designate  nothing  more  than  the  ensemble  of  the  senses  by  which  we 
perceive  the  external,  and  to  say  that  space  is  the  form  of  the  senses  by 
which  we  perceive  space  is  tautoloicy- 


THEORIES  OF  SPACE  PERCEPTION.  135 

local  significance  take  place  in  a  liomogeneous  ideal 
space  ?  d.  The  different  behavior  of  young  animals  and 
young  children  shows  their  percejjtion  of  space  to  be 
different.  Young  chickens  stand  erect,  run  in  a  straight 
line,  and  thrust  their  bills  skilfully  in  the  direction  of 
their  food.  Young  animals  turn  at  once  to  the  teats  of 
the  mother.  But  the  young  child  goes  through  a  long 
and  painful  experience  in  learning  the  first  conditions 
of  spacial  movement  and  action. 

II  Empiricism.  The  advocates  of  the  empirical  deri- 
vation of  the  idea  of  space  rely  upon  one  of  two  means 
of  accomplishing  it:  deduction  and  association.^ 

1.  Deduction.  It  is  said  that  the  form  of  space  (and 
time)  is  deduced  consciously  or  unconsciously  from  data 
which  have  not  this  form.  But  this  seems,  if  it  be  truly 
deduction,  to  be  impossible  on  its  face.  A  true  deduc- 
tion of  space  must  necessarily  proceed  upon  data,  prem- 
ises, of  space ;  but  to  allow  it  in  the  premises  is  not  to 
deduce  it. 

For  example,  Herbart  deduces  space  from  a  series  of  sen- 
sations whose  order  may  be  reversed.  Let  a  picture  be  the  ex- 
tended object  perceived,  having  the  points  a,  h,  c,  d,  which  are 
successively  taken  in  by  the  eye.  Now,  in  the  mental  construc- 
tion of  the  image  of  this  object,  those  sensations  longest  in 
consciousness  are  least  intense ;  so  in  order  of  intensive  repro- 
duction, the  points  are  presented  d,  c,  h,  a.  Thus  is  reached 
an  intensive  reversal  of  an  extensive  order.  All  this  is  true; 
but  the  question  remains,  why  is  this  reversed  order  projected 
in  space  ?  A  scries  of  musical  notes  are  reversed  in  intensity 
the  same  way,  but  they  do  not  assume  extensive  form.  There 
must  be  some  local  coloring  in  a,  b,  c,  d,  in  addition  to  their 
time  order;  but  to  admit  this  is  to  assume  the  thing  deduced. 
In  the  same  way.  Mill  overlooks  the  specific  character  of  the 
notion  of  extension  in  reducing  it  to  a  feeling  of  simple  suc- 
cession. ''The  idea  of  space,"  says  he,  "is  at  bottom  an  idea 
of  time:  the  notion  of  extension  or  distance  is  that  of  a  series 
of  muscular  sensations  continued  for  a  longer  or  shorter  time." 

'  Cf.  Rabier,  loc.  cit.  p.  132. 


136  PERCEPTION. 

2.  Association.  Tiie  case  is  uo  better  with  association, 
ias  a  means  of  deriving  space  from  unspacial  data.  Can 
spacial  presentations  be  constructed  from  an  association 
of  elements  foreign  to  space  perception?  Not  at  all;  for 
association  lias  no  transforming  power,  wliereby  a  prod- 
uct is  arrived  at  specifically  different  from  the  elements 
associated.  Association  can  unite  what  was  separated 
and  dissociate  what  -sras  united;  but  from  the  nature  of 
mental  states,  as  states  and  not  things,  the  laws  of  their 
.association  give  no  clue  to  their  transformation  in  terms 
of  extension.  Consequently,  as  says  M.  Eabier,  psychol- 
ogists who  have  recourse  to  association  to  explain  pres- 
entations of  extension,  fall  into  one  of  two  fallacies  : 
either  they  introduce  extension  covertly  into  the  associ- 
ated data,  or,  preserving  the  premises  free  from  exten- 
sion, they  bring  forth  a  product  which  is  not  extension 
at  all.  Either  a  petit io  principii  or  an  ignored io  elencM 
is  the  result. 

Bain's  view  seems  to  illustrate  the  first  of  these  fallacies. 
He  derives  the  notion  of  space  from  the  association  of  muscu- 
lar sensations  among  themselves  and  with  tactual  sensations. 
'''The  prolongation  of  the  muscular  contraction,"  says  he, 
''indicates  the  course  of  the  organ  through  space."  Now 
if  the  idea  of  space  enters  through  the  intensive  feeling  of 
muscular  contraction,  there  is  more  in  our  conclusion  than 
in  our  premises  and  we  have  an  ignoratio ;  if,  on  the  other 
hand,  the  sensation  is  one  of  movement  proper,  extension  has 
already  entered  and  we  need  no  association;  i\\\&\?,  a  petitin. 
This  criticism  applies  to  the  theory  of  Bain  in  all  its  details, 
.as  to  the  origin  of  vague  representations  of  extension,  the 
measure  of  extension,  and  direction,  all  of  which  he  aims  to 
-derive  from  conscious  musculnr  sensations  and  their  differ- 
ences in  point  of  intensity,  succession,  and  rapidity.  In  all 
this  there  is  not,  in  our  view,  the  first  beginning  of  an  expla- 
nation of  the  origin  of  the  notion  of  space.  We  are  obliged 
to  fall  back  upon  a  power  of  mind  wliereby  the  data,  given  in 
•sensation  as  affective  and  intensive,  become  extended  in  per- 
ception. 

The  question  has  often  been  asked  of  empiricists,  why  it  is 
that  the  muscular  sense  alone,  and  not  other  senses,  as  hear- 


THEORIES  OF  SPACE  PERCEPTION.  137 

ing,  gives  us  this  idea,.  In  sounds  there  are  differences  of 
intensity,  duration,  and  rapidity.  Feelings  of  continued  or 
successive  resistances  are  feelings  just  as  feelings  of  continued 
and  successive  sounds  are,  and,  before  the  association  claimed, 
they  are  equally  wanting  in  the  form  of  extension.  Why  then 
are  the  muscular  sensations  alone  convertible  into  extension  ? 
Bain  and  Spencer  cannot  answer,  as  we  do,  that  it  is  by  rea- 
son of  certain  characteristics  of  these  sensations  upon  which 
the  mind's  peculiar  space  perception  proceeds.  They  would 
then  be  nativists.  They  are  bound  to  explain  why  it  is  that 
notes  do  not  form  lines  nor  chords  surfaces,  while  muscular 
sensations,  which  are  equally  intensive  affections,  do  form 
lines  and  surfaces. 

The  second  of  these  fallacies  is  exemplified  by  the  theory 
of  Mr.  Mill  already  spoken  of.  He  starts  with  succession  a 
matter  of  time,  ends  with  succession  a  matter  of  time,  and 
does  not  reach  space  at  all. 

Under  the  term  "synthesis,"  some  empirical  thinkers  at- 
tempt to  hide  the  weakness  of  the  case  for  association.  They 
distinguish  a  simple  mixture  from  a  synthetic  combination. 
Space,  say  they,  is  the  result  of  such  a  synthetic  combination 
of  elements  to  which  it  is  in  the  first  place  foreign.  But  if  it 
be  a  true  synthesis,  by  its  very  nature  it  conceals  the  proper- 
ties of  the  elements  combined,  and  it  is  impossible  to  say  what 
mental  data  are  involved.  How  do  we  knov/  that  the  states 
of  consciousness  indicated  as  elements  of  the  presentation  of 
extension,  are  not  simple  occasions,  antecedent  conditions, 
which  in  themselves  do  not  suffice  for  its  production,  however 
they  may  be  necessary  to  it?  Any  such  empirical  synthesis  is 
open  to  the  demand  that  the  account  of  its  elements  be  ex- 
haustive: to  admit  any  unknown  element  is  to  give  up  the 
empirical  position,  for  this  element  may  be  native.  From 
this  point  of  view,  the  advocates  of  synthesis  grant  to  the 
"nativists  of  process"  all  that  they  ask.  They  grant  that 
presentations  of  extension  appear  suddenly  in  consciousness, 
they  do  not  know  how;  and  that  these  presentations  cannot 
be  derived  logically  from  any  other  states  of  consciousness. 
This  opens  the  door  for  the  claim  of  the  nativist,  that  while 
these  elements  are  truly  concerned  in  the  mental  synthesis  of 
space,  and  while  the  empiricist's  appeal  to  an  unknown  combi- 
nation is  justified  by  our  ignorance;  yet  we  may  go  farther  and 
say  that  no  such  intensive  elements  and  no  such  combinations 
can  be,  in  themselves,  sufficient,  without  a  native  reaction  of 
mind  by  which  space  is  reconstructed. 


188  PERCEPTION. 


§  6.  Intuition. 

The  third  and  last  stage  in  the  mental  synthesis  of 
the  finished  perception  of  the  external  world  may  be 
called  Intuition.  In  the  first  of  the  three  stages  under 
which  we  found  this  process  naturally  taking  place,  i.e. 
Differentiation,  we  saw  the  breaking  up  of  the  general 
and  vague  sensory  continuum  of  the  earliest  child  expe- 
rience into  the  difi'erentiated  and  recognized  sensations 
of  the  different  senses ;  in  the  second,  i.e.  Localization^ 
these  sensations  have  taken  position  in  space ;  in  the 
third,  i.e.  Intuition,  sensations  are  gathered  together  in 
the  permanent  units  or  wholes  which  we  call  things  in 
our  developed  perception. 

As  illustrating  the  incompleteness  of  the  perceptive 
process  at  the  stage  to  which  we  have  now  advanced,  we 
may  imagine  the  subject  with  a  given  number  of  well 
difi'erentiated  and  localized  sensations  ;  say,  a  taste,  a 
smell,  a  touch,  and  a  color.  These  have  no  connection 
among  themselves  at  their  first  experience,  although 
given  the  same  local  and  temporal  position.  There  is 
no  reason  that  they  should  be  thought  of  together,  or 
that  one  should  suggest  the  other.  That  is,  there  is  no 
reason  that  the  intuition  apple  should  emerge.  There  is  a 
further  process  by  which  this  important  lack  is  supplied, 
and  sensations,  until  now  isolated  and  disconnected,  are 
thrown  into  permanent  comj)lexes  or  groups.  In  this, 
further  advance,  several  necessary  steps  are  apparent. 

I.  Attention.  However  sensations  may  be  grouped 
in  the  passing  panorama  of  diffused  consciousness,  they 
have  no  connection  unless  their  coexistence  is  attended 
to.  And  not  only  so,  but  it  is  doubtful  whether  simple 
passive  attention  would  be  suflicient  for  the  grouping  of 
sensations  in  a  complex  whole.  It  may  at  least  be  safely 
said,  that  the  arranging  and  coordinating  power  of  act- 
ive attention  c;reatlv  facilitates  the  earliest  intuition  of 


INTUITION.  130 

things.  It  is  here  that  the  rehiting  or  apperceptive  func- 
tion of  active  attention  is  most  apparent.  It  will  be 
seen  in  treating  of  memory,  that  the  degree  and  intensity 
of  the  power  of  retaining  and  reproducing  presentations 
depends  upon  the  degree  of  attention  given  to  the  origi- 
nal experience.  This  is  especially  true  of  the  relations 
in  which  these  original  presentations  stand  to  one  an- 
other. The  touch,  taste,  color,  smell,  or  any  two  or 
three  of  the  qualities  of  the  a23ple  are  experienced,  for 
the  first  time,  in  immediate  conjunction  and,  while  merely 
a  colligation  of  sensations,  are  attended  to  as  such,  and 
their  coexistence  apprehended.  At  first  the  muscular 
and  touch  sensations,  as  localized,  precede,  and  with 
these  the  sensations  of  other  senses  are  observed  to  be 
simultaneous.     Thus  begins  the  further  fact  : 

II.  Association:  a  principle  by  which  presentations 
once  experienced  together,  tend  to  come  up  in  memory 
in  the  same  order  of  contiguity.  By  this  principle,  the 
renewed  experience  of  one  of  the  former  sensations  tends 
to  arouse  the  others  with  which  it  was  before  experi- 
enced. In  the  further  extension  of  our  experience,  ad- 
ditional sensations  are  added  to  the  associated  complex, 
as  when  we  learn  that  an  apple  before  known  as  spheri- 
cal and  red,  is  also  sweet  and  fragrant.  Like  associa- 
tions in  general,  this  grouping  of  sensations  becomes 
fixed  only  by  extensive  repetition  and  movement,'  and 
as  this  repetition  and  movement  conform  to  or  modify 
the  complex,  the  intuition  is  confirmed  or  new  products 
distinguished.  Thus  the  object  in  perception  becomes 
clearly  defined  and  distinguished  from  others,  and  the 
external  world  takes  on  its  permanent  form,  as  a  whole 
of  various  things  existing  in  space  relations. 

An  additional  fact,  important  to  tlie  permanent  fixing  and 
discrimination  of  percepts,  is  this,  that  we  learn  very  early 

'  On  the  function  of  movement  in  defining  and  differencing  things, 
see  Waitz,  Lehvbuch  d.  PsycJiologie,  §  48. 


140  PERCEPTION. 

to  name  objects  as  we  perceive  tliem.  This  is  the  result  of 
a  mental  power  considered  later,  and  need  be  noticed  here 
only  as  a  great  auxiliary  to  tlie  lasting  quality  of  our  sense 
intuitions.  In  the  ordinary  education  of  children,  when  their 
knowledge  of  language  goes  ahead  of  their  experience  of 
things,  the  names  are  ready  beforehand  and  are  aj)plied,  under 
instruction,  to  objects  present,  with  a  number  of  qualities 
clearly  pointed  out.  Thus  the  process  of  growth  in  the  com- 
bination of  qualities  is  greatly  abbreviated.  Teaching  by  object 
lessons  is  therefore  justified  psychologically  as  a  method,  in 
that  it  leads  the  child  to  attach  the  right  name  to  the  right 
object,  in  the  first  place,  and  thus  to  avoid  all  tentative  and 
mistaken  efforts  at  discrimination. 

Motor  Intuition.'  The  organized  data  of  muscular 
movement  become  for  the  motor  consciousness  what  the 
organized  sensations  of  the  special  senses  become  for 
the  affective  consciousness.  Individual  motor  feelings 
are  integrated  in  intuitions  of  external  worth.  These 
motor  intuitions  take  the  form  of  ideal  coordinations  of 
movement,  and  become  more  and  more  sure  and  auto- 
matic as  the  muscles  are  exercised  in  grouj^s  after  re- 
j^eated  effort.  In  as  far  as  they  are  constituted  from 
simple  sensations  of  movement,  they  are  the  earliest 
data  for  sense  intuition  in  general.  But  in  as  far  as 
feelings  of  effort  are  also  bound  up  with  feelings  of 
movement,  the  former  constitute  a  new  and  active  meas- 
ure of  our  perceptive  construction  of  the  external  world. 
The  early  random  movements  of  the  child  are  thus 
worked  up  into  the  systematic  coordinated  muscular 
groups  of  the  adult  life,  by  adaptation  to  the  environ- 
ment. 

Ideal  Product  of  Intuition.  In  the  process  of  combin- 
ing different  sensations  into  a  percept  whose  meaning 
for  the  mind  is  that  of  a  single  thing,  a  new  idea  or  notion 
takes  its  rise.  This  is  the  idea  of  synthetic  unity.  By  syn- 
thetic unity  is  meant  the  unity  that  stands  for  itself  alone 

'  Beicegxingsanschauung .  Compare  Maudsley's  discussion,  Physiology 
and  Pathology  of  the  Mind,  American  edition,  chap.  viii. 


SENSE  PERCEPTION  AND  THE  UNCONSCTO  US.      141 

and  cannot  be  divided ;  yet  tlie  imitv  that  lias  parts,  and 
results  from  tlieir  synthesis — as  the  idea  of  an  organ- 
ism, made  up  of  its  various  organs.  The  percept  is 
such  a  product.  The  fact  of  many  presentations  be- 
comes the  fact  of  the  presentation  of  the  man}*.  In  the 
words  of  Kant :  "  The  conception  of  combination  involves, 
in  addition  to  the  notion  of  multitudinous  elements  and 
their  s^-ntheses,  the  motion  of  their  unity.  .  .  .  Combi- 
nation may  be  abstractly  defined  as  the  idea  of  the  syn- 
thetic unity  of  the  manifold."  ' 

This  is  to  be  distinguished  from  the  idea  of  general  or 
numerical  unity  wliich  probably  rises  in  consciousness  earlier. 
It  is  difficult  to  see  liow  all  feeling  of  unity  and  plurality  can 
be  absent  in  the  beginning  of  the  differentiation  of  sensations. 
It  is  more  difficult  as  soon  as  sensations  begin  to  be  localized, 
as  are  sounds  in  time  and  things  in  space  succession.  The 
very  discrimination  of  mental  states  seems  to  involve  numeri- 
cal difference.  This  must  precede  the  idea  of  synthetic 
unity,  therefore,  since  the  notion  of  combination  includes  that 
of  the  different  units  which  enter  into  it. 

Sense  Perception  and  the  Unconscious.  In  discussing 
tlie  unconscious,^  we  have  already  spoken  of  the  theorists 
who  claim  that  the  fact  of  a  process  in  perception,  of 
which  we  are  not  immediatel}^  aware,  is  evidence  of  un- 
conscious mental  activity.  If  this  threefold  process 
takes  place,  we  are  told,  and  we  are  not  aware  of  it,  it 
must  be  unconscious.  Yet  upon  looking  closely  at  the 
process  as  we  have  understood  it  above,  this  necessity  is 
removed.  "We  must  consider  that  the  growth  of  percep- 
tion is  coincident  with  the  growth  of  consciousness  itself. 
However  true  it  is  that  we  know  no  such  process  in  per- 
ception now,  it  is  also  true  that  we  did  know  it,  in  part, 
when  our  consciousness  was  first  taking  form.  The  dif- 
ferentiation of  sensations  and  their  recognition  as  quali- 
tatively distinct,  were  perfectly  conscious.     The  young 

'  Quoted  by  Morris,  Kant,  pp.  106-7. 
'  Chap.  IV,  §  2. 


142  PERCEPTION. 

child  is  conscious  of  tlie  sounds  and  siglits  around  it,  even 
before  it  discriminates  tliem. 

In  the  process  of  localization  in  space,  the  case  is 
different,  and  upon  this  great  stress  is  laid.'  But  here, 
if  we  accept  the  exj^lanation  given  above,  we  are  not 
called  upon  to  recognize  mental  elements  at  all  among 
the  unconscious  data  of  this  form.  Muscular  movement 
and  local  signs  are  physical  data,  and  the  synthesis 
whereby  they  indicate  space  position  is  an  immediate  act 
of  mind.  It  might  with  equal  reason  be  claimed  that 
because  the  will  proceeds  upon  nervous  discharge  at 
the  motor  centre,  a  volition  to  move  the  arm  is  a  derived 
and  secondary  mental  fact  and  rests  upon  unconscious 
processes.  The  fact  that  the  synthesis  of  these  data  is 
mysterious  and  its  exact  nature  quite  unknown,  is  suffi- 
cient to  forbid  a  conclusion  that  it  rests  upon  uncon- 
scious mental  elements. 

As  for  localization  in  time,^  the  case  is  clearer  still. 
Here  we  have  no  reason  to  suppose  the  unconscious. 
The  two  classes  of  data  involved  are  both  j^erfectly  con- 
scious, i.e.  intensity  of  sensation  and  movements  of  at- 
tention. In  the  final  stage,  also,  intuition,  we  deal  with 
the  earliest  forms  of  child- consciousness,  as  in  diiferentia- 
tion.  Consciousness  is  itself  developing.  It  is  probable 
that  the  grouping  of  sensations  and  their  association  in 
permanent  form  rests  upon  conscious  experience.  This 
process  leaves  no  trace  upon  adult  consciousness,  after 
the  analogy  of  all  such  early  experience.  And  after  the 
reasoning  power  is  called  into  activity,  the  intuitive  syn- 
thesis is  no  longer  necessary,  since  by  that  wonderful 
capacity  of  mind  to  abridge  its  efforts  and  conserve  its 
l^roducts,  old  products  are  held  by  a  name,  and  the  idea 
of  synthetic  unity  is  ready  formed  for  any  combination 
of  external  qualities  we  may  meet  in  nature. 

'By  Wundt.  '  See  Chap.  X. 


SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS:  IDEA   OF  SELF.  143 

Deceptions  of  Sense  Perception.  Errors  arise  in  the 
process  of  synthetic  perception  from  the  fact  that  we  are 
no  longer  conscious  of  the  steps  in  the  process.  We 
fail  in  our  estimate  of  distance  by  the  eye,  of  direction 
by  the  ear,  of  time,  past  and  future.  We  are  subject  to 
certain  permanent  optical  illusions.  These  and  all  other 
mistakes  of  the  senses  are  explained  as  being  fallacious 
inferences  from  data  at  one  time  conscious  and  truthful. 
These  errors  cannot  be  shown  to  extend  to  sensation  it- 
self. A  sensation  must,  by  definition,  be  what  it  is  felt 
to  be.  For  the  same  reason,  error  cannot  attach  to  the 
presentative  element  in  our  first  experiences.  This  will 
be  further  treated  in  the  chapter  on  Illusions.' 

§    7.    EeFLECTIOX    or   SeLF-CON"SCIOUS]S'ESS.' 

The  highest  form  of  consciousness  has  been  seen  to 
1)6  se?/*-consciousness.  In  self-consciousness  there  is  a 
turning  in  of  the  experience  upon  the  self.  This  involves 
the  establishment  of  the  relation  of  subject  and  object 
which  is  the  fundamental  fact  in  perception,  and  the  re- 
turn of  the  mind  to  itself  as  its  own  object.  By  the  result 
of  reflection  is  meant,  therefore,  the  knowledge  which  the 
mind  has  of  its  own  operations,  recognized  as  its  own.  It 
is  an  advance  on  the  simple  awareness  of  consciousness, 
in  which  there  is  no  reference  to  self  as  different  from  its 
object.  In  reflection,  this  reference  has  distinct  place, 
and  the  self  is  discovered  through  the  act  of  attentive  in- 
spection, as  having  and  exercising  the  characteristics  of 
mind.  The  notion  of  self,  lilie  other  notions,  is  a  grad- 
ual growth.  The  vague  feeling  of  the  ego  which  the 
first  affective  experiences  afford,  is  defined  and  enriched 
by  added  marks,  such  as  efiiciency,  identit}-,  and  perma- 
nence. Especially  as  cause  is  the  self  realized  early,  in 
connection  with  muscular  feeling  and  will. 

'  Chap.  XIII.  «  Cf.  Chap.  I,  §  2. 


144  PERCEPTION. 

Ideal  Product  of  Eeflection :  Idea  of  Self.  Tliro ugli  re- 
flection, therefore,  the  idea  of  self  is  attained  and  as- 
sumes its  im23ortant  place  in  the  mental  -svorld.  Round 
the  self  as  a  centre  the  intellectual  life  plajs.  To  it  all 
possible  forms  of  experience  are  referred.  It  brings  co- 
herence into  the  circuit  of  consciousness,  by  giving  it  a 
centre  of  reference  and  a  circumference  of  limitation  to 
the  individual. 

On  perception.,  consult:  in  general,  McCosh,  Cog.  Poivers,  bk.  1, 
eh.  I;  Wundt,  Phys.  Psych.,  ch.  xi-xiv;  Carpenter,  Ment.  Phys.,  ch.  v; 
George,  Psycliologie,  p.  77  ;  Porter,  Hum.  Intel.,  pp.  158-221;  Ladd, 
Phys.  Psych.,  pp.  382-467  ;  Wundt,  llieorie  d.  Sinneswahrnehmung , 
pp.  376-445  ;  Waitz,  Lehrhuch,  §§  20-27,  and  Grundlegung  der 
Psychol.,  pp.  92-100;  Fortlage,  System  der  Psychologie,  §  31  ;  Lau- 
rie, Metaphysica,  pt.  1;  Spencer,  Psychol.,  n.  pp.  131-256  ;  Sergi, 
Teoria  fisiologica  del  percezione ;  Loewy,  Die  Vorstellung  des 
Binges;  Binet,  La  Perception  exterieure;  Uphues,  Wahrnehmung  und 
Empflndung ;  Ueberweg,  Logic,  pt.  1;  (History  of)  Bailey,  Letters 
on  Philos.  of  Hum.  Mind,  13-20;  Sergi,  Psychologie  Physiologique, 
bk.  2,  ch.  iv-vi ;  Ward.  Encyc.  Britann.,  art.  Psychology;  Hamilton, 
Metaphysics,  Lect.  XXI-XXVI.  Besides,  general  treatment  is  to  be 
found  in  all  the  works  upon  psychology,  as  Sully,  Outlines;  Rabier, 
Psychologie  ;  Spencer,  in  loc. 

On  space-perception :  Fortlage,  Beitrdge  ztir  Psychologie,  pp. 
342-281  ;  Volkmann,  Lehrhuch  d.  Psychol.,  §  18  ;  Ribot,  German 
Psychol.,  ch.  iv;  Herbart,  Lehrhuch  der  Psychol.,  §§  167-178;  Stumpf, 
Psychologischer  JJrsprung  der  RaumvorsteUnng ;  Spencer,  Psychol- 
ogy, n.  pp.  178-216 ;  Montgomery,  Mind,  x.  pp.  227,  377,  and  512  ; 
Hall,  Mind,  in.  p.  433  ;  Sully,  Mind,  ni.  pp.  1  and  167;  Sergi, 
Psychologie  Physiologique,  bk.  2,  ch.  vii  and  x  ;  (History)  Porter, 
Hum.  Intellect,  ch.  ix  ;  Binet,  Revue  Philosophique,  xxi.  p.  113  ; 
Berkeley,  Theory  of  Vision;  James,  Mind,  1888;  Ward,  loc.  cit.; 
Lipps,  Grundthatsachen  des  Seelenlehens,  ch.  xxi-xxv,  and  Psycholo- 
gische  Studien,  i;  Lotze,  Metaphysic,  bk.  2,  ch.  i,  and  bk.  3,  ch.  iv. 

Further  Problems  for  Study : 

Subject  and  object  in  perception  ; 
Validity  of  the  perception  of  the  external  world  ; 
Philosophical  bearings  of  the  doctrine  of  perception  ; 
History  of  theories  of  perception. 


REPRESENTATION. 

MEMORY. 


CHAPTER  IX. 

IlETE:N^TIO:fT  AKD  EEPRODUCTIOIN". 

The  data  of  knowledge,  as  they  are  afforded  by  the 
acquisitive  function  of  mind,  have  been  thus  far  enu- 
merated and  distinguished.  This  expression,  data  of 
knowledge,  implies  that  these  acquisitions  remain  at 
the  disposal  of  other  mental  functions  longer  than  the 
mere  instant  of  their  first  experience  ;  otherwise,  they 
would  not  be  the  materials  of  knowledge.  Our  states  of 
consciousness,  as  a  general  fact,  may  be  spontaneously 
revived.  The  original  states  of  consciousness  are  desig- 
nated Presentations,  or  primary  states ;  and  the  corre- 
sponding revived  states,  to  which  they  give  rise,  Repre- 
sentations, or  secondary  states. 

§  1.  General  Nature  of  Memory. 

The  capacity  to  be  revived  on  suitable  conditions  ex- 
tends to  all  states  of  consciousness.  This  revival  is 
most  vivid  and  facile  for  sensations  of  sight,  touch,  and 
sound ;  from  the  fact  already  noticed  that  these  sensa- 
tions are  most  presentative,  having  the  forms  of  sj^ace 
and  time.  Objects  seen  are  readily  pictured  when  the 
eyes  are  closed,  and  sounds  of  tunes,  and  more  espe- 
cially of  words,  are  reproduced  with  great  ease.  In  read- 
ing a  page,  we  recall  the  sounds  of  the  spoken  words  in- 
voluntarily ;  and,  if  it  be  a  page  of  poetry,  the  rhythm 
and  rhyme  are  caught  by  the  quick  revival  of  the  words 

145 


146  BETENTION  AND  REPRODUCTION. 

and  measures  in  succession.  Other  sensations,  as  tastes 
and  odors,  are  also  cajoable  of  reproduction.  The  fact 
that  we  distinguish  and  classify  them  is  sufficient  proof 
of  this.  Their  reproduction  is  more  obscure  from  the 
fact  that,  being  more  affective,  they  cannot  be  pictured 
under  the  presentative  forms  of  time  and  space.  But 
that  these  forms,  and  consequently  memory  pictures  in 
general,  are  not  essential  to  memory,  is  seen  in  the  fact 
that  pains  and  pleasures,  and  the  emotions,  which  are 
purely  affective  states,  are  remembered  with  great  dis- 
tinctness ;  these  states  afford  no  data  for  our  picturing 
faculty.  According  to  Epicurus,  the  memory  of  past 
jjleasure  and  the  imagination  of  future  pleasure  are  the 
23rincipal  source  of  our  happiness.  Sympathy  depends 
upon  the  revival  of  our  own  j^ains  and  pleasures ;  for  we 
cannot  sympathize  strongly  in  cases  which  our  own  ex- 
2)erience  does  not  cover.  And  finally,  the  acts  of  will 
are  present  in  memory,  giving,  according  to  their  nature, 
moral  satisfaction  or  regret. 

Strictly  speaking,  a  distinction  is  to  bo  drawn  between 
states  which  are  revived  after  having  once  disappeared  from 
consciousness,  and  those  which  per.'^ist  in  consciousness  a 
short  period  after  the  external  stimulus  has  ceased  to  act. 
The  latter  is  a  mental  after-image,  somewhat  like  the  physi- 
cal after-image  on  the  retina,  already  mentioned.  Every  per- 
cept clearly  distinguished  leaves  its  outline  in  consciousness 
for  a  very  small  period,  and  then  fades  rapidly  away.  In  the 
case  of  a  rapid  succession  of  presentations,  each  percept  occu- 
pies less  time  than  the  unit  of  duration,'  so  there  is  a  coexist- 
ence of  presentations  and  not  a  revival.  This  is  the  case,  prob- 
ably, with  written  and  spoken  words,  tunes,  rapid  rhythm. 

Nature  of  Bevived  States.  As  to  the  nature  of  the 
states  brought  up  in  memory,  two  general  theories  are 
held.  On  the  one  hand,  it  is  maintained  that  there 
is  a  specific  difference  between  presentations  and  theii; 
revived    images  ;    a    difference   of    nature.      Secondary 

'  See  p.  185. 


PEESEXTATION  AND  REPRESENTATION.  147 

states  resemble  the  primary,  it  is  said,  as  a  portrait  re- 
sembles the  original ;  but  there  is  an  absolute  distinction 
in  their  nature.'  In  opposition  to  this  view,  others  hold 
that  between  primary  and  secondary  states,  there  is  only 
a  difference  of  degree.  They  are  truly  Presentation  and 
i^epresentation ;  their  nature  is  the  same.' 

Proof  that  Presentation  and  Representation  differ  only 
in  Degree  or  Intensity.  Several  kinds  of  evidence  may  be 
adduced  in  support  of  the  second  of  these  theories. 

I.  From  Consciousness.  We  are  aware  in  conscious- 
ness of  no  peculiar  marks  of  revived  states  by  which  to 
distinguish  them  from  percepts,  except  that  they  are 
prevailingly  of  less  intensity.  In  the  conscious  repro- 
duction, the  conditions  of  the  presentation  are  vaguely 
reproduced.  The  representation  of  a  name,  sound,  the 
tic-tac  of  the  pendulum,  is  referred  to  the  ear.  The  im- 
age of  an  extended  object  is  formed  as  extended  in  the 
field  of  vision.  If  we  try  to  recall  the  taste  of  an  orange, 
we  seem  to  have  a  kind  of  after-taste  on  the  tongue.  In 
recalling  emotions,  the  general  conditions  of  our  first  ex- 
perience of  it  are  found  with  it  in  memory  by  the  law  of 
association.  In  the  case  of  voluntary  reproduction,  it  is 
true,  there  is  the  addition  of  an  exercise  of  will,"  which 
is  of  great  importance  in  affording  us  a  means  of  distin- 
guishing between  the  percept  and  its  image  ;  but  this  is 
not  necessary  to  the  reproduction  more  than  to  the  orig- 
inal perception,  since  most  of  our  memory  pictures  arise 
involuntarily. 

II.  Presentations  and  Representations  have  the  same 
Physical  Antecedents  and  Effects.  The  physical  antece- 
dents of  both  primary  and  secondary  mental  states  are 

'  So  Reid  and  Caidaillac. 

^  So  Hume,  most  of  the  English  school,  and  the  physiological  psy- 
chologists.    Cf.  Kabier,  loe.  cit.  pp.  152-157. 

2  Fichte  makes  the  feeling  of  freedom  essential  to  all  reproduction. 


148  RETENTION  AND  EEPBODUCTION, 

spoken  of  later  under  tlie  physical  conditions  of  memory. 
It  is  sufficient  to  say,  liere,  tliat  tlie  immediate  physical 
antecedents,  the  brain  processes,  are  the  same  in  both 
cases.  The  remote  antecedents  of  the  percept — presence 
of  an  object,  and  stimulus  of  the  sense — are  wanting  in 
the  case  of  the  revived  image ;  but  it  is  the  immediate 
antecedent  upon  which  the  representation  depends. 

The  physical  consequences  or  elfects  are  also  the 
same.  Miiller  says,  that  the  simple  idea  of  a  nauseous 
taste  is  sometimes  sufficient  to  produce  sickness,  the 
natural  effect  of  the  real  sensation.  The  visual  picture 
of  a  person  who  has  once  provoked  our  anger  serves  to 
produce  it  again  with  the  same  physical  expression. 
Intense  mental  picturing  of  a  primary  color  may  so  ex- 
haust the  retinal  elements,  that  the  complementary  color 
is  seen  when  the  eyes  are  opened."  It  is  hard  to  think 
upon  an  energetic  action  without  imitating  it,  just  as  in 
the  original  attention  to  the  performance  of  it  by  others, 
we  had  such  a  bodily  tendency  ;  and  to  have  a  word  in 
mind  is  usually  to  form  it  "svith  the  organs  of  speech. 

Further  than  this,  the  ps3'chological  antecedents  and  con- 
sequents are  ahnost  identical  in  the  two  cases.  There  is  this 
difference  between  the  train  of  presentations  and  that  of  rep- 
resentations, that  the  latter  is  accompanied  by  a  feeling  of 
familiarity  and  anticipation.  But  it  is  doubtful  whether  this 
feeling  is  present  at  the  first  reproduction,  since  it  involves  a 
measure  of  previous  knowledge  which  can  only  be  representa- 
tive. This  feeling  is  present  in  the  perception,  also,  when  by 
repetition  an  element  of  representation  is  involved  in  it.  The 
voluntary  character  of  certain  reproductions,  which  seems  to 
make  them  peculiar  as  to  their  antecedents,  has  its  counterpart 
in  certain  voluntary  efforts  of  perception  ;  as  when  we  explore 
an  unknown  scene  with  the  eye  or  feel  over  an  unknown  sur- 
face. Further,  as  to  the  consequents — the  simple  thought  of 
great  cold  makes  one  shiver.  The  thought  of  the  drawing 
of  a  sharp  knife  over  glass  sets  one's  teeth  on  edge,  as  Darwin 
says.  Any  one  who  has  attended  a  clinical  operation  knows 
how  acute  the  sensations  of  cutting  and  drawing  are  at  first. 

'  Lewes,  Problems,  3d  series,  p.  448. 


PRESENTATION  AND  BEPRESENTATION  149 

The  effects  of  attention,  also,  are  the  same  upon  the  image 
as  upon  the  first  sensation. 

III.  Freqiient  Confusion  hetween  Presentation  and  Bep- 
resentation.  The  strongest,  indeed  the  decisive,  proof 
that  psychologically  these  two  classes  of  states  are  really 
one  is  this  :  we  frequently  mistake  one  for  the  other. 
"  The  proof,"  said  Keid,  "  that  there  is  an  essential  differ- 
ence of  nature  between  these  states  is  that  we  never 
confound  a  sensation,  however  feeble,  with  an  image,  or 
the  contrary."  This  is  simply  an  error  of  observation. 
We  do  often  confound  them,  and  several  different  cases 
of  this  confusion  may  be  j)ointed  out. 

1.  Wlien  the  intensity  of  the  image  is  very  great.  This 
is  the  case  in  hallucinations  and  insanity.  "  Patients 
continually  hear  voices  speaking  to  them,  or  about  them, 
rephing  to  their  most  secret  thoughts,  suggesting  to 
them  profane  and  obscene  ideas,  and  advising  and  threat- 
ening them."'  In  these  cases,  abnormal  brain  action 
gives  the  image  the  verisimilitude  of  a  sensation  and 
the  distinction  is  completely  lost.  The  same  result  may 
arise  in  normal  life  from  simple  force  of  imagination. 
Newton  could  bring  before  him,  when  in  the  dark,  an 
image  of  the  sun,  with  all  the  characteristics  of  reality, 
and  Goethe  could  evoke  an  image  and  cause  it  to  pass 
through  a  series  of  transformations." 

Further,  there  are  cases  of  regular  mistake  in  our 
perceptions,  in  which  an  image  passes  for  the  real  object. 
In  reading  rapidly  we  do  not  see  all  the  letters  individ- 
uall}^,  but  pass  over  them  with  a  supply  of  appropriate 
images.  It  is  probable  that  we  see  the  first  letters  of 
the  words  and  the  last,  slurring  over  the  middle  charac- 
ters and  suppljang  them  from  our  knowledge  and  from 
the  connection.  Yet  we  think  that  each  letter  has  been 
seen  in  order.     The  blind  spot  in  the  field  of  vision  is 

'  Maudsley,  loc.  cit. 

^  Cf.  T<aine,  Intelligence,  bk.  3,  ch.  i. 


150  RETENTION  AND  REPRODUCTION. 

filled  in  by  our  images,  and  the  field  seems  to  present 
an  unbroken  continuity.  And  our  acquired  perceptions 
are  often  imaged  additions  to  our  presentations  and  in- 
terpretations of  tliem.  In  all  tliese  cases  the  image  is 
of  such  intensity  as  to  seem  homogeneous  with  the  pre- 
sentational field  which  it  supplements. 

2.  Wlien  the  actual  sensation  is  very  feeble.  The  same 
result  is  found  when  the  sensation  is  reduced  in  intensity 
to  the  similitude  of  the  image.  For  example,  when  a 
sound  dies  out  little  by  little,  the  time  comes  when  one 
is  uncertain  whether  he  still  hears  it  or  only  remembers 
it.  If  the  two  experiences  were  distinct  in  nature,  the 
line  between  them  would  be  very  plain.  Patients  often 
cannot  tell  whether  they  feel  a  pain  or  only  imagine  it. 

This  is  especially  the  case  in  states  of  hj'pnotic  hallu- 
cination. Here  a  mere  suggestion  of  the  presence  of  an 
object  sufiices  to  place  its  image  in  the  conscious  field 
of  the  patient  with  a  persistence  and  perceptive  consis- 
tency which  nothing  but  a  counter-suggestion  can  re- 
move. The  image  becomes  for  the  patient  an  actual  ob- 
ject for  all  the  senses,  the  ordinary  tests  of  illusion  ^  fail, 
and  there  is  absolutely  no  distinction  to  the  subject  be- 
tween the  image  and  the  reality.  The  psychological 
nature  and  value  of  this  state  cannot  be  discussed  here ; 
it  is  sufiicient  to  note  its  capital  bearing  upon  the  point 
at  issue. 

In  all  cases  in  which  there  is  no  actual  perceptive  expe- 
rience to  correct  the  force  of  images,  we  are  liable  to  illusion/ 
and  hence  the  mere  absence  of  percepts  is  often  sufficient  to 
cause  the  errors  attributed  above  to  the  strengthening  or 
weakening  of  sensation.  This  is  the  case  in  dreaming.  The 
dream  world  is  the  only  world  then  in  consciousness,  and 
though  its  intensity  is  probably  feeble,  as  is  seen  in  the  fact 
that  dreams  do  not  linger  generally  in  consciousness,  it  is  taken 
for  real,  simply  from  the  absence  of  anything  more  real  where- 
with to  contrast  it. 

•  See  Chap.  XIII,  §  5. 
■'  Chap.  XIII. 


DEFINITION  OF  MEMORY.  151 

Upon  tliis  identity  of  nature  of  percepts  and  their  images 
is  based  the  theory  of  illusions  which  is  advocated  later  :  and 
indeed  any  such  theory  requires  such  a  basis.  For  this  reason, 
the  ground  of  the  assumption  of  iheir  identity  is  entered  upon 
at  some  length,  though  among  recent  thinkers  it  is  with  great 
unanimity  maintained. 

Distinctness  of  Image.  The  ditiference  in  intensity 
between  presentation  and  image,  involves  both  distinct- 
ness of  outline  and  vividness,  or  strength.  The  former 
is  of  greater  importance,  as  uncertainty  and  vagueness 
in  an  image  are  usually  due  to  breaks  in  outline  and 
omission  of  details,  rather  than  to  general  dimness. 

The  differences  betw^eeu  presentations  and  images  in. 
respect  to  their  apperceptive  surroundings  are  summed 
up  by  Lewes  by  the  word  escort.  The  image  is  the  same 
mental  product  as  the  original  experience,  differing  from 
it  only  in  intensity ;  but  their  trains  or  escorts  differ  in 
a  variety  of  ways,  including  their  relation  to  the  ex- 
ternal world. 

Definition  of  Memory.  In  considering  the  entire  men- 
tal function  which  we  call  memory,  we  find  that  it  involves 
several  factors  or  stages,  which  are  sometimes  treated  as 
distinct  operations,  but  may  more  properly  be  considered, 
as  we  find  them,  together.  Together  they  constitute  a 
chain  of  events  whereby  the  mental  life  of  the  past  is 
retained  and  utilized  in  the  present.  First,  there  is  the 
permanent  possibility  of  the  revival  of  a  past  experience 
when  its  first  circumstances  are  repeated ;  this  is  called 
Retention.  Next,  there  is  the  actual  return  of  the  image 
to  consciousness:  Reproduction.  Third,  this  image  is 
known  as  having  already  been  presented  in  our  past 
experience :  Recognition.  And  finally,  there  is,  in  most 
cases,  an  immediate  reference  to  the  exact  past  time  of 
its  first  experience  :  Localization.  These,  taken  together, 
constitute  a  finished  act  of  memory,  and  will  be  consid- 
ered in  the  order  of  their  actual  rise  in  consciousness. 


152  BETENTION  AND  REPRODUCTION. 

Accordingly,  memory  may  be  defined  as  a  mental  re- 
mval  of  conscious  experie^we;  in  which  the  word  experience 
refers  to  the  past  and  indicates  Retention,  the  term  re- 
vival answers  to  Reproduction,  and  the  word  mental 
makes  the  whole  a  conscious  fact  of  Recognition.  This 
definition  puts  the  case  in  the  broadest  light  and  admits 
iiny  interpretation  of  the  subordinate  operations  which 
may  be  consistent  with  fact. 

§  2.  Eetention. 

It  is  seen,  in  the  above  analysis,  that  an  act  of  mem- 
ory touches  consciousness  at  two  points ;  at  the  begin- 
ning, i.e.  at  the  time  of  the  original  presentation,  and  at 
the  end,  i.  e.  in  the  act  of  conscious  revival.  We  remem- 
ber nothing  of  which  we  were  not  conscious  at  the  time 
of  its  occurrence,  nor  do  we  remember  anything  when  we 
are  in  a  state  of  unconsciousness.  These  two  points  of 
contact  conceded,  the  question  at  once  arises :  what  of 
the  intervening  period  ?  I  saw,  for  example,  a  house 
3^esterday  or  last  year  ;  I  was  conscious  of  the  presenta- 
tion. I  recall  the  image  of  the  house  to-day,  or  a  year 
hence ;  I  am  conscious  of  the  representation.  But 
where  has  it  been  in  the  mean  time,  while  I  was  not 
conscious  of  it  ?  Several  answers  have  been  proposed  to 
this  question. 

Theories  of  Retention.  I.  Images,  ive  are  told  by 
the  metaphysicians,^  are  stored  away  in  the  mind,  in  the 
pigeon-holes  of  the  soul,  to  be  brought  out  for  use 
when  the  processes  of  mind  require  them.  This  view,  it 
is  needless  to  say,  is  not  now  advocated  in  this  language. 
The  mind  has  no  pigeon-holes ;  it  is  not  a  storehouse 
of  images.  But  it  is  maintained  in  more  discriminating 
form  by  others  who,  properly,  find  it  necessary  to  main- 

^  See  Hamilton  on  Latent  Images,  Metaphysics,  Lect.  XXX :  so  Plato 
and  St.  Augustine. 


THEORIES  OF  RETENTION.  153 

tain  a  continuity  of  mind  over  the  chasm  of  forgetfulness 
which  divides  these  two  points  of  conscious  life.'  Yet  it 
seems  sufficient  answer  to  this  to  say  that,  if  the  image 
has  left  consciousness  it  has  left  the  mind,  as  far  as  we 
know.  It  is  only  by  consciousness  that  we  can  discover 
the  image  at  all.  This  has  greater  force,  also,  in  view  of 
what  has  already  been  said  in  reference  to  the  uncon- 
scious, and  in  view  of  the  complete  fulfilment  of  all  the 
requirements  of  the  case  which  we  find  in  the  theory  ad- 
vocated below.  If  physical  processes  are  sufficient  for 
the  case,  we  violate  the  law  of  economy  in  insisting  upon 
another  principle.''  And  the  assumption  of  a  substantial 
jDersistent  independent  soul,  which  is  caj^able  of  under- 
going permanent  modifications,  is  not  allowable  from  a 
strictly  empirical  standpoint  at  this  stage  of  our  prog- 
ress. If  there  were  no  other  way,  through  psychology 
or  physiology,  of  accounting  for  retention,  we  would  find 
here  a  legitimate  argument  for  such  a  postulate. 

II.  Retention  is  due  to  a  psychological  habit.^  This 
theory  refers  retention  to  habit,  and  conceives  of  habit 
as  a  permanent  disposition  of  the  mind  to  do  again,  when- 
ever circumstances  permit,  what  it  has  once  done ;  to 
think  again  what  it  has  once  thought.     As  a  description 

'  Leibnitz,  Ward.  "No  idea,"  says  Bouillier,  Le  principe  vital  et 
I'dme  pensante,  p.  405,  "  at  least  of  those  which  memory  may  recall,  ever 
leaves  the  miud  entirely.  No  idea  leaves  the  mind,  but  each  idea  be- 
comes invisible  for  a  time  or  permanently.  To  remember  is  to  have 
new  consciousness  of  what  has  not  ceased  to  exist  in  the  soul.  Thus 
there  sleep  in  the  depths  of  our  soul  and  in  different  beds  innumerable 
ideas  which  remain  unknown  till  some  circumstance,  some  effort  of  the 
attention,  brings  them  to  the  light." 

'  Leibnitz  was  constrained  to  admit,  in  virtue  of  the  principle  of 
preCstablished  harmony  between  mind  and  body,  the  conservation,  in 
the  organ,  of  phj^siological  dispositions  corresponding  to  these  latent 
memories.  So  Aristotle  held  a  doctrine  of  material  residues  {uovdi 
Kiv7]aEi<i)  which  were  correlative  with  the  mental  states  considered  as 
form.     De  an.,  ni.  2,  and  Anat.  post.,  ii.  19. 

3  Waitz,  Wundt. 


154  RETENTION  AND  REPRODUCTION. 

of  the  actual  fact  this  is  true.  There  is  such  a  tendency, 
to  a  very  marked  degree ;  but  it  is  merely  an  observed 
aspect  of  memory,  and,  in  noting  it,  we  do  not  at  all  ex- 
plain the  activity  of  memory.  When  we  have  called  it  a 
habit,  a  disposition,  a  permanent  tendency  of  mind,  what 
more  can  we  say  ?  The  questions  arise  :  Is  it  based  on 
psychological  grounds,  or  will  physiological  facts  explain 
it  ?  Is  it  an  ultimate  law,  or  can  it  be  reduced  to  simpler 
principles?  Habits  are  not  facts  of  consciousness,  and 
we  have  no  experience  of  them  except  by  observation  of 
the  states  which  are  supposed  to  exemplify  them ;  so 
that  they  elude  our  observation.  If  it  is  submitted, 
therefore,  as  an  explanation  of  retention,  that  the  mind 
becomes  accustomed  to  acting  in  certain  ways,  and  so 
repeats  itself,  the  ground  of  this  mental  custom  must  be 
again  referred  to  that  chasm  of  the  unconscious  which 
affords  so  ready  a  repository  for  the  outcasts  of  our  ig- 
norance. As  Volkmaun  remarks,  inasmuch  as  the  repre- 
sentations are  not  essences,  but  functions,  the  disposi- 
tions or  habits  of  mind  must  be  functional  dispositions. 
Now  a  functional  disposition  can  only  consist  in  a  slight 
persistence  of  the  function,  which,  in  turn,  can  only  mean, 
a  continuation  or  persistence  of  the  representation  in 
complete  unconsciousness.  By  phj^sical  disposition  or 
tendency  we  may  mean  combination  or  arrangement ;  a 
readiness  of  parts  for  a  given  result.  But  in  speaking  of 
presentations,  as  functions,  we  cannot  employ  such  a 
meaning.  Wundt  himself  remarks :  "  If  we  carry  the 
view  (of  dispositions  of  mind)  over  from  the  physical  to 
the  mental,  only  conscious  presentations  can  be  consid- 
ered real  presentations,  while  those  that  are  driven  out 
of  consciousness  may  be  considered  as  mental  disposi- 
tions of  ayi  unknown  hind  toward  revival."  And  he  goes 
on  to  say :  "  The  essential  difference  between  the  spheres 
of  the  physical  and  mental  consists  in  this,  that  in  the 
former  case  we  may  hope  to  learn  more  of  the  changes 


THEORIES  OF  RETENTION.  155 

wliicli  we  call  dispositions,  while  on  the  mental  side  this 
hope  is  forever  forbidden,  inasmuch  as  the  limits  of  con- 
sciousness are  at  the  same  time  the  limits  of  our  inner 
experience."  ' 

This  is,  however,  more  philosophical  than  the  preced- 
ing theory,  in  that  it  questions  each  re\dved  state  for  it- 
self as  a  new  functional  acquisition  instead  of  an  old 
preserved  entity.  And  if  we  were  able  at  this  point  to 
make  the  assumption  of  a  substance  called  mind — which 
was  above  forbidden — we  would  be  justified  in  resting  in 
the  law  of  habit  in  respect  to  it,  as  we  are  in  resting  in 
the  physiological  law  of  habit  to  which  appeal  is  made 
below.  Metaphysically  this  alternative  is  not  excluded  ; 
but  we  are  here  not  concerned  with  metaphysics,  and 
in  refusing  this  resort  we  are  only  following  openly  in 
the  path  followed  silently  by  Descartes,  Malebranche 
and  Leibnitz,  in  turning  to  the  body  and  seeking  in  it  an 
explanation  more  readily  confirmable  by  fact. 

III.  The  image  is  subconscious.  The  school  of  Her- 
bart  support  the  theory,  that  every  image  which  is  capa- 
ble of  being  revived  in  consciousness  exists  in  a  state  of 
diminished  intensity,  having  fallen  below  the  threshold 
of  consciousness,  to  rise  again  when,  for  any  reason,  its 
intensity  is  heightened.  This  may  mean  that  the  repre- 
sentation is  vaguely  or  dimly  conscious,  lying  in  a  state 
of  diffused  or  contracted  attention,  but  still  entering  as  a 
factor  in  the  complex  whole  of  our  present  state ;  in 
which  case,  the  theory  is  true,  as  is  generally  admitted. 
But  it  then  overlooks  the  great  mass  of  remembered 
facts ;  facts  which  are  in  no  sense  even  in  subconscious- 
ness, as  my  memory  of  a  date  in  history  when  I  am 
thinking  of  something  to  which  it  is  quite  foreign.  For 
these  entirely  unconscious  states,  the  Herbartians  ^  have 
no  alternative  but  to  hold  that  they  still  have  an  in- 

»  Pht/s.  Psych.,  2d  ed.,  ii.  p.  205. 

'^  For  example,  see  Volkmann,  loc.  cit.,  vol.  i,  §50,  and  §60,  p.  403. 


156  RETENTION  AND  REPROD  VCTION. 

teusitj,  below  all  estimation,  in  tlie  depths  of  the  psy- 
chic life.  This  is  the  old  metaphysical  theory  in  more 
modern  guise.  The  phrase  "  unconscious  presentation  " 
may  be  more  scientific  and  less  material  than  "  latent 
images"  or  "  stored-up  ideas,"  but  it  is  equally  obscure 
and  less  picturesque. 

Another  pertinent  objection  to  this  theory  is  that  it 
supposes  a  degree  of  sej)arateness  or  individuality  in  the 
unconscious  states,  which  in  real  mental  life  is  impossi- 
ble. If  rejDresentations  coexist  with  slight  intensities  in 
unconscious  mind,  why  do  not  those  of  the  same  quality 
coalesce,  as  in  real  presentation  ?  I  have  a  distinct  mem- 
ory of  two  notes,  say  cand  c' :  if  they  are  both  present  in 
unconsciousness,  differing  only  in  intensity  from  the  real 
sensations,  why  do  they  not  coalesce  in  a  single  sound  ? 
So  general]}'  with  these  states  :  there  is  no  interference 
or  mutual  hindrance,  as  in  real  experience.' 

General  Criticism.  As  a  general  criticism  of  the  pre- 
ceding theories  of  retention,  the  following  consideration 
is  of  great  importance.  They  agree,  especially  the  first 
and  third,  in  regarding  the  representation  or  image  as  a 
thing  of  itself,  a  something  which  exists,  and  whose  pres- 
ence somewhere  else  must  be  supj^osed,  when  it  is  not 
jDresent  in  consciousness.  We  are  told,  the  j)ercept  of  the 
house  was  in  consciousness  yesterday  and  the  representa- 
tion will  be  again  to-morrow  :  where  is  my  image  of  the 
house  to-day?  And  these  theories  attempt  to  conjecture 
the  whereabouts  of  this  image.  Very  slight  considera- 
tion leads  us  to  see  that  this  manner  of  thought  is  quite 
mistaken.  The  image  is  not  a  thing  at  all,  to  be  stored 
away  or  sunk  in  subconsciousness  like  a  stone  in  a  lake ; 
it  is  a  state,  a  mental  product,  dependent  upon  a  process, 
and  in  the  absence  of  this  process  it  simply  ceases  to  ex- 
ist. The  true  answer  to  the  question,  as  to  where  the  pres- 
entation is  in  the  time  between  percept  and  memory,  is 

'  Cf.  Waitz,  Lehrbuch  der  Psychologie,  1849,  p.  84. 


PHY8I0L0QICAL  THEORY  OF  RETENTION.        lo7 

Noivliere.  Its  reinstatement  is  simply  the  reiustitution 
of  the  process  which  at  first  gave  it  rise.  Its  recall  is  a 
re-creation,  really  a  new  presentation,  not  the  old  image. 
We  never  have  the  same  representation  twice.  We  are 
thus  led  to  another  theory. 

IV.  Physiological  Theory  of  Retention.  Disregard- 
ing the  fact  of  actual  rej^roduction,  which  is  considered 
below,  and  looking  only  to  the  permanent  possibility  of 
such  reproduction,  that  is,  to  the  set  of  conditions  of 
such  permanence  as  to  make  the  revival  of  mental  states 
at  any  time  real,  we  are  led  to  the  view  that  retention  is 
physical,  a  matter  of  the  modification  of  brain  and  nerve 
structure  or  function ;  such  modification  persisting  and 
giving  rise  to  a  physiological  habit  or  tendency.  Before 
proceeding  farther  to  explain  and  defend  this  view  some 
general  objections  may  be  met. 

1.  It  is  objected  that  physiological  modifications 
could  not  last  as  retention  does,  even  admitting  the  gen- 
eral principle  that  every  organic  modification  must  leave 
some  trace  behind  it.  Here  the  question  is  simply  as 
to  the  length  of  an  admitted  process  of  obliteration.  It 
is  not  held  that  these  modifications  do  not  fade  away 
and  finally  disappear,  as  far  as  memory  is  concerned. 
The  fact  of  forgetfulness,  seemingly  absolute,  establishes 
the  tendency  of  these  traces  to  disappear.  Therefore 
we  only  have  to  ask,  how  long,  relatively,  might  they 
last?  Admitting  this  point,  we  still  find  it  possible  to 
hold  that  these  nervous  modifications  persist  indefi- 
nitely, as  memory  sometimes  appears  to.'  There  are 
analogous  cases  of  long  persistence  of  physical  modifica- 


'  See  Ribot,  Les  Maladies  de  la  Memaire,  ch.  iv,  and  Taine,  Intelli- 
gence, II.  ch.  II,  for  remarkable  cases  of  such  memory.  An  ignorant 
girl,  during  a  severe  illness  in  her  twenty-fifth  year,  recited  long  pieces 
of  Greek,  Latin,  and  Hebrew,  which  she  had  heard  her  uncle  repeat 
when  she  was  nine  years  old. 


158  RETENTION  AND  REPRODUCTION. 

tion.  If  a  key  be  laid  upon  a  -white  paper,  and  exposed 
to  the  sun,  and  the  paper  be  then  preserved  in  darkness, 
the  image  of  the  key  is  visible  for  some  years.  Even  in 
case  of  organic  modification  where  the  physical  elements 
are  undergoing  perpetual  renewal,  the  form  persists. 
An  insignificant  scar  on  the  skin  remains  through  life. 
The  virus  of  small-pox  or  the  presence  once  of  an  in- 
fectious disease,  leaves  marks  sometimes,  throughout 
the  elements  of  the  body,  which  are  never  erased.'  Mus- 
cular fibre  is  permanently  modified  by  exercise.  We 
have  a  further  analogy  in  the  permanent  disposition 
which  the  motor  centres  assume  for  the  coordination  of 
movements.  At  first  complex  movements  are  performed 
with  great  difiiculty,  the  central  nervous  disposition  be- 
ing wanting ;  but  after  some  practice  these  dispositions 
become  established  and  the  coordinated  movements  be- 
come semi-automatic.^  Of  the  superior  centres  the 
same,  in  all  probability,  may  be  said. 

2.  It  is  further  objected  that  the  brain  does  not  af- 
ford sufficient  substance  or  accommodation  for  so  many 
coexisting  memories,  supposing  them  to  be  permanent 
traces,  either  in  the  organism  or  its  functions.  But  this 
difficulty,  although  frequently  urged,  does  not  deserve 
serious  thought.  According  to  the  most  moderate  esti- 
mate, the  large  brain  contains  about  600  million  cells 
and  even  a  larger  number  of  fibres.  And  we  are  not  at 
all  obliged  to  think  of  these  elements  as  having  a  single 
function  only.  They  are  known,  on  the  contrary,  to  act 
together  in  specific  connections,  and  the  varieties  of  con- 
nections of  so  many  elements  is  simply  infinite.  Fur- 
ther, we  have  here,  also,  analogous  cases  which  settle  the 


'  See  Maudsley,  Physiology  of  Mind. 

'  ' '  These  movements,"  says  M.  Luys,  "  show  the  tendency  of  the  sen- 
sor-motor cells  to  preserve  traces  of  discharges  which  have  once  taken 
place,  and  to  persist  in  the  disposition  which  is  earliest  given  to  them. 
The  nerve  cells  are  polarised  in  the  position  given  them." 


PHY8I0L0OICAL  THEORY  OF  RETENTION.         159 

question  witliout  furtlier  consideration  :  the  coexistence 
of  innumerable  functional  dispositions  in  the  motor  ar- 
rangement of  the  nerves  and  muscles  of  a  single  organ 
of  the  body  ;  the  marvellous  fact  of  the  life  development 
of  an  organism  encased  in  a  single  germ,  at  first  micro- 
scopic— a  germ  which  possesses,  in  disposition  or  ten- 
dency, all  the  organic  characteristics  of  the  parents  to 
the  most  minute  detail,  as  the  color  of  hair,  shape  of 
nose,  and  those  indescribable  similarities  of  feature 
which  constitute  family  resemblance,  or  the  disposition 
to  peculiar  motor  habits/  If  a  single  germ  cell  may 
jjossess  such  inexplicable  power  of  preserving  differ- 
ences of  form  and  function,  what  limit  can  we  set  to  the 
similar  power  of  the  brain '? 

The  whole  question  of  the  possibility  of  the  coexistence  of 
so  many  tendencies  in  the  brain,  seems  to  be  a  case  of  ignoratio 
elenchi.  We  cannot  doubt  the  possibility,  unless  we  have 
some  knowledge  both  of  the  functional  activity  of  the  cere- 
bral elements  and  of  the  real  nature  of  the  changes  which  make 
retention  possible.  But  of  both  these  our  ignorance  is  com- 
plete. What  is  the  general  character  of  cellular  change  in  the 
brain  ?  What  is  the  law  of  the  establishment  of  fibrous  con- 
nections in  the  brain?  What  changes  do  sensor  stimulus 
and  motor  reaction  work  either  in  the  cells  or  their  con- 
nection ?  These  questions  must  all  be  answered  before  we 
•can  say  anything  about  the  possibilities  of  cerebral  disposition. 

3.  It  is  again  objected  that  the  reduction  of  retention 
to  a  physical  tendency  and  modification,  interferes  with 
mental  continuity  and  destroys  the  unity  of  mind. 
This,  however,  is  seen  not  to  be  the  case,  when  we  re- 
member that  we  are  dealing  with  the  retention  of  indi- 
vidual states  or  presentations,  whose  lajDse  from  con- 
sciousness does  not  afiect  the  unity  and  continued  per- 
sistence of  consciousness  itself.  If  a  presentation  be 
quite  out  of  consciousness,  it  is  lost  to  the  mental  life, 

'  See  the  case  of  three  generations  having  the  habit  of  striking  the 
nose  with  the  fist  while  asleep,  Paulhan,  Phydologie  de  I'esprit,  p.  164. 


160  RETEI^TION  AND  REPRODUCTION. 

whether  it  be  iu  unconsciousness  or  in  physical  dispo- 
sition. The  unity  of  consciousness,  the  conscious  active 
unity  of  apperception,  remains  present  throughout  all 
the  come  and  go  of  states,  some  other  presentation  tak- 
ing the  place  of  that  which  is  lapsed  ;  or,  in  other  words, 
another  content  occupying  the  active  process.  The 
unity  of  the  mental  life  consists,  not  in  the  persistence 
of  single  states,  but  in  the  conscious  oneness  of  the  ego 
as  activity  or  energy. 

Pathological  Proof  of  Physiological  Dispositions  in  the 
Brain.  The  actual  proof  of  physiological  dispositions 
in  the  substance  of  the  brain  is  derived  from  cases  of 
disease  of  memory.  If  it  can  be  shown  that  all  cases 
of  the  impairment  of  retention  are  due,  other  conditions 
remaining  the  same,  to  disease  or  derangement  of  the 
brain  or  its  functions,  we  have,  by  the  logical  "  method 
of  difference,"  proof  that  the  primary  condition  of  reten- 
tion is  cerebral.  The  argument  is  not  entirely  conclu- 
sive even  for  retention,  since  there  remains  still  the  hy- 
pothesis of  unconscious  mental  modifications  parallel 
with  and  depending  upon  cerebral  modifications.  If 
this  latter  hypothesis  be  true,  we  would  still  possibly 
find  impairment  of  memory  following  cerebral  degenera- 
tion, though  it  would  be  exceedingly  improbable.  For 
if  there  be  "  mental  dispositions,"  as  well  as  "  physio- 
logical dispositions,"  why  should  not  the  former  secure 
memory  when  the  latter  fail  in  such  a  way  as  not  to  in- 
volve the  general  physical  basis  of  consciousness  ?  The 
general  argument  from  a  pathological  standpoint  is  well 
made  by  M.  Ribot,'  though  he  overlooks  the  possibility 
above  noted  of  parallel  "  mental  dispositions,"  as  held 
by  Wundt.  He  argues  through  all  the  details  of  the 
growth  of  memory,  its  degeneration,  destruction,  and  re- 

'  Diseases  of  Memory. 


PHYSICAL  BASIS  OF  MEMORY.  161 

covery,  with   the  accidents  and  variations  to  which  it 
is  subject. 

We  cannot  press  the  argument  further,  however,  with 
Eibot  and  make  memory  entirely  "  organic,"  from  the  fact 
that  it  overlooks  the  most  essential  mental  conditions,  which 
must  necessarily  be  constant,  if  we  would  argue  from  brain 
pathology  at  all.  These  conditions  are  spoken  of  below.  If, 
for  example,  as  in  the  thousand  cases  of  our  daily  life,  mem- 
ory fails  when  we  have  not  attended  closely  to  the  original 
percept,  we  would  still,  by  the  ''  organic  "  theory,  be  compelled 
to  look  for  the  failure  in  the  lack  of  a  physiological  disposi- 
tion :  while,  in  fact,  this  disposition  may  be  entirely  intact 
and  very  strong,  the  failure  being  due  to  the  absence  of  the 
purely  mental  function,  attention. 

Physical  Basis  of  Memory.  As  to  the  nature  of  the 
physical  basis,  which  constitutes  the  primary  condition 
of  retention,  we  may  speak  in  general  outline.  In  the 
case  of  any  sensation  and  its  reaction  in  movement,  two 
classes  of  physical  data  are  involved  :  sensor  and  motor. 
The  sensation  has  its  seat  in  the  gray  matter  of  the 
brain,  from  which,  by  a  fibrous  connection,  and  through 
certain  motor  elements  in  the  brain  or  spinal  cord, 
communication  is  established  with  the  muscular  tissue. 
Each  such  system  of  connected  or  associated  elements  is 
called  a  "  sensori-motor  connection."  Now  every  sensa- 
tion, say  that  arising  from  a  bell,  gives  two  kinds  of 
modifications  in  the  nervous  system  :  first,  it  works  an 
unknown  change  in  the  sensor  cells,  and  second,  it  tends 
to  establish  motor  connections.  Accepting  this  as  the 
simplest  type  of  such  action,  we  can  conceive  of  innumer- 
able modifications  and  complications  of  it.  Numerous 
motor  connections  may  be  possible  from  a  single  seat  of 
sensor  change.  For  example,  upon  feeling  a  painful  con- 
tact with  the  body,  we  have  numerous  alternative  move- 
ments to  relieve  it.  When  a  limb  is  fatigued  we  may  move 
it  into  various  positions  of  change.  When  we  hear  a 
word  we  have  a  tendency  both  to  speak  and  to  write  it, 
involving  different  motor  connections,  or  we  may  make 


162  RETENTION  AND  REPRODUCTION. 

a  gesture  expressive  of  its  meaning.  In  the  same  way, 
different  sensory  centres  become  connected  with  one 
another  by  their  frequent  association  together :  as  the 
taste  and  color  of  an  apple.  Now  every  time  the  sense 
in  question  is  excited  by  the  same  stimulus,  the  same 
course  of  transmission,  by  the  law  of  least  resistance,  is 
liable  to  be  called  into  play ;  and  there  is  a  tendency, 
both  to  confirm  the  sensor  modification  and  to  strengthen 
the  sensori-motor  connection.  Thus  greater  facility  and 
rapidity  are  given  to  the  process,  and  there  arises,  in  the 
nervous  organism  a  readiness  or  disposition  to  repeat  its 
own  acts  under  similar  circumstances. 

Now  in  the  case  of  reproduction,  or  memory,  the  same 
nerve  elements  are  affected,'  and  in  the  same  manner ; 
except  that  the  sensor  centres  are  excited  from  within 
instead  of  from  without :  from  some  other  centre  instead 
of  from  the  end  organ.  For  example,  if  instead  of  hear- 
ing the  striking  of  the  bell,  I  am  thinking  of  architecture, 
then  of  the  cathedral  at  Thun,  the  bells  of  Thun  arise 
to  mind,  and  I  have  a  memory  of  the  sound  of  a  bell. 
This,  by  an  established  association,  excites,  entirely  from 
within,  the  centre  of  vision,  giving  a  visual  image  of  a 
bell,  this  excites  the  motor-connection  with  the  organs 
of  speech,  and  I  pronounce  the  word  bell.  Thus  the 
same  elements  are  brought  into  play  as  in  the  actual 
presentations  by  the  senses  involved — the  bell  itself  be- 
ing absent.  This  is  the  physical  basis  of  a  memory. 
The  organism  is  disposed  toward  the  production  of  the 
state  of  consciousness  of  the  original  perception.  The 
execution  of  movements,  at  first  diflicult,  becomes  easy, 
then  semi-automatic,  and  often  irresistible,  and  nothing 
remains  to  make  the  phj'sical  retention  real  reproduc- 
tion, save  the  mental  conditions  which  inaugurate  its 
movement. 

'  See  the  law  given  by  Bain,  Senses  and  Intellect,  p.  333. 


MENTAL  CONDITIONS  OF  RETENTION.  163 

Otlier  physical  conditions  of  memory  are  only  such  as  are 
concerned  with  the  maintenance  of  this  nervous  function ; 
such  as  general  Jiealth  of  body,  active  circulation,  and  rich 
quality  of  blood.  The  old  doctrine  of  "animal  spirits"  as 
held  by  Hartley  and  Locke  is  an  attempt  at  a  physiological 
explanation  of  memory.  "Custom,"  says  Locke,'  "settles 
habits  of  thinking  in  the  understanding  as  well  as  of  deter- 
mining in  the  will  and  of  motion  in  the  body  :  all  which  seem 
to  be  but  trains  of  motion  in  the  animal  spirits,  v/hich,  once 
set  agoing,  continue  in  the  same  steps  they  have  been  used 
to,  which,  by  often  treading,  are  worn  into  a  smooth  path 
and  the  motion  in  it  becomes  easy  and,  as  it  were,  natural." 

Mental  Conditions  of  Retention.  The  mental  condi- 
tions of  retention  are  purely  conditions  and  not  the  reten- 
tion itself,  which  we  have  found  to  be  a  matter  of  the 
physical  organism.  First  we  note  the  intensity  of  the 
sensation.  Sensations  or  perceptions  of  slight  intensity 
are  not  remembered ;  this  is  because  they  do  not  reach 
the  relating  and  fixing  activity  of  apperception.  It  is 
probable  that  they  are  retained  as  bodily  modifications 
and  have  their  influence  upon  the  general  cast  of  our 
memory.  But,  not  having  been  given  a  place  and  con- 
nection in  the  mental  life,  they  have  no  associations  of 
sufficient  strength  to  accomplish  their  recall.  Intense 
sensations,  on  the  other  hand,  draw  the  attention  to  them- 
selves and  are  remembered.  Another  condition,  or  fa- 
cilitating circumstance,  is  repetition  of  the  first  sense- 
experience.  Repetition  tends  to  bring  a  presentation 
before  the  attention  from  the  very  fact  that  it  is  the 
same  experience  we  have  before  met.  A  presentation 
whicli  is  at  first  too  slight  for  notice  and  so  escapes  at- 
tention, at  another  time,  and  under  different  conditions, 
is  apperceived  and  fixed  in  an  environment  of  conscious 
states.  In  many  cases,  also,  the  very  fact  of  repetition 
serves  to  add  actual  strength  to  the  presentation,  pro- 
ceeding upon  the  nervous  modification  or  tendency  be- 
gotten of  its  earlier  occurrence. 

'  Essay,  II,  chap,  xxxiii,  §  6. 


164  RETENTION  AND  REPRODUCTION. 

The  most  important  of  these  conditions,  however, 
and  that  to  which  those  mentioned  may  be  subor- 
dinated, is  the  attention.  The  attention  considered  in 
its  entire  function  as  the  apperceptive  agent  of  our 
mental  life  is,  as  shall  be  seen  later,  the  one  essential 
mental  condition  of  memory.  It  carries  in  it  the  fact  of 
mental  continuity.  Here  we  deal  only  with  its  bearing 
on  retention.  It  is  a  universal  principle,  that  things 
attended  to  are  remembered,  and  things  not  attended  to 
are  forgotten.  This  arises  from  a  twofold  effect  of  atten- 
tion :  first,  as  was  seen  in  the  chapter  on  attention,  it  in- 
creases the  intensity  of  presentations,  and  so  gives  them 
a  greater  strength  and  nearness  in  the  flow  of  mental 
states  ;  and,  second,  it  gives  them  a  related  position,  as  of 
contiguity,  resemblance,  cause,  in  reference  to  other 
states  with  which  or  near  which  they  occur.  We  shall 
see,  in  studying  association,'  that  our  mental  experiences 
are  never  isolated.  They  are  always  bound  together  by 
relations  which  the  mind  discerns  in  apperception. 
The  more  closely  and  definitely  they  are  bound  together 
the  more  permanent  are  our  acquisitions ;  and  the  more 
loosely  bound,  the  more  easily  dropped  out  and  lost. 
Now  apperception  is  this  binding  activity.  When  we 
say  we  experience  a  sight  and  attend  to  it,  we  mean  that 
we  bring  out  its  details  in  relation  to  one  another  and  in 
relation  to  our  earlier  and  later  experience,  giving  them 
a  place  in  the  permanent  texture  of  our  memory. 

§  3.   Repeoduction. 

Its  Primary  Condition.  The  first  condition  of  the  re- 
production of  an  image  is  the  physiological  disposition 
which  appears  to  constitute  retention.  Assuming  reten- 
tion, therefore,  we  inquire  into  the  further  elements  of 
reproduction.     It  is  easy  to  see  that  this  purely  physical 

1  Chap.  XI. 


REPRODUCTION:  ITS  CONDITIONS.  165 

modification  does  not  account  for  the  revival  of  an  image 
in  consciousness.  The  essential  element  of  memory  is 
lacking.  The  simple  fact  that  matter  modified  as  you 
please  does  not  remember,  serves  to  refute  the  theory  of 
**  organic  memory."  We  might,  with  as  much  reason,  say 
that  the  post  remembers  the  nail  which  was  driven  into  it, 
because  it  retains  a  permanent  modification  in  the  arrange- 
ment of  its  elements,  or  that  the  seasoned  meerschaum 
pipe  remembers  by  virtue  of  the  molecular  changes 
which  its  frequent  use  has  wrought ;  as  that  the  brain 
remembers  because  of  its  molecular  dispositions.  Of  the 
physical  process  we  may  say  :  a.  That  it  is  the  necessary 
basis  of  memory,  as  far  as  our  experience  goes.  h.  That 
it  accounts  for  retention,  c.  That  it  gives  direction  to 
the  flow  of  our  memories,  by  the  determination  of  one 
of  many  alternative  nervous  causes.  But  it  is  no  more  an 
approach  to  an  explanation  of  the  revival  in  conscious- 
ness of  an  image,  than  of  the  first  perception  itself.  The 
physical  process  determines  lohat  I  shall  remember :  the 
mental  process,  lioiu  I  shall  remember  it.' 

Supplementary  Condition.  It  has  already  been  made 
more  or  less  clear  that  a  rej^roduction  is  a  re-crea- 
tion, a  new  product,  which  is  due  to  the  same  conditions 
as  the  original  perception,  with  the  lack  of  the  external 
stimulus.  This  lack  is,  however,  seeming  rather  than 
real,  since  the  central  stimulus  is  as  really  supplied  from 
wdthin  as  though  the  object  were  present.  Admitting, 
then,  the  physiological  disposition  of  the  organism,  due 
to  former  experience,  we  find  the  further  supplementary 
condition  of  reproduction  to  be  a  neio  stimulus  of  the 
centres,  arising  generally  from  an  inner  or  mental  source. 
This  new  stimulus,  however,  is  not  always  mental,  since 
there  is  a  vast  range  of  bodily  conditions  from  which  the 
centres  may  be  excited,  stimuli  which  may  be  called  intra- 

1  Compare  the  discussion  of  Ladd,  Pliys.  Psychology,  pp.  546-560. 


166  RETENTION  AND  REPRODUCTION. 

organic  in  distinction  both  from  the  excitations  of  the 
external  workl  and  from  those  of  the  workl  of  conscious 
states.  Any  stimulus  which  fulfils  the  one  condition  of 
reproducing  the  jDhysical  function,  as  it  operated  in  per- 
ception— the  mental  conditions  of  recognition  being  again 
present — suffices  for  the  revival  of  a  presentation. 

This  theory  of  reproduction  explains  many  mysterious 
facts  which  are  inexplicable  on  the  theory  of  mental  habit 
or  of  unconscious  memory.  The  whole  field  of  unconscious 
trains  of  ideas  is  covered  by  the  consideration  of  an  organic 
process.  We  are  often  surprised  at  the  sudden  appearance  in 
consciousness  of  a  representation  which  has  no  apparent  con- 
nection with  our  train  of  thought.'  Yet,  by  close  attention, 
we  can  often  find  some  dim  association  with  an  earlier  state. 
In  consciousness  we  have  forgotten  the  connection,  but  an  or- 
ganic disposition  asserts  itself  through  all  the  links  of  our 
earlier  presentation,  and  the  unexpected  idea  is  the  conse- 
quence. This  is  supported  by  the  fact  drawn  from  psychom- 
etry,  that  in  every  sensor  reaction  the  physiological  process, 
takes  less  time  than  the  mental.^  It  is  quite  conceivable, 
therefore,  that  when  a  series  of  nervous  modifications  follow 
one  another  very  quickly,  sufficient  time  is  not  afforded  be- 
tween them  for  the  conscious  presentation.  Often,  also,  after 
vain  efforts  to  remember  a  date  or  name,  we  give  it  up,  but 
when  thinking  of  other  things,  it  suddenly  pops  up,  so  to 
S]3eak,  in  consciousness.  It  is  possible,  that  in  our  casting 
about  for  the  desired  memory,  we  have  started  a  train  of  asso- 
ciation which  has  run  its  course  in  the  organic  disjjositions, 
and  terminated  successfully.  These  cases  will  be  again  referred 
to  in  the  consideration  of  the  association  of  ideas.  This  ex- 
planation seems  much  more  natural  than  the  mysterious 
hypothesis  of  unconscious  mind. 

The  principle  that  the  same  physical  process  is  involved  in 
the  reproduction  as  in  the  presentation,  is  confirmed  by  the 
distinction  above  noted,  ^  between  a  persistent  presentation  and 
its  revived  image.  The  persistent  presentation  is  seen,  at  once, 
to  depend  upon  the  same  excitation  and  nerve  process  which 
gave  the  percept ;  yet  it  remains  when  the  object  is  withdrawn. 

'  Cf .  Hamilton,  Lect.  on  Metaphysics,  iv,  and  Mill,  Exam,  of  Ham- 
ilton, ch.  XV. 

2  See  p.  110. 

3  See  p.  146. 


SECONDARY  AIDS  TO  REPRODUCTION.  167 

Hence  we  have  every  reason  to  believe  that  the  revived  image 
is  due  to  the  same  nerve  process^  since  it  differs  from  the  per- 
sistent presentation  only  in  its  separation  from  the  external 
stimulus  by  a  very  brief  period  of  time.  One  is  a  prolonga- 
tion of  the  primary  state,  the  other  a  restoration  of  it:  the 
former  is  the  continuous  effect  of  a  continuous  cause,  the 
other  the  intermittent  effect  of  an  intermittent  cause. 
Another  proof  drawn  from  physiology  that  the  same  nervous 
elements  are  called  into  play  in  the  representation,  is  the  fact 
that  memory  fatigues  the  same  centres  that  the  actual  percep- 
tion does.  If  a  bright  color  be  imagined  and  thought  of  in- 
tensely and  the  eyes  then  closed,  the  complementary  color  is 
seen,  just  as  is  the  case  after  an  actual  perception. ' 

Secondary  Aids  to  Reproduction.  There  are  certain 
secondary  conditions  which  tend  to  the  most  ready  repro- 
duction of  mental  pictures.  In  their  general  nature  they 
are  almost  identical  with  the  auxiliary  conditions  of 
actual  experience,  and  so  add  new  evidence  of  the  iden- 
tity of  the  two  classes  of  facts.  Among  them  we  may 
notice  :  a.  Intensity  of  the  nervous  stimulation.  All  direct 
excitants  of  our  nerve  tissue,  as  coffee,  opium,  hashish, 
stimulate  the  reproduction  of  images  and  thus  aid  the 
memory  temporarily.  So  also,  any  occurrence  that  ex- 
cites the  nervous  system  as  a  whole,  as  a  blow  on  the 
head,  great  danger,  a  threat  of  death.''  h.  The  absence 
or  feeble  intensity  of  present  states  of  consciousness.  This 
tends  to  throw  the  attention  upon  the  revived  image, 
which  is  ordinarily  feebler  than  the  present  presentation. 
For  this  reason,  we  close  our  eyes  when  trying  to  re- 
member something,  c.  As  before,  in  the  case  of  reten- 
tion, the  attention  is  the  principal  aid  to  reproduction. 
Representations  must  be  attended  to  to  be  apprehended 
at  all,  and  after  this,  attention  makes  them  still  more 
distinct.     Indirectly  also,  attention  may  be  used  to  call 

1  Wundt. 

^  Hence  the  frequent,  but  not  universal,  experience  of  minute 
memory  of  past  events  when  one  is  in  danger,  as  drowning  :  generally 
it  is  greatly  overestimated. 


168  BETENTION  AND  REPRODUCTION: 

up  representations.  We  think  of  an  object  or  event  in 
some  known  relation  to  tlie  one  we  wisli  to  remember, 
and  set  a  train  of  association  going  wliicli  secures  to  us 
tlie  desired  image.  Often,  however,  the  fixing  of  the  at- 
tention may  hinder  the  memory  seriously,  from  the  fact 
that  it  tends  to  hold  an  image  before  the  mind  to  the 
exclusion  of  others  and  so  impedes  the  flow  of  association. 
d.  By  association,  finally,  as  is  seen  later,'  the  function  of 
reproduction  is  given  consistency  and  unity,  and  made 
available  for  the  higher  uses  of  mind. 

Power  of  Imaging.  The  power  of  recalling  mental 
pictures  varies  greatly  with  individuals  and  at  different 
periods  of  life.  Images  of  sight  are  most  distinct  and 
lasting  and  become  our  type  of  memory  pictures  in 
general.  It  is  argued  from  the  fact  that  persons  who 
become  blind  before  five  to  seven  years  of  age  never  have 
visual  pictures  in  their  dreams,  that  these  permanent 
images  are  not  formed  before  that  age.*  Persons  who 
have  this  power  to  a  marked  degree  are  known  as  having 
good  imaginations,  though  simple  revival  of  images  is 
the  most  rudimentary  form  of  imagination.  It  may  be 
a  bane  to  the  mental  life  rather  than  an  advantage,  as  in 
the  case  of  insistent  and  fixed  ideas.  In  accordance 
with  the  principle  of  attention  already  noticed,  the 
images  of  childhood  are  strongest  in  our  memory.  The 
attention  at  that  period  is  not  burdened  with  activities, 
and  trivial  things  are  of  great  interest  and  importance  : 
such  images  are  also  recalled  so  often  in  after  years, 
that  repetition  gives  them  great  vividness  and  number- 
less associations.  Many  old  people  are  constantly  led 
"back  in  conversation  to  their  childhood,  even  when 
memory  of  middle  life  is  failing.^ 

'  Chap.  XI. 

^  Jastrow,  in  New  Princeton  Review,  Jan.  '88. 

^On  the  "visualizing  power,"  see  Gallon,  Inquiries  into  Human 
'Faculty,  chap,  on  "Mental  Imagery." 


DEVELOPMENT  OF  TEE  ORGANIC  IN  MEMORY.     169 

Development  of  the  Organic  in  Memory.'  It  lias  ap- 
peared that  the  fact  of  reteutiou  is  due  to  a  physiologi- 
cal disposition,  and  that  the  facility  of  reproduction 
depends  upon  the  strength  of  this  disposition.  By 
repetition  and  habit  every  act  becomes  more  easy  and 
prompt  and  less  expenditure  of  force  and  attention  is 
necessary  to  its  reinstatement.  This  is,  in  the  first 
place,  physically  true :  blood  flows  to  the  brain  in  less 
quantities  when  the  action  is  an  habitual  one,  "  less  nerv- 
ous force  is  disengaged,  .  .  .  and  the  heat  resulting 
from  the  chemical  process  is  more  feeble." "  And,  as  an 
immediate  consequence,  the  consciousness  accompany- 
ing the  act  becomes  less  vivid.  As  Mr.  Spencer  says  : ' 
"  Memory  embraces  all  that  class  of  facts  which  are  in 
process  of  becoming  organic.  It' continues  as  long  as 
these  facts  are  being  organized  and  disappears  when 
their  organization  is  complete."  We  find  certain  acts 
becoming  quasi-unconscious  or  completely  so,  as  the 
movement  of  the  pianist  and  dancer,  the  motions  of 
our  fingers  in  writing,  and  of  the  lips  and  tongue  in 
speaking.  Thus  the  perfection  of  the  mechanism  of 
memory  tends  to  the  suppression  of  the  psychological 
fact  of  memory :  consciousness  retreats  behind  the  nerv- 
ous system,  and  there  is  a  progressive  materialization  of 
our  thought,  a  tendency  to  automatism.  As  the  force  of 
the  sun  is  stored  up  in  coal,  so  thought  finds  permanent 
realization  in  the  structure  of  the  nervous  system. 

The  limits  of  this  j)rocess,  however,  are  seen  in  the 
perpetual  novelty  of  our  experience  and  activities.  The 
very  acquirement  of  complex  habits  leads  on  to  the 
possibility  of  performances  still  more  wonderful.  The 
mental  life  is  progressive.     As  the  attention,  will,  and 


'  On  this  section,  cf.  Rabier,  loc.  cit.  pp.  164-168. 

'  Paulhan. 

^  Psychology,  vol.  I,  part  4,  cli.  vr. 


170  RETENTION  AND  REPRODUCTION 

thouglit  are  no  longer  needed  to  govern  our  grosser  ac- 
tivities, they  are  disposable  for  additional  refinements. 
So  our  mental  life  and  capabilities  are  always  full  and 
occupied,  their  function  only  becoming  broader  and  more 
elevated  from  this  tendency  to  organic  form.  Further, 
attention  tends  to  keep  in  conscious  operation  processes 
otherwise  unthought  of.  According  to  Dumont,^  the  at- 
tention occasions  a  flow  of  blood  to  the  organic  seat  of  the 
state  which  is  attended  to  ;  the  nervous  action  is  thereby 
given  tone  and  intensit}^  and  consciousness,  by  a  reaction, 
is  strengthened.  A  remarkable  example  of  this  is  given 
by  Egger.''  We  have  no  memory  or  re]3resentation  of 
the  sensations  of  touch  and  muscular  movement  from 
the  lips  and  tongue  in  speaking  words,  but  we  have  a 
perfectly  clear  memory  of  their  sound.  Why  is  there 
this  difference,  when  the  power  of  speech  was  learned 
with  great  effort  and  attention  ?  It  is  because  the  exer- 
cise of  the  attention  has  been  called  into  play  constantly 
to  word  sounds,  as  the  vehicles  of  thought,  while  the 
movements  of  speech  have  become  automatic  and  almost 
unconscious  from  repetition.  Memory  has  remained  psy- 
chological in  the  one  case  and  has  given  place  to  the 
organic  in  the  other. 

Retention  and  Reproduction  as  Mental  Growth.  The 
growth  of  the  mind  through  accumulated  experience  is 
a  matter  of  individual  appreciation.  There  is  a  constant 
enlargement  of  view  and  strength  of  purpose  due  to 
exercise.  Exery  mental  experience  leaves  the  mind  dif- 
ferent as  every  physical  change  leaves  'i\\e,  body  differ- 
ent. There  is  a  progressive  development  of  self-hood ; 
a  realization  of  mental  possibility  in  the  form  of  actual 
life,  which  gives  individuality  to  the  man  and  colors  his 


'  De  rHabitude,  Revue  Philosophique,  vol.  i. 
2  Victor  Egger,  De  la  Parole  interieure. 


MEMORY  AS  MENTAL  GROWTH.  Ill 

disposition.  In  this  sense,  all  experience  is  retained 
mentally,  retained  in  the  altered  possibilities  which  it 
opens  up.  Proceeding  we  shall  find  that  mental  habits 
appear  stronger,  perhaps,  than  physical,  and  such 
habits,  dispositions,  vague  feelings  of  intellectual  prefer- 
ence and  aversion  are  the  sum  of  all  the  elements,  how- 
ever minute,  of  our  past. 


CHAPTER  X. 

RECOGNITION  AND  LOCALIZATION. 

§  1.  EECOGi^riTioisr. 

Recognition  is  the  third  stage  reached  in  the  devel- 
opment of  memory.  Granted  an  image  reproduced,  a 
representation,  it  is  then  recognized.  Representations 
are  "  accompanied,"  says  Locke,  "  with  an  additional  per- 
ception (feeling)  indicating  that  they  are  not  new,  that 
they  have  been  before  experienced.  This  is  ordinarily 
called  recognition."  This  additional  fact  of  recognition, 
however,  does  not  always  accompany  revived  images,  and 
by  the  study  of  the  cases  in  which  it  is  absent,  we  are 
able  to  learn  what  recognition  is. 

Peeling  of  Familiarity.  In  a  general  view  of  recog- 
nition from  the  standpoint  of  common  consciousness,  it 
consists  in  the  feeling  of  familiarity  with  which  an  image 
or  object  affects  us.  We  say  feeling,  since  the  act  of 
recognition,  in  itself,  follows  the  act  of  knowledge  in 
which  the  object  or  image  is  again  presented  :  that  is, 
representation  or  reproduction  precedes  recognition. 
This  feeling  of  familiarity  is  vague  and  often  misplaced, 
and  ordinarily  goes  unanalyzed. 

Distinction  between  Recognition  of  an  Object  and  of  an 
Image.  The  means  by  which  recognition  arises,  vary 
as  the  recognition  is  of  an  object  or  of  an  image.  In  the 
case  of  the  second  perception  of  an  object,  its  recognition 
is  accomplished  by  means  of  an  image  which  is  already 

172 


THEORIES  OF  RECOGNITION.  173 

recognized.  We  institute  a  comparison  between  the  per- 
cept and  the  image,  and  pronounce  them  the  same  or 
similar.  This  is  seen  to  be  the  case  in  frequent  in- 
stances in  everj-day  life.  If  we  are  asked  whether  an 
object  is  the  same  as  one  seen  before,  we  often  say  we  do 
not  know,  for  we  do  not  remember  how  the  former  object 
looked  :  which  means,  that  we  are  unable  to  call  up  and 
recognize  any  image  with  which  the  object  present  may 
be  compared.  In  the  case  of  the  recognition  of  an  im- 
age, such  a  procedure  is  impossible.  It  would  presup- 
pose another  image  still,  and  so  on  indefinitely.  The 
question,  therefore,  is  narrowed  down  to  the  means  by 
which  we  recognize  a  reproduced  image. 

Theories  of  Recognition.  I.  Eeturn  to  consciousness  of 
an  image.  A  current  theory  of  recognition  is  based  upon 
the  unconscious  theory  of  retention.  As  seen  above,  ac- 
cording to  this  theory,  presentations  remain  in  uncon- 
sciousness during  periods  of  forgetfulness.  They  are  of 
diminished  intensity,  but  still  the  same  in  nature  as 
before,  and  of  continued  existence.  Eecognition,  then, 
is  simply  the  return  of  the  image  to  consciousness  by  an 
increase  of  intensity,  due  either  to  a  second  perception 
or  to  a  train  of  association.  In  case  the  reproduction  is 
a  real  object,  the  new  percept  reinforces  the  image  :  and 
in  case  it  is  a  new  image,  brought  up  by  association,  it  is 
assimilated  to  the  old  image  lying  in  unconsciousness.' 

To  this  theory  it  may  be  objected,  that  it  overlooks 
the  distinction  between  reproduction  and  recognition. 
According  to  it,  all  reproductions  should  be  recognized ; 
since  no  image  is  ever  entirely  lost,  and  each  reproduc- 
tion would  find  an  ally  necessarily  in  the  depths  of  the 
unconscious  life  of  mind.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  however, 
numbers  of  our  reproduced  images  are  not  recognized. 
Again,  it  overlooks,  as  the  Herbartian  school  consistently 

'  See  Volkmann,  ioc.  cit.,  i.  p.  414. 


174  RECOGNITION  AND  LOCALIZATION. 

do  througliout,  the  permanent  unity  of  consciousness  as 
a  subjective  thing.  As  shall  be  remarked  later,  there  is 
a  constant  reference  to  self  in  recognition.  The  image  is 
the  same  as  when  I  saw  it  before ;  I  myself  am  recog- 
nized as  being  in  the  same  condition  as  before.  If  the 
mind  is  only  a  bundle  of  playing  and  changing  states, 
whence  comes  this  permanent  background  to  which  alone 
the  states  are  the  same,  and  by  which  alone  they  are 
recognized  as  the  same  ? 

II.  Recognition  as  the  feeling  of  the  satisfaction  of  a 
physical  disposition.  This  theory  again  proceeds  upon  a 
foregoing  doctrine  of  retention,  i.e.  that  retention  is  a 
matter  of  physiological  modification  and  disposition.  It 
is  said  that  this  disposition  gives  the  possibility  of  repro- 
duction ;  the  reinstatement  of  the  function  toward  which 
we  were  disposed  gives  reproduction,  and  recognition  is 
simply  the  consciousness  of  this  reinstatement  of  a 
physical  process,  with  its  accompanying  mental  state. 
There  is  no  doubt  that  such  a  feeling  of  physical  facility 
is  an  indication  to  us  of  our  former  experience  of  the 
same  act,  and  that  in  this  way  recognition  is  assisted. 
The  act  of  volition  is  assisted  by  the  readiness  for  motor 
discharge  arising  from  physical  habit.  Yet  this  feeling  is, 
in  neither  case,  the  act  of  recognition  or  of  volition.  This 
is  shown  by  numerous  cases  of  retention  and  reproduc- 
tion with  their  physical  basis,  in  which  recognition  is 
wanting,  as  was  said  above.  If  the  satisfaction  of  a 
physical  habit  accounted  for  recognition,  all  cases  of 
such  satisfaction  under  the  same  circumstances  would 
be  accompanied  by  recognition.  But  in  fact,  the  same 
representation  is  sometimes  recognized  and  sometimes 
not.  Again,  if  this  theory  were  true,  we  would  always 
recognize  external  objects  of  whose  existence  we  had  be- 

'  So  the  feeling  of  novelty  in  a  new  experience  is  due  to  the  estab- 
lishment of  a  new  physical  association  ;  cf.  Drobisch,  Empirische  Psy- 
cliologie,  §  33. 


THEORIES  OF  RECOGNITION.  175 

fore  been  conscious  a  moderate  number  of  times  ;  since 
the  same  physical  process  is  reinstated  at  each  percep- 
tion. Yet  we  cannot  lay  too  much  stress  upon  these 
physiological  points.  They  always  admit  of  exceptions 
from  unknown  causes,  such  as  the  condition  of  the  body 
as  a  whole,  and  the  systemic  affections.  But  it  may  be 
objected  to  this  theor}^,  on  purely  mental  grounds,  that 
it  does  not  take  account  of  the  mental  aspects  of  recog- 
nition which  are  brought  out  by  the  analysis  below. 

III.  Eecognition  as  time  perception.  By  another  class 
of  theorists,  recognition  is  considered  as  the  establish- 
ment of  relations  of  past  and  future  :  that  is,  the  question 
how  is  a  representation  recognized,  is  answered  when  we 
conceive  the  fact  of  time  perception.  Reid  defines 
recognition  as  "  immediate  knowledge  of  the  past." 
Rabier  says  "  to  recognize  is  to  refer  to  the  past."  Yet 
a  little  consideration  leads  us  to  see  that  these  two 
questions  are  quite  distinct  in  their  nature.  McCosh 
hints  this  distinction  in  separating  the  recognition  from 
the  "  past  time "  in  which  it  is  necessarily  construed.' 
The  feeling  of  familiarity  is  itself  quite  distinct  from 
the  sense  of  time,  and  it  is  only  as  an  interpretation  of 
this  feeling  that  we  locate  the  object  or  experience  in 
the  past.  This  is  seen  in  many  cases  of  recognition 
which  are  qiiite  vague  as  to  time,  and  which  we  cannot 
localize.  Illusions  of  recognition,  also — instances  in 
which  a  strange  feeling  of  familiarity  possesses  us  when 
we  are  confident  that  the  experience  is  new — seem  to 
show  that  the  time  element  which  they  indicate  is  not 
essential.  The  contrary  is  also  true  ;  the  perception  and 
estimation  of  time  do  not  always  involve  recognition.  It 
is  probable  that  the  perception  of  a  unit  of  duration  ^  is 
a  fact  of  immediate  consciousness,  and  that  the  beginning 


'  Cognitive  Powers,  p.  153. 
2  See  p.  185. 


176  RECOGNITION  AND  LOCALIZATION. 

of  localization  in  time  proceeds  upon  elementary  facts  of 
succession. 

Yet  while  tliis  is  true,  the  facts  of  recognition  are 
necessarily  construed  in  past  time.  For  this  reason, 
the  two  points  come  up  for  discussion  together.  And 
there  is  reason  for  this  general  association  of  recog- 
nition and  localization  in  time.  Brown  says  '  "  recog- 
nition is  the  perception  of  relations  of  time."  This 
emphasizes  the  element  of  relation  in  connection  with 
recognition.  Recognition  is  grounded  on  the  rela- 
tions of  the  image  recognized,  and  to  this  extent  time 
enters,  since  every  event  has  time  relations.  But,  as  we 
shall  endeavor  to  show,  other  relations  are  also  involved, 
though  not  as  universally.  Recognition,  therefore,  gen- 
erally presupposes  the  perception  of  time  relations ;  but 
only  as  one  class  of  the  relations — the  most  important 
class — which  constitute  its  ground.  We  are  led,  there- 
fore, to  another  theory  of  recognition. 

IV.  Tlie  recognition  of  an  image  is  the  reinstatement  of  its 
apperceptive  relations.  It  has  already  been  seen  that  the 
reproduction  of  an  image  consists  in  the  reinstatement 
of  the  conditions,  physical  or  mental,  of  the  original  per- 
ception. The  reinstatement  of  the  physical  conditions 
suffices  to  bring  an  image  back  into  consciousness  :  but  it 
is  not  then  necessarily  recognized.  It  is  only  when  some 
of  the  mental  connections — the  relations  established  be- 
tween the  percept  and  others  by  apperce23tive  attention 
— are  again  presented,  that  the  sense  of  familiarity  is  felt. 
It  is  seen  to  be  necessary  that  there  be  some  accomj^any- 
ing  mental  state  to  which  the  representation  is  related. 
Often  when  an  image  arises  in  consciousness,  we  do  not 
recognize  it  till  we  bring  back  some  association  with  it. 
Often,  also,  we  see  a  face  and  in  so  far  recognize  it  as 
to  feel  vaguely  familiar  with  it ;  while  we  strive  to  bring 

'  Philosophy  of  the  Human  Mind,  ii.  p.  108. 


THEORIES  OF  RECOGNITION.  177 

up  more  of  its  apperceptive  connections  in  order  fnlly  to 
identify  it.  Tliis  first  vague  recognition  is  probably  due 
to  tlie  reapperception  of  the  spacial  proportions  of  the 
face. 

This  is  further  proved  by  the  fact  that  percepts  which 
are  not  related  in  the  first  presentation,  for  example 
single  isolated  sensations,  as  the  stroke  of  a  bell,  are 
not  recognized  in  the  representation.  Y/e  say  of  such 
presentations  that  there  is  nothing  distinguishing  or 
characteristic  about  them,  whereby  the}^  should  be  recog- 
nized. But  this  is  only  to  say  that  there  were  no  specific 
points  of  connection  between  this  image  and  others,  or 
between  the  parts  which  are  separately  apperceived.  As 
soon  as  some  sign  is  made  of  a  peculiar  kind  in  connec- 
tion with  the  image,  it  is  recognized.  Eecent  experi- 
ments by  Lehmann  on  the  recognition  of  differences 
of  color,  strikingly 'confirm  this  view.'  Different  shades 
of  gray,  which  could  not  be  recognized  when  seen  quite 
alone,  were  recognized  when  they  were  given  names 
beforehand,  or  when  a  number  was  attached  to  each 
in  the  first  perception.  Of  nine  shades  without 
names  or  numbers,  only  46  per  cent,  gave  true  recog- 
nitions ;  while  the  same  shades,  with  numbers,  gave  75 
per  cent,  of  correct  identifications.  Here  the  introduc- 
tion of  a  simple  local  relation  in  the  perception,  gave  a 
clue  for  the  reapperception  of  the  representation. 

If  we  trace  the  case  farther  back  in  our  mental  history,  we 
find  additional  ground  for  this  conception  of  recognition. 
Perception,  as  has  been  said,  proceeds  upon  the  presentative 
or  knowledge  element  of  sensation  :  and  this  presentative 
element  is  found  to  be  peculiar  to,  or  at  least  most  prominent 
in  the  spacial  and  temporal  senses.  In  these  senses,  our  sen- 
sations take  on  the  form  of  relations  in  space  and  time,  and 
it  is  this  relational  character  that  makes  cognition  and  apper- 
ception possible.     With  this  consideration  in  mind,  the  hy- 

'  Alfred  Lehmann,  Philosophisdie  Studien,  vi.  This  view  of  recogni- 
tion was  developed  before  Dr.  Lehmann's  work  was  published. 


178  RECOGNITION  AND  LOCALIZATION. 

pothesis  becomes  very  reasonable,  that  recognition  is  the 
reinstatement  of  cognition,  i.e.  of  the  apperceptive  activity 
which  proceeded  upon  the  relational  aspect  of  sensation. 

This  view  of  the  case  also  enables  ns  to  take  ac- 
count of  the  subjective  element  of  recognition,  which  is 
overlooked  in  other  theories.  There  is  more  in  recog- 
nition than  the  sense  of  familiarity  with  an  image.  There 
is  the  feeling  of  ourselves  as  in  familiar  circumstances. 
It  is  one's  self  who  has  been  in  this  state  before.  That 
is,  there  is  consciousness  of  an  abiding  active  self  which 
persists  in  the  twofold  experience  of  presentation  and 
representation.  This  feeling  of  self  first  arises  in  the 
active  outgo  of  mental  energy  in  attention,  or  in  the  re- 
]ating  process  of  apperception.  Now  when  by  reinstate- 
ment of  this  process,  the  fact  of  recognition  is  experienced, 
it  carries  with  it  essentially  the  feeling  of  an  emphasized 
self :  the  self  of  the  first  apperception  is  again  evident 
in  the  self  of  the  reapperception,  and  the  sameness  of 
the  apperceptive  content  gives  sameness  to  the  subjective 
agent.  The  self,  then,  which  we  are  conscious  of  as  per- 
sisting, is  the  active  self  ;  as  the  self  of  attention,  which 
is  now  reproduced,  is  an  active  self.  This  active  phase 
of  the  mental  life  will  again  appear  in  localization  in  time.' 

By  activity  here  is  not  meant  voluntary  activity,  but  sim- 
ply the  outgo  of  attentive  force,  whether  voluntary  or  not. 
In  the  case  of  recognition,  indeed,  there  is  lacking  the  feeling 
of  volition,  the  conditions  of  the  reinstatement  being  already 
fixed  in  the  original  apperception.  Hence,  as  Gratacap  sug- 
gests/ there  is  lacking  that  feeling  of  liberty  or  freedom  which 
is  present  in  the  constructive  imagination.  This  distinction 
is  useful  to  us  in  distinguishing  between  past  images  and  pure 
creations  of  the  imagination/ 


'  Below,  §  3. 

2  TJieoriede  la  Memoir e,  p.  91. 

3  See  p.  249. 


RECOGNITION :    PERSONAL  IDENTITY.  179 


§  2.  Ideal  Pkoduct  of  Eecognition  :  Personal  Identity. 

In  the  foregoing  discussion,  the  origin  of  the  idea  of 
identit}',  in  general,  and  the  identity  of  self,  becomes  clear. 
In  our  feeling  of  personal  identity,  it  is  not  self  apart 
from  its  activities  of  which  we  are  conscious  as  persisting, 
for  we  know  self  only  through  its  activities  :  it  is  the 
abiding  consciousness  of  the  power  of  activity  which  con- 
stitutes this  feeling.  It  rests,  first,  upon  reproduction, 
since  a  single  present  experience  does  not  afford  the 
duration  or  time  through  which  we  feel  ourselves  to  be 
the  same.  There  must  be  reproduced  images  with  which 
our  present  experience  is  compared.  But  further,  these 
images  must  be  recognized,  and  must  carry  with  them  that 
feeling  of  familiarity  which  is  afforded  in  the  reinstate- 
ment of  the  apperceptive  activity  of  attention.  This 
activity  is  felt  to  be  my  activity  in  the  second  experience 
as  in  the  first,  and  the  recognition  of  the  I  takes  place 
in  virtue  of  this  repeated  activity. 

It  should  be  carefully  noted,  that  as  in  the  original 
fact  of  attention,  it  was  activity,  potency,  that  gave  reality 
to  our  experience  and  constituted  the  fact  of  mind  ;  so 
here,  the  ideal  product  of  memory  is  a  conception  of  per- 
sonality, which  is  essentially  subjective  force  or  energy. 

§  3.  Localization  in  Time. 

In  the  foregoing  discussion  of  recognition,  relations 
of  time  are  found  to  enter  necessarily.  The  discus- 
sion as  to  the  nature  and  origin  of  the  idea  of  space,  has 
involved  to  a  degree  the  idea  of  time  also.  As  has  been 
already  said,  however,  the  two  cannot  be  considered 
under  the  same  mental  category.  The  data  to  be  taken 
into  account  in  the  consideration  of  the  notion  of  space 
are  more  abundant  and  can  be  better  estimated,  from  the 
fact  that  extensive  sensations  may  be  isolated  and  their 


180  RECOGNITION  AND  LOCALIZATION. 

conditions  separately  considered.  In  considering  the 
mental  phenomena  in  which  time  is  involved,  no  such 
api^eal  to  the  logical  method  of  difference  is  open  to  us. 
All  the  facts  of  mind  involve  time  relations.  As  Kant 
has  said,  time  is  the  universal  form  of  inner  experience. 

The  question  as  to  the  origin  of  the  idea  of  time  must 
be  approached,  as  in  the  similar  problem  of  space,  from 
the  standpoint  of  concrete  perception  of  filled  time. 
Time  in  the  abstract  we  do  not  know.  We  experience 
time  only  as  we  experience  events,  definite  and  individ- 
ual, in  time.  We  sometimes  seem  to  apprehend  the  flow 
of  pure  time,  as,  in  the  night  we  lie  awake  in  silence,  con- 
scious of  the  vacancy  of  our  minds ;  but  even  then  this 
flow  of  time  is  marked  off  b}^  distinct  events,  the  beating 
of  the  heart,  the  direction  of  attention,  fragmentary  sen- 
tences or  words  which  flit  over  our  consciousness  and  are 
looked  at  only  to  be  dismissed. 

The  inquiry  then  seems  to  be  as  to  the  localization  of 
events  in  time,  as  we  have  already  considered  the  local- 
ization of  things  in  space.  There  are  two  general  char- 
acters of  our  notion  of  time  under  which  its  relation  to 
our  perceiving  activity  is  seen ;  namely,  duration  and 
succession.  These  correspond  in  the  time  continuum, 
respectively,  to  length  and  position  in  the  space  continu- 
um. 

The  question  is  much  discussed,  which  of  these  two  aspects 
of  time  is  prior  and  fundamental  to  our  idea  of  time.  The 
question  is  not  worth  its  cost,  from  the  simple  fact  that  dura- 
tion and  succession  are  coincident  iu  the  beginnings  of  the  ob- 
scure consciousness  of  childhood.  The  child  consciousness 
is  born  of  changes  in  its  sensory  continuum,  which  indicate 
succession,  and  it  is  only  as  these  changes  persist  in  relation  to 
others  which  do  not — as  the  processes  of  the  body,  the  systemic 
affections,  the  broad  basis  of  sensation  which  makes  up  the 
coming  individual — that  they  can  be  said  to  have  duration. 
Duration  can  be  perceived  only  as  it  is  filled  with  an  event, 
and  that  event,  even  though  the  first  in  child  consciousness, 
is  a  change  from  the  vague  undifferentiated  consciousness  which 


LOCALIZATION  IN  TIME.  181 

preceded  it.  So,  as  shall  appear  below,  the  answer  to  the 
question  "  What  is  the  form  of  the  mental  reaction  in  the  sense 
of  time  ?"  is  probably  this  :  a  filled  temporal  continuum,  Just  as 
the  eye  gives  us,  under  the  reaction  for  space,  a  filled  spacial 
continuum.  In  one  case,  length  is  given,  as  made  up  of  posi- 
tions ;  in  the  other,  duration,  as  made  up  of  successions. 

The  terms  of  the  j)roblem  of  localization  in  time  are 
analogous  to  those  of  localization  in  space.  Why  is  it 
that  the  experiences  or  events  of  our  inner  life  are  ar- 
ranged in  time  order,  as  before  and  after  ?  It  is  quite 
possible  that  it  should  be  otherwise.  Suppose  a  being 
with  no  memory  whatever ;  to  him  each  event  would  be 
now.  There  would  be  no  past  or  future  ;  every  mental 
fact  w'ould  be  worth  its  face  value  in  the  present,  with  no 
relation  to  other  mental  facts.  And  again,  granting  the 
fact  of  memory,  why  is  it  that  each  event  takes  its  proper 
place  in  the  line  of  time  ;  the  place  it  occupied  in  the  orig- 
inal experience  and  no  other  ?  And  further,  even  though 
retained  and  reproduced  in  consciousness  as  a  present 
state,  why  does  it  not  simply  remain  a  factor  in  the  com- 
plex make-up  of  our  j^resent  experience  ?  In  more  gen- 
eral terms,  how  are  states  of  consciousness  of  a  purely 
intensive  and  affective  nature  projected  and  localized  in 
time  form? 

The  answer,  as  before  for  space  perception,  is  this : 
By  a  mental  reconstruction  of  time,  tchereby  intensive  data 
tire  interpreted  in  terms  of  succession. 

The  difference  between  the  data  and  their  finished  time 
form  is  simply  the  difference  between  the  succession  of  ideas 
cind  the  idea  of  succession.  This  difference  is  very  great.  As 
Bradley  puts  it:  ''Suppose  there  is  a  series  of  facts  outside 
the  mind,  the  question  remains.  How  can  they  get  in  ?"  ' 
In  order  to  the  succession  of  ideas,  only  one  need  be  present 
at  a  time,  and  they  need  have  no  constant  connection.  But 
for  the  idea  of  succession,  there  must  be  at  least  two 
ideas  before  the  mind,  the  preceding  and  the  succeeding. 
This   involves   the   bringing   up  of   past   states  to  the  level 

'  Principles  of  Logic,  p.  74. 


182  RECOGNITION  AND  LOCALIZATION. 

of  the  present.  Now  the  mind  sees  all  its  states  in  this 
way — bronglit  up  to  the  plane  of  the  present.  I  think  of  four 
events  which  happened  in  four  successive  days.  They  are  all 
now  present  to  my  consciousness,  and  it  is  only  my  present  state 
of  which  I  am  conscious.  Of  this  state,  a,  h,  c,  d  are  factors. 
How  is  it  that  these  present  intensive,  qualitative,  states  are 
projected  in  an  order  of  time,  the  same  as  their  original  oc- 
currence ?  How  is  it,  to  use  Mr.  Ward's  figure,  that  certain 
states  are  thrown  back  in  a  line  at  right  angles  to  this  plane 
of  the  present  ?  "  We  may,  if  we  represent  succession  as  a  line, 
represent  simultaneity  as  a  second  line  at  right  angles  to  the 
first.  Now  it  is  with  the  former  line  that  we  have  to  do  in 
treating  of  time  as  it  is,  and  with  the  latter  in  treating  of 
our  intuition  of  time.  ...  In  a  succession  of  events,  say  of 
sense-impressions  a,  t),  c,  d,  e,  .  .  .  the  presence  of  b  means 
the  absence  of  a  and  c,  but  the  presentation  of  this  succession 
involves  the  simultaneous  presence,  in  some  mode  or  other,  of 
two  or  more  of  the  presentations  a,  h,  c,  d."  '  This  is  analogous, 
as  the  same  writer  says,  to  the  projection  of  the  simultaneous- 
ly perceived  points  of  the  visual  field  in  a  line  of  spacial  suc- 
cession, representing  distance. 

It  is  seen  at  once  that  there  must  be  some  qualitative  col- 
oring attached  to  these  simultaneous  states,  which  serves  as 
datum  for  their  temporal  discrimination.  If  a  is  located  as 
before  I,  and  h  as  before  c,  it  can  only  be  through  the  men- 
tal interpretation  of  some  accompaniment  of  a,  b,  and  c,  re- 
spectively, by  which  their  temporal  position  is  determined. 
This  interpretation  is  called  the  mental  reconstruction  of  time. 

Data  for  the  Reconstruction  of  Time.  The  data  upon 
which  the  mental  reconstruction  of  time  proceeds,  are 
exceedingly  obscure  ;  the  more  so  through  the  difference 
already  remarked  between  this  process  and  that  in  the 
case  of  space,  to  which  it  is  supposed  to  be  analogous.  In 
the  case  of  space,  we  have  non-spacial  senses  to  compare 
with  spacial  senses.  But  with  time,  there  is  no  such  re- 
source, and  we  are  unable  to  fix  upon  facts  as  absolutely 
necessary  to  the  idea  of  time,  as  shown  by  the  absence 
of  that  idea  in  their  absence.  There  are  one  or  two 
kinds  of  data,  however,  so  consciously  involved  in  our 

'  Encyc.  Britann.,  9th  ed.,  art.  Psycliology. 


TEE  RECONSTRUCTION  OF  TIME.  183 

localization  of  objects  iu  time,  tliattliey  may  be  safely 
indicated. 

I.  Intensity  as  an  Indication  of  Time.  Upon  consid- 
eration, the  most  e\ddeut  characteristic  of  our  past  ex- 
periences is  their  progressive  fading,  as  they  grow  more 
remote.  In  general,  the  last  hour  is  more  distinct  than  its 
predecessor,  and  yesterday  than  the  day  before.  It  may 
therefore  be  stated  as  a  general  rule,  that  the  intensity 
of  a  representation  is  a  sign  of  its  locality  in  time,  in 
reference  to  other  representations  brought  with  it  into 
consciousness.  This  rests  upon  the  principle  of  memory, 
that — with  certain  exceptions,  to  be  instanced  later — the 
power  of  reproduction  and  the  intensity  of  the  repro- 
duced image  vary  inversely  as  the  time  elapsed  since  the 
original  perception.  Presentations,  therefore,  experi- 
enced in  the  order  a,  h,  c,  d,  would  be  reproduced  in 
an  order  of  intensity  d,  c,  b,  a ;  and  this  inverse  inten- 
sive order  serves  as  a  sign  for  their  mental  interpretation 
in  the  original  time  order  a,  b,  c,  d.  This  is  further 
supported  by  the  fact  that  mistakes  as  to  the  relative 
time  of  events  are  occasioned  by  simple  differences  in 
the  intensity  of  their  reproduction.  Things  which  im- 
pressed us  strongly  linger  in  our  memory  and  seem  to 
be  recent,  while  later  events  are  dim  or  forgotten.' 

The  fact  of  the  interpretation  of  intensities  cannot  be 
deemed  sufficient  in  itself  for  time  localization.  If  uncor- 
rected, the  tendency  to  mistakes  spoken  of  would  be  a  source 
of  continual  illusion.  Of  two  successive  presentations  the 
stronger  would  always  be  located  last,  whatever  might  be 
their  real  order.  Hence  we  cannot  stop  here  with  some,'  who 
call  these  differences  of  intensive  coloring  the  "  temporal 
sign;"  but  must  seek  some  further  point  of  reference  in  the 
mental  life  for  these,  as  yet,  confused  representations. 

More  intense  images  also  serve  as  rallying  points  or  dates 

'  See  Herbart's  theory  of  space  perception,  above,  p.  135. 
*  Lipps. 


184  BECOGNITION  AND  LOCALIZATION. 

in  the  past,  around  which  other  events  are  grouped.  We 
date  many  subsequent  events  from  the  death  of  a  friend,  the 
burning  of  a  house,  or  some  other  great  occurrence. 


II.  Movements  of  Attention  as  indicating  Position  in 
Time.  Although  not  as  clearly  of  simple  import  as  the 
fact  of  intensity,  in  its  relation  to  localization  in  time,  the 
act  of  attention  has  an  undoubted  influence.  From  one 
aspect,  it  assists  and  reinforces  the  indication  given  by 
intensive  coloring.  Attention  pursues,  in  the  main,  a 
regular  rhythmical  course  and  so  brings  out  clearly  the 
intensive  relations  of  successive  mental  facts.  On  the 
other  hand,  it  tends  to  subvert  these  indications,  since 
strong  attention  placed  upon  one  presentation  or  a  series 
increases  its  intensity  relatively  to  adjacent  states  of 
mind.  The  former  are  thus  thrown  out  of  their  true 
time  order. 

As  further  evidence  that  the  primary  movement  of 
the  attention  is  of  extreme  import  in  the  genesis  of  the 
idea  of  time,  the  following  facts  may  be  spoken  of. 
a.  The  flow  of  time  seems  accelerated  when  the  atten- 
tion is  agreeably  occupied.  This  is  most  true  when 
the  occupation  is  varied  in  easy  stages,  and  the  active 
efforts  of  mind  are  not  strongly  taxed,  h.  The  flow  of 
time  is,  on  the  other  hand,  impeded  when  the  attention 
is  kept  in  a  strained  or  concentrated  condition  :  this  is 
due  to  weariness  in  the  mental  life,  which  seems  to 
have  an  immediate  influence  upon  our  time  intuition. 
€.  Time  flows  slowly  when  exciting  impressions  fol- 
low"  in  such  rapid  succession  as  to  leave  the  attention 
in  a  state  of  confusion.  Here  there  is  not  sufiicient 
time  for  the  adjustment  of  the  attention  to  the  suc- 
cessive excitations,  and  the  perception  of  the  lapse  of 
time  is,  as  a  consequence,  confused,  d.  Time  flows 
slowly  when  the  mind  is  unoccupied.  There  are  no  out- 
standing ideas  upon  which  the  grasping  and  reacting 


UNITS  OF  DURATION.  185 

power  of  attention  may  seize,  e.  After  a  given  move- 
ment of  attention,  a  future  movement  over  the  same 
series  is  easy,  while  the  rearrangement  of  the  series  is 
difficult ;  thus  the  absence  of  mental  effort  is  a  sign  of 
temporal  order.  /.  In  dreams,  where  the  force  of  atten- 
tion is  greatly  diminished,  the  sense  of  time  is  confused 
and  mistaken.' 

The  least  inference  which  can  be  drawn  from  such  facts 
is  this :  that  the  intensive  states  of  our  attentive  mental 
life  are,  in  some  way,  signs  employed  in  the  mental  re- 
construction of  time.  These  signs  coexist  with  those 
derived  from  our  passive  sense  experiences,  and  together 
constitute  a  general  class  of  intensive  data.  The  inten- 
sive phases  of  reproduced  presentations,  on  the  one 
hand,  seem  to  bear  especially  upon  the  succession  of 
events  in  the  past :  we  think  of  succession  by  the  num- 
ber of  things  in  time.  The  phases  of  the  attention 
bear  especially  upon  the  feeling  of  duration  in  the  pres- 
ent. We  measure  duration  in  terms  of  our  own  atten- 
tive adjustment,  as  having  experienced  and  expecting  to 
experience.  Duration  is  the  feeling  of  the  interval  be- 
tween things  in  time.* 

Units  of  Duration.  If  it  be  true  that  the  sense  of  the 
lapse  of  time  depends  intimately  upon  the  rhythmical 
intensive  phases  of  the  attention,  we  would  expect  to 
find  units  of  duration  in  the  flow  of  time  which  would 
correspond  with  these  phases.  Experiments  in  deter- 
mining the  area  of  consciousness  show  such  units,  in  the 
maximal  length  of  filled  time  which  we  are  able  to  com- 
pass with  a  single  immediate  intuition.  It  was  stated,  in 
speaking  of  the  area  of  consciousness,'  that  about  twelve 
distinct  impressions  of  sound,  succeeding  one  another  at 

'  See  cases  given  by  Maury,  Le  Sommeil  et  lea  Reves,  p.  110. 
^  This  distinction  Is  due  to  Mr.  Ward,  loc.  cit. 
=*  Above,  p.  68. 


186  RECOGNITION  AND  LOCALIZATION. 

intervals  of  .2  to  .3  sec.  could  be  held  in  consciousness 
together.  Multiplying  this  interval  by  the  number  of 
impressions,  we  have  2.4  to  3.6  sec,  as  approximately 
the  extent  of  our  distinct  unit  consciousness  of  filled 
time.'  The  maximal  extent  of  our  intuition  of  empty 
time  or  pure  duration  is  probably  considerably  shorter, 
as  is  shown  by  experiments  as  to  the  correctness  of  our 
estimate  of  small  periods  of  time.  It  is  found  that  we 
estimate  correctly  an  empty  period  of  .7  to  .8  sec,  shorter 
periods  being  overestimated  and  longer  periods  made 
too  short.  ^ 

It  is  through  this  unit  consciousness  of  time  that  all 
time  distance  is  estimated.  The  representations  that  it  in- 
cludes constitute  the  plane  of  the  immediate  present,  which 
we  may  consider,  in  reference  to  time,  as  a  circle,  the  earlier 
impressions  in  it  passing  out  at  one  side  and  the  later  com- 
ing in,  as  a  constant  stream.  Time,  as  we  know  it,  is  not  a 
siugle  line  of  succession,  but  numerous  lines  giving  a  certain 
number  of  coexistences  in  the  present.  It  is  out  of  this 
circle  of  the  present  that  the  past  is  projected  in  lines  at  right 
angles  to  its  plane,  like  distance  from  the  field  of  vision.  This 
is  but  a  figure  to  aid  our  conception,  but  so  natural  and  con- 
venient a  figure  that  we  employ  it  even  in  unreflective  think- 
ing: as  when  we  saj^  an  event  is  "so  far  back,"  or  that  two 
events  happened  "side  by  side."  And  there  is  no  reason, 
in  the  nature  of  the  case,  that  intensive  data  should  be  spoken 
of  in  terms  of  time,  rather  than  in  terms  of  space. 

The  various  theories  propounded  to  derive  the  idea  of  time 
correspond  in  the  main  to  those  already  described  under  the 
head  of  space,  i.e.  natividic  and  empirical.  Empiricists  do 
not  urge  their  point  with  equal  force  in  this  case,  because  data 
of  a  physiological  and  experiential  kind  are  wanting.  They 
generally  attempt  to  bring  time  in  under  the  cover  of  the 
empirical  derivation  of  space,  asserting  that  the  same  consid- 

'  Prof.  James  does  not  seem  to  be  right  in  taking  the  number  40, 
held  in  the  mind  by  grouping,  as  his  multiple  of  impressions  ;  for  the 
groups  of  5  to  8  are  a  device  of  a  symbolic  nature  to  aid  the  range  of 
mind.  Each  group  represents  a  unit,  and  the  impressions  in  it  are  not 
distinct  in  consciousness.     Art.  below  quoted,  p.  381. 

^  See  James'  resume  in  art.  Percep.  of  Time,  in  Jour,  of  Spec.  Philos.^ 
Oct.  '86. 


THEORIES  OF  TIME  PERCEPTION.  187 

erations  suffice  also  for  time.  On  the  nativist  side,  tlie  case 
takes  the  form  of  nativism  of  product,  or  "formalism,"' 
largely.  And  it  cannot  be  denied  that  the  grounds  for  consid- 
ering time  a  mental  form  are  not  weak.  The  position  we  have 
taken,  however,  tluit  of  a  nativism  of  process  precisely  analo- 
gous to  the  process  of  space  perception,  grants  the  essential 
claim  of  nativism,  a  mental  activity  peculiar  to  time  percep- 
tion, and,  at  the  same  time,  utilizes  the  data  of  experience  as 
they  are  discovered  by  investigation.  That  these  data  are 
more  obscure  than  those  for  the  perception  of  space,  does  not 
weaken  the  philosophic  position;  while  the  fact  is  offset,  in  a 
measure,  by  the  force  of  the  analogy  between  tiie  two.'' 

The  older  theory  of  the  immediate  perception  of  real  time 
overlooks  the  distinction  between  succession  as  it  takes  place 
and  succession  as  it  is  perceived.  Locke  derives  the  idea  from 
"reflection  upon  the  succession  of  our  ideas."  This  begs  the 
question,  since  we  must  have  the  idea  of  succession  before  we 
can  reflect  upon  it.  The  question  is,  how  does  the  successive 
form  of  ideas  enter  the  mind  at  all?  Eeid^s  ^  refutation  of 
Locke  rests  upon  the  same  error.  He  says,  if  ideas  in  succes- 
sion have  duration,  each  idea  must  have  duration,  hence  we 
perceive  duration  v/ithout  succession.  This  assumes  that  the 
real  duration  of  the  single  idea  is  a  perceived  duration,  or,  as 
he  puts  it,  "an  immediate  knowledge  of  the  past."  On  the 
contrary,  it  is  possible  that  the  first  stimulus  to  time  percep- 
tion may  arise  from  a  series  of  impressions  each  of  which  has 
real  duration.  So  with  the  theory  of  the  Scottish  philoso- 
phers generally.* 

As  representing  the  empirical  theorists,  Mr.  Sully  may  be 
referred  to.  He  points  out  somewhat  vaguely  the  passive  in- 
tensive data  cited  above  for  time  localization,  and  hints  at 
tlie  function  of  attention  as  giving  temporal  signs, ^  but  fails 
to  account  in  any  way  for  the  transformation  of  these  intensive 
data  into  time  form  ;  except  so  far  as  calling  it  an  "  associa- 

1  From  Kant. 

'^  For  recent  theories,  with  references,  see  James'  note,  loc.  cit.  pp. 
398-400  ;  also  Volkmauu,  Lelirbuch  der  Psychologie,  §87,  Anmerkung  4. 

3  Intellectual  Powers,  Essay  III,  chap. v. 

*  So  McCosh,  Cog.  Powers,  p.  156.  Stewart  divides  the  problem  more 
properly.  He  says:  "The  remembrance  of  a  past  event  is  not  a  simple 
act  of  the  mind,  but  the  vcdnd.  first  forms  a  conception  of  the  event,  and 
then  judges  from  circumstances  of  the  period  of  time  to  which  it  is  to 
be  referred." — Loc.  cit,,  vol.  I.  eh.  vi. 

5  Outlines,  p.  200. 


188  RECOGNITION  AND  LOCALIZATION. 

tion  by  contiguity"  does  so.  "  It  imjjlies,"  he  says,  ''an  act  of 
reflection  upon  the  succeeding  representations  (Locke),  and 
the  representation  of  them  together,  at  the  same  moment, 
as  successive.""  But  what  is  the  nature  of  this  "reflec- 
tion," whereby  the  representation  of  them  together,  at  the 
same  moment,  becomes  also  the  representation  of  them  as 
"  successive".'' 

Perception  of  Time  by  the  Ear.  Of  the  special  senses, 
the  ear  is  most  acute  in  the  appreciation  and  measure- 
ment of  time.  Single  sound  stimuli  are  discriminated 
"with  great  delicacy  and  exactness,  both  of  interval  and 
of  duration.  For  this  reason,  hearing  is  called  the  sense 
for  the  perception  of  time.  Its  function,  in  this  respect, 
is  similar  to  that  of  sight  for  space.  It  makes  more 
exact  and  definite  the  vague  time  continuum  reported 
first,  probably,  by  the  muscular  senSe  and  later  by  the 
other  senses.  This  delicacy  of  time  perception  under- 
lies the  pauses  of  speech,  the  quantity  of  vowel  sounds, 
the  metric  flow  of  poetry,  and,  more  than  all,  the  rhythm 
and  technical  "  time"  of  music' 

§  4.  Ideal  Product  of   Temporal   Localizatiox  :  Idea 

OF  Time. 

From  the  conception  of  coordinated  events  in  the 
form  of  past  time,  we  pass  by  abstraction  to  the  idea  of 
time :  that  is,  we  pass  from  filled  to  empty  time.  The 
point  of  immediate  exjjerience  is  called  the  present,  in 
relation  to  the  past,  and  the  whole  possibility  of  addi- 
tional experience  is  called  the  future.  The  future,  there- 
fore, is  not  time  at  all :  it  is  simply  the  anticipation  of 
more  experience  like  that  already  placed  in  the  past. 
The  finished  product,  the  idea  of  time,  is  of  late  growth 
in  the  mental  life  of  the  child. 

'  Sully,  Outlines,  p.  256. 

'^  On  the  perception  of  rhythm  by  the  ear,  see  Sully,  Sensation  and 
Intuition,  chap.  vrii. 


KINDS  OF  MEMORY.  189 

§  5.  Kinds  of  Memory:  Local,  Logical. 

We  have  found  memory,  viewed  entirely  from  the 
subjective  side,  to  be  the  revival  of  an  image  in  its  net- 
work of  relations  with  other  images.  Things  are  re- 
membered in  groups,  as  they  were  at  first  apperceived. 
This  involves  the  variety  of  relations  which  are  possible 
in  apperception.  The  kinds  of  relations  thus  reproduced, 
serve  to  aid  us  in  distinguishing  between  different  kinds 
of  memory.  For  example,  an  image  may  carry  with  it 
the  local  connections  of  its  first  perception ;  that  is,  its 
locality  was  the  prominent  feature  of  its  apperception. 
Such  memory  is  called  local  memory.  It  is  in  this  way 
that  we  memorize  long  sentences  by  the  position  on  a 
printed  or  written  page,  or  the  parts  and  ornaments  of  a 
room.  These  memories  are  fleeting  and  temporary, 
generally,  from  the  fact  that  local  relations  are  acciden- 
tal, and  do  not  belong  necessarily  to  the  objects  remem- 
bered. It  is  only  as  long  as  we  can  reproduce  the  whole 
page  that  we  can  recall  the  part  desired.  The  same  also 
is  true  of  temporal  memories.  Beyond  these  extrinsic  or 
accidental  relations,  we  find  others  which  are  essential. 
Cause  and  effect,  substance  and  property,  whole  and 
parts,  are  such  relations.  Memory  by  means  of  these 
is  called  logical  memory.  It  is  more  permanent  and  valu- 
able than  local  memory,  from  the  fact  that  these  rela- 
tions always  subsist,  and  the  related  image  is  always 
suggested,  when  that  to  which  it  is  related  is  capable  of 
being  presented.  It  is  seen  at  once  that  logical  memo- 
ries should  be  cultivated  rather  than  local,  and  that  the 
latter,  except  when  only  temporary  acquisition  is  desired, 
should  be  avoided. 

On  memory,  consult:  Taine,  Intelligence,  pt.  1,  bk.  2,  ch.  n; 
McCosh,  Cog.  Poivers,  bk.  3,  ch.  i-ii;  Carpenter,  Ment.  Physiology, 
ch.  x;  Sully,  Outlines,  ch.  vii;  George,  Psycliologie,  p.  281;  Ladd, 
Physiol.  Psychology,  pp.  545-559:  Volknaann,  Lehrbuchd.  Psyc?iol., 
§§69-85   (especially  §  83);  Drobisch,  Psychologie,  §§  31-39;  Ribot, 


190  RECOGNITION  AND  LOCALIZATION. 

Diseases  of  llemory,  ch.  I;  Fortlage,  System  der  Psycliologie,  §  14; 
Fauth,  Das  Gedacfitniss ;  Bering,  Uebe?-  das  Qeddehtniss ;  Kay, 
Memory ;  Waitz,  Lehrbuch  der  Psychologies  §  11,  and  Qrundlegung 
der  Psychol.,  p.  56;  Calderwood,  Mind  and  Brain,  ch.  ix;  (His- 
tory) Burnham,  Amer.  Journal  of  Psychol.,  ii,  Nos.  1  and  2;  Binet, 
Revue  Philosaphique,  xxiii.  473  and  (Richet)  xxi.  560;  Rabier, 
Psychologic,  ch.  xiv-xvi ;  Grataeap,  Theorie  de  la  Memoire  ;  Beneke, 
Lehrbuch  d.  Psychol.,  ch.  iil.  On  the  educational  bearings  of  the 
subject,  see  references  given  by  Sully,  Outlines,  p.  300,  and  the  trea- 
tises on  pedagogics,  especially  Dorpfeld,  Beitrdge  zur  pddagogi- 
schen  Psychologie. 

On  temporal  perception  and  localization  :  Volkmann,  Lehrbuch, 
§§  87-89;  Waitz,  Lehrbuch,  §  53;  Drobisch,  Psychologie,  §§  58-61; 
Maudsley,  Physiol,  of  Mind,  ch.  ix;  CaXdev^^ooA,  Mind  and  Brain, 
ch.  IX;  James,  Journal  of  Bpeculatim  Philosophy,  Oct.  1886;  Ward, 
Encyc.  Britann.,  art.  Psycliology ;  Romanes,  Mind,  in.  277;  Spen- 
cer, Psychology,  i.  p.  207;  Sergi,  Psychol.  Physiologique,  bk.  2, 
ch.  II;  Glass,  Philosophische  Studien,  iv.  p.  423;  Hodgson,  Time 
and  Space,  pt.  1,  ch.  in ;  Lipps,  Orundthatsachen  des  Seelenlebens, 
ch.  XXVI ;  Exner,  Hermann^ s  Handbuch  d.  Phys^iologie,  Bd.  II, 
Thl.  1,  pp.  260-262;  also  articles  by  Dietze,  Estel,  and  others  in 
Philosophische  Studien. 

Further  Problems  for  Study  : 

Mental  continuity  in  memory ; 
Memory  during  sleep ; 
Cultivation  of  memory ; 
Memory  systems. 


COMBINATION. 


CHAPTEE    XI. 

ASSOCIATION. 

§  1.  General  Nature  of  Association. 

Definition  of  Association.  In  the  foregoing  chapters 
reference  has  been  repeatedly  made  to  the  principle  of 
"  association  of  ideas  ;"  indeed  some  knowledge  of  such  a 
principle  is  so  generally  implied  in  the  affairs  of  life  that 
its  familiarity  has  been  assumed.  The  truth  that  things 
owe  their  character  to  their  associations,  that  men  are  in- 
fluenced by  their  associates,  is  only  a  broader  applica- 
tion of  the  law  which  takes  its  rise  in  the  psychic  life. 

The  conditions  under  which  the  revival  of  mental 
images  in  general  is  possible  have  been  stated.  It  pro- 
ceeds upon  a  renewal  of  the  nervous  action  which  ac- 
companied the  first  perception,  and  the  reinstatement  of 
the  original  apperceptive  act  with  a  sufficient  intensity 
and  duration.  This,  however,  does  not  suffice  to  inform 
us  what  it  is  that  gives  specific  direction  to  the  flow  of 
reproduced  states.  Why  is  it  that  among  an  infinite 
number  of  possible  reproductions,  a  particular  repre- 
sentation rather  than  others  is  revived  ?  This  question 
indicates  the  true  function  of  association,  which  is  the 
'progressive  revival  of  particular  mental  states.  The  fact 
of  association  may  also  be  defined,  as  the  relation  between 
revived  states  of  consciousness,  icherehy  continuity  of  suc- 
cessive representation  is  secured  in  the  form  of  neio  inte- 
grated states. 

191 


192  ASSOCIATION. 

Ground  or  Reason  of  Association :  the  Preceding  Idea. 
If  we  thus  conceive  of  association,  as  the  law  of  the  con- 
nection of  representations  in  consciousness,  and  j^icture 
the  series  of  such  representations,  the  nature  of  the  con- 
nection in  each  case  is  seen  to  lie  in  the  character  of  the 
antecedent  image.  For  example,  I  am  thinking  at  this 
instant  of  the  rain  ;  and  wh}'  ?  Because  I  have  seen  the 
heavens  covered  with  clouds.  I  have  an  idea  of  thun- 
der, because  I  have  just  seen  a  flash  of  lightning.  I 
think  of  Napoleon  because  I  have  already  thought  of 
Ctesar  or  Alexander.  In  each  such  case,  the  idea  at 
present  before  me  is  determined  by  the  idea  which  im- 
mediately preceded  it.  If  the  antecedent  idea  had  been 
difierent,  so  would  also  the  subsequent  idea.  If,  for  ex- 
ample, I  had  thought  of  Socrates  instead  of  Alexander, 
it  is  altogether  improbable  that  Napoleon  would  have 
come  to  mind.  There  are  no  states  of  mind  which  can 
be  completely  isolated  from  this  chain  of  connected 
links.  Our  whole  mental  life  is  a  progressive  series  of 
suggestions,'  or  of  integrations  of  ideas. 

The  word  idea  is  used  here  in  its  broadest  sense,  to  cover 
all  and  every  form  of  mental  modification,  not  alone  the 
purely  intellectual,  but  also  the  emotional,  voluntary,  and  sen- 
sational. We  have  seen  that  sensations  are  associated  with 
movements,  and  movements  with  impulses  of  the  will :  and 
later  the  same  universal  connection  with  other  states  will  be 
seen  to  hold  good  of  the  feelings.  The  word  idea  has  lost  all 
definite  psychological  meaning  in  a  more  contracted  signif- 
icance— being  replaced  by  exact  expressions,  such  as  presenta- 
tion, representation,  notion — and  may  well  bear  the  general  sig- 
nificance which  the  expression  "association  of  ideas"  gives  it. 

Relation  of  Association  to  Memory.  The  reciprocal 
relation  of  association  and  memory  is  so  close,  and  the 
two  functions  run  into  each  other  so  intimatel}',  that  it 
is  impossible  to  consider  either  entirely  independently 

'  Word  used  by  Brown  :  it  is  more  appropriate  than  association. 


PHYSIOLOGICAL  BASIS  OF  ASSOCIATION.  193 

of  the  other.  Memory  involves  both  reproduction  and 
recognition,  and  inasmuch  as  both  of  these  depend  upon 
the  reinstatement  of  the  relation  seized  upon  in  apper- 
ception, an  element  of  association  is  involved  in  the  re- 
lated mental  states.  That  is,  the  first  arrangement  of  the 
facts  of  experience  gives  ground  both  for  the  possibility 
of  reproduction,  memory,  and  for  the  form  of  rej)roduc- 
tion,  association.  On  the  other  hand,  memory  as  re- 
tention precedes  association,  properly  so  called;  since 
images  must  be  retained  in  order  to  be  associated.  But 
since  the  association,  like  the  retention,  is  unconscious, 
and  since  memory  is  conscious  only  when  it  is  a  com- 
pleted act,  we  may  consider  the  two  together  as  a  com- 
pleted form  of  mental  activity,  memory  supplying  the 
content  and  association  the  form. 

Physiological  Basis  of  Association.  In  speaking  of 
the  physiological  habits  which  lie  at  the  basis  of  reten- 
tion, we  had  occasion  to  point  out  the  complex  nature 
of  the  dispositions  or  tendencies  in  the  mental  life  to 
which  they  give  rise.  We  may  suppose  both  associative 
connections  between  localities  or  elements  in  the  cerebral 
cortex,'  and  the  multiplication  of  these  connections,  in 
an  intricate  network  of  fibrous  and  cellular  tissue.'  Con- 
sidering these  connections  as  constituting  the  organic 
counterpart  of  the  associated  mental  life,  we  see  at  once 
the  wide  capacity  it  affords  for  varied  and  related  repre- 
sentation. The  stimulus  of  a  single  element  in  the  net- 
work arouses  many  connections,  first  those  best  estab- 
lished and  oftenest  repeated,  then  others  in  varying 
degrees  of  strength  of  revival.  For  example,  we  may 
suppose  the  memories  involved  in  the  sight,  touch, 
sound,  written  signs,  and  spoken  word,  of  a  bell,  to  be 
thus  connected.     The  presentation  of  a  bell  to  \'iew  re- 

'  Wundt,  Phys,  Psych.,  3d  ed.,  and  Charcot. 


194  ASSOCIATION. 

Tives  at  once  no  less  than  five  different  memories :  the 
muscular  memories  involved  in  spelling  the  word  bell, 
the  word  as  heard  when  spoken  and  seen  when  writ- 
ten, the  sound  of  the  striking  of  the  bell,  and  its  hard 
smooth  touch.  These  come  up  in  varying  degrees  of 
readiness,  according  as  we  are  accustomed  to  exercise 
them  resj)ectively  in  our  experience  with  bells.  Other 
more  indistinct  memories,  such  as  the  church  spire, 
dining-rooms,  crowd  in  upon  us,  each  having  its  correla- 
tive accompaniment  in  the  brain  activities.  The  basis, 
therefore,  of  association  is  the  same  as  that  of  reten- 
tion and  admits  of  the  same  physiological  explanation  : 
that  is  to  say,  the  mere  possibility  of  association  in 
revived  states  is  provided  for  in  the  physiological  re- 
tention of  the  related  molecular  changes  occasioned  at 
their  first  experience.  The  actual  revival,  however,  as 
remembered  states,  is  mental,  as  reproduction  and  recog- 
nition'are  mental.  For  this  reason,  the  laws  of  associa- 
tion are  unconscious  until  critical  examination  of  the 
nature  of  associated  states  reveals  them.  And  ei'en  then 
we  have  no  means  of  penetrating  the  unconscious  to 
determine  their  exact  nature  or  scope. 

§  2.  Laws  of  Association. 

I.  Particular  or  Secondary  Laws.  "When  we  seek," 
says  Aristotle,  "  after  an  idea  which  is  not  immediately 
before  us,  we  reach  it  through  the  mediation  of  another 
idea,  either  by  resemblance,  or  contrast,  or  contiguity.^' ' 
Modern  psychologists  generally  follow  Aristotle  in  this 
enumeration  of  the  principles  of  association,  at  least  as 
respects  resemblance  and  contiguity.  Deferring  the  dis- 
cussion of  contrast,  we  may  state  two  great  laws  of  asso- 

•  Cf.  Rabier,  loc.  cit.  p.  184.  'A(p  duoiov,  rj  evavriov,  ri  rov 
•crvveyyv'i.  Aid  Tovro  yeverdi  rf  dva./JV7j<ri?. — Aristotle,  De  Mem. 
et  Rem.,  c,  ii-iv,  1. 


SECOND AET  LAWS  OF  ASSOCIATION.  195 

ciation ;  depeuding  upon  the  two  classes  into  which,  in 
introspection,  the  facts  of  the  case  seem  to  fall. 

In  the  first  place,  images  are  associated.  That  is,  one 
of  two  or  more  states,  all  of  which  are  reproductions, 
jjrecedes  and  brings  up  the  others.  The  face  of  a  friend, 
whom  I  recall,  recalls  the  place  and  time  of  our  last 
meeting.  On  the  other  hand,  a  new  experience,  a  presen- 
tation, may  bring  up  images  of  the  past.  My  new  ac- 
quaintance recalls  some  one  of  m^^  old  friends.  These 
two  classes  of  facts  exhaust  the  range  of  association.  In 
the  first  of  the  two  cases,  the  images  which  come  up 
together  have  always  been  together  in  the  mind  before  : 
this  is  contiguity.  Whatever  their  former  relation  to  each 
other  may  have  been,  when  we  experienced  them,  wheth- 
er cause  and  eflect,  whole  and  parts,  or  any  other  of  the 
relations  the  mind  discovers,  it  matters  not :  it  is  suffi- 
cient that  they  have  been  present  before  in  conscious- 
ness, as  contiguous  in  time.  In  the  second  case,  the 
presentation  which  tends  to  recall  the  image  is  always 
seen  to  be  like  the  latter  in  some  respect :  this  is  resem- 
blance. Resemblance  to  an  image — again  disregarding 
contrast — is  the  only  characteristic  of  a  presentation, 
which  serves  as  ground  for  the  immediate  revival  of  that 
image. 

The  two  particular  or  secondary  laws  of  association 
may,  in  accordance  with  the  preceding,  be  formulated 
somewhat  as  follows  : 

1.  Contiguity :  Ideas  which  have  been  apperceived 
together  are  reproduced  under  the  same  apperceptive 
relations. 

2.  Resemblance  :  A  presentation  which  in  any  way  re- 
sembles an  image,  tends  to  cause  the  reproduction  of 
that  image,  with  its  related  images. 

It  should  be  noted  that  it  is  only  a  new  presentation 
to  which  the  law  of  resemblance  can  be  said  to  apply  as 
tending  to  re\'ive  past  images.     As  soon  as  the  presenta- 


196  ASSOCIATION. 

tiou  is  repeated  its  resemblance  to  the  revived  image  is 
not  emphasized  in  the  reproduction,  but  the  fact  that 
the  image  which  its  former  perception  has  left  behind 
has  once  coexisted  with  the  image  suggested  at  that  time, 
makes  it  a  case  of  contiguity.  For  example,  I  meet  a 
man  B,  and  I  think  of  my  friend  A,  whom  he  resembles. 
After  that,  the  two  images  are  associated  together  by 
reason  of  the  contiguity  thus  established :  so  that  when 
I  see  B  again,  the  resemblance  is  not  necessary  to  the 
suggestion,  though  it  still  strikes  me,  and  is  known  to  be 
the  cause  of  the  first  association.  In  this  case  the  re- 
peated perception  adds  vividness  and  strength  to  the 
association,  since  the  reality  of  the  object  passes  over  in 
a  measure  to  the  image  which  it  calls  up.' 

This  reduction  of  a  large  class  of  cases  of  seeming 
resemblance  to  contiguity,  is  a  step  toward  the  elimina- 
tion of  resemblance  altogether,  as  an  ultimate  ground 
of  association.  While  we  hold  that,  from  an  em^jirical 
standpoint,  resemblance  is  an  evident  and  real  reason 
for  the  connection  between  ideas,  and  must  be  recog- 
nized as  such,  still  on  reflection,  we  find  it  possible  to 
reduce  all  cases  of  resemblance,  in  their  ultimate  nature, 
to  contiguity.  In  every  case  of  resemblance  between  a 
presentation  and  the  image  it  suggests,  there  may  be 
said  to  be  elements  common  to  the  two  :  elements  in  the 
present  presentation  which  afi'ect  us  in  an  identical  way 
with  elements  in  the  image  which  it  resembles.  In  a 
strange  portrait,  which  we  say  resembles  a  friend,  there 
are  certain  points  of  feature  or  expression,  few  or  many, 
which  are  identical  with  our  friend's  :  these  points  coexist 
with  others  in  the  image  of  our  friend,  and  the  whole 
image  is  brought  up  by  this  coexistence  or  contiguity. 
In  the  presentation  there  are,  say,  elements  a,  b,  c,  etc., 
and  in  the  image,   elements  A,  &,  C  ;  the  common  ele- 

'  See  the  striking  examples  given  by  Stewart,  Philosophy  of  the 
Human  Mind,  chap,  v,  part  1,  sect.  1. 


SECONDARY  LAWS  OF  ASSOGIATION.  197 

ment  h  makes  tlie  presence  of  botli  necessary.  M.  Taine, 
following  Brown  and  Hobbes,  formulates  a  law  to  ex- 
press this  process  of  association :  When  part  of  an  idea 
appears  in  consciousness  the  lohole  appears.^ 

In  illustration  of  this  law,  the  following  quotation  from 
Thomas  Brown  is  apt:'''  ''A  ruff  like  that  worn  by  Queen 
Elizabeth  brings  before  us  the  sovereign  herself,  though  the 
person  who  wears  the  ruff  may  have  no  other  circumstance  of 
resemblance ;  ....  it  is  necessary  only  that  a  part  of  the 
complexity  (the  Queen)  should  be  recalled — as  the  ruff — to 
bring  back  all  the  other  parts,  by  the  mere  principle  of  con- 
tiguity. .  .  .  The  eyes  of  a  stranger  affecting  our  vision  in 
precisely  the  same  manner  as  the  eyes  of  a  friend,  thus  pro- 
duce one  part  of  the  complex  whole  which  we  have  been  ac- 
customed to  recognize  as  our  friend,  and  the  one  part,  by  its 
former  proximity,  recalls  the  others.  In  this  manner,  we 
might  be  able  to  reduce  every  case  of  suggestion  from  direct 
resemblance  to  the  influence  of  mere  contiguity." 

Brown's  position  also,  that  associated  emotion  often  sup- 
plies the  link  of  contiguity  in  cases  of  resemblance  or  faint 
analogy,  seems  to  be  just.  The  events  often  resemble  each 
other  only  in  the  emotion  which  they  excite.  This  fact  of 
emotion  is  a  part  of  the  experience  in  each  case,  and  tends  to 
be  followed  by  the  reproduction  of  the  secondary  image. 

The  great  importance  of  the  law  of  contiguity  in  op- 
position to  resemblance  is  further  emphasized  by  the 
experiments  of  Lehmann  already  spoken  of  above.'  The 
simple  addition  of  a  mark,  number,  or  name  to  the  sev- 
eral shades  of  worsted  aided  the  memory  by  contiguity, 
when  the  resemblances  of  the  pieces  to  one  another  were 
too  great  for  distinction.  From  all  the  variations  in  his 
experiments,  he  draws  the  conclusion,  that  "the  law  that 
best  explains  the  facts,  is  the  law  of  adjacency,  in  ojjpo- 
sition  to  the  law  of  similarity."  * 

'  Intelligence,  trans.,  pp.  79-81.  Cf.  Bain,  Senses  and  Intellect,  chap. 
II,  §2. 

'  Lectures  on  the  Philosophy  of  the  Mind,  ii.  pp.  13-13.  Mr.  Bradley 
also  finds  this  theory  in  Wolfe  (1732),  Princ.  of  Logic,  311-313. 

■^  See  p.  177. 

*  See  Science,  vol.  xir.  p.  153. 


198  ASSOCIATION. 

Association  by  Contrast.  Since  Aristotle,  various 
thinkers  have  cited  contrast  as  a  distinct  principle  of 
association.  It  seems  warranted  at  first  sight  by  a  vari- 
ety of  well-marked  experiences.  The  sight  of  a  dwarf 
brings  up  a  giant,  a  bright  color  recalls  strongly  con- 
trasted colors,  sour  makes  one  think  of  sweet.  There 
can  be  no  doubt,  in  such  cases  of  contrast,  of  the  reality 
of  the  suggestion ;  but  are  there  not  other  reasons  than 
that  of  contrast,  to  which  it  may  be  referred  ?  There 
are  such  reasons,  it  seems,  in  all  cases,  and  we  are  led 
to  reduce  these  associations  to  resemblance,  and  ulti- 
mately to  contiguity. 

1.  In  most  cases  of  contrast  there  is  a  standard  of  ref- 
erence to  which  both  the  presentation  and  the  re\dved 
image  are  referred :  this  standard  constitutes  a  point 
common  to  both  ideas,  a  point  of  resemblance.  For  ex- 
ample, the  short  man  suggests  the  tall,  since  both  are, 
at  once,  thought  of  in  comparison  with  an  average  man. 
The  one  is  short  only  as  he  is  shorter  than  usual,  and 
the  other  is  tall  only  as  he  is  taller  than  usual.  Thus  in 
the  very  conception  of  the  contrasted  images,  a  common 
element  enters.  This  common  element  is  the  h  of  our 
earlier  illustration,  and  secures  the  association  by  con- 
tiguity. This  variation  from  a  normal  standard  accounts 
also  for  the  association  of  emotional  and  volitional  states,, 
as  great  misery  with  great  happiness,  great  effort  with 
complete  inertness. 

2.  Many  instances  of  contrast  arise  from  the  early 
character  of  our  knowledge  acquisitions.  The  begin- 
nings of  knowledge  involve,  as  has  been  seen,  a  process 
of  distinguishing  or  differentiation : '  things  are  fixed 
and  defined  in  relation  to  other  things.  This  tends  to 
fix  in  our  minds  many  instances  of  contrast.  In  early 
education,  the  child  is  taught  to  appreciate  qualities  in 

'  Chap.  VIII,  §3. 


ASSOCIATION  BY  CONTRAST.  199 

some  objects  by  having  poiuted  out  to  him  the  conspicu- 
ous absence  of  these  qualities  in  other  objects :  until  it 
becomes  a  mental  habit,  and  finally  a  method  of  logical 
procedure.'  All  such  primary  connecting  of  contrasted 
things  takes  place  among  contiguous  states,  and  frequent 
repetition  confirms  the  association.  If  we  had  only  seen 
regular  oval  leaves,  they  would  have  no  contrasted  asso- 
ciations ;  but  having  once  been  led  to  observe  leaves 
which  are  very  indentate,  the  contrast  at  once  presents 
itself  afterwards ;  but  the  association  is  due  primarily 
to  the  contiguit}^  thus  established. 

3.  It  is  also  true,  as  Brown  and  Horwicz  suggest,  that 
there  is  an  emotional  coloring  in  cases  of  contrast,  as  in 
resemblance,  which  supplies  a  connecting  point  of  simi- 
larity. Vague  analogies  which  are  stronger  by  reason 
of  inherent  contrasts,  and  contrasts  which  are  brought 
out  by  an  underlying  analogy,  occasion  a  repetition  of  an 
affective  state,  which  ties  together  the  members  of  the 
relation.  For  example,  a  three-handed  monstrosity 
brings  to  mind  a  one-handed  monstrosity,  and  all  the 
circus  oddities  we  have  ever  heard  of,  come  to  mind ;  sim- 
ply because  they  are  all  monstrosities,  they  excite  in  us 
a  common  feeling  of  repulsion.  They  resemble  one  an- 
other in  the  fact  of  variation  from  normal  nature,  and  in 
the  common  emotion  this  variation  excites.  The  same 
may  be  said  of  states  wdiich  involve  similar  volitional 
accompaniments.'' 

It  seems  true,  therefore,  that  all  cases  of  association 

'  Inductive  "method  of  difference." 

^  The  necessity  of  holding  contiguity  to  be,  of  the  three,  the  great 
principle  of  association  was  recognized  by  Berkeley.  He  says  {Theory 
of  Vision,  §  25):  "  That  one  idea  may  suggest  another  to  the  mind,  it  will 
suffice  that  they  have  been  observed  to  go  together,  without  any  demon- 
stration of  the  necessity  of  their  coexistence,  or  so  much  as  knowing 
what  it  is  that  makes  them  so  to  coexist."  He  seems  clearly  to  subor- 
dinate relation — "that  which  makes  them  so  to  coexist" — to  contigu- 
ity. 


200  ASSOCIATION. 

by  contrast  may  be  accounted  for,  as  either  variations 
from  a  mental  standard,  contiguities  observed  and  estab- 
lished in  the  process  of  the  acquisitio7i  of  knowledge,  or  emo- 
tional and  volitional  resemblances. 

Yet,  as  in  the  case  of  resemblance,  it  is  proper  that  con- 
trast should  be  considered  a  law  of  association.  Analysis  and 
reduction  of  a  psychological  fact  does  not  cast  out  the  fact 
from  our  conscious  life.  The  means  of  referring  contrast  to 
other  classes  of  suggestion  are  conscious  and  apparent  on  re- 
flection, while  the  means  by  which  resemblance  is  seen  to  be 
contiguity  are  more  hidden  ;  and  for  that  reason,  contrast 
cannot  be  considered  coordinate  with  the  two  secondary  laws  : 
but  it  is  still  a  valid  account  of  a  large  class  of  cases,  to  call 
them  suggestions  by  contrast. 

II.  Universal  or  Primary  Law.  One  great  principle 
of  associative  reproduction  has  been  found  in  contiguity 
by  succession,  its  special  forms  being  simple  contiguity, 
resemblance,  and  contrast.  The  tendency  to  suggestion 
by  this  law  is  greatly  strengthened  by  other  factors, 
whose  consideration  leads  to  the  underlying  principle  of 
all  association.  If  such  contiguity  were  the  whole  case, 
only  the  physical  side  of  memory,  that  is  retention, 
would  be  operative  in  the  reproduction :  and  our  mem- 
ories would  present  the  uniform  sequences  and  regular 
fadings  which  physical  dispositions  undergo.  The  pecu- 
liarities of  personal  mental  life,  the  characteristics  of 
individuals,  which  are  so  striking  in  the  varieties  of  form 
and  content  of  memory,  would  be  greatly  reduced.  But 
such  a  supposition  is  impossible,  since  memory  is  mainly 
mental,  as  perception  is.  It  is  an  active  sj'uthetic  pro- 
cess of  constructing  relations.  Apperception,  therefore, 
is  the  power  which  gives  definitive  cast  to  our  associa- 
tions, and  supplies  the  lack  we  have  spoken  of.  The  re- 
lations discovered  in  apperception  in  their  variety,  and 
their  infinite  intensive  phases,  give  character  and  deeper 
meaning  to  contiguous  experiences. 


PBIMARY  LAW:    CORRELATION.  201 

Law  of  Correlation :  every  association  of  mental  states 
is  an  integration,  due  to  the  previous  correlation  of  those 
states  in  apperception.  The  relatious  which  we  discover 
among  the  objects  of  our  perception  are  very  varied, 
and  many  attempts  have  been  made  to  classify  them.' 
Besides  the  relations  of  time  and  resemblance  which 
have  already  found  their  place  in  association  by  con- 
tiguity, the  principal  connections  which  the  intelligence 
finds  among  its  objects  are  suhordination,  causation,  and 
design.  The  relation  of  subordination  has  various  appli- 
cations, as  whole  and  parts,  substance  and  accident,  and 
underlies,  as  will  be  seen,  the  use  of  the  notions  of  genus 
and  species  in  the  symbolic  and  discursive  oj)erations. 
The  real  logical  import  of  this  relation  is  only  appre- 
hended after  the  formation  of  general  notions  and  the 
growth  of  mind  on  its  logical  side.  In  early  childhood, 
it  is  simply  apperceived  as  contiguity.  Causation  also, 
in  its  completed  form,  involves  the  ideas  of  necessity  and 
potency,  which  give  it  the  form  of  a  universal  relation 
between  given  data,  while  in  child  life  it  is  simply  a  per- 
cejDtion  of  succession.  Design  arises,  perhaps,  even  later 
in  life,  since  it  involves  more  seldom  the  simple  fact  of 
contiguity,  and  requires  a  larger  stretch  of  experience 
for  its  generalization  in  a  notion. 

The  very  great  value  of  correlations  in  our  past  ex- 
perience is  apjjarent  without  amplification.  Mere  con- 
tiguity in  time  may  fade  and  disappear,  when  a  relation 
remains  intact.  For  example,  all  the  circumstances  sur- 
rounding tlie  first  perception  of  a  match,  the  time,  per- 
sons, manner  of  striking,  material  lighted,  are  long  since 
forgotten  ;  but  the  effect,  a  blaze  of  fire,  is  remembered. 
The  elements  of  potency  and  necessity,  peculiar  to  caus- 
ation and  foreign  to  mere  contiguity,  are  in  this  case  the 
means  of  memory.    Correlation  is,  for  the  mental  life,  the 

'  See  Chap.  XIV,  wliere  a  provisional  list  is  advanced. 


202  ASSOCIATION. 

essential  thing.  This  has  alread}^  been  pointed  out  in 
the  section  on  "kinds  of  memory  :  "  '  and  the  reason  for 
it  is,  that  contiguity,  -syhich  is  merely  the  mental  correla- 
tive of  the  phj'sical  process,  is  supplemented  by  the 
attentive  force  of  mind,  which  gives  to  our  successive 
states  an  essential  inner  connection,  corresponding  to 
the  relations  of  external  realities. 

Examples  readily  suggest  themselves  of  memories  which 
show  this  difference.  We  remember  a  string  of  foreign  mean- 
ingless words  only  as  long  as  the  actual  sounds  j^ersist  iu  con- 
scioiisness.  But  if  we  detect,  in  the  sound,  similarities  to 
words  in  our  own  tougue,  they  remain  longer  in  memory 
through  this  relation.  But  as  before,  it  is  only  after  the 
words  assume  meaning  and  sense  to  us  that  they  become  per- 
manent acquisitions.  McCosh  tells  the  story  of  a  clergyman 
who  asked  a  sailor  boy  to  box  the  compass  backwards,  which 
he  readily  did  from  the  correlations  of  the  points  of  direction 
with  one  another — they  had  the  same  meaning  both  ways; — 
but  when  the  boy  retorted  by  asking  the  clergyman  to  repeat 
the  Lord's  Prayer  backwards,  the  clergyman  was  defeated. 
In  the  latter  case,  the  words  had  no  correlations  or  meaning, 
and  their  simple  contiguity  was  not  sufficient  for  memory.'^ 

Preference  as  Influencing  Association.  Another  fac- 
tor which  influences  greatly  the  direction  and  character 
of  our  association,  is  found  in  individual  preferences  and 
talents.  As  a  general  thing,  our  preferences  take  the 
direction  of  our  talents.  Individuals  differ  notably  in 
the  manner  in  which  the  same  experiences  impress  them, 
and  in  the  relations  they  discover  under  the  same  exter- 
nal conditions.  An  artist  sees  the  red  evening  sky  with 
feelings  only  of  beauty  and  pleasure,  while  the  farmer 
discovers  in  it  probabilities  of  ruin  to  his  crops.  The 
student  of  a  practical  and  utilitarian  cast  of  mind  cher- 

'  See  p.  189.  For  details  on  the  correlative  faculty  and  its  products, 
see  Chap.  XIV. 

'^  On  the  meaning  and  value  of  correlative  association,  see  Lotze, 
Mkrocosmus,  i.  p.  232. 


I 


PBEFERENCE  AS  INFLUENCINQ  ASSOCIATION.     203 

islies  his  books  only  as  a  means  of  increasing  liis 
chances  of  success  or  usefulness  in  life,  while  his  more 
ideal  neighbor  studies  to  secure  a  broader  mental  range 
or  an  acquaintance  with  deeper  truths  for  their  own 
sake.  In  this  there  is  an  immediate  intrusion  of  the 
prevailing  temperament  into  the  web  of  daily  experience, 
carrying  the  attention  and  effort  over  upon  specific  rela- 
tions of  things ;  which  tends  in  its  turn  to  fix  these  cor- 
relations in  mind  and  thus  to  heighten  the  disposition  in 
its  peculiarity.  Native  preference  gives  direction  to  as- 
sociations, and  associations  becoming  fixed  give  perma- 
nence to  native  preferences.  In  general,  it  may  be  said, 
that  mental  work  is  most  successful  when  done  along 
the  line  of  inclination. 

It  may  be  well  to  point  out  the  danger  arising  from  the 
free  play  of  this  law  of  association.  Free  exercise  in  the  line 
of  inclination,  to  the  exclusion  of  other  well-directed  mental 
exertion,  tends  to  develop  great  disproportion  in  the  growth  of 
mind,  especially  in  childhood.  Children  should  not  be  al- 
lowed to  choose  their  mental  pursuits.  The  disciplinary  value 
of  compulsory  application  to  things  which  are  distasteful  is 
readily  seen,  in  the  increased  flexibility  of  the  attention, 
greater  voluntary  control  of  the  intellectual  impulses,  and  the 
broadening  of  the  mental  horizon.  It  is  only  after  these  qual- 
ities and  capabilities  have  been  already  attained  by  a  well- 
balanced  course  of  compulsory  training,  that  the  student 
should  be  allowed  to  devote  himself  to  a  more  contracted  cir- 
cle of  study. 


§  3.  Forms  of  Association". 

Association  by  contiguity  takes  two  great  forms, 
when  regarded  in  reference  to  the  objects  or  events  from 
which  our  mental  states  arise.  These  events  or  objects 
may  coexist  in  time  or  space,  or  they  may  be  successive 
in  time.  Thus  distinguished  we  have  association  by  Co- 
existence  and  by  Succession.     When  we  come,  however,  to 


204  ASSOCIATION. 

consider  that  it  is  not  objects  which  are  associated,  but 
our  mental  affections,  and  that,  in  reproduction,  these 
affections  must  be  projected  in  a  time  series  whose  form 
is  always  succession,  we  find  that  coexistence  of  objects 
gives  rise  to  succession  of  ideas.  That  this  is  true  is 
seen  from  an  examination  of  the  two  possible  kinds  of 
coexistence  in  space  and  time.  Objects  which  coexist  in 
space,  as  has  been  already  seen,  are  apj^erceived  by  a 
rapid  shifting  of  the  attention,  the  maximal  unit  of  imme- 
diate apperceptive  apprehension,  for  sounding  bodies,  be- 
ing about  12  distinct  stimuli,  each  of  which  may  be  itself 
separately  apperceived,  and  for  sight  about  5  to  7,'  which 
are  given  as  one.  For  the  other  senses  this  range  is  still 
more  contracted.  Each  such  apperceptive  unit  consti- 
tutes a  single  presentation,  capable  of  reproduction  only 
as  a  whole,  as  one  image,  and  not  as  a  plurality-  of  coex- 
isting images  :  consequently,  the  next  image  brought  up 
is  that  to  which  the  attention  was  next  shifted,  and  the 
representation  of  all  sensation  arising  from  external  stim- 
uli must  be  in  the  form  of  succession.  For  example, 
after  looking  at,  say,  twenty  crosses  on  a  blackboard,  I 
reproduce  them  as  four  successive  representations  of 
five  crosses  each,  or  in  a  longer  series  of  smaller  imits, 
the  single  crosses  in  each  unit  being  rejjroduced  not  as 
coexistent  images,  but  as  components  of  the  unit  image 
of  five.  If  they  are  reproduced  as  single  crosses,  it  is  in 
succession,  arising  either  from  the  appercejjtion  of  each 
cross  separately,  or  from  the  information  that  the  crosses 
are  all  alike,  which  information  takes  the  place  of  our 
own  apperceptive  exploration.  So,  however  rej)roduced, 
the  representation  arises  from  succession. 

Passing  to  coexistence  in  time,  the  same  is  found  to 
be  true.     Experiences  which  happen  contemporaneously 

'  Hamilton. 


FORJIS  OF  ASSOCIATION  205 

are  reproduced  in  a  single  apperceptive  complex,  as  one 
image,  and  not  as  a  plurality  of  coexisting  images.  For 
example,  a  musical  chord  is  reproduced  in  its  effect,  as 
one  thing,  the  whole  giving  a  single  sensitive  modifica- 
tion. It  is  true  we  may  analyze  this  complex  into  its 
elements,  but  such  an  analysis  proceeds  upon  a  previous 
analysis  of  the  actual  presentation  which  gave  a  suc- 
cessive character  to  the  factors  comprised.  Suppose 
upon  hearing  the  chord  at  first,  I  distinguished  in  the 
whole  effect  four  tones ;  the  act  of  distinguishing  or  re- 
lating these  tones  depends  upon  successive  acts  of  ap- 
perception, the  relating  power  of  attention.  And  in  so 
doing,  the  separate  tone-stimuli  remain  no  longer  coex- 
istent, but  are  successive. 

Thus  we  hold  that  the  one  form  of  contiguous  repro- 
duction is  Succession.  This  we  would  expect  from  what 
has  already  been  found  to  be  the  physical  basis  of  mem- 
ory. Mental  reproduction  was  seen  to  depend  upon  the 
persistence  of  physical  modifications  in  the  form  of 
physiological  dispositions  ;  these  dispositions  being  ten- 
dencies toward  a  series  of  successive  molecular  changes, 
which  have  their  mental  accompaniment  in  the  succes- 
sion of  conscious  states.  By  the  law  of  cause  and  effect, 
these  changes  are  a  progressive  series  in  time,  the  terms 
being  sometimes  complex  physically,  but  giving  a  result- 
ant mental  modification,  which  is  a  single  mental  state, 
and  not  a  coexistent  plurality  of  states.  If  conscious- 
ness be  unitary,  and  have  but  one  centre  of  appercep- 
tion, these  contemporaneous  changes  can  only  constitute 
for  consciousness  one  modification  as  a  whole,  the  re- 
sult being  a  single  presentation.  The  presentations  thus 
arising,  are  thrown  into  successive  form  by  the  rhythmic 
activity  of  apperception,  under  the  limitation  of  our  per- 
ception of  units  of  duration.'      If  these  units  of  dura- 

'  See  p.  185. 


206  ASSOCIATION. 

tion  were  shorter  or  longer,  the  succession  of  our  ideas 
would  be  faster  or  slower  than  now.' 

Porms  of  Coexistent  or  Simultaneous  Association." 
Considering  the  nature  and  relation  of  the  objects  or 
events  which  give  the  later  possibility  of  mental  sugges- 
tion, they  appear  often  to  be  coexistent  or  simultaneous. 
!For  purposes  of  actual  reproduction  these,  as  has  been 
said,  take  the  form  of  succession  ;  but  are  distinguished 
from  other  successive  suggestions,  in  that  they  depend 
upon  simultaneousness  of  external  stimulus.  These  as- 
sociations fall  into  several  classes : 

a.  Unitary  or  synthetic  associations.  This  form  of 
expression  applies  definitively  to  the  associative  process 
involved  in  synthetic  sense  perception,  the  grouping  of 
differentiated  and  localized  sensations  in  the  form  of 
unit  objects  in  space.  The  function  of  association  in 
this  process  has  already  been  pointed  out,  and  it  is  men- 
tioned here  only  for  purposes  of  classification.^  The 
mental  process  of  intuition,  whose  ideal  product  is  the 
idea  of  synthetic  unity,  proceeds  upon  the  basis  of  the 
association  of  its  sense-materials  in  two  forms :  (1)  Ex- 
tensive associations,  in  which  the  data  of  extension  are 
presupposed,  as  in  the  association  of  the  sensations  which 
take  the  form  of  the  percept  tree,  or  of  sensations  having 

'  The  prevailing  German  classification  of  the  principles  of  associa- 
tion, followed  by  Herbart,  Wundt,  Taine,  Trautscholdt,  is  seen  in  the 

following  table  : 

Association 


External  Internal 

I I 


I  I  I  I  I 

Coexistence  Succession     Subordination     Coordination    Dependence 

(in  time)  |  [__ 

t  I  i  i 

Resemblance    Contrast    Causation    Design 
-  On  this  section,  compare  Wundt,  loc.  cit.  ch.  xvn.      ^  See  p.  139. 


COEXISTENT  OB  SIMULTANEOUS  ASSOCIATION.     207 

the  property  of  extensity,  that  is,  made  up  of  component 
sensations  of  the  same  quality  whose  intensities  do  not 
coalesce,  and  (2)  Intensive  associations,  in  which  there 
are  no  such  extended  data,  as  in  the  associative  synthesis 
of  musical  tones,  where  the  component  sensations  of  the 
same  quality  do  coalesce. 

h.  Assimilative  Associations.  In  many  cases,  one  of 
two  reproduced  images  is  assimilated  to  the  form  of  the 
other,  and  mistaken  for  it.  It  is  always  a  case  of  asso- 
ciation by  resemblance,  and  partakes  of  the  nature  of  an 
illusion  of  perception  or  memory.  This  process  is 
strongly  typified  in  dreams  in  which  some  slight  stimulus 
is  assimilated  or  accommodated  to  the  form  of  our  dream 
consciousness,  and  plays  an  important  role  in  its  develop- 
ment :  a  slight  noise  becomes  thunder,  and  the  storm 
with  all  its  accompanying  sights  and  sounds  is  j^i'esent 
to  us.'  So  in  theatrical  representations,  the  scenery  is 
often  assimilated  to  the  real  actions  of  the  performers, 
and  the  whole  presents  a  spectacle  of  temporary  reality. 

c.  Disparate  Associations.  These  associations  arise 
from  the  coexistence  of  disparate  presentations,  as  a 
sound  and  a  light,  a  sensation  and  an  emotion,  a  feeling 
and  a  volition.  One  feels  faint  at  the  sight  of  blood,  or 
sorrow  at  the  sight  of  black  crape.  Among  these  asso- 
ciations, are  some  very  remarkable  and  important  illus- 
trations of  the  far-reaching  application  of  the  general 
laws  of  suggestion.  The  close  connection  between  sen- 
sation and  muscular  movement  has  already  been  re- 
marked. It  gives  rise  to  our  developed  motor  intuition. 
In  adult  life  it  is  so  intimate  a  connection,  that  we  are 
sometimes  unable  to  sever  the  sensor  and  motor  ele- 
ments of  our  experience  from  each  other.  The  nervous 
circuit,  which  is  of  great  importance  in  the  formation  of 
mental  associations,  becomes  self-acting  and  reflex.  It 
is  quite  beyond  our  power,  for  example,  to  prevent  flinch- 

'  See  the  author's  experience  ia  Science,  vol.  xii.  p.  216. 


208  ASSOCIATIOX. 

ing  from  the  seat  of  expected  or  real  pains,  to  hide  em- 
barrassment by  suppressing  blushing,  to  avoid  various 
individual  nervous  reactions  in  circumstances  of  excite- 
ment. Among  the  closest  of  these  motor  associations  is 
that  between  the  hearing  of  words  and  their  speech. 
The  possibility  of  the  use  of  language  depends  upon  the 
exactness,  variety,  and  control  of  these  associations :  as 
is  illustrated  in  the  great  difficulty  children  have  in 
learning  to  speak,  and  by  the  phenomena  of  aphasia  in 
its  several  varieties.  The  power  of  articulating  certain 
classes  of  words,  or  all  speech,  may  be  lost,  while  the 
memories  of  the  words,  sounds,  and  written  signs,  re- 
main intact.  Or  the  motor  association  involved  in 
writing  the  sign  maybe  dissolved,'  while  the  word-speak- 
ing power  remains.  These  associations,  in  many  other 
varieties,  have  become  so  intimate  from  repetition,  that 
the  organs  involved  take  up  their  part  often  uncon- 
sciously to  the  agent.^ 

Another  still  more  remarkable  association  of  dis- 
parate sensations  is  that  of  colors  and  sounds ;  associa- 
tions which  seem  to  be  independent  of  any  indimlual 
experience  of  contiguity,  and  consequently  to  rest  in  the 
difl'usive  or  sympathetic  nature  of  the  sensorial  reaction 
under  color  and  sound  stimuli.  The  case  of  two  broth- 
ers named  Nussbaumer  has  become  classic.  They  ex- 
perienced regular  and  constant  sensations  of  color  in 
connection  with  sounds  even  in  their  dreams,  but  only 

'  Called  agraphia. 

'^  The  remarkably  separate  and  distinct  forms  of  the  motor  asso- 
ciations involved  in  speech  are  seen  in  the  fact  that  each  language 
seems  to  have  its  consciousness,  and  the  words  of  one  are  seldom  sub- 
stituted for  those  required  in  using  another  connectedly.  I  may  cite 
the  case  of  a  little  girl  five  years  of  age,  in  Milwaukee,  Wis.,  who  uses 
German  and  English  equally  well,  and  always  replies  in  the  language 
in  which  she  is  addressed,  with  no  effort  or  thought.  She  has  both  a 
German  and  an  English  motor  intuition  for  language.  A  similar  case 
is  reported  by  Carpenter,  Mental  Physiology,  p.  264. 


COMPLEX  ASSOCIATIONS.  209 

approximately  tlie  same  series  of  colors  for  tlie  two 
men.  Similar  associations  of  toiicli  and  color  are  re- 
ported. The  blind  are  sometimes  able  to  determine 
sharply  contrasted  colors  by  touch,  and  a  hypnotized 
patient  is  said  to  have  sorted  colored  wools  with  his 
eyes  blindfolded.' 

Complex  Associations.  The  complex  character  of  the 
physical  dispositions  which  underlie  associations  has 
already  been  remarked.  It  is  impossible  to  isolate  a 
single  track  of  nervous  connection  from  the  general  net- 
work of  elements  which  constitute  the  ground  of  all 
sensorial  reaction  :  and  the  difficulty  is  almost  as  great 
in  regard  to  mental  phenomena.  The  idea  which  we  sin- 
gle out  as  the  suggestion  of  a  preceding  state  is  only  one, 
in  most  cases,  of  a  great  plurality  of  lines  of  mental 
direction  which  are  open  for  our  pursuit.  And  this  com- 
plexity is  enhanced  when  we  remember  that  the  sug- 
gesting idea  is  itself  only  one  of  the  numerous  sugges- 
tive progeny  of  other  states  antecedent  to  it.  These 
so-called  lines  of  direction — pursuing  the  figure  of  a  field 
of  consciousness  to  which  these  lines  would  be  perpen- 
dicular— all  tend  outward  from  a  given  point,  the  sug- 
gesting idea.  For  example,  the  year  1492  suggests  the 
discovery  of  America,  the  great  events  of  the  Italian 
Renaissance,  the  Humanistic  movement,  and  the  Exodus 
of  the  Children  of  Israel,  together  with  any  or  many  indi- 
vidual associations  which  may  have  been  formed  with  it, 
such  as  the  dates  of  other  great  geographical  discoveries. 
Now  in  the  revival  of  this  network  of  relations,  the  rich- 
ness of  its  suggestions  may  serve  as  a  help  or  as  a  hin- 
drance to  memory,  according  as  the  order  of  the  revival 
be  a  converging  or  a  diverging  association. 

'  Fontan.  See  account  of  the  Nussbaumer  and  other  cases,  in  Lewes, 
P)'oblems,  3d  seri'es,  III,  chap,  iv,  and  Amer.  Jour,  of  Psych.,  vol.  i.  p. 
740  ;  also  Francis  Galton,  on  "  Color  Associations,"  in  Inquiry  into  Hu- 
man Faculty,  p.  145. 


210  ASSOCIATION. 

I.  Converging  Associations.  In  the  converging  asso- 
ciation, the  mind  enters  upon  one  of  many  paths,  all  of 
which  lead  to  the  same  result.  This  is  the  great  resource 
of  memory  in  cases  of  voluntary  recollection.  We  cast 
about  in  consciousness  for  some  idea  related  to  the  image 
we  wish  to  call  up,  and  the  probabilit}^  of  our  finding 
such  a  pathway  to  the  goal,  depends  upon  the  number 
of  mental  relations  which  have  been  formed  around  it. 
In  case  I  wish  to  recall  the  date  1492,  I  have  only  to 
think  of  any  one  of  the  events  mentioned  which  are 
associated  with  it,  since  they  all  converge  in  their  lines  of 
suggestion  to  the  one  result. 

II.  Diverging  Associations.  In  this  case,  the  process 
is  reversed  and  the  memory  is  hindered  and  embarrassed 
by  its  possible  alternatives.  If  I  wish  to  remember  the 
date  of  the  invention  of  gunpowder,  and  can  only  do  so 
through  its  association  with  the  date  1492,  I  am  liable, 
in  the  absence  of  all  other  means  of  orientation,  to  go 
after  it  in  connection  with  the  Exodus,  or  any  other  of 
the  divergent  lines  of  suggestion,  and  can  perhaps  only 
reach  the  true  result,  after  having  exhausted  these  possi- 
bilities, by  returning  again  and  again  to  the  central  idea. 

§  4.  Force  of  Association. 

Prom  the  preceding  remarks,  the  influences  which 
tend  to  give  force  and  permanence  to  an  association 
are  readily  seen.  On  the  one  hand,  the  physio- 
logical dispositions  which  render  reproduction  possible, 
are  made  strong  and  lasting  in  the  nervous  structure,  by 
frequent  repetition  of  the  stimulus.  Just  to  the  degree 
of  the  repetition,  as  we  should  expect,  is  the  association 
strengthened  and  made  facile.  This  repetition,  we  may 
suppose,  often  takes  place  in  dreams.  After  seeing  an 
object  two  or  three  times,  the  danger  of  again  failing  to 
recognize  it  is  greatly  reduced.  Yet  the  physiological 
dependence    is    the    least    important   influence    in   the 


CONTINUANCE  OF  THE  SUGGESTING  IDEA.       211 

strengthening  of  association ;  since  contiguity,  thougli 
more  universal,  is  less  important  than  correlation,  in  its 
establishment.  The  attention,  which  establishes  the 
observed  relations  in  association,  is  the  most  important 
means  of  strengthening  them.  Strong  attention  to  a  single 
chain  of  events  is  often  sufficient  to  fix  it  permanently  in 
mind ;  and  we  are  generally  able,  when  troubled  with  for- 
getfulness  in  a  particular  connection,  to  relate  the  desired 
event  to  some  remembered  fact,  and  thus  to  hold  it  in  the 
memory  train.  This  is  an  exercise  of  the  higher  function 
of  apperception.  As  we  have  seen  in  considering  the  two- 
fold nature  of  memory,  association  may  be  improved 
both  from  the  physical  and  from  the  mental  side. 

Continuance  of  the  Suggesting  Idea.  It  should  be  re- 
marked that  the  suggesting  idea,  in  a  case  of  association, 
does  not  give  place  entirely  to  the  idea  suggested,  but 
remains  before  consciousness,  at  first  in  a  state  of  passive 
attention,  but  constantly  liable  to  be  again  brought  into 
the  focus  of  apperception.  The  mental  disposition  of 
both  ideas  depends  upon  the  interest  and  value  of  the 
association  in  the  mental  train.  Often  among  many  ideas 
which  follow  a  given  representation,  none  are  fitted  to 
serve  the  purpose  of  the  intelligence,  and  they  are  all 
dismissed  from  consciousness,  only  the  original  being 
held  in  apperception,  and  further  lines  of  suggestion 
started.  And  often  the  contrary  is  the  case  :  the  image 
wished  once  being  suggested,  the  suggesting  idea  is 
allowed  to  fall  into  subconsciousness  and  to  disappear. 
It  is  here,  as  will  appear  later,  that  the  voluntary  element 
of  our  inner  life  is  asserted,  not  only  in  the  outgo  of  the 
energy  of  attention,  but  also  in  the  selective  and  directive 
act  of  choice,  among  possible  chains  of  ideas. 

On  association,  consult :  Porter,  Human  Intellect,  pp.  272-300  ; 
McCosh,  Cog.  Powers,  bk.  2,  ch.  ni  ;  Taine,  Intelligence,  pt.  1,  bk. 
2,  ch.  II;  Wundt,  Physiol.  Psychol.,  ch.  xvi;  Carpenter,  Mental 
Physiol.,  pp.  251-2")9;  Volkmann,  Lehrbuch  d.  Psychol.,  §§  70-79; 


212  ASSOCIATION. 

"Waitz,  Lehrbuch  d.  Psychol.^  §  14;  Drobisch,  PsycJwlogie,  §§  33-41; 
Maudsley,  Physiol,  of  Mind,  ch.  v;  Fortlage,  System  der  Psycho- 
logies §  15;  Sully,  Outlines  of  Psychol.,  ch.  vii;  Strieker,  Studien  iiber 
die  Association ;  Lehmann,  Philosophische  Studien,  v.  1;  (Sugges- 
tion) Richet,  Revue  Philosophique,  xxi.  334  and  (Brochard)  ix.  257; 
Morell,  Outlines,  pt.  8;  Hume,  Treatise  on  Human  Nature,  pt.  1; 
Gratacap,  Theorie  de  la  Me  moire,  ch.  iv-v;  Lipps,  Grundthatsachen 
des  Seelenlehens,  pt.  3;  (especially)  Bradley,  Principles  of  Logic, 
pp.  273-321;  (Psychology  of  association)  Ferri,  La  Psychologie  de 
r association  ;  Lotze,  Metaphysic,  pp.  460-470;  Rabier,  Psychologie, 
ch.  XVI.  For  additional  references,  see  Dewey,  Psychology,  p.  152, 
and  Volkmann,  loc.  cit. ,  Anmerkungen. 

Further  Problems  for  Study  : 

The  "  psychology  of  association;" 
Educational  bearings  of  association; 
Ethical  bearings  of  association. 


CHAPTER  XII. 
IMAGINATION. 

§  1.  Passive  Imagination". 

The  crowning  phase  of  the  imaging  power  of  mind 
is  the  imagination.  It  may  be  understood  in  two  senses. 
First,  imagination  is  often  used  to  denote  the  general 
representative  function  of  mind,  the  power  of  represent- 
ing by  images,  thus  including  memory  and  association, 
as  well  as  the  constructive  working  up  of  images.'  Sec- 
ond, the  word  is  often  more  properly  restricted  to  this 
last  process,  that  whereby  the  material  of  representation 
at  the  disposal  of  the  thinking  subject,  is  combined  in 
forms  of  ideal  construction,  which  are  independent,  in  a 
measure,  of  external  truth.  While  the  latter  is  more 
properly  the  function  which  now  claims  explanation,  it  is 
not  well  to  disregard  the  more  general  phases  of  the 
idealizing  acti-vdty  which  the  broader  definition  has  in 
view,  since  they  precede  its  more  definitive  exercise,  and 
give  the  best  vantage-ground  for  viewing  it. 

Material  of  the  Imagination.  The  material  of  the  im- 
agination, as  of  the  representative  function  generally,  is 
supplied  entirely  by  the  earlier  function  of  acquisition. 
The  imagination  never  creates.  It  serves  only  to  give 
form  to  ideas  revived.  The  data  of  sense  perception  and 
self-consciousness,  understanding  by  the  latter  the  whole 
ground  of  new  experience  in  the  threefold  aspects  of 
mind,  supply  all  its  content.    And  further,  its  material  is 

'  So  the  (pavraaia  of  Aristotle  and  the  (pavTacrriKov  of  the 
Stoics. 

213 


214  IMAGINATION. 

always  representable.  The  products  of  the  higher,  or 
discursive,  operations  are  necessarily  excluded  ;  since  the 
abstract  or  general,  in  the  notion  or  in  thought,  cannot  be 
pictured.  In  brief,  imagination  uses  the  percept  and  not 
the  concept,  as  these  terms  are  distinguished  later. 

Proceeding,  therefore,  to  consider  the  broad  charac- 
teristics of  the  imaging  power,  and  disregarding  the 
more  particular  processes  which  memory  and  associa- 
tion comprise,  we  find  that  general  imagination  is  Pas- 
sive and  Active. 

Passive  Imagination.  By  passive  imagination  is  meant 
the  spontaneous  uncontrolled  play  of  images  in  con- 
sciousness, from  whatever  cause  they  spring,  and  in 
whatever  arrangement  they  take  form.  It  finds  its  sim- 
plest type  in  the  incoherent  forms  of  dream  conscious- 
ness. Here  there  is  no  mental  supervision  of  the  flow 
of  ideas,  no  true  appreciation  of  their  relative  value  for 
the  mental  life,  no  exercise  of  will  in  selecting  or 
combining  them.  The  phj^sical  and  intellectual  causes 
of  their  production  are  free  to  work  their  own  effects, 
and  the  result  is  the  storming  of  consciousness,  in  its 
helpless  state,  with  all  the  missiles  of  sense-acquisition. 

Presuppositions  :  Memory  and  Association.  It  is  read- 
ily seen  that  the  free  play  of  images  proceeds  upon  the 
revival  and  association  of  images.  The  method  of  this 
revival  is  both  physical  and  mental,  and  consists  only  in 
the  wider  range  of  the  dispositions  of  brain  and  mind 
which  have  been  seen  to  lie  at  the  basis  of  memory,  the 
Jioio,  and  association,  the  what,  of  reproduction. 

1.  The  physical  basis  here  presents  its  most  complex 
and  intricate  activity,  as  is  seen  in  the  boundless  combi- 
nations presented.  Indeed,  this  infinite  complexity  and 
irregularity  has  led  many  to  deny  the  dependence  of 
this  power  upon  the  laws  which  ordinarily  govern  repro- 


PASSIVE  IMAGINATION.  215 

diiction.  But  we  have  only  to  consider,  witli  Waitz/  the 
real  nature  of  the  inter-connected  chains  of  cerebral  asso- 
ciation, to  see  that  the  truth  is  what  the  principle  of  the 
unity  of  mind  would  lead  us  to  believe.  Let  us  consider 
the  prevailing  cast  of  a  subject's  consciousness  to  be 
determined  by  an  indefinite  mass  of  systemic,  emotional, 
and  presentative  groups,  which  cover  the  entire  history 
of  the  past,  resting  now  each  in  subconsciousness,  but 
capable,  upon  the  physical  associative  reinstatement  of 
the  conditions  of  its  first  production,  of  asserting  itself, 
in  whole  or  in  part,  above  the  level  of  the  general  pro- 
duct. The  result  will  not  be  the  reproduction  of  long 
connected  series  of  states.  From  the  nature  of  the 
cortical  structure,  the  ramifications  of  nerve  elements 
which  represent  unessential  or  accidental  mental 
modifications,  are  most  readily  excited.  As  mental 
states,  they  are  outside  the  chain  of  ideas,  and  seem 
quite  detached  and  irrelevant ;  but  in  their  physical 
basis,  they  are  reasonable  effects.  And  this  result  is 
indefinitely  multiplied  by  the  combinations  of  different 
cerebral  trains.  The  entire  sensorium  vibrates  with  its 
single  members,  and  surcharged  parts  are  thus  excited 
by  connections  perhaps  too  delicate  and  fine  for  any 
appreciation  on  the  subjective  side.  Thus  images  far 
removed  in  thought  from  one  another  and  never  con- 
sciously connected,  are  thrown  together  in  imagination. 

This  state  of  complete  confusion  in  consciousness  rarely 
extends  over  its  whole  area,  however ;  for  while  we  are  con- 
scious at  all,  there  is  a  greater  or  less  degree  of  mental  super- 
vision. Even  in  dreams,  there  is  a  glamour  of  logical  or  aes- 
thetic consistency  thrown  over  the  most  inconsistent  elements. 
We  think  we  are  making  convincing  arguments  or  reciting 
delicious  stanzas,  when,  awaking,  we  find  it  the  most  mean- 
ingless jargon.  And  in  states  of  light  dreaming,  when  the 
picture  as  a  whole  is  coherent,  new  excitations  of  the  senses 
are  accommodated  to  it. 

'  Lehrbuch  der  Psychologic,  pp.  119  and  fol. 


216  IMAGINATION. 

As  lias  been  said,  dreams  are  tlie  most  evident  type 
of  the  free  play  of  this  physical  causation.  When  we 
are  asleep,  the  active,  distinguishing,  correlating,  and 
arranging  function  of  mind  is  at  rest ;  some  of  the  senses 
are  freely  open  to  excitation  from  without,  and  the  mechan- 
ical element  of  our  personality  is  predominant.  More- 
over, the  withdrawal  of  the  blood  supply  from  the  brain, 
which  is  the  usual  accompaniment  of  a  reduced  con- 
sciousness, tends  to  alter  the  relative  potential  of  its 
j^arts.  It  facilitates  the  discharge  of  isolated  regions,  or 
exposes  elements  whose  ordinary  activity  is  covered  by 
larger  or  more  recent  connections.  As  would  be  ex- 
pected, children  dream  very  little.  They  have  not 
formed  the  physical  tendencies  which  give  to  passive 
consciousness  such  a  spontaneous  complexit}-. 

In  our  waking  states,  also,  we  often  indulge  in  the 
state  of  uncontrolled  representation,  which  passive  imag- 
ination presents.  When  we  relax  all  mental  exertion, 
and  fall  into  revery  or  day-dreams,  this  spontaneous 
flow  of  images  is  realized.  Yet  the  play  of  representa- 
tions is  never  in  our  waking  states  as  detached  and  in- 
coherent as  in  dreams.  We  can  usually  detect,  even  in 
our  states  of  completest  intellectual  abandon,  the  suc- 
cessive connections  in  trains  of  ideas,  governed  by  the 
principles  of  regular  suggestion.  In  cases  of  great  men- 
tal fatigue,  when  the  active  exercise  of  attention  is  no 
longer  possible,  there  remains  still  a  form  of  passive  ap- 
perception, by  which  our  images  are  thrown  into  some 
degree  of  logical  coherence. 

From  the  consideration  of  the  physical  side  of  passive  im- 
agination, we  may  perliaps  explain  the  fact  that  the  pictures 
of  imagination  are  often  much  more  vivid  than  those  of  mem- 
ory. In  the  case  of  the  former  the  active  power  of  mind,  which 
we  have  seen  to  have  a  great  effect  in  heightening  or  depressing 
the  intensity  of  images,  is  wanting.  The  attention  remains 
neutral  to  all  the  images  in  consciousness,  and  the  effects  of 
the  physical  stimulus  appear  in  all  their  value.     In  the  case 


CONDITIONS  OF  PASSIVE  IMAGINATION.  217 

of  active  attention,  however,  the  attention  is  directed  only  to 
those  images  which  are  of  value  for  the  train  then  before  the 
mind  ;  these  are  heightened  in  their  effect,  and  the  others 
fall  into  dim  outline  or  into  entire  unconsciousness. 

2.  TJie  subjective  aspect  of  passive  imagination  is  of 
more  importance  and  of  greater  obscurity  than  its  physi- 
cal basis.  And  yet  its  phenomena  are  in  the  main  con- 
sonant with  the  foregoing  presuppositions.  We  would 
expect  from  the  intricacy  and  confusion  of  the  physical 
network  of  connections  w^hich  imagination  presupposes, 
that  the  mental  facts  would  present  the  same  general 
appearance ;  and  that,  on  the  other  hand,  while,  in  the 
midst  of  this  intricacy,  the  laws  of  dynamic  cerebral  as- 
sociation hold  invariably,  so  in  the  mental  phenomena, 
the  laws  of  association  must  hold  through  all  the  appear- 
ance of  lawless  flow.  The  first  part  of  this  expectation, 
that  the  images  of  imagination  will  show  detached  and 
incoherent  form,  is  certainly  realized  in  fact.  The  most 
striking  characteristic  of  imagination  is  the  strange  and 
wanton  nature  of  its  combinations.  Detached  parts  of 
former  images  are  combined  in  unexpected  and  ridiculous 
forms.  Monsters  before  unknown  are  put  together 
from  earlier  creatures  of  thought.  Situations  are  de- 
vised which  involve  persons  and  places  impossible  to  be 
reached  or  associated  in  real  life. 

But  the  second  aspect  of  the  case,  the  reign  of  the 
laws  of  association  in  the  products  of  imagination,  is  not 
at  all  evident  upon  the  surface,  and  becomes  more  ques- 
tionable in  view  of  the  characteristic  just  mentioned. 
Yet  all  that  we  know  of  the  case  leads  us  to  the  opinion 
that,  here  as  elsewhere,  mental  facts  are  subject  to  men- 
tal laws,  and  that  the  play  of  images  in  imagination  is 
not  fortuitous.' 

1  See  below,  §  3. 


218  -  IMAGINATION. 


§  2.  Modes  of  Passive  Imagination. 

The  process  of  imagination,  in  its  passive  form,  takes 
on  two  general  modes  :  it  first  breaks  up  the  complexes 
of  experience  into  their  elements,  small  or  great,  and 
second,  with  these  elements,  builds  up  new  products. 
These  two  modes  may  be  called,  respectively.  Dissocia- 
tion and  Compositio7i. 

I.  Dissociation.  From  what  has  been  said,  the  part 
played  by  dissociation  is  evident.  If  there  were  no  such 
breaking  up  of  representations,  imagination  would  be 
simply  memory.  The  same  forms  of  mental  process 
would  be  indefinitely  repeated.  Our  mental  life  would 
be  wearisome  in  its  sameness,  except  as  we  widened  the 
range  of  our  actual  sense-experience.  As  a  jorocess,  dis- 
sociation may  be  more  or  less  prominent,  and  its  thor- 
oughness, or  the  contrary,  indicates  the  degree  of  imag- 
inative power  possessed  by  individuals  ;  since  construc- 
tion or  recombination  must  be  limited  to  the  elements  at 
hand.  In  the  process  already  described,  the  ground  or 
reason  of  this  dissociation  may  be  seen. 

1.  It  is  often  due  to  the  breaking  up  of  physical  con- 
nections in  the  brain.  The  fact  of  forgetfulness  or  fad- 
ing of  memory  is  largely  to  be  explained  by  the  separa- 
tion and  dissolution  of  former  dynamic  circuits.  The 
command  of  a  language,  for  example,  which  has  been 
long  neglected,  is  lost  from  inability,  on  the  one  hand,  to 
recall  the  verbal  elements  and,  on  the  other  hand,  from 
inability  to  coordinate  the  movements  of  pronunciation. 
But  single  words  or  letters,  parts  of  former  groups, 
remain  clearly  before  us.  By  the  dropping  away  of 
certain  elements  of  a  complex  whole,  the  others  become 
more  vivid  and  the  result  is  a  more  or  less  complete 
analysis. 

2.  The   same   is   true   of    the   mental   side   of   our 


DISSOCIATION.  219 

memory  :  dissociation  takes  place,  also,  purely  within  the 
range  of  consciousness.  We  found  that  attention,  as  ac- 
tive apperception,  tended  to  arrange  states  in  groups,  and 
also  to  heighten  their  intensity.  Now  not  only  are  en- 
tire groups  thus  acted  upon  variously  by  the  attention, 
giving  different  degrees  of  permanence  in  memory ;  but 
parts  or  elements  of  these  groups  are  also  affected.  Of 
a  long  argument,  I  may  remember  only  a  single  step, 
without  effort.  Of  a  face,  only  the  nose,  perhaps,  or  the 
chin,  is  clear  in  memory.  The  whole  of  a  word  or  sen- 
tence is  often  brought  up  in  memory  from  the  persist- 
ence of  a  single  letter  or  combination,  which  before  at- 
tracted the  attention.  Consequently,  in  the  progressive 
fading  which  all  representation  undergoes,  parts  of 
groups,  or  elements  of  single  images,  fall  away,  while 
other  parts  or  elements  stand  out  alone.  This,  as  before, 
constitutes  a  more  or  less  complete  analysis  of  former 
complexes.  For  example,  in  the  complex  image  we  have 
of  Cffisar,  we  distinguish  the  orator  from  the  general. 
If  we  think  of  the  orator,  association  brings  up  Cicero  : 
but  if  we  have  the  general  in  mind,  Alexander  is  sug- 
gested.' 

3.  Further  than  this,  we  shall  find  in  active  imagina- 
tion a  positive  separation  of  the  parts  of  images,  by  the 
abstracting  and  generalizing  power  of  mind.  We  are 
conscious  of  a  tendency  toward  the  reduction  of  complex 
products  to  their  elements.  We  note  irregularities  in 
outline,  protuberances,  inconsistencies,  and  thus  isolate 
portions  of  our  representations.  This  is  seen  particu- 
larly where  the  association  is  not  a  necessary  one,  and 
the  parts  dissociated  have  a  completeness  and  unitj^  of 
their  own  :  as  the  wings,  legs,  head,  of  a  bird,  consid- 
ered each  for  itself,  or  the  subject,  predicate,  and  copula 
of  a  proposition. 

'  See  Rabier,  Psychologie,  p.  233. 


220  IMAGINATION. 

There  are  few,  if  any,  of  our  mental  concepts,  which  are 
not  subject  to  this  dissociating  process.  And  it  seems  to  rest 
ultimately  upon  the  basis  of  the  unity  of  consciousness,  of 
which  mention  has  been  made.  If  our  percepts  are  put  to- 
gether from  units  by  an  associative  synthesis  which  becomes 
})ermanent  only  by  repetition,  it  is  probable  that  lack  of  rej)e- 
tition  or  a  conflicting  association  would  tend  to  the  separation 
of  these  units.  That  is,  in  brief,  the  elements  which  are  asso- 
ciated are  found  in  all  stages  of  association,  and  as  long  as 
they  do  not  pass  into  unconscious  reflexes,  they  are  available, 
as  elements,  for  new  combinations. 

II.  Composition.  The  analytic  data  of  sense  do  not 
remain  without  form  in  consciousness,  but  are  built  up 
into  new  combinations.  The  forms  of  these  combinations 
are,  as  has  been  said,  apparently  cajDricious  and  without 
law,  esjDecially  in  passive  states,  where  there  is  no  se- 
lective power  concerned  in  their  arrangement.  But  fur- 
ther consideration  leads  us  to  a  different  conclusion. 

§  3.  Laavs  of  Passive  iMAGiXATioisr. 

Contiguity  and  Resemblance.  The  laws  of  passive 
imagination  are,  for  the  reasons  given  below,  the  laws  of 
association '  which  have  already  been  discovered  :  Con- 
tiguity and  Resemblance.  The  principle  of  Correlation 
underlies  the  constructive  imagination. 

1.  Analogy  from  the  physical  basis.  We  have  seen, 
in  speaking  of  the  physical  side  of  imagination,  that  the 
same  apparent  contradiction  presented  itself  there.  There 
are  cerebral  associations,  on  the  one  hand,  giving  a  con- 
stant law  of  molecular  change ;  and,  on  the  other,  unusual 
and  detached  discharges,  which  are  apparently  fortui- 
tous. But  it  was  seen  that  the  latter  really  arises  from 
the  former  fact,  when  viewed  in  its  great  complexity. 
The  same  elements,  being  in  different  connections,  are  ex- 
cited sometimes  in  one  and  sometimes  in  another,  giving 
detached  or  partial  reactions,  different  from  the  serial 

'  Cf.  Kant,  on  Rejyroductive  Imag.,  Anthropologie,  §§  27-33. 


LAWS  OF  IMAGINA'TI02^.  221 

cliaiiges  of  tlieir  former  movement.  So  the  correspond- 
ing mental  modiiications  might  be  expected  to  present 
the  same  phases  :  detached  and  broken  form,  at  the  same 
time,  and  for  the  reason,  that  the  laws  of  suggestion  are 
acting  together  in  their  complexity.' 

2.  Images  combined  in  imagination  are  often  found 
to  he  di7'ectly  associated,  when,  at  first,  they  seemed  quite 
disconnected  in  experience.  A  little  consideration  some- 
times enables  us  to  detect  a  coexistence  or  resemblance 
which  was  at  first  entirely  hidden.  This  simply  means 
that  our  memory  of  things  may  be  more  distinct  than 
our  memory  of  their  relations  to  one  another  :  which  is 
perfectly  reasonable,  since  the  distinctness  of  either  in 
memory  depends  upon  the  degree  of  apperceptive  energy 
expended  upon  it. 

3.  This  position  is  only  an  extension  of  the  assump- 
tion already  made,  that  tJw  laws  of  association  are  gen- 
erally controlling  in  revived  states.  The  facts  of  memory 
require  us  to  suppose  regular  suggestions  in  many  cases 
in  which  the  ground  of  the  association  cannot  be  de- 
tected. 

4.  The  laiv  of  contiguity  affords  boundless  possibilities 
of  variation  in  imagination  from  the  combinations  of 
real  experience.  If  we  admit  the  princijile  that  resem- 
blance occasions  suggestion  by  reason  of  identical  points 
in  the  ideas  connected,  which  points,  by  contiguity,  bring 
up  the  whole  of  the  suggested  image,  no  limit  can  be 
set  to  the  unconscious  play  of  this  principle.  A  slight 
point  of  resemblance  in  any  part  or  aspect  of  mental 
states,  may  serve  to  connect  whole  combinations  in  which 
this  point  occurs,  other  parts  or  points  thus  being  brought 
together  with  no  link  of  resemblance.  The  vaguest  sug- 
gestions of  sameness  in  a  plurality  of  states  may  suffice 
unconsciously  to  connect  them  all  with  one  another, 
and  mth   all  their  parts   respectively.     And   the   same 

'  Cf .  Drobisch,  Empirisclie  Psychologie,  pp.  101-103. 


222  IMAGINATION. 

holds  not  only  of  images  proper,  but  of  the  volitional  and 
emotional  background  in  which  they  lie.  The  same  gen- 
eral state  of  the  system,  on  two  occasions,  may  suffice  to 
connect  their  whole  knowledge  content,  for  future  associ- 
ation. Emotions  experienced  in  connection  with  thought, 
or  events,  or  actions,  may  cause  them  to  suggest  one 
another.  And  of  all  this,  by  necessity,  we  consciously 
know  very  little.  It  is  probable  that  by  far  the  wider 
realm  of  imaginative  activity  lies  outside  the  range  of 
active  consciousness.' 

The  extent  to  which  minor  and  unessential  details  serve, 
through  vague  resemblances,  to  connect  very  different  ideas,  is 
seen  in  language.  Words  often  come  to  our  tongues  which 
are  entirely  out  of  place  in  their  connection,  and  the  only 
reason  we  can  discover  is  a  faint  likeness  in  sound  or  spelling 
to  the  words  we  wish.  Mr.  Lewes  gives  the  following  illus- 
tration :  "Wishing,'^  he  says,  "to  speak  the  name  of  my 
friend  Dr.  Bastian,  I  said  Dr.  Brinton,  and  then  caught  my- 
self about  saying  Dr.  Bridges,  but  finally  succeeded  in  pro- 
nouncing Dr.  Bastian.  1  made  no  mistake  in  regard  to  the 
persons ;  but  the  common  element  in  the  three  names,  the 
letter  B,  served  to  call  up  all  three.  ^^  Mother's  of  several 
children  often  pronounce  the  names  of  three  or  more  of  them 
before  properly  naming  the  one  addressed.  The  resemblance, 
of  course,  is  simply  the  fact  that  they  stand  in  a  common 
relation. 

5.  We  may  also  argue  from  the  fact  noticed  above, 
that  a  state  of  entire  unreasonahleness  and  conftision  is 
never  reached  by  the  imagination.  There  is  a  slight,  or 
sometimes  great,  feeling  of  consistency  and  logical  ar- 
rangement, even  when  the  ideas  suggested  are  most 
heterogeneous ;  and  from  this,  to  com^jlete  selective 
control  of  the  imaging  function,  many  stages  are  possible. 
Even  in  great  fatigue  and  indifference  of  the  attention,  we 
react  upon  unexpected  states  and  endeavor  to  reduce 
them  to  order.  From  this  involuntary  supervision  and 
arranging  of  images  in  consciousness,  according  to  the 

'  Cf.  George,  Lehrbuch  der  Psychology,  p.  276. 


LAWS  OF  IMAGINATION.  223 

laws  of  association,  we  may  argue  the  extension  of  those 
laws  to  cases  of  less  evident  mental  suggestion. 

6.  Finally,  man}^  of  these  associations — assuming 
them  to  be  such — may  be  due  entirely  to  the  continuity  of 
the  physical  process.  Cases  are  at  hand  of  suggestion 
through  the  intervention  of  elements  entirely  uncon- 
scious :  elements  which,  while  physically  perfectly  reg- 
ular in  their  serial  order,  yet  present,  on  the  mental  side, 
breaks  or  gaps  which  we  cannot  fill  in.  Here  the  physi- 
cal links,  too  feeble  perhaps,  in  their  nervous  discharge, 
to  be  accompanied  by  consciousness,  suffice  to  hold  to- 
gether states  that  are  conscious. 

From  the  nature  of  the  case,  it  is  impossible  to  prove  or 
to  disprove  the  reign  of  association  in  imagination.  The 
points  given  above  serve,  at  the  best,  to  show  the  possibility  of 
such  a  supposition,  and,  by  removing  all  considerations  opposed 
in  nature,  to  render  the  assumption  of  a  unity  of  law  through- 
out the  apperceptive  function,  still  more  probable.  The  case 
is  further  strengthened  by  the  lack  of  any  counter  hypothesis. 
To  call  the  imagination  a  separate  activity,  whose  function  it 
is  to  bring  confusion  into  the  mental  life,  is  not  only  to  leave 
it  unexplained,  but  to  raise  a  barrier  to  our  assumption  that 
psychology  is  a  science  at  all.  And  the  value  of  the  position 
here  taken  becomes  more  apparent  as  we  proceed  to  active 
imagination,  where  we  find  the  process  of  construction  more 
conscious,  and  to  a  degree,  under  the  regulation  of  will. 

Principle  of  Preference.  The  facts  of  passive  imagina- 
tion are  probably  explainable,  therefore,  by  the  two  secon- 
dary laws  of  association.  Contiguity  and  Resemblance. 
But  beyond  this,  the  additional  principle  of  association, 
called  above  the  principle  of  Pre/*erewce,' seems  to  play  a 
wide  role  in  determining  the  ivhat  of  imagination.  This  is 
necessarily  true,  if  the  theory  of  imagination  already  ad- 
vocated is  true  ;  for  the  general  background  of  con- 
sciousness, from  which  trains  of  images  emerge,  is  made 
up  of  the  whole  mental  experience  :  impulses,  instincts, 
volitions,  as  well  as  purely  representative  states.     It  is 

'  See  p.  228. 


224  IMAGINATION. 

in  these  elements  that  personality^  character,  and  prefer- 
ence consist.  If  preference  gives  cast  and  character  to 
association,  it  must  influence  imagination,  since  imagi- 
nation proceeds  upon  the  data  of  association. 

The  same  is  true  of  all  the  auxiliary  conditions  of  associ- 
ation, and  the  law  of  preference  is  emphasized  only  because  its 
influence  is  more  marked.  It  becomes  very  prominent  in 
active  imagination,  where  the  fact  of  native  preference  or 
talent  becomes  the  only  means  of  explaining  some  cases,  and 
the  basis  of  the  classification  of  others.  The  subject  is  taken 
up  again  under  that  head  below.  The  preference  here  spoken 
of  carries  with  it  emotional  interest,  since  interest  is  only  the 
expression  of  that  readiness  of  attention,  whose  motive  is  pref- 
erence. Hence  interest,  instead  of  indicating,  in  imagination, 
the  absence  of  association,  as  Dewey  declares, '  is  present  as  an 
influencing  factor  in  all  association. 

§  4.  Fancy. 

The  combining  function  of  passive  imagination, 
viewed  in  its  product,  is  called  fancy.  Fancy  is  the 
familiar  decking  out  of  commonplace  experience  with 
images  brought  from  distant  and  unexjDected  regions. 
Incongruous  elements  are  placed  in  juxtaposition,  gro- 
tesque forms  grow  up  from  most  familiar  elements,  the 
most  extravagant  antitheses,  and  even  contradictions,  are 
allowed  indulgence  in  this  delightful  license  of  thought. 
It  brings  freshness  into  the  midst  of  tedious  processes 
and,  in  its  subtle  refinements,  appeals  directly  to  the 
emotional  and  aesthetic  nature.  The  passive  automatic 
play  of  fancy  is  to  be  emphasized  in  contrast  with  the 
more  purposive  construction  of  active  imagination,  which 
remains  to  be  considered. 

The  student  should  notice  also  the  enlarging  and 
diminishing  functions  of  fancy.  In  addition  to  the  sepa- 
ration and  recombination  of  the  elements  of  our  repre- 
sentation,  it   brings   about   unexpected   and   grotesque 

1  Psychology,  p.  198. 


RELATION  OF  FANCY  TO  REALITY.  225 

alterations  in  tlie  size  of  things.'  Pigmies  and  giants 
are  ordinary  acquaintances  of  our  fancy.  Things  which 
we  fear  or  dread  are  apt  to  be  very  large,  and  things 
which  we  ridicule  or  despise,  very  small.  It  is  probable 
that  this,  as  many  other  aspects  of  the  imagination,  is 
due  largely  to  the  emotional  coloring  of  the  time.  The 
ordinary  correctives  of  reality  and  thought  being  want- 
ing, the  presentative  life  is  at  the  mercy  of  the  emo- 
tional. The  idea  which  calls  the  emotion  forth  accom- 
modates itself  to  the  emotion,  by  way  of  justification 
for  it. 

Relation  of  Fancy  to  Reality.  Passive  imagination  is 
characterized,  throughout,  by  the  absence  of  all  reference 
to  the  real  world.  In  it  the  mind  frees  itself,  as  it  were, 
from  its  accustomed  bondage  to  external  things,  and 
makes  its  universe  entirely  within.  The  truthful  images 
of  memory  are  torn  asunder,  and  built  up  into  forms 
never  realized  in  nature  or  in  sober  thought.  Animals 
are  given  voices,  inanimate  objects  legs,  and  the  world  is 
peopled  with  beings  as  strange  as  rare.  Yet  this  is  true 
only  in  the  nature  of  imagination,  not  in  its  actual  re- 
sults ;  for  in  its  active  forms,  as  we  shall  see,  it  main- 
tains a  constant  though  covert  reference  to  reality  :  and 
even  in  the  most  automatic  play  which  is  ever  realized, 
there  is  slight  supervision  and  correction  from  the  un- 
derlying sense  of  consistency,  beauty,  and  truth.  The 
vague  feeling  of  satisfaction  or  dissatisfaction  which  we 
experience  in  connection  with  our  fancies,  is  due  to  the 
habit  of  comparing  our  mental  states  with  reality,  and 
even  in  dreams,  where  all  such  reference  to  the  external 
world  is  impossible,  we  believe  in  our  visions  as  firmly 
as  in  the  experience  of  our  waking  life. 

The  relation  of  fancy  to  active  imagination  is  taken  up 
later.     It  is  a  vexed  question  and  has  become  so  because  of 

'  See  McCosh,  Cognitive  Powers,  p.  165. 


^26  IMA  am  A  TION. 

the  indefinite  meaning  given  to  both  terms.  Eestrictiug  the 
word  fancy  to  the  meaning  here  given  it,  and  understanding 
by  imagination,  as  opposed  to  fancy,  active  imagination  only, 
the  distinction  between  tliem  is  clear.  As  appears  below, 
their  relation  to  reality  is  an  important  point  of  difference. 

§  5.  Active  oe  Constructive  Imagixation. 

Definition.  The  distinction  between  active  and  pas- 
sive imagination  has  been  in  part  defined.  In  addition 
to  the  processes  described  in  tlie  foregoing,  the  active 
imagination  involves  the  exercise  of  will  in  some  of  its 
forms,  whether  it  be  the  positive  attempt  to  control  the 
images  of  fancy,  or  the  merest  supervision  and  di- 
rection of  their  play.  By  the  word  active,  therefore,  is 
meant  energetic.  Energy  is  expended  in  voluntary  atten- 
tion, in  selective  choice  of  imaginative  material,  and  in 
the  impelling  desire  toward  the  construction  of  a  given 
product.' 

This  distinction  is  already  made  familiar  in  the  cases  of 
attention  and  memory.  Attention  was  found  to  be  passive 
or  reflex,  and  active  or  voluntary,  and  memory  takes  two 
forms,  reminiscence  and  recollection,  according  as  it  is  pas- 
sive or  active.  The  root  of  the  distinction  is  found  in  the 
nature  of  the  exciting  cause  in  each  case.  In  general,  mental 
functions  may  be  called  active  when  they  are  stimulated 
from  withhi,  from  the  potential  subject  itself,  being  accom- 
panied by  a  feeling  of  power  and  accomplishment  :  and  pas- 
sive, when  they  are  stimulated  from  without,  that  is,  from 
organic  or  extraorganic  causes,  being  entirely  free  from  the 
feeling  described." 

The  distinction,  however,  in  this  case,  is  not  an  ab- 
solute one.  The  beginnings  of  mental  supervision,  or  at 
least  the  feeling  of  such  supervision,  is  found  in  the 
most  mechanical  play  of  images.  Yet  we  shall  find  it 
valuable  for  purposes  of  analysis,  as  the  foregoing  sec- 
tions on  passive  imagination  seem  to  assure  us. 

'  On  this  distiuction,  as  depending  upon  desire,  see  Brown,  PMlos. 
of  the  Hum.  Mind,  ii.  p.  135. 

*  See  "Wnndt  on  this  distinction,  Fhys.  Psych.,  2d  ed.,  ii.  331. 


CONSTRUCTIVE  IMAGINATION.  227 

This  phase  of  the  imaging  power  is  further  called 
<:onstructive,  from  the  nature  of  its  product.  In  it  is 
emphasized,  again,  the  intentional  nature  of  the  com- 
pound state  which  is  built  up.  Passive  combination  or 
fancy  is  a  kind  of  construction ;  but  here  we  deal  with 
the  purposive  putting  together  of  elements  for  the 
attainment  of  an  end  of  use  or  beauty.  This  is  the  pro- 
cess of  artistic  and  scientific  construction. 

§  6.    ANALYSIS   OF    CONSTKUCTIVE   IMAGINATION". 

In  analyzing  the  process  of  construction  by  the  im- 
agination, we  proceed  upon  the  account  already  given  of 
the  passive  play  of  images.  That  is,  the  dissociation  of 
the  elements  of  former  ideal  complexes  is  assumed,  and 
their  readiness  to  be  recombined  under  the  control  of 
the  active  part  of  our  nature.  The  analysis,  therefore, 
is  now  restricted  to  this  active  power  itself,  and  its 
modification  of  the  products  of  fancy.  We  may  distin- 
guish four  factors  or  moments  in  the  process  of  con- 
struction :  Natural  Impulse  or  Appetence,  Intention,  Selec- 
tive Attention,  and  Feeling  of  Fitness.  These  may  be 
considered  in  this  order. 

I.  Natural  Impulse  or  Appetence.  It  is  readily  seen, 
that  if  the  automatic  flow  of  images  in  imagination  is  to 
be  modified  from  the  side  of  the  inner  self,  there  must 
be  some  impulsion,  motive,  or  desire  which  leads  to  it. 
An  accidental  modification,  due  to  the  capricious  exercise 
of  will,  would  be  self-defeating,  and  would  secure  no 
systematic  construction  whatever.  There  must  be  some 
end  in  view,  however  vague ;  and  a  natural  tendency 
toward  it,  an  attraction  or  the  contrary.  In  considering 
the  nature  of  emotion  in  a  later  chapter,  certain  original 
tendencies  of  our  active  self  toward  or  from  certain  ends 
or  actions  will  become  apparent.  Leaving  till  then  all 
further  discussion  of  their  nature,  we  simply  note  here, 


228  IMAGINATION. 

that  all  exercise  of  will  springs  from  these  appetences^ 
and  that  the  intelligent  exercise  of  will  always  has  in^ 
view,  as  its  end,  objects  which  arouse  the  appetences. 
Among  these  "  springs  of  action"  may  be  mentioned, 
love  of  pleasure  and  aversion  to  pain,  the  natural  affec- 
tions, love  of  the  beautiful  and  the  right ;  princijDles. 
which  are  common  to  all  men  in  some  degree,  but  which 
vary  in  force  within  very  wide  limits  in  individuals. 
Any  or  all  of  such  principles,  which  are  strong  enough 
in  the  individual  to  lead  to  action,  or  to  give  cast  to  the 
emotional  life,  may  serve  as  basis  for  imaginative  con- 
struction. If  we  are  led  to  hope  for  the  accomj^lish- 
ment  of  a  desire,  we  picture  ceaselessly  the  actual  attain- 
ment of  it,  ourselves  enjoying  its  benefits,  and  our  enemies 
discomfited.  Nothing  is  allowed  in  the  scene  which  does 
not  increase  the  pleasure,  adverse  elements,  even  whea 
known  to  be  real,  being  discarded.  SimjDly  on  the 
ground  of  strong  desire — of  praise,  money,  truth — the 
images  of  imagination  are  constructed,  built  up  into  a. 
consistent  whole.  Principal,  however,  among  the  ap- 
petences which  are  predominating  in  the  imagination, 
are  the  Love  of  the  beautiful,  and  the  Love  of  truth,  or  the 
desire  for  knowledge.  These  lie  at  the  basis  of  the 
general  kinds  of  constructive  imagination,  later  designated 
Esthetic  and  Scientific. 

Law  of  Native  Talent  or  Preference.  The  law  of  pref- 
erence which  has  already  been  sjjoken  of  enters  here, 
and  finds  in  the  "  springs  of  action"  its  adequate  explana- 
tion. In  different  individuals,  different  prevailing  temper 
and  taste  appear,  which  are  so  pronounced,  that  great 
classes  of  men  can  be  separated  from  one  another  on  this 
principle  of  classification.  The  fundamental  differences 
of  temperament — as  sanguine,  melancholic,  etc. — depend 
upon  the  sum  or  general  tendency  of  these  motive  prin- 
ciples.    And  the  popular  distinctions  of   character,  as 


ANALYSIS  OF  CONSTRUCTIVE  IMAGINATION.      229 

avaricious,  selfish,  religious,  social,  point  to  the  prevail- 
ing intensity  of  some  one  or  more  of  the  appetences. 

II.  Intention.  This  permanent  preference  in  charac- 
ter leads  to  desire,  as  permanent  and  controlling,  to  ac- 
complish something  in  the  line  of  its  activity.  And  the 
entire  life,  if  circumstances  do  not  prevent  its  satisfac- 
tion, is  moulded  with  this  end  in  view.  Professions  are 
chosen,  associations  formed,  pleasures  indulged  in,  all  of 
which  both  satisfy  this  permanent  desire  and  strengthen 
it.  This  may  be  called  Intention.  Intention,  as  shall  be 
seen  in  the  part  devoted  to  the  volitional  life,  is  a  form 
of  active  readiness  or  consent,  permanent  in  its  kind, 
and  needing  only  occasion  or  opportunity  to  flow  forth 
into  action.  The  scientific  man  has  a  constant  impulse 
or  intention  towards  the  objects  of  his  science.  It  has 
become  to  him  the  chosen  channel  for  the  expenditure 
of  his  intellectual  energy.  The  artist  likewise  finds  his 
whole  life  devoted  to  the  pursuit  of  the  forms  which 
gratify  his  gesthetic  nature.  His  consciousness  is  filled 
with  images  of  the  beautiful,  and  his  intention  is  so  spon- 
taneous, that  volition  follows,  on  occasion,  automatically. 

The  factors  which  have  been  called  Appetence  and  Inten- 
tion serve  for  a  preparation  on  the  emotional  side,  as  the  laws  of 
reproduction  serve,  on  the  intellectual  side.  The  modification 
of  passive  imagination,  which  we  are  seeking  to  explain,  finds 
here  its  necessary  basis.  The  impulse  to  action  presses  for- 
ward in  channels  of  lasting  intention,  and  has  only  to  be  fed 
by  images,  as  they  enter  consciousness  by  association,  to  produce 
forms  of  construction.  The  product  is  yet,  however,  incom- 
plete ;  since  the  controlling  elements  are  hidden  in  the  depths 
of  character,  and  act  without  conscious  oversight.  Such  con- 
struction can  be  called  active  only  in  the  sense  that  it  arises 
from  past  action;  that  is,  from  "fixed  tendencies  induced  by 
earlier  volition.  The  essential  factor,  tlierefore,  of  true 
imaginative  construction,  remains  yet  to  be  named. 

Though  this  is  true,  yet  we  find  that  here,  as  with  the 
earlier  intellectual  functions,  there  is  a  tendency  toward  the 
mechanical  activity  of  the  process  of  construction,  through 


280  IMAGINATION. 

habit.  After  much  familiarity  with  the  details  and  means 
involved  in  certain  classes  of  constructions,  as  inventions, 
works  of  art,  the  product  comes  complete  to  consciousness 
with  no  attention  whatever,  or  expectation.  As  has  been  said 
by  Wundt,  it  comes  "•  like  a  flash  of  lightning."  And  the  re- 
sult is  as  great  as  would  have  been  accomplished  by  tiresome 
constructive  etfort.  This  is  only  the  case,  however,  after  the 
mind  has  grown  accustomed  to  the  putting  together  of  its 
images  voluntarily,  and  is  rich  in  appropriate  material.  ■  It 
then  dispenses  with  the  will,  as  the  body  does  when  its  dy- 
namic connections  have  become  powerful.  For  this  reason, 
as  Volkmann  '  remarks,  educated  men  narrate  events  in  a 
reasonable  or  constructive  way,  as  compared  with  the  illiter- 
ate. They  leave  out  unimportant  details,  construe  missing 
parts,  and  construct  a  consistent  picture  of  the  whole.  Here 
is  a  selective  and  arranging  imagination  at  work  unconsciously. 
The  peasant  tells  things  in  dry  detail,  just  as  they  happen. 

III.  Selective  Attention.'  We  now  reach  the  powder 
which  controls  the  constructions  of  imagination,  the  at- 
tention. Presupposing  the  native  preferences  and  ten- 
dencies which  have  been  spoken  of — summed  up,  in  the 
phrase  of  Professor  James,  as  "  the  idiosyncrasies  of 
interest," — the  will,  in  attention,  builds  up  images,  which 
meet  its  purpose,  into  forms  of  novelty  and  beauty.  The 
attention  is  given  to  reproductions  with  this  construc- 
tion in  view.  The  scientist  or  artist  views  his  ideas 
as  so  much  material,  to  be  directly  used  for  the  purpose 
of  his  science  or  art,  and  each  image  in  turn  is  scru- 
tinized, alone  and  with  its  escort,  to  discover  the  possi- 
bilities of  combination  which  lie  inherent  in  it.  Images 
which  do  not  present  promise  of  usefulness  in  the  con- 
struction are  withdrawn  from  attention  and  fade  away ; 
others  which  fit  into  the  growing  temple  of  imagination 
are  changed,  divided,  refined,  combined,  and  cast  into 
complete  form,  in  the  relating  function  of  apperception. 

The  psychological  value  of  this  phase  of  the  imagina- 
tion, consists  in  the  prolonged  and  concentrated  mental 

'  Lehrbuch  der  Psychologie,  i.  p.  481. 
'^  Rabier,  Psychologie,  p.  231. 


ANALYSIS  OF  CONSTRUCTIVE  IMAGINATION.     231 

reaction  whicli  it  involves :  wliat  Newton  has  called 
"patient  thought."  Surface  analogies  are  seen  by  the 
common  mind,  and  need  no  efibrt  of  construction ;  but 
the  hidden  properties,  the  relations  which  spread  wide 
out  through  nature  and  art — these  are  discovered  only 
when  the  veils  that  conceal  them  are  pierced  by  the 
power  of  constructive  thought.  Every  scientific  hy- 
pothesis is  such  a  piece  of  construction.  Only  the  prop- 
erties of  the  matter  in  hand  are  taken  which,  by  the 
selective  attention,  can  be  arranged  in  a  logical  frame- 
work, to  be  tested  by  further  appeal  to  fact.  Causes  are 
imagined  to  be  working  alone,  although  never  so  found, 
and  their  effects  constructed.  "  So  Newton  saw  the 
planet  falling  into  the  sun,  a  thing  that  did  not  take 
place,  but  which  would  take  place  if  the  tangential 
force  were  suppressed."  ' 

The  attention,  therefore,  in  imagination,  has  a  two- 
fold part.  First,  it  is  Exclusive,  that  is,  it  excludes  rep- 
resentations which  have  no  meaning  for  the  task  in  hand. 
This  is  not  a  positive  banishment  from  consciousness, 
since  that  is  impossible.  The  efibrt  to  banish  an  idea 
only  makes  it  more  vivid,  while  the  attention  is  held 
fixed  upon  it.  But  it  consists  in  the  neglect  of  this 
particular  idea,  as  unsuited  to  the  purpose  of  pres- 
ent pursuit.  Thus  withdrawn  from  attention,  an  image 
sinks  into  subconsciousness  and  is  practically  banished. 
Second,  it  is  Selective  ;  apperception  and  consequent  em- 
phasis, of  the  image  made  use  of,  follow  upon  its  selection. 

The  result,  therefore,  is  a  product  of  apperception : 
since  the  construction  of  imagination  is  strictly  analo- 
gous to  the  construction  of  the  external  world  in  sense- 
perception.  In  the  latter  case,  objects  and  relations  are 
forced  into  consciousness  to  be  arranged,  coordinated, 
reconstructed,  by  the  apperceiving  function.     Here  the 

1  Rabier.  luc.  cit.  p.  233. 


232  IMA  OINA  TION. 

data  are  supplied  from  the  dissolution  of  former  apper- 
ceptive syutheses,  by  a  selective  principle,  only  to  be  re- 
combined  by  a  second  apperception.  In  tlie  first  con- 
struction, reality  is  the  corrective  and  guide :  it  is  only 
after  repeated  experiences,  that  our  synthetic  wholes  in 
perception  are  made  correct.  Here,  in  imagination,  this 
corrective  is  wanting ;  but  its  place  is  supplied  by  the 
critical  selection  of  the  attention.  If  a  combination  passes 
the  scrutiny  of  the  attention,  it  stands  in  imagination. 

This  last  distinction  is  not  fully  true  for  all  iinagiuative 
constructions.  In  the  scientific  imagination,  appeal  is  also 
made  to  nature  for  confirmation.  In  this  case,  the  analogy 
with  synthetic  sense-perception  is  even  closer,  as  is  seen  later. 
If,  further,  the  process  be  in  its  intimate  nature  apperception, 
the  result  cannot  be,  in  any  sense,  "  fictitious  and  arbitrary.''  ^ 

lY.  Feeling  of  Fitness.  It  must  have  become  e^ddent, 
that  this  selection  of  images  by  the  attention,  proceeds 
upon  some  principle.  There  must  be  some  criterion  of 
choice,  something  either  in  the  images  themselves  or  in 
the  end  which  they  are  to  subserve,  which  renders  some 
available  and  others  useless.  The  perception  of  this  fit- 
ness requires  in  general  two  things. 

1.  An  end  or  purpose  held  in  conscious  thought,  which 
is  to  be  realized  by  construction.  It  is  readily  seen 
that  this  must  be  involved  in  the  active  as  distinguished 
from  the  passive  imagination,  since  the  volitional  addi- 
tion in  the  former  case  proceeds  by  motives,  and  a  mo- 
tive is  the  consideration  of  an  end.  That  is,  the  will  is 
exerted  only  for  the  accomplishment  of  something  which 
is  presented  as  an  idea.  This  end  or  ideal  aim,  as  shall 
be  seen  in  considering  the  aesthetic  imagination,  may  be 
the  vaguest  and  most  general  notion,  having  only  the 
characteristics  of  the  general  class  to  which  it  belongs. 
An  artist  desires  to  make  something  beautiful,  or  some- 

'  Abercrorabie. 


ANALYSIS  OF  CONSTRUCTIVE  IMAGINATION.     233 

thing  expressive,  an  inventor,  something  useful.  They 
begin,  with  this  vague  thought,  to  select  their  images. 
And  as  the  construction  proceeds,  it  is  as  new  to  them 
as  to  others,  and  satisfies  them,  if  it  meet  the  general  re- 
quirement of  their  first  thought.  Later  in  the  growing 
process,  the  end  becomes  more  definite,  as  the  possibili- 
ties of  the  creation  become  evident.  The  artist  then 
projects  lines  of  possible  combination,  to  be  filled  in  by 
actual  representations.  To  use  the  figure  of  George, 
this  hypothetical  advance  of  the  scientific  imagination  is 
like  a  net,  thrown  over  the  objects  of  consideration  at 
the  moment,  its  lines  marking  out  the  path  of  future 
discovery.' 

Not  only  is  this  vagueness  of  the  end,  in  imaginative  con- 
struction, empirically  noticeable,  but  it  is  necessarily  so,  a 
priori.  For,  as  Brown  well  maintains,  it  is  "absurd  to  sup- 
pose that  we  can  will  the  existence  of  any  particular  idea; 
since  this  would  be  either  to  will  without  knowing  what  we 
willed,  which  is  absurd — or  to  know  already  what  we  willed  to 
know,  which  is  not  less  absurd.""  If  I  willed  a  particular 
compound,  I  must  have  already  conceived  that  compound, 
which  relieves  me  of  the  necessity  of  willing  it.  There  can 
he  no  doubt,  however,  that  the  first  conception,  particularly 
in  a  work  of  art,  is  brought  about  by  the  evident  fitness  of 
some  present  images  for  further  construction;  and  that  they 
suggest  more  or  less  definitelv  to  consciousness  the  nature  of 
the  product  to  be  realized.  The  end  itself,  then,  coiistantly 
changes,  broadening  and  deepening,  as  the  ideal  construction 
takes  form.  It  is  true,  also,  that  the  products  of  passive  im- 
agination often  suggest  combinations  and  conceptions  which 
serve  as  ideals  or  ends  in  the  voluntary  selection  of  images. 

2.  Feeling  of  adaptation  to  this  end.  It  is  only  neces- 
sary at  this  point  to  show  the  presence  of  such  a  feeling, 
not  to  discuss  its  nature  or  origin.  It  seems  to  consist 
in  a  sense  of  the  adaptation  of  means  to  end.  Only  by 
it,  is  the  exclusive  and  selective  attention  guided  in  its 

1  George,  LeJiriucTi,  pp.  276-377. 
*  Philosophy,  II.  p.  126. 


234  IMAGINATION. 

choice  of  elements.  As  a  feeling,  it  extends  throughout 
our  entire  mental  and  active  life.  We  pass  involuntary 
judgment  on  the  fitness  of  an  instrument  for  its  use  of 
the  material  for  a  garment,  of  an  officer  for  his  office. 

This  feeling,  in  its  variations  in  individuals,  is  in 
large  part  the  basis  of  artistic  talent.  The  general  pro- 
portions of  things,  the  relative  value  of  details,  the  har- 
mony of  discordant  meanings,  the  reduction  of  varied 
elements  to  a  fundamental  motive— these  and  many  other 
problems  of  the  artist,  call  this  feeling  prominently  into 
play.  He  says  :  "  I  know  not  why,  but  I  feel  that  it 
must  be  so."  Some  men  are  almost  destitute  of  such  a 
sense.  They  shoAv  its  lack  in  the  absence  of  personal 
and  room  adornment,  in  incongruous  and  peculiar  ac- 
tions— actions  inappropriate  to  the  circumstances.  This 
lack  may  be  summed  up  concisely  as  either  the  want  of 
constructive  imagination,  or  the  want  of  the  sense  of  fit- 
ness in  selecting  its  material.' 

§  7.  KiKDS  OF  Constructive  Imagination". 

Finished  Imagination.  We  are  now  prepared  to  gain 
a  view  of  the  entire  process  of  imagination,  looked  at,  not 
as  the  union  of  these  sej)arate  activities  or  factors,  but 
as  what  it  appears  at  first  sight  to  be,  a  single  function 
of  mind.  Under  the  action  of  the  emotional  and  intel- 
lectual elements  considered,  it  gives  forth  its  results  as 
reapperceptions  of  the  data  of  sense.  The  final  con- 
structive product  is  a  true  mental  unity  or  picture,  Mdiich 
has  its  own  significance  for  the  mind,  apart  from  its  ele- 
ments. This  significance  is  an  ideal  meaning,  which 
possesses  general  interest,  and  appeals  to  man  universal- 
ly. Considering  the  subject-matter  of  the  imagination 
and  the  relation  which  its  constructions  bear  to  the  world, 

'  The  further  discussion  of  this  sense  of  fitness,  as  feeling,  is  re- 
served for  the  treatment  of  the  aesthetic  emotions. 


SCIENTIFIC  IMAGINATION.  235 

two  general  forms  may  be  distinguished :  the  Scientific 
and  the  Esthetic  imagination. 

I.  Scientific  Imagination.  The  scientific  or  acquisi- 
tive imagination  is  the  imagination  occuj^ied  with  the 
discovery  of  truth.  At  first  sight,  it  appears  true  that 
the  constructions  of  this  faculty  have  no  value  for 
knowledge,  and  that  intellect  only  suffers  from  its 
exercise.  But  we  find  that  the  imagination  is  the  pro- 
phetic forerunner  of  almost  all  great  scientific  discover- 
ies. The  mental  factors  seen  to  underlie  all  imaginative 
construction,  are  here  called  into  play  in  a  highly  exag- 
gerated way.  The  associative  material  presented  covers, 
generally,  the  whole  area  of  the  data  of  the  scientific 
branch  in  hand  :  familiarity  with  the  principles  and  lav/s 
already  discovered  is  assumed,  and,  in  general,  a  condi- 
tion of  mental  saturation  with  the  subject.  For  this 
reason,  we  look  to  scientific  specialists  for  new  truths 
and  hypotheses,  and  have  no  ear  for  the  vagaries  of  the 
dilettante  and  amateur.  Native  taste  or  preference  is  also 
here  highly  significant.  There  is  as  distinctly  a  scientific 
genius  as  there  is  an  artistic  genius.  Great  discoverers 
in  science  have  a  facility  in  discovering  deep-seated  an- 
alogies and  relations,'  an  appetence  for  positive  truth,  a 
tendency  to  accept  only  the  confirmed  deliverances  of 
nature  herself.  They  generally  are  men  of  great  emo- 
tional soberness  and  intellectual  enthusiasm,  if  the  an- 
tithesis be  allowed.  Further  than  this,  their  imaginative 
process  is  largel}'  under  control.  This  is  no  doubt  the 
great  essential ;  the  preponderating  force  of  the  exclu- 
sive and  selective  attention.    Not  onh^  do  great  scientists 


*  "The  discovery  of  a  new  law.'*  says  Helmholtz,  "  is  the  discovery 
of  an  analogy  in  the  chain  of  tlie  phenomena  of  nature  which  has 
remained  before  unknown  To  find  new  ideas,  it  does  not  suffice  to 
gather  superficial  analogies,  but  we  must  penetrate  profoundly  into  the 
texture  of  the  whole." 


236  .  IMAGINATION. 

see  deeply,  but  they  are  able,  from  an  exquisite  sense  of 
relative  values  in  nature,  and  of  relative  lituess  in  fact,  to 
dissect,  arrange,  and  classify,  until  from  a  few  great  gen- 
eral resemblances,  tlie  construction  of  a  law  is  possible. 
And  it  is  only  by  this  force  of  relating  attention,  or  ap- 
perception, that  the  actual  law  is  finally  constructed.  A 
minor  scientist  may  collect  data  and  draw  from  them 
generic  resemblances,  but,  ^\dtli  all  his  study  and  effort, 
he  does  not  construct.  The  trained,  refined,  and  nature- 
given  constructive  force  of  attention  alone  does  this. 

The  absence  of  the  strict  emotional  element  is  to  be  noted 
here,  as  its  presence  is  remarked  iu  tlie  esthetic  imagination. 
Emotional  excitement  of  any  kind  tends  to  disturb  a  calm 
view  and  deliberate  comparison  of  facts.  Even  what  we  have 
called  the  intellectual  entliusiasm  of  an  investigator — an  emo- 
tion called  intellectual,  since  it  arises  from  the  free  play  of  the 
discursive  faculty — sometimes  leads  him  to  immature  infer- 
ences or  false  observations. 

Relation  of  Scientific  Imagination  to  Reality :  Scien- 
tiSe  Hypotheses.  This  form  of  imagination  has  also  been 
called  acquisitive,  and  therein  it  is  jjlain  that  it  has 
direct  reference  to  our  knowledge  of  the  world  and 
things.  It  differs  in  this,  both  from  the  passive  exercise 
of  the  imaging  power,  which  has  no  guide  but  interest 
and  preference,  and  from  the  aesthetic,  whose  end  is 
pleasure  in  an  ideal,  which  is  not  realized  in  nature. 
The  end  of  the  scientific  imagination  is  truth  and  its 
impelling  motive,  love  of  truth.  For  this  reason,  the 
corrective  reality  which  is  wanting  in  the  other  cases,  re- 
turns here  in  its  full  import.  The  data  of  this  form  of 
imagination  are  true  images,  the  elements  of  knowledge. 
Its  constructions  are  logical  processes,  through  which 
further  truths  may  be  anticipated  by  inference  ;  and  its 
anticipations  are  worthless,  unless  they  stand  an  exhaust- 
ive comparison  with  nature's  phenomena,  and  by  it  re- 
ceive confirmation.  The  purpose  of  scientific  imagina- 
tion then  is  utility,  not  pleasure. 


SCIENTIFIC  HYPOTHESES.  237 

The  form  of  all  sucli  anticipations  of  nature  is  liypo- 
tlietical.  There  remains  in  consciousness,  with  it  all,  the 
feeling  that  the  product  is  subjective,  a  creation  of  mind 
and  an  eager  desire  to  test  its  actual  truth.  The  con- 
structions, therefore,  of  the  scientific  imagination  are 
called  hypotheses.  They  carry  various  degrees  of  proba- 
bility, both  subjective  and  objective.  By  subjective 
probability  is  meant  the  amount  of  belief  which  we  our- 
selves attach  to  our  constructions.  Often  the  data  are 
so  well  understood  and  the  process  of  construction  so 
conscious,  that  our  belief  amounts  to  psychological  cer- 
tainty.' 

The  element  of  reality,  or  truth,  is  further  secured  to 
these  imaginations,  by  the  exact  logical  nature  of  the 
form  into  which  the  data  are  thrown,  another  character- 
istic distinction  from  the  sesthetic  imagination.  Every 
stage  in  the  growth  of  the  conception  must  be  logically 
valid.  The  laws  of  contradiction,  cause,  inference,  are 
duly  observed  in  the  control  by  the  selective  attention  : 
and  when  this  is  the  case,  the  mind  rests  in  the  product 
with  satisfaction.  So,  for  example,  Newton  constructed 
the  successive  conceptions  of  his  great  discover}^,  build- 
ing each  upon  correct  inference,  and  after  its  direct  con- 
firmation, using  this  inference  again,  in  the  construction 
of  a  broader  generalization.  The  violation  of  any  logical 
principle  at  either  stage  in  the  argument  would  have 
vitiated  the  whole.'' 

In  most  cases,  the  beginning  of  discovery  is  notliing  more 
than  a  conjecture,  a  happy  supposition.  The  mind  at  once 
begins  to  search  for  means  of  testing  it,  which  itself  involves 
the  imagination  of  new  material  dispositions.  Tliese  tests  are 
made  more  and  more  rigid,  if  successful,  until  the  crucial 
test,  as  it  is  called,  is  reached,  which  either  confirms  or  dis- 
proves the  hypothesis.     As  already  said,  it  is,  in  most  casj^s, 

'  For  the  discussion  of  the  general  question  of  our  belief  in  images, 
see  the  chapter  on  Illusions  (XIII). 
*  Cf .  Porter,  Human  Intellect,  §  364. 


238  IMAGINATION. 

the  previous  qualification  of  the  inquirer  which  gives  his  con- 
jecture probability.  The  means  of  confirmation  or  testing 
are  usually  experimental,  resting  upon  the  logical  method  of 
difference.  ^ 

As  far  as  the  construction  of  hypotheses  is  a  necessary  out- 
come of  logical  procedure,  the  result  has  a  universal  cast,  that 
is,  it  is  necessarily  true.  We  find,  later,  that  the  gesthetic 
imagination  is  characterized  by  a  more  marked  universality 
of  form.  It  is  the  outcome  of  subjective  feelings  which 
are  general,  resting  upon  common  psychological  cognitions 
of  the  beautiful.  The  external  confirmation  of  truth,  which 
alone  serves  to  establish  the  true  validity  of  the  scientific  con- 
struction, is,  in  this  aspect,  a  point  of  union  between  the  two 
forms  of  imagination.  It  is  the  true  aim  of  both  to  be  of  uni- 
versal import:  gesthetic  construction  attains  it  by  inward  feel- 
ings of  beauty;  scientific  construction  attains  it  by  reference 
to  fact. 

II.  Esthetic  Imagination.  The  aesthetic  imagination 
differs  from  the  scientific,  especially,  in  the  end  toward 
which  the  constructive  process  tends.  Assuming  the 
same  factors  or  stages  in  its  development,  the  difference 
is  seen  in  the  fact  that  the  end  is  no  longer  knowledge, 
but  beauty.  The  selective  attention,  therefore,  in  this 
case,  singles  out  elements  which  satisfy  the  sense  of  the 
beautiful,  wdiether  or  not  its  construction  is  realizable 
in  the  combinations  of  fact.  What  it  is  that  constitutes 
the  beautiful  is  to  be  spoken  of  later.^  Among  the  gen- 
eral relations  which  are  called  beautiful,  are  symmetry, 
harmony,  unity  in  variety;  representative  materials  which 
promise  these  aesthetic  combinations  are  taken  up  and 
thrown  into  forms  of  construction. 

Several  empirical  features  of  such  mental  composi- 
tions may  be  remarked.  First,  the  aesthetic  imagination, 
as  James  Mill  observes,'  is  accompanied  by  a  lively  play 

^  See  Mill,  System  of  Logic,  p.  280.  In  sketcliing  this  general  process 
of  discovery,  we  do  not  overlook  cases  of  discovery  by  liappy  accident, 
pure  experiment,  etc. 

^  Treated  in  connection  with  the  aesthetic  feelings. 

^  Analysis,  vol.  i.  p.  181;  quoted  by  Bain. 


.ESTHETIC  IMAGINATION.  239 

of  pleasurable  excitement,  which  continues  throughout 
the  continuance  of  the  constructive  work.  It  receives 
great  reinforcement  or  decrease,  according  as  the  con- 
ception is  skilfully  or  poorly  worked  out.  The  emo- 
tional life  is  more  intimately  concerned  than  in  scien- 
tific construction,  and  instead  of  disturbing,  it  greatly 
assists  the  operation.  The  forms  of  esthetic  construc- 
tion are  also  more  instantaneous  and  inexplicable,  for 
the  reason  that  they  arise  from  an  emotional  stimulus, 
and  have  no  logical  and,  often,  no  conscious  develop- 
ment. Great  artists  are  usually  men  of  strong  emo- 
tional temperament,  and  frequently  show  a  corresponding 
lack  of  high  practical  and  theoretical  judgment.  Their 
conceptions  take  shape  spontaneously,  with  little  selec- 
tion of  elements,  or  conscious  blending ;  and  when 
once  satisfactorily  executed,  they  are  unwilling  to  admit 
modification  except  in  unimportant  details.  Further, 
the  corrective  standard  of  reference  is  now  not  reality, 
but  an  ideal  of  universal  acceptance — a  form  not  found 
in  nature,  but  of  which  nature  in  her  perfect  working 
would  be  capable.  Of  course,  the  conception  itself  is 
the  artist's  ideal,  the  most  perfect  copy  of  a  thing,  or 
the  most  beautiful  variation  of  a  thing,  Avhich  he  can 
conceive  :  but  this  imagination  is  a  work  of  art,  only  as 
it  embodies  what  is  common  to  all  ideals  of  the  class, 
and  is  pronounced  beautiful  by  all  cultivated  tastes. 

The  question  as  to  the  true  province  of  art,  imitation  or 
construction,  as  the  two  great  theories,  realism  and  idealism 
respectively,  announce  it,  cannot  be  long  unsolved  from  a 
standpoint  of  the  psychology  of  ideals.  If  art  is  the  produc- 
tion of  the  imagination  at  all,  its  ideals  are  imaginative  con- 
structions, not  natural  facts.  The  act  of  putting  a  concep- 
tion in  oil  or  marble  is  not  the  artist's  part — a  machine  might 
do  it  better.  The  art  value  is  entirely  the  conception.  The 
execution  is  only  the  more  or  less  adequate  means  of  expres- 
sion. If  imitation,  therefore,  be  the  whole  of  art,  execution 
can  be  better  left  to  the  camera  and  the  death-mask.  There 
is  no  reason  that  esthetic  ideals  should  not  surpass  nature  as 


240  IMAGINATION. 

much  as  the  forms  of  practical  invention  surpass  her  rude 
contrivances  for  using  her  own  forces.  Nature  never  con- 
structs a  phonograph,  just  as  she  never  puts  human  thouglit 
and  aspiration  into  simple  color  and  form. 


§   8.    EeLATIOK   of   lMAGIN"ATIO]Sr   TO    THOUGHT. 

The  old  opinion  that  imagination  is  opposed  to  the 
proper  exercise  of  the  severer  processes  of  thought,  is 
giving  place  to  a  more  discriminating  view.  It  is  true 
that,  in  so  far  as  imagination  proceeds  by  preferences, 
and  constructs  under  the  leading  thread  of  emotion,  the 
exact  processes  of  logic  may  be  interfered  with,  as  reality 
is  left  and  fancy  indulged.  Yet  when  held  in  proper  re- 
straint, imagination  reinforces  and  assists  the  operations 
of  thinking ;  and  this  in  several  ways. 

1.  By  the  dissociation  which  the  imagination  occa- 
sions, the  elements  of  knowledge  are  broken  up,  and  made 
mobile  and  disposable  for  the  elaborative  function.' 

2.  In  the  earlier  forms  of  knowledge  which  are  neces- 
sary to  abstract  thinking,  the  imagination  plays  an  impor- 
tant role.  In  all  acquired  jDerception,  the  imagination 
goes  further  than  actual  cognition :  as  in  the  estimation 
of  distance  by  the  eye,  the  filling  in  of  the  blind  spot  in 
the  retinal  field,  the  reconstruction  of  images  in  all  cases 
of  illusions  of  sense."  So  also  sensations  and  emotions 
are  more  or  less  under  the  direct  influence  of  imagination, 
vague  suggestions  of  pain  are  constructed  into  forms  of 
localized  disease,  and  new  symptoms  are  imagined  and 
believed.  All  sorts  of  emotions  may  be  aroused  by  im- 
aginative imitation,  until  they  become  actual  in  con- 
sciousness. Likewise,  also,  general  and  abstract  concepts 
owe  their  validity  to  the  imagination  ;  since  they  sum  up 
resemblances  in  an  entire  series  of  objects  or  events, 

>  Volkmann,  loc.  cit.,  i.  483  and  fol. ;  also  see  Spencer,  Princ.  of 
Psychology,  ii,  p.  534. 

"^  George,  loc.  cit.  pp.  375  and  378. 


RELATION  OF  IMAGINATION  TO   THOUGHT.       241 

when  experience  is  limited  to  but  few.  And  universal 
propositions  require  the  same  kind  of  constructive  pic- 
turing. Every  departure  from  experience,  in  short,  rests 
in  imagination. 

3.  In  the  apperceptive  act  the  two  functions  are  es- 
sentially one.  Passive  imagination  presents  the  same 
ground  for  imaginative  construction  that  the  arena 
of  nature  does  for  synthetic  presentation.  Hence  the 
breadth  of  objective  knowledge  may  be  and  is,  as  has  been 
seen  in  scientific  imagination,  greatly  increased  through 
the  imaginative  function  of  apperception^  This  fundamen- 
tal oneness  is  insisted  on  by  Wundt,  though  we  cannot  go 
his  length  in  asserting  an  absolute  oneness  of  process '  : 
since  the  complete  necessity  of  the  logical  chain,  as  it 
holds  in  correct  thought,  is  done  away  with  by  the  per- 
sonal element  involved  in  construction  by  imagination. 

In  contrast  with  the  points  of  similarity  which  have 
been  indicated  between  these  two  functions,  a  point  of 
essential  difference  is  noteworthy.  It  resides  in  the  ma- 
terial which  they  use  respectively.  As  has  been  said, 
the  imagination  deals  with  the  representable  material  of 
the  acquisitive  function,  the  percept,  that  which  may  be 
pictured.  In  thought,  on  the  other  hand,  we  deal  with 
the  abstract  and  general  notion  ;  we  proceed  by  words 
or  concepts,  which  cannot  be  pictured.'' 

However  much  the  two  processes  resemble  each  other  in 
their  apperceptive  character,  we  cannot  assert  their  identity 
while  the  mental  escort  in  the  two  cases  is  so  different.  We 
must  hold  that  thought,  logical  thought,  is  a  conscious  opera- 
tion, however  much  its  more  spontaneous  forms  may  have  be- 
come involuntary  through  repetition.  Wundt  himself  has 
given  up  the  principle  of  unity  of  thought  as  he  announced  it 
in  his  first  edition.     Perhaps  as  concise  a  manner  as  may  be 

'  Pliys.  Psych.,  2d  ed.,  ii.  p.  321. 

"^  It  is  this  distinction  which  leads  Prof.  Wnndt  to  define  the  two 
functions  in  terms  of  each  other.  "  Imagination  is  thought  by  means 
of  pictures,"  and  "  thought  is  imagination  by  means  of  notions." — Ibid. 


242  imagination: 

found,  of  expressing  the  real  similarity  and,  at  the  same  time, 
the  ground  of  diiference  between  the  two  functions  is  this  : 
thought  is  the  representative  or  cognitive  apprehension  of  re- 
lations among  notions ;  imagination  is  the  affective  or  felt 
apprehension  of  relations  among  images. 

Law  of  Constructive  Imagination:  CoiTelation.  In 
the  apperceptive  analogy  between  the  constructive  ima- 
gination and  thought,  the  law  of  all  active  construction 
becomes  evident.  Passive  imagination  has  been  seen  to 
proceed  by  the  secondary  laws  of  association :  active 
imagination  proceeds  by  the  primary  law,  Correlation. 
In  correlative  association,  there  is  a  deeper  principle, 
underlying  contiguity  and  resemblance,  an  essential  ap- 
perceptive relation ;  so  in  constructive  imagination,  there 
is  a  deeper  principle,  a  relation  of  truth  or  beauty,  which 
underlies  the  simple  contiguities  and  resemblances  in- 
volved in  the  compositions  of  fancy.  Relations  of  truth 
are  the  objective  content  of  the  scientific  imagination, 
and  relations  of  beauty  give  universal  meaning  to  the 
aesthetic. 

§  9.  Ideal  Peoduct  of  lMAGi]srATio]sr :  the  I^^fin-ite. 

It  is  from  the  imaging  power  that  we  attain  the 
idea  of  the  Infinite ;  since  it  is  only  by  the  enlarging  of 
the  limited  data  of  perception,  that  unlimited  extent  in 
time  and  space  can  be  constructed.  Following  McCosh,' 
w^e  may  look  at  the  infinite  under  two  aspects  :  first,  de- 
fined under  its  cognitive  or  representative  aspect,  it  is 
that  to  which  nothing  can  be  added,  tlw  perfect,  after  its 
kind.  It  is  called  representative,  since  we  find  the  prep- 
aration of  this  idea  in  our  psychological  analysis  of  im- 
agination. In  the  scientific  imagination,  the  limit  of  dis- 
covery, or  the  sum  of  truth,  is  the  infinite  of  constructive 
activity,  and,  in  the  ideal  of  aesthetic  construction,  we 

'  Cognitive  Powers,  pp.  181-182. 


IDEAL  PRODUCT  OF  IMAOINATION.  243 

tave  the  perfect.  The  other  we  may  call  the  emotional 
aspect  of  the  infinite,  since  it  consists  in  the  feeling  of 
inadequacy  which  accompanies  all  our  attempts  to  con- 
struct or  picture  the  infinite.  All  images  are  felt  to  be 
entirely  out  of  place,  and  we  think  of  the  infinite  as 
stretching  out  beyond  our  utmost  conception.  Another 
emotional  ingredient,  in  the  whole  aifection  which  the 
thought  of  infinity  arouses,  is  the  feeling  of  awe  and  self- 
littleness  which  passes  over  us. 

The  metaphysical  and  dialectical  difiiculties  to  which  the 
conception  of  the  infinite  seems  to  give  rise,  do  not  come 
within  our  province.  We  are  concerned  only  with  the  psy- 
chological representations  which  stand  for  the  infinite,  in  our 
mental  symbols.  In  the  attempt  to  picture  the  general  no- 
tion, we  proceed  by  an  image,  as  of  space  stretching  in  all  di- 
rections, of  objects  of  huge  size,  mountains,  rivers,  etc.  But 
the  feeling  of  inadequacy  is  very  strong,  and  the  image  is  dis- 
missed for  another,  which  is,  of  necessity,  just  as  faulty.  The 
conception  of  the  infinite  is  an  analogous  mental  movement, 
tlie  feeling  of  inadequacy  being  greatly  exaggerated. 

On  imagination,  consult :  Wundt,  Phys.  PsycTi.,  n.  p.  320  ; 
MeCosh,  Coff.  Pcnvers,  bk.  2,  ch.  v  ;  Carpenter,  Ment.  Physiol.,  ch. 
Xii ;  George,  Psych.,  p.  274  ;  Porter,  Hum.  Int.,  pp.  325-331  ;  Volk- 
maun,  Leiirhuch.  §  84  ;  Waitz,  Lehrhuch,  §  15 ;  Maudsley,  Phys.  of 
Mind,  ch.  ix ;  Hickok,  Ment.  8ci.,  p.  Ill  ;  Joly,  L' Imagination  ; 
Sergi,  Psych.  Physiologique,  bk.  3,  ch.  n  and  ni  ;  Sully,  Outlines  of 
Psychol. ,  ch.  vin  ;  Rabier,  PsycJiologie,  ch.  xvii-xx ;  Beneke,  Lehr- 
huch der  Psychologie,  ch.  v  ;  Hamilton,  Metaphysics,  Lect.  XXXIII. 

Further  Problems  for  Study : 

Use  and  abuse  of  the  imagination  ; 
Growth  of  imagination  in  childhood  ; 
Cultivation  of  the  imagination  ; 
Play-instinct ; 
Ethical  imagination  ; 
Imagination  and  religious  faith. 


CHAPTER    XIII. 

ILLUSIONS. 

§  1.  Natuke  of  Illusion. 

Relation  of  Illusion  to  Mental  Pathology.  The  imag- 
inative processes  described  above  answer  to  tlie  normal 
working  of  the  reproductive  function  in  its  broadest 
aspect.  Yet  this  faculty  is  subject  to  various  forms  of 
derangement,  which  greatly  widen  its  sphere  of  influence 
in  the  mental  life,  and  at  the  same  time,  afford  us  unex- 
pected means  of  gaining  insight  into  its  real  nature.  The 
study  of  illusions  belongs  properly  to  the  pathology  of 
mind,  just  as  the  study  of  the  abnormal  or  diseased  con- 
dition of  any  bodily  function  belongs  to  the  pathology 
of  the  body :  yet  it  is  more  true  here,  than  in  the  latter 
sphere,  that  the  normal  only  needs  exaggeration  to  become 
abnormal,  and  that  the  same  princij^le  of  explanation 
serves  for  both.  The  most  fruitful  study  of  the  entire 
representative  function  in  recent  times  has  been  con- 
ducted from  the  side  of  mental  pathology. 

There  will  be  occasion,  as  we  proceed,  to  refer  to  the  new 
work  which  recent  years  have  seen  in  this  department :  yet  a 
word  of  general  introduction  to  it  is  not  out  of  place.  The 
rise  of  physiological  psychology  has  brought  with  it  a  general 
overhauling  of  our  ideas  of  all  forms  of  mental  alienation. 
The  old  conception  of  insanity,  i.e.  that  the  unfortunate 
victim  was  no  longer  the  possessor  of  a  mind,  in  the  ordinary 
sense,  but  was  possessed  by  an  evil  spirit,  which  yielded  only  to 
exorcism  or  violence, '  has  given  place  to  a  conception  as  much 

'  See  White's  art.,  "Demoniacal  Possession  and  Insanity,"  in  Pop. 
8d.  Monthly,  Feb.  '89,  and  his  abundant  references.  Also  the  intro- 
ductory chapters  of  Kraflft-Ebing's  Lehrbuch  der  Psychiatrie. 

244 


RELATION  OF  ILLUSION  TO  MENTAL  PATHOLOGY.  245 

more  scientific  as  humane.  This  conception  may  be  stated 
somewhat  thus  :  all  forms  of  mental  derangement  find  their 
rational  explanation  in  the  failure  or  predominance  of  some 
bodily  function,  and  in  a  corresponding  unbalance  in  the  mental 
world.  The  two  sets  of  functions  invariably  accompany  each 
other.  Consequently  modern  psychology  finds  a  possible  ap- 
proach to  every  form  of  mental  aberration,  and  has  as  many 
means  of  alleviation  and  cure.  Distinction  after  distinction  is 
made  between  phases  of  abnormal  intellection,  before  treated 
as  alike  qualifying  for  a  common  madhouse,  and  it  is  only 
after  the  resources  of  the  physiologist,  the  pathologist,  the 
hygienic  specialist,  and  above  all,  the  intelligent  and  sympa- 
thetic psychologist,  have  been  exhausted,  that  such  a  case  is 
pronounced  incurable.  The  new  j^sychology,  therefore,  has 
many  new  departments,  and  many  new  lines  of  resource. 
Neurology,  histology,  the  study  of  dreams,  hallucinations,  and 
monomanias,  the  mental  processes  of  the  deaf,  dumb,  and 
blind,  superstitions,  spirits,  and  the  numberless  vagaries 
"which  afflict  peoples  and  influence  sound  thought — in  short, 
nothing  which  springs  from  mind,  whether  normal  or  dis- 
eased, can  escape  the  eye  of  contemporary  research.  This 
branch  of  psychology  is  laying  under  tribute  all  depart- 
ments of  the  study  of  man  :  and  contributions  to  its  matter 
are  found  scattered  in  the  Journals  of  physiology,  medicine, 
zoology,  as  well  as  those  devoted  to  mind  in  particular. ' 

In  this  connection,  we  have  only  to  deal  wdtli  those 
irregular  forms  of  ideation  to  wdiich  the  regular  processes 
sometimes  give  rise  :  that  is,  with  individual  unexpected 
states,  rather  than  with  the  general  and  permanent 
irregularities  which  constitute  mental  disease.  Our 
view  includes  the  beginning  of  mental  tendencies  away 
from  the  line  of  average  results  ;  tendencies  which,  like 
all  other  mental  products,  become  fixed,  through  habit, 
in  forms  of  chronic  delusion.  It  is  in  the  reproductive 
faculty  that  mental  aberration  generally  takes  its  rise. 
The  imaging  power,  as  a  representative  power,  is  true 
to  reality  only  as  its  factors  unite  and  functionate  in 

'  On  the  physiological  side,  we  may  mention  Charcot,  Ferrier,  Brown- 
Sequard,  Wier  Mitchell;  and  on  the  mental  side,  Griesinger,  Wundt. 
Lotze. 


246  ILLUSIONS. 

tlieir  due  relation  to  one  another.  We  can  readily  see 
how  a  failure  in  attentive  selection  of  images,  gives  con- 
structions which  are  untrue,  how  mistaken  vistas  of 
memory,  may  lead  to  fallacious  processes  of  thought,  and 
mistaken  forms  of  action.  The  imagination  stands  mid- 
way between  the  acquisition  of  material  and  its  rational 
use,  and  errors  in  its  results,  either  in  the  independent 
working  up  of  the  material,  or  its  preparation  for  higher 
thought,  causes  far-reaching  deception  to  the  subject. 

General  Character  of  Illusion.  By  illusion,  therefore, 
in  its  broadest  sense,  we  understand  mental  deception,  or 
mistaken  trust  in  the  validity  of  a  subjective  state,  be 
this  state  what  it  may.  An  unconscious  logical  fallacy 
is  an  illusion,  a  perceptual  apparition  is  an  illusion,  a 
mistake  in  color,  due  to  expectancy,  is  an  illusion, 
a  religious  superstition  is  an  illusion.  Viewed  thus 
in  its  breadth  as  coincident  with  all  the  domain  of 
our  conscious  life,  two  general  points  may  be  found 
common  to  all  classes  of  illusions.  First,  the  element 
of  Belief  which  attaches  to  all  illusional  states,  and, 
second,  the  Representative  Nature  of  all  such  states. 

This  general  use  of  the  word  illusion  seems  necessary  in 
defect  of  another  word.  We  shall  find  in  the  distinction 
between  illusion  proper  and  hallucination,  the  meaning  to 
which  the  word  might  more  properly  be  restricted,  if  common 
usage  and  this  poverty  of  language  did  not  make  it  impossi- 
ble. It  is  unfortunate  that  many  such  terms  are  first  used  as 
generic  names,  and  are  subsequently  applied  to  one  of  the 
coordinations  under  the  general  name.  We  have  found  it 
to  be  the  case  both  with  memoiy  and  imagination.  For  the 
more  restricted  meaning  we  sliall  use  the  phrase  iUusionjyroper, 
except  where  the  context  renders  the  signification  plain. 

In  thus  defining  illusion,  we  have  presupposed  a  standard 
of  truth  in  tlie  normal  workings  of  the  mind.  We  are  de- 
ceived as  to  fact  when  the  grounds,  upon  which  we  are  ac- 
customed to  rely,  fail.  What  we  are  accustomed  to  in  our 
mental  flow  is  the  norm  of  truth,  and  variations  from  it  are  the 
false.  As  to  the  absolute  validity  of  knowledge  and  thought 
— that  we   have  no  right  to  discuss  here.     To  say  with  M. 


GENERAL  CHARACTER  OF  ILLUSION.  247 

Taine '  that  all  perception  is  hallucination,  even  though  its 
report  may  turn  out  to  be  true,  is  to  confuse  definitions  to  no 
purpose  :  since  if  it  be  true,  it  is  not  hallucination.  We  must 
keep  within  the  circle  of  the  common  consensus  of  human 
knowledge,  if  we  would  have  any  standard  of  reference  for 
psychology  at  all.  For  the  same  reason,  we  exclude  from  the 
class  of  illusions,  all  deceptions  which  are  intimately  and 
universally  inherent  in  the  bodily  organism :  that  is,  decep- 
tions which  all  men  share  alike,  and  which  are  only  discovered 
by  the  indirect  methods  of  science.  So,  for  example,  is  the 
inverted  image  of  external  things  upon  the  retina,  the  mis- 
takes we  all  make  in  contrasting  colors,  in  estimating  visual 
angles  and  forms.  In  all  such  cases,  the  deception  is  due  to 
a  modified  nervous  process,  not  to  a  mental  cause.  The  sen- 
sation really  sedent  upon  the  central  nervous  change  is  what 
we  experience,  not  the  unmerged  and  separate  sensory  stim- 
uli." And  by  the  same  principle  of  exclusion,  all  states  of 
the  universal  consciousness  which  are  shown  only  by  extra- 
conscious  means  to  be  untrue,  are  not  illusions  in  a  psycho- 
logical sense  ;  such  as  the  contention  that  the  feeling  of  con- 
tinuous personal  identity  has  no  real  foundation,  that  the  flow 
of  time  is  not  continuous  in  our  experience,  etc. 

I.  Relation  of  Illusion  to  Belief.  It  has  been  said  that 
trust  in  a  mental  state,  or  belief  in  its  reality,  is  a  common 
characteristic  of  illusional  states.  We  cannot  enter  here 
into  a  discussion  of  the  nature  of  belief,  as  a  psychological 
state,  since  it  is  not  necessary  to  the  case  in  hand.  It  is 
sufficient  to  note  that  the  mind  preserves  the  same  atti- 
tude toward  those  reproductions  which  constitute  illu- 
sions in  our  mental  life,  as  toward  those  which  have  a 
corresponding  realit3\  The  reason  that  the  mind  is  thus 
disposed  to  illusion  is  again  reverted  to  later.  We  at- 
tribute to  the  products  of  representation,  the  correspond- 
ences which  hold  between  the  presentations  of  former 
experience  and  independent  objects  or  events,  external 
to  us.     And  it  is  this  belief  which  gives  the  illusion  its 

'  Intelligence,  part  2,  book  1,  ch.  i. 

^  For  a  variety  of  such  so-called  deceptions  of  sense  (Sinnestduschun- 
gen),  see  Wundt,  Pht/s.  Psych.,  ii.  pp.  92-109.  But  ou  the  other  hand, 
we  include  mistakes  arising  after  correct  perception,  from  errors  ia 
judgment  or  inference  (Wahnidee). 


248  ILLUSIONS. 

force.  The  criteria  or  grounds  of  tliis  belief,  therefore, 
are  those  which  justify  belief  in  the  external  world,  as 
known  in  sense  perception.  And  on  the  preceding  as- 
sumption of  the  validity  of  the  normal  processes  of 
knowledge,  we  may  remain  satisfied,  except  so  far  as  to 
inquire  why,  in  this  latter  case,  that  belief  is  misplaced.' 
II.  Representative  Nature  of  lUusional  States.  The 
second  characteristic  of  all  illusions  is  their  represen- 
tative quality.  Decej)tions  of  sense  were  seen  to  arise 
in  the  synthetic  or  inferential  construction  of  our  sense 
perceptions."  This  synthesis  of  sense  is  further  based 
upon  the  representative,  as  oj^posed  to  the  afi'ective,  ele- 
ment in  sensation.  In  other  words,  the  formal,  sjDace 
and  time,  aspect  of  sensations  alone  gives  ground  for 
representation  and  consequent  elaboration :  and  only  as 
the  product  begins  to  be  removed  from  the  immediate- 
ness  of  pure  intensive  feeling,  is  there  occasion  for  belief, 
as  opposed  to  direct  knowledge.  It  is  only  in  a  picture, 
or  copy,  or  representation,  that  the  reality  can  be  simu- 
lated ;  and  it  is  only  as  the  reality  is  itself  a  picture,  a 
presentation,  that  a  copy  or  representation  can  simulate 
it.  For  this  reason,  we  reach  a  further  exclusion  of  states 
from  the  field  of  illusion,  i.e.  those  sensations,  feelings, 
emotions,  volitions,  in  which  the  affective  force  is  pre- 
dominant or  unmixed.  Consequently,  as  we  should  ex- 
pect, illusions  of  the  eye  and  ear  are  most  common,  and 
those  of  touch  not  unusual,  these  senses  being  most 
representative  ;  ^  while  deceptions  in  taste  and  smell  are 
rare,  except  when  they  arise  purely  from  mental  causes, 
or  from  consistency  with  illusions  already  established  for 
sight  or  hearing."     Consciousness,  in  its  immediate  af- 

'  Cf.  treatment  of  categorical  judgments,  Chap.  XIV,  §  4. 

2  See  p.  143. 

3  Cf.  Sully,  Illusions,  pp.  33-34. 

*  For  example,  when  we  are   sure  there  is  fire  in  the  house,  it  is 
Tery  easy  to  smell  it. 


ILLUSION  DUE  TO  INTERPRETATION.  249 

fective  revelations,  cannot  deceive,  since  it  is  at  once 
aware  of  its  own  content,  as  trutli,  whatever  its  external 
value  may  be.  This  doctrine  dates  back,  through  Kant ' 
and  Aristotle,*  to  the  Cyrenaic  school. 

Illusion  due  to  Interpretation.  Considering  these  two 
characteristics  of  illusions,  we  are  led  to  look  upon  all 
such  states  as  the  result  of  the  mistaken  interpretation 
of  representations.  In  perception,  presentations  are  in- 
terpreted in  terms  of  reality,  and  the  interpretation  is 
true  :  in  illusion,  representations  are,  for  the  same  rea- 
sons, whatever  they  are,  also  interpreted  in  terms  of  re- 
ality, and  the  interpretation  is  not  true.  We  say  for  the 
same  reasons,  meaning  that  the  evidence  which  leads  to 
belief  in  the  former  case,  the  marks  of  reality  which  we 
recognize,  are  also  present  in  the  second,  and  induce  be- 
lief here  also.  We  are  now  led  to  ask  :  What  are  the 
grounds  of  this  interpretation  ? 

§  2.  Grounds  of  Illusion". 

I.  Similarity  of  Presentations  and  Representations. 
The  most  misleading  feature,  without  doubt,  of  repre- 
sentative mental  products,  is  their  very  close  resemblance 
to  the  original  presentations.  This  has  already  been  re- 
marked in  discussing  the  nature  of  mental  images.'  This 
being  the  case,  there  is  every  reason  to  expect  mistakes 
in  identification,  unless  there  be  some  marks  in  the 
mental  accompaniment  or  escort  of  reproductions,  upon 
which  the  mind  may  seize.  That  there  are  such  differ- 
ences is  seen  in  the  possibility  of  detecting  and  banish- 
ing illusions,  but  the  great  similarities  in  the  case  lead 
us,  in  common  life,  to  overlook  them. 

II.  Absence  of  Internal  Stimulus.  The  means  by 
which,  in  all  cases  of  active  imagination,  a  reproduction 

'*  Anthropologie,  %  \Q.  ^  De  An.,  n.  Q.  ^  See  pp.  146-151. 


250  ILLUSIONS. 

is  known  to  be  such,  is  found,  at  least  in  part,  in  the 
feeling  of  voluntary  effort  put  forth  in  the  revival.  This 
effort  is  directive,  as  has  been  seen  in  speaking  of  the 
selective  attention,  and  is  accompanied  by  the  weariness 
which  all  attention  occasions.  We  are  conscious  of  hav- 
ing a  mental  initiative  in  the  reproduction,  of  being  our- 
selves responsible  for  the  imaginative  product.  This 
we  may  call  an  internal  stimulus,  as  contrasted  with  the 
sense  or  organic  excitations  from  which  ordinary  pres- 
entations arise.  An  entire  train  or  network  of  ideas 
may  thus  be  built  up,  constituting  a  secondary  con- 
sciousness, parallel  with  the  first  or  true  series  of  j^res- 
entations.  The  voluntarily  pictured  scene  may  arise 
before  me — my  distant  home,  friends,  and  all  the  famil- 
iar surroundings,  with  myself  among  them.  But  be- 
neath it  all,  is  my  matter-of-fact  present  consciousness, 
the  true  state  of  my  mind,  in  diffused  and  vague  atten- 
tion. I  attach  no  belief  to  the  former,  because  I  feel 
myself  forcefully  responsible  for  its  reproduction. 

In  the  illusional  reproduction,  on  the  other  hand, 
there  is  no  such  feeling  of  origination  or  expenditure. 
The  image  is  presented  in  the  ordinary  course  of  pres- 
ent experience,  as  a  part  of  the  normal  content  of  con- 
sciousness. And  the  subject  is  led  to  the  belief,  in  the 
absence  of  internal  causation,  that  the  representation  is 
due  to  an  external  cause,  that  is,  that  it  arises  from  an 
external  object.  In  this  case,  we  fail  to  keep  distinct 
the  two  consciousnesses,  the  imagined  scene  being  as 
real  to  us  as  that  in  which  we  actually  move. 

This  plainly  cannot  suffice  to  explain  the  greater  number 
of  illusions,  since  a  very  great  part  of  our  imaginative  con- 
struction is  not  voluntary.  The  entire  play  of  passive  imagi- 
nation, which  appears  to  be  so  varied,  is  unaccompanied  by 
any  feeling  of  expended  energy.  The  mind  is  the  passive 
theatre  of  the  play  of  ideas,  under  the  laws  of  association.  Yet 
it  does  not  deceive  us  as  to  its  reality.  The  absence  of  the  in- 
ternal stimulus  is,  in  cases  of  active  imagination,  undoubted- 


GROUNDS  OF  ILLUSION:  PHYSICAL  CHANGE.       251 

ly  an  additional  guarantee  and  safeguard,  but  we  must  look 
farther  for  the  ground  of  other  and  less  simple  cases  of  illu- 
sion, 

III.  Intraorganic  Stimulus:  Physical  Change.  In 
cases  of  illusion,  if  there  be  any  stimulus  or  cause  at  all, 
and  it  be  neither  of  mental  nor  of  external  origin,  we  are 
driven  to  the  third  and  true  alternative  :  the  stimulus  is 
intraorganic ;  it  arises  from  a  given  condition  or  modi- 
fication of  the  bodily  organism  itself.  We  have  found 
that  the  nervous  process  which  underlies  reproduction 
in  general,  is  the  same  in  its  special  seat,  and  in  its  mo- 
tor tendency,  as  the  original  perception,  the  stimulus 
arising  either  at  the  nervous  centre  or  in  some  portion 
of  the  nerve  courses  or  endings.  The  peculiar  fact  that 
the  stimulus  of  a  nerve  course  is  alwaj'S  located  at  the 
extremity,  and  that  the  sj)ecial  courses  always  react  in 
the  special  forms  peculiar  to  their  end  organs,  has  also 
been  remarked.  In  these  facts  v/e  have  data  for  the 
projection  of  the  images  which  arise  from  central  or 
general  organic  causes  into  the  field  of  real  perception. 
Sensations  of  light,  for  example,  due  to  the  self-dis- 
charge of  the  centre  for  sight  in  the  cellular  sub- 
stance— which  may  be  the  case  when  the  irritability  of 
the  centre  reaches  a  high  degree  of  potential  force' — or 
to  the  existence  of  resident  light-points  in  the  darkened 
retinal  field,  arising  from  spontaneous  excitation  by  fric- 
tion or  disease,*  or  again  to  mechanical  violence  done  to 
the  optic  nerve  at  any  point — are  alike  referred  to  exter- 
nal luminous  objects.  There  is  nothing  in  the  central 
process  to  indicate  the  source  of  the  stimulus.  The 
hearing,  also,  is  often  occupied  with  excitations  which 
have  no  external  sound  counterpart.  Children  hear 
voices  speaking  to  them,  visionaries  receive  messages 
from  heaven.     All  of  these  are  cases  of  spontaneous  ex- 

'  Volkmann,  and  Wundt,  Phys.  Psych.,  p.  357. 
«  Wundt,  ibid.,  ii.  p.  355. 


252  ILLUSIONS. 

citation  in  the  ear  or  centre,  or  are  due  to  actual  noises 
in  the  head  or  body,  conveyed  through  the  tissues  to  the 
auditory  apparatus.  Among  the  causes  of  hallucination 
enumerated  by  Griesinger,'  are  the  following,  -which  are 
entirely  physical :  (1)  local  disease  in  the  organ  of  sense  ; 
(2)  deep  physical  exhaustion  ;  (3)  outward  calm  and  still- 
ness— absence  of  external  stimulus,  as  in  sleep  ;  (4)  ac- 
tion of  drugs,  hashish,  opium,  etc.,'  and  many  deep- 
seated  diseases. 

IV.  Mental  Predisposition  to  Illusion.  The  physical 
processes  which  underlie  reproduction  are  liable  to  pre- 
dispositions to  nervous  discharge,  consisting  in  a  high 
degree  of  excitabilit}'.  The  same  may  be  said  of  j^redis- 
positions  to  the  rei3roduction  of  images,  on  the  mental 
side.  In  the  first  place,  the  associative  law  of  preference 
holds,  determining  the  kind  of  illusion  to  which  one  is 
most  liable.  Further  than  this,  long  indulgence  in  any 
train  of  thought,  or  frequent  reiDetition  of  the  same  men- 
tal imagery,  tends  to  give  a  whole  class  of  images  a 
readiness  and  facility  w^hich  often  becomes  organic  and 
illusional.'  But  by  far  the  most  important  class  of  cases 
arising  from  mental  i^redispositiou,  come  from  a  state  of 
high  mental  expectancy.  In  this  state,  the  image  or  idea 
of  the  expected  object  or  event  is  kept  so  constantly  and 
strongly  in  mind,  that  the  subject  conceives  of  it  as 
already  accomplished.  Other  events  or  images  take  on 
the  form  of  the  expected  event  or  image,  by  an  assimila- 
tion to  be  spoken  of  later  on.  A  good  illustration  is 
found  in  the  anticipation  of  an  expected  sound,  when  it 

^  Mental  Pathology  and  Tlierapeutics,  London,  1867,  pp.  94-95. 

^  Especially  santoniue:  see  remarkable  effects  given  by  Mayer,  Z>«'(? 
Sinnestduschungen,  p.  108.  It  is  well  known  that  optical  hallucina- 
tions are  especially  common  in  cases  of  heart  disease:  Hagen,  Sinnes- 
tduschungen, p.  127. 

'  See  cases  cited  by  Carpenter,  Mental  Physiology,  p.  207  and  fol. 
Called  by  Sully  a  state  of  sub-expectation. 


MENTAL  PREDISPOSITION  TO  ILLUSION.  253 

is  to  be  intercalated  in  a  series  of  other  sounds,  the 
expectant  attention  being  strained  to  receive  it.'  The 
illusions  of  the  theatre  are  due  to  this  mental  predispo- 
sition. And  the  success  of  the  spiritualist  in  bringing 
up  ghosts,  lifting  tables,  and  doing  other  wonders,  turns 
upon  the  readiness  of  his  audience  to  fall  into  illusion. 
Furthermore,  the  state  of  expectancy  is  greatly  enhanced 
by  the  addition  of  violent  emotion,  as  fear  or  hope. 
When  under  a  state  of  great  fear,  the  most  unoffending 
objects  take  on  the  form  of  our  apprehension  :  ordinary 
noises  become  the  footfall  of  burglars,  a  harmless  bush 
in  a  graveyard,  is  a  spirit,  slight  bodily  pains  are  made 
the  symptoms  of  frightful  diseases.  The  emotion  has 
an  immediate  influence  in  quickening  and  concentrating 
the  attention,  and  the  attention  in  turn  keeps  the  ex- 
pected image  present,  even  when  the  peripheral  stimula- 
tion is  of  the  most  opposed  nature.  And  the  illusion  is 
sometimes  so  powerful  that  it  affects  more  than  one  sense. 
A  further  and  more  philosophical  predisposition  to 
illusion,  in  the  normal  processes  of  mind,  is  found  in 
the  assumption  already  made,  that  average  and  ordinary 
experience  is  truthful.  The  growth  of  mind,  from  its 
earliest  stages,  is  based  upon  this  assumption.  Indeed, 
development  in  mind  is  the  progressive  adaptation  of 
the  subjective  to  the  objective,  the  refinement  of  har- 
mony in  a  relation  of  which  each  term  is  absolutely  de- 
pendent on  the  other.  Truth,  to  us,  is  what  this  relation 
means,  and  truth,  to  us,  outside  of  knowledge,  is  a  meta- 
physical absurdity.  We  do  not  stop  to  question  ex- 
perience, since  experience,  for  psychology,  is  the  final  end 
of  all  questioning.  For  this  reason,  belief  in  sensations, 
images,  reasoning,  is  a  part  of  those  processes  them- 
selves. It  is  only  when,  by  reason  of  some  inconsistency 
in   our   mature   life,  after   mental   symbolism   becomes 

1  See  p.  113. 


254  ILL  USIONS. 

established/  we  find  violence  done  to  our  belief,  that 
the  feeling  of  illusion  enters  consciousness  at  all.  The 
real  fact  demanding  explanation  is  not  the  question, 
why  do  we  believe  in  some  states  which  are  not  real  in 
fact,  but  why  do  we  not  believe  in  all  states.  Just  as 
the  little  child  confides  in  all  men  by  nature,  and  learns 
from  painful  experience  that  all  cannot  be  trusted,  so  he 
confides  at  first,  also,  in  all  his  mental  states,  and  learns 
by  an  experience  just  as  costly,  that  some  are  deceptive. 
With  this  new  experience,  comes  also  the  means  of  de- 
fence against  similar  illusions,  and  so  the  indications  are 
learned  by  which,  under  careful  weighing,  the  illusive 
state  may  be  detected. 

M.  Eabier's  statement  of  this  truth  is  full  and  precise: 
''  Thought  is  in  its  nature  essentially  objective  or  rather  ob- 
jectifymg.  That  is  to  say,  whatever  is  thought,  seems  to  us 
naturally  to  be  a  thing,  an  object  perceived  in  thought.  The 
operations  of  sense,  of  consciousness,  of  understanding,  of 
memory,  even  of  imagination,  appear  to  us  to  be  acts  of  vision 
or  perception.  We  see,  or  believe  we  see,  sensible  objects, 
abstract  truths,  the  past,  the  future,  etc.  .  .  .  From  this  it 
becomes  evident  why  belief  naturally  accompanies  evidence. 
It  is  because  at  bottom,  evidence  and  belief  are  one  and  the 
same  thing.  Both  evidence  and  belief  may  be  defined  as  the 
objectification  of  the  object  of  thought.  .  .  .  Naturally,  there- 
fore, every  representation,  in  the  absence  of  contradiction,  is 
objectified,  and  naturally  also  every  representation  is  accom- 
panied by  belief."  And  Taine  is  right  in  saying  that  under 
normal  conditions  the  production  of  the  mental  state  alone, 
in  his  words  tlie  "  intermediary,"  is  sufficient  to  produce  illu- 
sion.^ 

The  element  of  truth  in  James  Mill's  association  theory  of 
belief,  is  covered  by  this  view  of  illusion,  since  the  fixing  of 
the  escort  or  normal  network  of  experience,  which  the  illu- 
sion contradicts,  is  brought  about  by  association. 

'  Cf .  Bradley,  Pi'inciples  of  Logic,  p.  35. 

*  ITie  Intelligence,  p.  208.    Rabier,  loc.  cit  p.  372. 


KINDS  OF  ILLUSION:    ILLUSION  PROPER.         255 

§  3.  Kinds  of  Illusion". 

The  general  characteristics  of  all  illusional  states 
have  until  now  been  considered.  Looking  at  special  cases 
more  closely,  we  find  that  they  may  be  divided  into  tAvo 
general  classes.  First,  there  are  many  cases  in  which 
the  state  which  constitutes  the  illusion,  while  itself  alto- 
gether independent  of  an  external  stimulus,  is  yet  brought 
into  consciousness  through  the  perception  of  some  real 
object  difi"erent  in  character  from  itself :  that  is,  cases 
in  which  the  image  seen  is  a  misinterpretation  of  some 
real  thing.  This  is  called  Illusion  Proper.  Second, 
there  are  cases  in  which  the  image  is  not  connected  with 
any  external  thing  whatever,  but  is  a  pure  projection 
into  the  conscious  field  of  presentation.  This  is  called 
HaUiLcination. 

This  distinction  is  ordinarily  accredited  to  Esquirol,* 
though  Volkmann  traces  it  back  to  the  Stoics'  distinction 
between  cataleptic  and  acataleptic  imagination.  It  is  a  con- 
venient working  classification,  but,  as  will  appear  below,  it 
cannot  be  considered  in  any  way  a  fast  line  of  division.  The 
general  grounds  of  illusion  already  stated  and  the  consider- 
ation of  the  physical  process  in  the  same  cases,  both  tend 
to  show  the  real  identity  of  the  two  states.  We  cannot  hold, 
with  the  old  psychology,  that  the  stimulus  in  hallucination  is 
purely  psychic.  It  is  simply  a  difference  in  degree  of  spon- 
taneity, subjectively  considered,  or  of  central  potential,  or- 
ganically considered,  whether  the  image  appear  with  no 
special  sense  stimulation,  or  only  with  it.  And  whether  the 
stimulus  be  within  the  body  or  without  it,  is  indifferent,  as 
far  as  the  mental  product  is  concerned. 

I.  Illusion  Proper.  Proceeding  upon  this  distinction 
between  illusion  proper  and  hallucination,  the  former 
may  be  considered  in  more  detail.  At  the  outset,  we 
find  ourselves  face  to  face  with  the  whole  class  of  ex- 
periences, in  which  one  mental  state  is  taken  for  another. 
There  are,  really,  two  images  involved,  one  the  rightful 
'  Des  Maladies  mentales,  i.  p.  159. 


256  ILLUSI02\^S. 

image,  the  presentation,  as  ordinarily  aroused  by  the 
stimulus  experienced,  saj"  the  sound  of  the  clock  :  the 
other,  the  image  of  something  different,  formed  within 
the  domain  of  the  same  sense  quality,  and  usually  prom- 
inent in  consciousness  before  the  time  of  the  illusion ; 
as  the  alarm  of  fire,  into  which  the  striking  of  the  clock 
is  interpreted.  The  latter  is  an  image  in  the  strict  sense 
of  the  word,  the  former,  a  sensation.  This  identification 
proceeds  upon  similarities  which  may  be  very  close  or 
very  vague.  In  states  of  strong  emotional  tension, 
simply  the  quality  of  the  affection — as  coming  from  the 
same  sense — is  sufiicient  to  produce  illusion,  or  even 
further  than  this,  the  mere  fact  of  sense  stimulation 
brings  the  dominant  image  into  apperception,  with  all 
the  marks  of  reality.  The  fact  that  the  sensorium  is  in 
a  state  of  reaction,  is  sufiicient,  the  special  sensation  ex- 
perienced being  interpreted  into  that  aspect  of  the  illu- 
sional  image,  which  would  appeal  to  the  same  sense,  if  it 
were  real.  The  timid  traveller  in  the  woods  of  the  West, 
at  night,  not  only  mistakes  trees  for  Indians,  but  every 
sound  becomes  the  soft  tread  of  the  savage.  The  dreaded 
thing  is  so  entrenched  in  the  centre  of  converging  lines  of 
association,  that  the  same  image  is  called  up  whatever 
sense  is  brought  into  play.'  It  is  easily  seen,  also,  that 
this  is  more  readily  the  case  when  the  sense  stimulation 
is  uncertain  or  vague  in  its  character — as  vision  at  night, 
— since,  in  this  case,  fewer  points  of  opposition  are  pre- 
sented to  the  superposed  image. 

The  actual  process,  therefore,  in  cases  of  illusion 
proper,  is  one  of  Assimilation.  It  has  been  seen,  in  cases 
of  association  by  contiguity,  that  images  are  often  as- 
similated to  one  another,  under  conditions  of  attentive  or 

'  A  good  example  is  given  by  Dr.  Tuke  (see  Carpenter,  Mental  Phys., 
§  186):  a  lady  who  was  occupied  with  the  subject  of  drinking-fountains, 
was  deceived  by  a  pile  of  stones  on  the  roadside,  and  afterwards  nar- 
rated even  the  inscription  she  had  read  upon  this  imaginary  fountain. 


PHYSICAL  ASPECT  OF  ILLUSION  PROPER.        257 

emotional  excitement.'  The  result  in  such  cases  is  the 
disappearance  of  the  assimilated  image  and  the  intensify- 
ing of  the  image  that  remains.  Illusion  proper  is  a  case 
of  such  assimilation,  except  that  the  merging  of  the  two 
images  in  this  case  is  entirely  unconscious,  thus  giving 
ground  for  the  rise  of  belief.  The  assimilations  of  the 
theatre,  on  the  contrary,  rarely  rise  to  illusions,  since 
we  are  throughout  conscious  of  the  duality  of  our  states. 
We  further  find  that  the  intensity  of  the  actual  sensa- 
tion passes  over  into  the  imagination,  thus  bringing  it 
into  conditions  of  harmony  with  the  presentational  en- 
vironment.'^  This  is  seen  in  the  fact  that  the  illusion 
lasts  no  longer  than  the  actual  sensation  upon  which  it 
rests.  The  imaginative  image  passes  back  into  the  state 
of  unstable  representation  which  it  had  at  first,  when  the 
peripheral  stimulus  is  withdrawn. 

Physical  Aspect  of  Illusion  Proper.  The  presence  in 
illusion  proper  of  an  actual  sensation,  gives  us  access  to 
the  physical  side  of  the  phenomenon.  Kemembering 
that  representation  involves  the  same  central  elements 
as  the  corresponding  sensation,  we  may  suppose  the 
image  which  constitutes  the  illusion,  in  any  case,  to  have, 
as  its  physical  basis,  a  nervous  discharge  of  extreme 
facility  and  multiplied  connections.  Frequent  repeti- 
tion, disease,  or  drugs,  have  given  its  centre  a  degree  of 
sensibility  so  delicate,  that  any  activity  of  the  sensorium, 
as  a  whole,  leads  to  its  discharge ;  and  the  discharge  is 
of  so  wide-reaching  a  kind,  that  the  regular  changes  due 
to  moderate  sense  stimulation  are  merged  in  it.  The 
entire  movement  of  the  cerebral  elements,  then,  tends  to 
the  emphasis  of  this  particular  process.  And  thus  em- 
phasized, it  passes  from  the  state  of  unstable  tendency, 

•  See  p.  207. 

2  Volkmann;  a  necessary  view  from  the  Herbartian  standpoint. 


258  ILLUSIONS. 

to  that  of  actual  subjective  representation.  The  rein- 
forcement received  from  the  peripheral  stimulation,  cor- 
responds to  the  increased  intensity  already  noted  in  the 
illusional  image. 

Elements  of  Reality  in  the  Illusion  Proper.  In  virtue, 
also,  of  the  presence  of  extra-organic  stimulation,  the  illu- 
sion proper  has  elements  of  reality  brought  into  it  necessa- 
rily, which  are  wanting  to  the  hallucination.  In  an  earlier 
chapter,  it  was  seen  that  certain  subordinate  processes 
were  involved  in  perception,  which,  by  way  of  synthesis, 
afford  us  our  knowledge  of  things,  as  connected  with  one 
another  and  localized  in  space.  The  relation  and  localiza- 
tion of  percepts  tend  to  differentiate  them  sharply  from 
images,  as  will  appear  below,  and  so  far  to  indicate  their 
reality.  The  flow  of  reproductions,  even  when  uncon- 
tradicted from  the  primary  consciousness  of  things 
around,  has  no  exact  and  definite  local  coloring.  Even  in 
our  dreams,  in  which  the  independence  and  isolation  of 
the  imaginations  from  disturbing  reality  is  as  great  as  is 
possible,  their  localization  is  vague  and  changing :  the 
relations  of  space  are  extremel}^  confused.  And  their 
relational  connection  with  one  another  is  of  so  loose  and 
unimportant  a  kind,  that  the  most  startling  and  incon- 
sistent transformations  do  not  surprise  us. 

In  the  assimilation,  however,  upon  which  illusion 
proper  rests,  these  two  characters  are  supplied  by  the 
assimilated  sensation.  The  reproduced  image  steps  into 
the  shoes,  so  to  speak,  of  the  sensation,  and  appropriates 
both  its  local  position,  and  its  relational  connections  in 
the  network  of  actual  fact.  The  Indian  seen  in  the  for- 
est, is  no  longer  a  vague  placeless  image,  flitting  here  and 
there  in  consciousness,  with  no  relations  to  other  images, 
by  which  he  is  made  permanent  and  real :  but  he  takes 
the  place  of  the  tree  which  is  assimilated  to  him,  and  all 
its  definiteness  of  place,  time,  and  environment,  becomes 


nA  LL  UCINA  TION.  259 

liis.     For  this  reason,  as  will  appear,  the  detection  of 
illusions  is  more  difficult  than  that  of  hallucinations. 

II.  Hallucination.  In  hallucination,  all  extra-or- 
ganic stimulation  is  wanting.  The  illusional  image  is  a 
pure  projection  of  mind.  For  this  reason,  we  find  that 
"both  the  mental  and  the  physical  process  has  an  enor- 
mously exaggerated  intensity.  On  the  mental  side,  it  is 
only  when  the  force  of  attention  has  been  so  long  or  so 
violently  exerted  that  an  image  becomes  fixed  or  impera- 
tive, that  it  attains  the  appearance  of  actuality.  And  on 
the  physical  side,  not  onl}'  is  the  nervous  centre  highly 
excitable,  but  it  is  in  a  kinetic  state,  its  discharge  is  au- 
tomatic :  instead  of  proceeding  from  the  action  of  peri- 
pheral or  central  stimuli,  it  proceeds  in  spite  of  all  op- 
posing stimuli.  This  state,  either  of  mind  or  body,  is 
always  near  the  line  of  disease  :  cases  of  hallucination 
in  normal  health  are  extremely  rare,  and  arise  mostly 
from  great  weariness  in  the  mental  life.  The  classical 
case  of  Nicolai,  the  Berlin  bookseller,  need  only  be  re- 
ferred to.'  Thoroughgoing  hallucinations  are  rare,  fur- 
ther, from  the  absence  of  all  means  of  localizing  them, 
and  of  connecting  them  properly  with  outside  states. 
Even  when  they  are  localized  outside  us,  the  absence  of 
the  connection  enables  us  to  detect  them,  as  in  the  case 
of  Nicolai  and  numerous  others,  as  Newton  and  Her- 
schel.  Yet  in  some  cases,  they  carry  their  associated 
escort  of  images  with  them,  giving  a  consistent  presenta- 
tional continuum ;  this  is  the  case  in  hypnotic  hallu- 
cination. 

§  4.  Eange  of  Illusion. 

The  nature  of  illusional  states  has  been  indicated 
with  some  exactness  :  it  remains  to  see  just  where,  in  the 
mental  life,  such  states  oftenest  appear  and  how  they 
may  be   detected.     "With   reference   to  the   intellectual 

'  Carpenter,  loc.  cit.  p.  167. 


260  ILLUSIONS. 

functions  affected,  illusions,  including  hallucinations, 
may  be  classified  as  follows  :  I.  llUisioiis  of  Presentation  ; 
II.  Illusions  of  Representation ;  III.  Illusions  of  Reflection 
or  Thought. 

I.  Illusions  of  Presentation.  Under  tliis  heading  are 
included  all  errors  which  enter  in  the  complex  process  of 
perception,  through  mistakes  in  proper  identification  of 
sensations,  mistakes  in  their  differencing  and  classifica- 
tion, and,  which  is  very  important,  mistakes  in  their 
localization  in  space.  Under  strong  expectancy,  as 
has  been  said,  or  under  violent  emotion,  sense  utter- 
ances are  very  frequently  mistaken  for  one  another. 
A  naturalist,  under  the  excitement  and  hope  of  an  ex- 
pected discovery,  must  guard  carefully  against  the  dan- 
ger of  reading  into  his  specimens  the  peculiarities  he 
is  searching  for.  And  in  classifying  and  arranging  our 
first  sensations,  similar  mistakes  occur;  as  the  confu- 
sion of  two  tastes  or  odors.  Errors  of  space  localization 
are  exceedingly  common  and  varied,  since  the  estimation 
of  distance  and  direction  depends  upon  complex  data  of 
inference.  Under  this  head,  therefore,  we  find  all  mis- 
takes which  enter  our  consciousness  in  the  perceptive  or 
preparatory  processes,  before  the  percept  is  finished  for 
reproduction,  combination,  and  elaboration.  They  may 
be  defined  as  individual  errors  in  the  synthetic  construc- 
tion of  the  percept.'  "  The  belief,"  says  Adamson,  "  of 
consciousness  in  the  correspondence  of  its  content  (the 
percept)  wdth  reality  .  .  .  though  firm  ...  is  shown  to  be 
merely  the  rapid  summation  of  a  number  of  signs  which 
.  .  .  are  accepted  without  examination.'"" 

II.  Illusions  of  Representation.  Mistakes  in  the 
character  and  connection  of  representations  may  proceed 

>  For  detailed  accounts  of  this  class  of  illusions,  see  Sully,  Illusions, 
chaps,  iii-vi,  with  the  references  which  he  gives. 
■^  Eiicyc.  Britann.,  vol.  ni.  p.  533. 


ILLUSIONS  OF  REPRESENTATION.  261 

from  those  errors  wliicli  arise  in  presentation,  simply 
from  the  law  of  the  repetition  of  error.  For  the  most  part, 
however,  it  is  here  that  illusional  states  take  their  rise. 
Indeed,  properly  sj^eakiug,  an  element  of  representation 
enters  necessarily  into  illusions  of  presentation,  since 
presentation,  in  its  fullest  form  in  perception,  involves  the 
reproduction  of  sensational  states.  This  form  of  illusion 
may  again  be  viewed  differently,  according  as  it  arises 
from  mistakes  in  any  one  of  the  integral  functions  of 
reproduction.  We  have,  therefore.  Illusions  of  Memory,' 
comprising  illusions  of  Recognition^  of  Localization  in 
Time,  and  of  Self -consciousness. 

1.  Illusions  of  Recognition  exhibit,  again,  the  class  of 
external  assimilations  which  are  called  illusions  proper, 
as  opposed  to  hallucinations.  The  peripheral  stimula- 
tion excites  the  sensation  which  ordinarily  arises  from  it, 
but  this  sensation  is  not  recognized.  The  process  of 
recognition,  which  was  found  to  consist  in  the  proper 
adjustment  of  a  mental  state  in  its  appercej)tive  train  or 
escort,  is,  in  this  case,  mistaken,  not  in  the  direct  experi- 
ence of  the  sensation,  but  in  the  substitution  of  an  ideal 
escort  for  the  real.  The  sensation  is  taken  up  into  the 
flow  of  previous  states,  and  identified  with  one  of  its  con- 
nected images. 

2.  Illusions  of  Localization  in  Time.  Corresponding  to 
the  presentational  illusions  which  involve  estimates  of 
space,  we  find  ourselves  also  subject  to  illusion  in  our 
sense  of  past  time.  These  states  are  more  popularly  known 
as  "  illusions  of  memory."  The  ground  of  our  localization 
of  events  in  the  past  has  already  been  treated  olV  and  we 
have  to  deal  here,  not  with  the  synthetic  reconstruction 
of  time,  but  with  the  arrangement  of  experiences  in  time, 
that  is,  with  temporal  persj^ective.  It  presupposes  the 
idea  of  time,  and  also   certain  data  of  differentiation, 

'  Cf.  Sully,  loc.  cit.  chap,  x,  aud  llibot,  Les  Maladies  de  la  Memoire. 
*  See  p.  179. 


262  ILLUSIONS. 

whereby  events  may  be  considered  as  before  and  after, 
in  relation  to  one  another.  The  misinterpretation  of 
these  data  leads  to  the  reversal,  confusion,  or  entire 
abolishment  of  order  in  our  memory  of  the  past.  Of 
these  states,  there  are  several  distinct  tj-pes. 

a.  Illusion  as  to  actual  time  of  the  occurrence  of  a  past 
event.  This,  like  mistaken  estimates  of  distance,  rests 
upon  empirical  data,  the  most  important  being  the  fact 
of  relative  intensities  of  remembered  states,  as  affected  by 
the  attention.  As  the  importance  of  events  is  distorted, 
so  also  is  their  temporal  order. 

h.  Illusion  as  to  the  connections  of  past  events.  This  is  due 
to  the  mental  exaggeration  of  particular  details,  and  the 
imaginary  supply  of  missing  links.  Ordinary  testimony 
in  the  law  courts,  in  cases  of  different  versions  of  the 
same  event,  illustrp^tes  this  class  of  illusions.  Different 
individuals  give  contradictory  details,  according  as  they 
have  imagined  them.  Such  perversions  of  truth  are  en- 
tirely unconscious,  and  are  firmly  believed  in.  Further 
than  this,  when  points  are  supplied  intentionally  with  pur- 
pose to  deceive,  frequent  repetition  tends  to  make  them 
real  to  the  subject.  They  become  constituent  parts  of  the 
original  experience.  They  are  then  no  longer  falsehoods, 
but  illusions.'  So,  many  of  our  experiences  of  childhood 
are  not  real  memories,  but  have  become  parts  of  our  con- 
sciousness of  the  past  from  frequent  repetition,  by  our 
parents  or  friends,  in  our  hearing.  It  will  be  seen  that 
this  unconscious  filling  in  of  our  past  lives  with  suitable 
details,  takes  its  color  in  different  individuals  from  the 
law  of  preference. 

c.  Hallucinations  of  memory :  the  projection  into  the 
past  of  experiences  which  have  no  foundation  of  fact. 
Illusions  of  this  kind,  it  is  seen,  shade  off  imperceptibly 
into  hallucinations  and  illustrate  the  real  identity  of  the 
two  states.     These  hallucinations  of  memory  cannot  be 

'  The  question  of  responsibility  for  sucli  states  is  not  raised  here. 


ILLUSIONS  OF  REPRESENTATION.  263 

explained,  as  those  of  perception  are,  as  tlie  projection 
of  a  reproduced  image  into  reality,  under  conditions  of 
emotional  or  attentive  excitement ;  since  it  is  the  fact  of 
reproduction  which  is  in  question.  In  cases  of  health- 
ful mental  activity,  such  hallucinations  arise,  probably, 
from  vague  likenesses  of  present  or  fancied  events  to  real 
past  experience,  which  leads  to  their  identification.  The 
past  experience  involved  may  also  be  a  pure  imaginative 
construction  or  a  dream.'  These  latter  experiences 
are  real,  as  experiences,  and  being  subject  to  revival 
with  the  images  of  real  presentations,  are  with  great  dif- 
ficulty distinguished  from  them.  The  experiences  of 
dreams  are,  at  their  occurrence,  often  pure  hallucina- 
tions, and  though  they  are  rectified  after  waking,  they 
remain  with  our  creations  of  fancy,  liable  to  be  identi- 
fied with  past  events  of  real  occurrence.'  More  often 
real  hallucinations  of  memory  indicate  a  greater  or  less 
degree  of  mental  alienation.  Often  insane  subjects  are 
overpowered  by  a  single  conception,  which  assimilates  to 
itself  the  whole  mental  life,  and  leads  to  a  new  mental 
personality.' 

The  curious  feeling  of  familiarity  which  we  sometimes  ex- 
perience in  the  midst  of  surroundings  really  quite  new,  has  been 
much  speculated  upon.  The  fact  of  such  a  feeling  is  incon- 
testable. Plato  attempts  to  turn  it  to  account  as  a  feeling  of 
reminiscence,  from  a  former  life  of  the  soul.  Evolutionists 
have,  in  the  fact  of  race  experience  and  its  organic  modifica- 
tions, a  means  of  accounting  for  the  phenomenon.  Eadestock, 
by  tabulating  his  dreams,  was  able  to  refer  many  such  feelings 
to  experiences  of  his  sleep-life.  Whatever  we  may  say  as  to  the 
influence  of  the  experience  of  our  ancestors  upon  our  own  per- 

'  So  Radestock,  Schlafund  Traum. 

^  See  case  given  by  Carpenter,  loc.  cit.  p.  456. 

^  An  example  of  this  occurred  in  the  State  Lunatic  Asylum  at  Colum- 
bia, S.  C— a  woman  under  the  permanent  illusion  that  she  was  Martha 
Washington.  She  narrated  detailed  incidents  from  her  husband's  life, 
called  visitors  by  the  names  of  his  contemporaries,  and  exhibited  a 
string  of  gold  beads  as  his  last  gift  to  herself. 


264  ILLUSIONS. 

sonal  life,  we  certainly  find  that  our  dreams  become  confused 
with  our  waking  states.  And  taking  these  in  their  infinite 
variety,  in  connection  with  the  forgotten  details  of  our  wak- 
ing life,  we  have  ground,  certainly,  for  all  shades  of  indefi- 
niteness  in  the  reference  of  present  states  to  the  past.  When 
we  remember,  also,  that  the  laws  of  association  in  passive 
imagination  entirely  elude  our  conscious  observation  and 
are  buried,  in  their  activity,  in  the  organic  processes,  we 
surmise  that  the  sphere  of  our  temporal  localization  may  also 
have  an  enlargement  from  the  organic  side.  Brain  modifica- 
tions too  weak  for  conscious  accompaniments,  or  presenting 
these  accompaniments  inopportunely,  may  be  reinstated  in 
actual  experience,  with  so  faint  a  shadow  or  residue  of  their 
former  occurrence,  as  to  be  absolutely  incapable  of  localization 
in  past  time.  And  the  vagueness  of  their  recognition  may  give 
its  character  to  the  feeling  of  familiarity  they  excite.  Or  there 
may  be  a  secondary  vibration  or  echo,  after  a  strong  stimu- 
lation or  shock  to  the  sensoriura.  which  is  projected  into  the 
past,  by  reason  of  the  consciousness  of  a  time  interval,  and  of 
the  great  diiference  in  intensity  of  the  two  shocks.'  Again, 
emotional  analogies  may  often  account  for  this  feeling.  When 
a  state  in  which  emotion  largely  predominates  is  thus  referred 
to  the  past,  it  is  probably  identified  with  a  former  emotional 
state,  the  representative  differences  being  overlooked." 

3.  Illusions  of  Self-consciousness.  We  come  now  to 
speak  of  the  subjective  element  in  memory — the  feeling 
of  self  which  accomj)auies  all  representation.  By  illu- 
sions of  self-consciousness  is  meant  mistakes  either  as 
to  the  affective  state,  of  self,  or  as  to  the  personality  and 
identity  of  self. 

Of  these  subjective  illusions  we  may  mention  emo- 
tional illusions  ;  wrong  estimates  of  our  emotional  states, 
as  when  an  angry  man  declares  that  he  was  "  never 
more  cool  in  his  life."  Desire  leads  us  to  misappre- 
hend our  own  real  affective  state.  Again,  we  misappre- 
hend  ourselves   in   the   past   in  various  ways,  such  as 

'  Cf.  Lewes,  loc.  cit.  p.  130. 

^  Having  this  feeling  on  entering  a  church  in  Alexandria,  Va.,  for 
the  tivst  time,  and  thinking  closely  upon  it,  with  a  view  to  an  analysis 
•of  the  experience,  I  found  it  to  rest  largely  in  the  strong  religious  feel- 
ing which  the  church  service  called  forth. 


ILLUSIONS  OF  THOUGHT.  265 

exaggerating  our  importance,  our  foresight,  etc.,  or,  in 
the  present,  our  sagacity,  influence,  power.  This  is  due 
to  the  intense  emotion  of  self-interest. 

Again,  the  unreflecting  mind  is  under  continual  illu- 
sion as  to  the  continuity  of  self -consciousness.  One  thinks 
of  himself  as  being  the  abiding  watchman  beside  the 
come  and  go  of  our  inner  states,  whose  eye  is  never 
withdrawn,  and  who  never  falls  asleep.  Yet  so  far  is 
this  from  the  truth,  that  there  are  constant  gaps  in  the 
continuity  of  our  consciousness  of  self.'  Every  hour  of 
profound  sleej)  has  no  memory  of  events  and  no  mem- 
ory of  self.  All  lapses  from  vivid  consciousness,  due 
to  drugs,  are  so  many  breaks  in  the  thread  of  our  self- 
conscious  life.  And  when  we  return  to  ourselves,  we  are 
completely  lost,  by  the  failure  we  experience  in  our  ef- 
forts to  connect  the  awaking  state  with  anything  before 
it.  As  the  previous  conscious  state  returns  in  memory, 
we  simply  leave  out  the  interval,  and  connect  the  parted 
ends  of  life,  and  continuity  is  again  our  illusion.* 

III.  Illusions  of  Thought.  Finally,  there  is  a  class  of 
illusional  states  which  arise  from  the  operations  of  the 
logical  or  discursive  faculty.  These  will  be  better  un- 
derstood when  that  function  has  been  studied.  Con- 
sidered as  exclusive  of  the  other  kinds  of  illusion,  they 
comprise  what  are  termed,  in  logic,  fallacies  of  inference, 
material  and  formal.  As  far  as  they  are  material,  they 
spring  from  mistaken  interpretation  of  the  reality  of 
mental  products  :  and  when  purely  formal,  they  reside 
in  the  method  of  the  logical  process  itself.' 

'  We  deal  here  "with  the  empirical  self-consciousness,  leaving  the 
metaphysical  questions  connected  with  it  quite  untouched. 

-  Cf.  Sullj%  Illusions,  p.  290;  also  Volkmann,  loc.  cit.,  ir.  p.  220. 

^  See  Sidgwick's  thorough  treatise,  Fallacies,  and  consult  the  Logics 
under  that  heading. 


266  ILLUSIONS. 


§  5.  Detection  and  Rectification  of  Illusions. 

In  general,  illusional  states  do  not  have  the  charac- 
teristics which  usually  distinguish  reproductions  from 
presentations.  They  are  intense  ;  they  are  localized ; 
they  are  more  or  less  fixed  in  an  escort  or  ideal  environ- 
ment, which  gives  them  an  apperceptive  truthfulness 
and  force.  For  the  detection  of  illusion,  it  is  only  neces- 
sary that  an  image  return  to  the  normal  standard  in 
any  one  of  these  respects :  that  is,  that  it  become  very 
feeble,  that  it  have  no  definite  localization,  that  it  appear 
in  consciousness  with  an  inappro23riate  appercej)tive 
escort,  or  with  none.  Hence  from  the  nature  of  the  illu- 
sional state  itself,  we  have  three  means  of  detecting  it, 
which,  when  found  existing  together,  make  the  case  un- 
mistakable. 

1.  Diminished  Intensity.  The  fact  of  diminished  in- 
tensity, as  distinguishing  an  image  from  a  sense  presen- 
tation, has  already  been  dwelt  upon.  The  fact  applies 
to  all  possible  reproductions.  This  test  is  of  little  value 
in  cases  of  very  vivid  representation,  and  in  cases  where 
localization  enters,  since,  in  such  cases,  this  latter  fact 
is  the  controlling  one.  But  in  cases  of  vague  sensation, 
and  of  sensations  which  are  not  customarily  localized,  we 
are  driven  to  the  discrimination  in  intensity,  as  the  only 
means  of  detecting  illusion. 

2.  Absence  of  Definite  Locality.  On  the  other  hand, 
in  the  case  of  an  image  whose  corresponding  sensation 
is  always  localized — as  images  of  sight  and  touch^ — the 
absence  of  spacial  locality  is  at  once  a  sufiicient  guarantee 
of  its  illusional  character.  However  intense,  detailed, 
and  clear,  for  example,  the  image  of  a  house  may  be, 
if  it  is  not  localized  in  front,  behind,  somewhere  in  the 
visual  field,  we  pronounce  it  at  once  an  illusion.     The 


INAPPROPEIATE  ESCORT.  267 

same  is  also  true  of  tem]Doral  localization  in  cases  of 
illusion  of  memory. 

A  distinction  should  be  made,  with  Volkmann,  between 
localization,  in  this  connection,  and  joro;'ecfiO«.  The  fact  that 
an  image  is  not  definitely  localized  in  space  may  still  be  true, 
tliough  the  image  may  be  projected  without,  as  an  external 
thing.  Projection  seems  to  imply  conditions  of  space  in  the 
mental  product,  but  not  conditions  of  place.  When  a  hallu- 
cination is  detected  and  recognized  and  its  position  in  space 
filled  by  real  things,  it  does  not  then  become  an  image  merely, 
felt  to  be  subjective;  but  retains  its  projection  without  us. 
This  distinction  is  covered  by  Taine  by  saying  that  with  pro- 
jection a  representation  is  a  sensation;  without,  it  is  an  image. 
In  other  words,  the  sensational  data  which  contribute  to  the 
perception  of  space  are  pi-esent  in  the  projected  representa- 
tion, but  without  the  definite  character  necessary  to  localiza- 
tion— a  proof,  again,  that  space  perception  proceeds  upon 
physiological  data. 

3.  Inappropriate  Escort.  This  test  gives  us  a  very 
convenient  and  practicable  method  of  banishing  illusions 
whenever  sense  perception,  generally,  and  logical  thought 
are  normal.  The  character  which  we  instinctively  look 
for  is  incongridty  or  contradiction  in  the  presentational 
continuum.  The  primary  consciousness  of  the  actual 
world,  as  it  breaks  in  through  the  open  avenues  of 
sense,  presenting  a  consistent  whole  reported  by  all  the 
senses  together,  suffers  immediate  violence  by  the  in- 
trusion of  a  representation  which  has  not  external  truth. 
Incongruities  and  inconsistencies  at  once  arise.  These 
may  all  be  considered  as  some  form  of  contradiction  in 
consciousness,  and  lead  us  to  the  principle  of  contradic- 
tory representation.  This  principle  may  be  stated  thus : 
of  tioo  contradictory  states  of  consciousness  one  at  least  must 
he  false.  In  the  thought  function,  we  find  the  same  prin- 
ciple, called  the  logical  law  of  non-contradiction.  In 
the  sphere  of  pure  representation,  this  contradiction 
takes  the  form  of  repressive  or  antagonistic  opposition 
among  images  ;  the  quality  and  range  of  escort  being  the 


268  ILL  USI0N8. 

ground  of  divisiou  as  to  wliich  is  true,  and  wliicli  false. 
In  many  cases,  the  escort  of  tlie  true  presentation  is 
already  so  fixed  in  consciousness  and  confirmed  by  dif- 
ferent sense-deliverances,  tliat  a  hallucination  is  at  once 
detected.  A  visual  image  is  seen  on  the  background  of 
a  wall  or  forest,  which  latter  comes  strongly  out  when 
attended  to,  and  the  hallucination  disappears.  An  ap- 
peal is  often  made  to  another  sense  to  confirm  such  an 
image.  The  other  sense,  as  touch,  establishes  a  differ- 
ent external  series,  and  the  hallucination  is  detected.' 
This  last  form  of  contradiction — that  between  two  dif- 
ferent senses — affords  the  only  practicable  test,  in  many 
cases,  of  illusion  proper  in  percepti6n,  since,  as  has  been 
seen,  the  real  object  in  this  case  gives  to  the  illusional 
image  its  locality  and  escort,  as  far  as  a  single  sense  is 
concerned.  There  is  nothing  in  the  physical  surround- 
ings to  lead  us  to  believe  that  the  Indian  is  really  a  tree, 
or  that  the  slight  noise  is  not  his  tread.  On  approach- 
ing and  touching  the  tree,  however,  our  illusion  of  sight 
is  rectified.  Further,  we  have  here  the  reason  for  fre- 
quent hallucination  and  illusion  when  the  organ  of  sense 
is  fatigued.  The  incapacity  of  the  organ  to  produce  the 
normal  presentation,  and  its  proper  escort,  removes  the 
means  of  detecting  creatures  of  the  imagination. 

This  principle  of  contradiction  also  enables  us  to 
bring  to  bear  upon  images  the  conclusions  of  a  higher 
nature,  which  we  have  before  reached  :  conclusions  based 
upon  suflicient  reasons.  Memory,  natural  law,  testi- 
mony, experience,  rational  truth,  any  of  these  may  lead 
us  to  disbelieve  in  an  image,  though  it  persist  in  our 
conscious  life.  A  resident  of  New  York  would  not  be- 
lieve that  a  herd  of  buffalo  had  been  seen  in  Central 
Park  or  a   wild  Indian  in  his  parlor  :  a  stone  unsup- 

'  Christ  appealed  to  this  test  in  telling  Thomas  to  touch  his  body  : 
the  vision  might  well  have  been  a  hallucination,  due  to  exhaustion  or 
grief. 


INAPPROPRIATE  ESCORT.  269 

ported  in  midair  we  simply  treat  as  an  absurdity.  In 
all  sucli  cases  the  sense  report  is  subordinated  to  higher 
rational  conviction. 

This  subordination  of  lower  to  higher  forms  of  evidence 
leads  to  a  conservatism  in  science  which  is  its  only  safety  from 
the  wildest  speculation  and  delusion.  In  psychology,  the 
doctrine  of  telepathy  carries  Avith  it  a  proposition  in  contra- 
diction with  the  experience  and  belief  of  the  world  in  all  his- 
tory :  that  there  may  be  direct  communication  between  mind 
and  mind.'  Not  only  must  the  evidence  be  convincing  as  to 
its  force  and  interpretation,  but  it  must  also  be  sufficient  to 
overcome  the  strong  presumption  that  the  alleged  facts  on 
which  it  rests,  have  a  psychological  and  illusional  origin.^ 

On  illusions,  consult :  Taine,  Intelligence,  pt.  1,  bk.  2,  ch.  i,  in, 
and  IV,  and  pt.  3,  bk.  1;  AVundt,  Physiolog.  Psychol.,  cb.  xix.  1; 
Carpenter,  Ment.  Physiol.,  p.  165  and  pp.  206-209;  George,  Psychol., 
p.  362;  Volkmann,  Lehrbuch  d.  Psychol.,  §§  103-104  and  116; 
Griesinger,  Mental  Pathology  and  Therapeutics ;  Ribot,  Maladies 
de  la  Memoire  (also  Diseases  of  the  Will  and  Personality,  3  vols.)  ; 
Gurney,  Mind,  s.  p.  161;  Esquirol,  Maladies  mentales ;  Krafft- 
Ebing,  Bie  Sinnesdelirien  ;  Binet,  Mind,  ix.  p.  206  ;  Sully,  Illusions  ; 
Krauss,  Bie  Psychologie  des  Verhrechens,  pt.  1,  ch.  i ;  (Sleep)  Porter, 
Hum.  Int.,  pp.  331-351;  Brierre  de  Boismont,  Hallucinations; 
Maury,  Le  Sommeil  et  les  Rives ;  Radestock,  Schlaf  unci  Traum  ; 
Spitta,  Schlaf-  und  Traumzustande  ;  Mayer,  Sinnestduschungen. 

Further  Problems  for  Study : 

The  problems  of  mental  pathology ; 
Hypnotic  illusion  and  suggestion  ; 
Manifold  personality ; 
Belief  and  evidence. 

'  See  Gurney,  iu  PJiantasms  of  the  Living. 

'  For  the  theory  of  the  detection  of  logical  illusions,  or  fallacies,  see 
the  Logics. 


ELABOEATION. 


CHAPTER   XIV. 

THOUGHT. 

§  1.  Natuee  of  Thought. 

General  Character  of  the  Thinking  Process.  As  a  de- 
parture iu  the  mental  life,  thought  seems  in  its  nature 
to  present  processes  hitherto  entirely  wanting.  Thought, 
thinking,  reasoning,  characterize  an  operation  at  first 
sight  distinct  from  imagination,  memory,  perception. 
Yet  it  is  from  these  subordinate  operations  in  their  sin- 
gular manifestation,  that  thought  is  distinct,  not  from 
the  generic  power  of  apperception  which  includes  and 
energizes  them  all.  Thought  is  the  crowning  act  of  ap- 
perception. In  the  operations  already  considered,  the 
relating  activity  of  attention  has  been  presupposed,  es- 
pecially iu  the  synthetic  process  of  perception  :  but  its 
further  pursuit  has  been  neglected  in  the  examination 
of  the  representative  function  of  mind.  Yet  this  latter 
function  not  only  rests  upon  apperception  unconscious, 
but  leads  up  to  and  renders  possible,  apperception  con- 
scious. In  perception  and  imagination,  the  laws  of  as- 
sociation hold  the  apperceiving  power  down  to  a  me- 
chanical reconstruction  of  the  data  of  presentation  :  in 
reasoning,  the  energy  of  apperception  transcends  these 
bonds,  and  proceeding  upon  the  data  of  representation, 
realizes  itself  in  its  own  way,  according  to  its  oivn  laivs. 
It  is  conscious  and  voluntary.  Thought,  therefore, 
looked  at  from  the  subjective  side,  is  the  reapperception 

270 


CHARACTER  OF  THE  THINKINa  PROCESS.        271 

of  the  api3erceptive  product,  iu  an  active  conscious  way : 
and  from  the  objective  side,  it  is  the  development  of 
mind  in  its  essential  nature  as  the  organ  of  the  realiza- 
tion of  truth  ;  a  rational  and  teleological  development, 
v/hich  imagination  pictures  as  possible,  and  synthetic 
perception,  although  mechanical,  typifies  and  fore- 
shadows/ 

Thought,  therefore,  is  not  a  power  or  faculty  as  held  by  the 
old  psychology.  It  is  rather  the  fuller  exhibition  of  the  one 
power  or  energy  which  underlies  all  the  faculties.  In  thought, 
only,  does  the  attention,  which  is  limited  by  the  senses  in  per- 
ception, and  misled  by  the  range  and  freedom  of  reproduction, 
in  imagination,  get  the  upper  hand,  and  follow  its  own  rubrics 
of  independent  action.  As  related  to  perception,  therefore, 
thought  can  be  called  the  synthesis  of  percepts,  as  perception 
is  the  synthesis  of  sensations  :  and  as  related  to  imagination, 
it  may  be  called  the  construction  of  combinations  in  accord- 
ance with  laws  of  its  own,  and  the  laws  of  external  truth  ; 
just  as  imagination  is  the  construction  of  combinations  in 
accordance  with  the  laws  of  mental  reproduction.  For  exam- 
ple, we  can  imagine  Samson  dead  and  the  temple  of  the 
Philistines  still  standing ;  there  is  nothing  in  the  mere  co- 
existence of  the  representations  to  forbid  it.  But  we  cannot 
thinJc  it,  for  it  violates  the  mental  principle  of  cause  and 
effect.  So  we  can  picture  the  Deity  doing  wrong,  but  we  can- 
not think  it.  The  relation  to  other  phases  of  the  mental  life 
will  become  plainer  as  we  consider  the  different  stages  in  the 
thought  process. 

The  relation  of  psychology  to  logic  should  be  spoken  of 
here,  both  to  indicate  the  true  sphere  of  the  latter  and  to  jus- 
tify the  following  treatment  of  the  reasoning  process.  Logic 
as  taught  in  the  text-books  is  a  formal  science.  It  deals  with 
the  finished  products  of  the  apperceptive  faculty,  as  they  are 
seen  in  their  matured  forms,  independent  of  their  origin, 
truthfulness,  or  psychological  justification.  As  a  formal 
skeleton  or  framework  of  thought,  logic  misses  the  meaning, 
the  motive,  which  is  alone  valuable  to  psychology.  There 
might  also  be  a  logic  of  perception,  or  of  imagination  :  being 
the  analytic  form  in  which  these  operations  cast  their  material, 
whatever  this  material  be.  Consequently,  we  are  concerned 
merely  with  the  nature  of  the  thought  process — though  a  full 

'  On  the  apperceptive  nature  of  the  thought  operatious,  see  Wiindt, 
Logik,  I,  pt.  1,  ch.  II. 


272  THOUOHT. 

treatment  would  include  also  its  logic, — its  value  and  bearing 
in  the  mental  life  ;  and  reference  is  made  to  the  books  on 
logic  for  that  side  of  the  case.  The  distinction  is  most  clearly 
seen  in  the  treatment  of  the  judgment.' 

Stages  in  the  Thinking  Process.  The  gingle  appercep- 
tive act  in  which  we  have  seen  thinking  to  consist,  takes 
forms  of  more  or  less  complexit}^  in  three  stages  of  men- 
tal product : 

Conception,  Judgment,  Beasoning.  These  are  both 
chronologically  and  essentially  dependent  uj^on  one  an- 
other, and  will  be  considered  in  this  order. 

§  3.  Conception. 

Process  of  Conception.  Conception  is  the  process  by 
which  we  reach  the  general  notion  ;  which  is,  as  shall  be 
seen  below,  a  representative  state  of  mind,  which  holds 
the  attention  upon  a  plurality  or  class  of  objects  taken 
together,  or  upon  any  individual  considered  as  a  mem- 
ber of  a  class,  and  not  as  an  indi\ddual.  Man,  tree,  gov- 
ernment, virtue,  are  general  notions.  Considered  as 
products  of  conception,  they  are  called  concepts,  and 
considered  as  names,  in  language,  terms.  The  concept 
is  related  to  the  percept  as  the  percept  to  the  sensa- 
tion. The  percept  is  built  uj)  upon  the  basis  of  sensa- 
tions, but  can  be  applied  to  a  single  sensation  only  as  it 
is  representative  of  others,  or  carries  the  force  of  others 
in  itself :  so  a  concept  is  built  up  upon  percepts,  and 
can  be  applied  to  a  single  percept  only  as  it  is  taken  to 
represent  others.  The  range  of  a  concept  in  its  appli- 
cation to  individuals  is  called  its  Extension  or  breadth  : 
thus  man  has  greater  extension  than  poet.  It  applies  to 
a  greater  number  of  single  things.  And  the  meaning  of 
a  concept  in  regard  to  the  qualities,  attributes,  or  char- 
acteristics, which  it  includes,  is  called  its  Intension  or 

'  Below,  §  3,  p.  383. 


PROCESS  OF  CONCEPTION :  ABSTRACTION.        273 

deptli  :  thus  poet  has  greater  intension  than  man,  since^ 
in  addition  to  the  qualities  of  all  men,  it  includes  the 
quality  of  being  poetical.'  The  growth  of  the  concept 
may  be  observed  from  the  side  either  of  intension  or  ex- 
tension :  in  the  former  case,  it  is  known  as  Abstraction  ; 
in  the  latter,  as  Generalization. 

I.  Abstraction.  1.  Analysis.  The  finished  perception, 
or  intuition  of  a  thing,  it  will  be  remembered,  involves  a 
synthesis  of  sensations  giving  an  ideal  product.  The 
percept,  in  its  first  experience,  however,  is  thrown  into 
consciousness  by  external  causes  and  has  no  such  dis- 
tinct unity.  The  child's  first  sight  of  his  father  is  only 
a  mass  of  visual  sensations,  and  when  he  begins  to  use 
the  name  supplied  from  without,  he  applies  it  to  any 
man  indiscriminately.  He  has  no  such  thing  as  a  general 
conception  of  man ;  for  the  reason  he  calls  a  stranger 
papa,  is  not  that  the  term  applies  equally  to  other  men, 
but  that  he  mistakes  the  individual  for  the  man  he  is 
accustomed  to  call  papa.  Yet  in  the  psychological  state 
of  the  child,  we  recognize  a  general  notion ;  an  image  or 
symbol  which  answers  for  any  one  of  many  individuals. 
So  it  is  probably,  also,  with  animals.  The  peculiar  feat- 
ures of  different  men  are  undetected,  and  the  intension  of 
the  term,  while  very  great,  is  of  the  most  apparent  super- 
ficiality. This  we  believe  to  be  the  beginning  of  all  our 
general  notions.  In  adult  thinking  when  new  concep- 
tions enter  our  mental  life,  it  is  from  the  broadest  and 
vaguest  mental  pictures  that  they  gradually  take  form. 
My  first  experience  of  a  new  word,  say  government,  in 
my  reading,  gives  me  only  the  vague  meaning  which  I 
gather  from  the  context.  I  carry  this  conception,  under 
which  all  conceivable  forms  of  government  might  pass, 
until  from  some  other  source  my  idea  is  clarified.     From 

'  Mill,  Logic,  bk.  1,  ch.  n,  §  5  ;  he  uses  the  term  connotation  for  in- 
tension. 


274  THOUGHT. 

this  point,  increasing  experience  leads  me  to  limit  the 
meaning  of  the  term,  by  dropping  marks  which  are  not 
cihvays  present.  That  is,  the  intensive  meaning  of  any 
notion  is  analyzed,  and  only  those  qualities  retained 
which  if  dropped  would  destroy  the  concept.  This 
form  of  abstraction  may  be  called  Analysis. 

The  difference  between  this  treatment  and  that  m  the 
formal  logics  is  plain.  Abstraction  is  not,  in  psychology  at 
least,  a  voluntary  dropping  off  of  certain  qualities  in  order 
that  another,  already  selected,  may  be  considered  alone.  This 
would  involve  the  conception  beforehand  ready-made.  On 
the  contrary,  it  is  a  gradual  unforeseen  process  of  elimination, 
as  the  discovery  of  truth  necessitates  it.  Instead  of  starting 
with  different  governments,  abstracting  the  quality  of  sover- 
eignty from  them  all,  and  leaving  behind  their  individual 
characters  :  I  begin  with  a  vague  notion  of  government,  and 
by  analysis  through  experience,  find  that  sovereignty  alone  is 
essential  to  all  its  forms.  This  analysis,  as  appears  later,  is 
the  basis  of  the  analytic  judgment.'  By  it  the  concept  is  freed 
from  connections  with  others,  and  also  from  confusion  and 
dependence  among  its  own  parts. 

The  growth  of  our  knowledge  of  an  object  which  thus 
leads  us  to  drop  from  the  concept  all  accidental  qualities,  is  a 
progressive  decrease  of  intension ;  yet  it  is  a  growth  toward 
more  exact  and  comprehensive  insight  into  the  real  nature  of 
the  object  defined.  For  this  reason,  a  distinction  should  be 
drawn  within  the  idea  of  intension,  according  as  intension  is 
great  in  number  of  qualities — its  usual  significance — or  in  ex- 
actness, thoroughness,  and  adequacy.  The  former  might  be 
expressed  by  Mr.  Mill's  term,  connotation,  and  the  latter  by 
the  word  depth.  In  our  example  above,  the  first  vague  notion 
has  greater  intension,  as  connotation,  but,  as  has  ])een  said,  it 
is  superficial  :  it  is  only  as  the  concept  is  narrowed  down  to  a 
few  well-marked  qualities  that  our  knowledge  is  adequate  and 
deep.  So  important  is  this  distinction,  that  George,  though 
not  noting  its  bearing  upon  intension,  limits  the  word  con- 
cept (Begnjj')  altogether  to  notions  which  have  this  property 
of  depth:  that  is,  those  that  carry  ''complete  knowledge  of 
an  object  and  its  origin. "  * 

'  On  this  view  of  abstraction,  cf.  Ward,  loc.  cit.,  also  Volkmann,  loc. 
cit.,  II.  246.  The  distinction  between  psychological  and  logical  notions 
is  brought  out  by  Sigwart,  Logik,  pp.  261-272. 

■^  Lehrbuch,  pp.  499-500. 


PROCESS  OF  CONCEPTION :   OENEEALIZATION.     275 

This  process  of  analysis  is  furthered  by  the  actual  play  of 
representations  in  memory.'  By  the  law  of  the  progressive 
fading  of  memories  in  the  past,  individual  peculiarities  are 
lost,  and  individuals  of  the  same  general  nature  are  identified 
with  one  another.  The  dim  shadowy  outline  thus  recalled 
-serves  the  purposes  of  the  general  notion.  This  accounts  for 
the  greater  vagueness  and  indefiniteness  of  the  image,  as  the 
notion  becomes  more  general.  It  gives  a  representative  sup- 
port to  the  general  concept,  though  it  is  not  the  concept  it- 
self :  the  latter  involves  something  which  is  felt  throughout 
to  be  unrepresentable.  This  reduction  of  images  to  a  single 
''composite"  or  "generic  image"  is  typified  in  composite  pho- 
tography, as  Mr.  Galton  has  shown." 

2.  Synthesis.  Yet  another  result  from  experience  is 
necessary  to  the  complete  development  of  the  concept : 
its  enlargement  in  intension.  In  the  testing  which  we 
constantly  make  of  the  adequacy  of  our  notions,  we  find 
that  not  only  must  elements  be  dropped  from  our  first 
tentative  concepts,  but  that  others  must  be  added.  New 
discoveries  constantly  increase  the  intension  of  familiar 
concepts.  Eesearch  in  natural  science  reveals  an  unex- 
pected property  in  a  substance,  or  mark  in  a  specimen, 
"which  is  thereafter  a  part  of  the  concept.  This  contin- 
ual addition  to  the  intension  of  the  concept  is  synthesis. 
It  lies  at  the  basis  of  the  synthetic  judgment. 

We  thus  find  two  kinds  of  change  constantly  going 
on  in  our  concepts,  both  of  which  tend  to  define  and 
purify  them  into  complete  harmony  with  truth.  In  the 
method  of  Socrates,  both  these  correctives  of  conception 
were  kept  in  view,  and  his  appeal  to  the  experience  of 
others  was  a  means  to  the  widening  and  enlarging  of  ex- 
perience. But,  further,  the  same  process,  especially  its 
synthetic  aspect,  tends  to  a  modification  of  the  concept 
in  its  extension. 

II.  Generalization.     Generalization  is  the  process  of 

'  See  the  clear  exposition  of  Waitz,  Lehrbuch,  pp.  518-533. 
'  Inquiries  into  Human  Faculty. 


276  THOUGHT. 

making  more  general  the  application  of  the  class  name 
to  individuals ;  that  is,  the  bringing  of  more  individuals 
within  the  class.  Abstraction,  as  analysis,  both  hinders 
and  aids  this  process  :  it  hinders  it,  inasmuch  as  by  re- 
moving the  vagueness  and  superficiality  of  the  concept^ 
it  rules  out  objects  at  first  included  ;  and  it  aids  it, 
since,  in  reducing  the  number  of  qualities  included,  it 
enables  more  objects  to  meet  the  intensive  requirement. 
As  synthesis,  abstraction  increases  the  generality  of  a 
notion,  since  the  discovery  of  a  new  quality  tends  to 
bring  into  the  class  objects  before  overlooked  which 
possess  that  quality.  Yet  we  see  the  contrary  result 
here  also,  since  in  adding  qualities  we  increase  the  re- 
quirements of  intensive  eligibility. 

The  process  of  generalization  is  exceedingly  difficult  and  in 
actual  life  seldom  absolutely  exact.  Only  in  cases  of  complete 
induction  can  we  rest  safely  in  it.  Mistakes  and  fallacies  in 
reasoning,  failures  in  nature-discovery,  are  usually  found  to  rest 
in  hasty  or  superficial  generalization.  And  further,  we  may 
remark  at  this  point,  the  very  great  instability  and  mobility 
of  our  concepts.  Since  they  are  a  development  in  the  mind 
depending  upon  experience,  and  experience  is  unlimited,  our 
concepts  are  always  subject  to  correction  and  revision.  A 
concept  which  seems  clear  and  exact  is  given  a  different  place 
and  estimation  in  our  thought,  often  from  an  hour's  conver- 
sation with  another  ;  and  we  say,  we  ''  see  it  in  a  new  light." 
This  is  especially  true  in  the  higher  abstractions.  Chapters 
in  moral  science  are  devoted  simply  to  the  meaning  of  the  con- 
cepts virtue  and  right.  Intercourse  labors  constantly  under 
the  disadvantage  which  arises  from  ambiguous  meanings. 

Products  of  Conception.  From  conception,  therefore, 
we  obtain  two  classes  of  notions  :  the  abstract  notion^ 
which  brings  before  us  qualities  regarded  as  more  or  less 
distinct  from  the  things  in  which  they  inhere ;  and  the 
general  notion,  which  brings  before  us  things  in  more  or 
less  disregard  of  the  qualities  which  inhere  in  them. 
The  former  is  a  concept  in  intension,  the  latter  in  ex- 
tension.    To  these,  as  ready  classes,  the  ordinary  per- 


CONCEPTION  AS  DISCOVERT  OF  RELATIONS.      211 

ceptions  of  our  adult  life  are  referred  by  tlie  most  rapid 
and  careless  reference. 

Conception  as  Discovery  of  Eolations.  From  the 
preceding  account  of  conception,  its  essential  appercep- 
tive nature  is  seen.  Relations  of  identity,  likeness,  sub- 
ordination, constitute  its  ground.  Percepts,  themselves 
synthetic  j^roducts  of  apperception,  are  synthesized  anew, 
and  their  real  relations  idealized  in  the  concept.  The 
relations  thus  summed  up  are  conformable  to  truth, 
while  those  of  the  imagination  are  not.  And  it  does  not 
suffice,  as  an  account  of  this  process,  simply  to  say  that 
the  relations  exist,  and  that  is  sufficient  for  their  appre- 
hension ;  for,  as  has  been  so  often  said,  we  have  to  pass 
liere,  as  in  synthetic  perception,  from  the  relation  of 
perceptions  to  the  j)erception  of  relations.  It  is  only  as 
excitations  that  percepts  serve,  excitations  to  a  spiritual 
activity  by  which  presentations  of  the  relations  of  simi- 
larity, equality,  contrast,  arise :  presentations  which, 
as  Lotze  says,  "  would  not  be  possible  without  this  new 
spiritual  activity."  ' 

Language  in  its  Relation  to  Conception.  With  the 
general  philosoph}'-  and  development  of  speech  we  are 
not  here  concerned,  having  to  do  simply  with  its  primary 
function  as  a  means  of  symbolic  representation.  Words 
answer  the  purjDose  in  conception  that  images  do  in 
perception.  They  hold  in  a  representable  symbol  the 
result  of  the  apperceptive  process.  The  reproduced 
image  passes  through  all  the  phases  of  memory  and 
imaginative  construction  without  recurrent  reference  to 
the  real  objects  :  so  words  carry  through  all  the  higher 
operations  of  thought,  the  summary  of  experience  which 
the  concept  represents.  And,  further,  by  means  of  vo- 
cal articulation,  they  make  its  communication  to  others 

'  Outline  of  Psychology ,  §  23. 


278  THOUGHT. 

possible.  Consequently,  language  lias  a  twofold  psj'cho- 
logical  utility :  1.  It  fixates  and  expresses  exact  stages 
in  mental  product,  thus  enabling  the  mind,  instead  of 
returning  constantly  to  its  experiential  sources,  to  take 
its  departure  from  some  advanced  position.  2.  It, 
consequently,  enormously  abbreviates  and  facilitates 
thought.  A  name,  once  given  to  a  conception,  holds  it  as 
a  conquest  ever  afterwards,  however  circuitous  and  pain- 
ful were  the  original  route  to  its  acquisition.' 

Yet  language  often  serves  to  confuse  and  hinder 
thought,  in  that  words  tend  to  give  a  stability  and  fixed- 
ness to  conceptions,  and  do  not  admit  of  the  progressive 
rectification  which  the  process  of  abstraction  affords.  A 
study  of  word  derivations  shows  the  manner  in  which 
conceptions  grow  away  from  the  first  meanings  of  the 
terms  used. 

This  fact  that  language  simj)ly  performs  a  symbolic  func- 
tion in  company  with  images,  sensations,  and  indeed  all 
representative  states,  hinders  our  elevating  it  to  a  distinct 
place  in  psychology."  Whatever  the  "symbolic  power'' be, 
it  certainly  is  exercised  before  the  growth  of  language.  It 
seems  to  rest  in  apperception  itself,  being  a  relation  of  sub- 
stitution or  identity. 

The  Use  of  Images  in  Conception.  The  image  which 
serves  to  give  representative  force  to  the  concept,  has 
already  been  spoken  of.'  Further,  it  may  be  said  that 
the  notions  which  are  less  general  have  a  distinct  mental 
picture,  which  presents  the  barest  outline  or  scheme  of 
the  class  reality.'     This  image  is  seen,  if  closely  exam- 

1  On  the  physiology  of  speech,  see  Ferrier,  loc.  cii.,  chap,  xi;  Mauds- 
ley,  Phi/s.  of  Mind,  chap,  viii ;  also  M.  A.  Starr  iu  McCosh's  Cog.  Pow- 
ers, p.  201. 

2  McCosh,  ibid.,  p.  196. 

3  See  p.  275. 

•  *  So  Berkeley,  Mill,  Hamilton :  cf.  Drobisch,  Psych.,  pp.  56  and  102, 
and  his  quotation  from  Tiedemann. 


CONCEPTION  AND  REALITY.  279 

ined,  to  result  from  a  succession  of  images  of  particulars, 
presented  in  quick  succession,  and  then  discarded  as 
lla^dng  too  great  intension/  There  is  a  distinct  feeling 
of  the  inadequacy  of  each  image  in  turn,  and  this  feeling 
persists  in  the  final  representation.  As  Lotze  says,"  "  We 
feel  that  any  other  color  has  an  equal  right  to  serve," 
as  that  which  we  picture  for  the  general  concept  of  color. 
This  vague  outline  takes  its  particular  features  from  the 
individuals  to  which  we  have  given  most  attention  or  from 
the  properties  which,  from  experience,  we  have  come  to- 
consider  essential.  The  effect  of  attention,  also,  is  to 
bring  out  strongl}-  certain  properties  in  the  concept  to 
the  neglect  of  others,  as  Mill  well  shows.^ 

In  the  case  of  the  more  abstract  notions,  however,  it 
is  very  doubtful  whether  we  proceed  by  any  actual  pic- 
ture of  the  real  meaning ;  as  in  the  concepts,  virtue,  and 
gratitude.  Yet  the  image  of  the  printed  word  often 
takes  the  place  of  such  a  picture.  In  rapid  discourse, 
also,  we  seem  to  use  the  words  for  what  they  themselves 
convey,  without  further  imaging.  There  is  no  reason 
that  the  mere  auditory  image  of  a  word  should  not  an- 
swer the  purposes  of  the  concept  as  well  as  the  visual 
image. 

Relation  of  Conception  to  Reality  and  Belief.  From 
what  has  been  said,  the  degree  and  kind  of  reference 
which  the  concept  has  to  reality,  is  apparent.  The  con- 
cepts are  constructed  through  the  discernment  and 
mental  construction  of  "  intelligible  relations  "  *  between 
percepts  ;  which  percepts,  though  themselves  also  men- 
tal constructions,  correspond  to  real  objective  things. 
Percepts  are  reconstructions  of  reality,  intuitions.     Con- 

'  So  Hume,  Treatise  on  Hum.  Nat.,  p.  34. 

"  Logik,  p.  31. 

^  Exam,  of  Hamilton. 

*  Mansel. 


280  THOUGHT. 

sequentlj  the  concept  has  an  immediate  reference  to 
reality  in  the  percepts  whose  intelligible  relations  it 
sums  up.  Every  concept  asserts  :  1.  A  plurality  of  per- 
cepts, which  assure  us  of  the  existence  of  one  or  more  ob- 
jects or  events  in  space  or  time,  and  2.  The  jDerception  of 
certain  intensive  relations  between  these  percepts,  which 
assure  us  that  the  same  relations  are  objective.  Of 
any  reality  further  than  this,  that  is  of  a  real  objective 
thing  which  answers  to  the  conceptual  ideal,  we  have  no 
assurance,  either  in  psychological  necessity  or  objective 
experience. 

In  the  second  of  these  ''assurances,"  M'e  find  the  use 
of  the  concept  as  type,  in  the  mind  and  in  nature.  Inas- 
much as  the  qualities  of  the  general  notion  are  only  those 
which  belong  to  each  member  of  the  class,  the  concept 
becomes  the  type  of  pure  class  intension.  It  is  never 
realized  in  nature,  since  the  concreting  of  it  makes  it 
subject  to  the  accidental  properties  of  reality.  When  a 
single  thing  is  taken  as  type,  it  is  with  the  understanding 
that  it  is  subject  to  the  revision  and  criticism  which  we 
have  found  all  individual  images,  serving  in  this  capacity, 
to  be  subject. 

We  are  here  at  the  heart  of  the  controversy  which  has 
given  rise  to  logical  Eealism,  Nominalism,  and  Conceptual- 
ism.'  Realists  hold  that  tliere  is  an  archtypal  reality  cor- 
responding to  the  general  notion  ;  this  doctrine  is  seen 
in  its  purest  phase  in  Plato's  idea.  Nominalists  hold  that 
the  general  notion  has  no  reality  except  in  individuals, 
and  no  mental  form  other  than  the  individual  image  :  "gen- 
eral notions  are  only  particular  ones  considered  in  a  certain 
light. ''^  Conceptualists  maintain  that  the  general  notion  is  a 
mental  construction  apart  from  individual  percepts,  and  has 
reality  as  such.  It  is  distinct  both  from  the  externally  real, 
and  from  the  verbally,  or  representatively,  nominal.     Upon 

'  On  this  gi-eat  discussion,  see  Hamilton,  Lectures  on  Metaphy.,  xxxv; 
Porter,  Hum.  Int.,  part  3,  chaps,  ii  and  iv;  also  references  at  the  end  of 
this  chapter. 

2  Hume,  Treatise,  I,  1,  §  7. 


UNITY  OF  THE  CONCEPT.  281 

this  controversy,  we  may  say,  in  general,  that  Eealism  is  right 
in  saying  :  a.  That  there  is  a  real  type  more  or  less  approached 
in  each  individual ;  and  h.  That  the  general  notion  arises  from 
relations  of  resemblance  which  are  real.  On  the  other  hand, 
Nominalism  is  right  in  saying  :  a.  That  the  general  notion  is 
a  name  which  has  no  external  reality  except  that  of  individual 
things ;  h.  That  it  proceeds  by  the  use  of  individual  images;  and 
c.  That  words  are  its  peculiar  expression.  But  Conceptualism 
covers  all  these  partial  truths  in  saying  :  a.  That  the  general 
notion  is  a  real  mental  product  arising  from  observation  of 
real  relations  and  itself  constituting  the  type  to  which  indi- 
viduals more  or  less  closely  approach  ;  b.  That  these  relations 
are  thought  relations  as  well  as  real  relations ;  c.  That  the 
individual  image  is  itself  a  thought  product;  and  d.  That 
woi'ds  must  have  a  thought  significance,  otherwise  they  are  a 
mere  afflatus  vocis.^ 


Unity  of  the  Concept.  Development  of  Idea  of  Identity. 
The  unity  of  the  concept  is,  therefore,  an  ideal  unity,  a 
unity  of  product  rather  than  of  its  material  or  objective 
realization.  There  is  no  process  of  conceptual  intui- 
tion of  sense  as  there  is  of  perceptual  intuition  of  sense ; 
consequentl}^  no  external  unity,  to  serve  as  confirmation 
and  rectification  of  the  concept.  But,  on  the  other  hand, 
the  fact  of  internal  or  logical  unity,  with  the  safeguards 
of  reality  spoken  of  above,  gives  the  concept  a  clear  dis- 
tinction from  the  constructions  of  imagination.  In  the 
case  of  the  latter,  tliere  is  a  mechanical  combination  with 
no  necessary  or  rational  unity :  here  there  is  a  mental 
growth,  guided  by  the  laws  of  apperceptive  synthesis. 
We,  therefore,  find  an  ideal  product  of  conceptual  syn- 
thesis, which  is  one  with  the  ideal  product  of  perceptual 
synthesis  :  the  idea  of  synthetic  unity. "^  The  idea  is  the 
same,  because  the  essential  apperceptive  process  is  the 


'  The  student  should  distinguish  carefully  between  logical  and  philo- 
sopJiical  Realism  :  the  latter  being  the  doctrine  that  the  external  world, 
as  given  in  perception,  is  real.  It  has  no  necessary  connection  with 
this  discussion. 

5  See  p.  140. 


282  THOUGHT. 

same ;  the  value  of  tlie  two  mental  states  varies  in  tlieir 
different  relations  to  reality.  Perceptual  unity  is  intui- 
tional as  well  as  synthetic,  and  conceptual  unity  is  only 
synthetic. 

In  conception,  the  idea  of  identity  found  in  the  func- 
tion of  recognition,'  receives  further  development.  By 
the  princijDle  of  identity,  the  synthesis  in  abstraction  ia 
carried  forward,  new  intensive  marks  being  gathered 
into  the  unity  of  the  concept :  generalization  is  a  process 
of  identifying.  And  in  the  analytic  abstraction  of  the 
conception,  the  principle  later  called  non-contradiction, 
is  asserted  through  the  imjDOssible  conjunction  of  incon- 
sistent attributes.  Through  conception,  the  unappre- 
hended identity  of  memory,  and  the  unconscious  law  of 
contradiction,  which  leads  to  the  detection  of  illusions,* 
find  conscious  application  in  the  thought  process. 

Belief  in  the  Eeality  of  the  Concept.  The  reality  of 
the  concept,  as  already  explained,  is  a  belief-realit}^ ;  that 
is,  the  concept  is  asserted  to  be  true  in  view  of  the  men- 
tal tendency  to  believe  in  it.  But  inasmuch  as  the  per- 
ceptual data  of  abstraction  are  themselves  subject  to 
illusion,  the  concept  is  even  more  so.  The  predispo- 
sition to  believe  all  the  states  of  mind  here  leads  us 
into  constant  error,  since  we  are  apt  to  take  the  last 
stage  attained  in  the  development  of  the  concept  to  be 
the  whole  truth.  It  is  only  after  we  have  learned  the 
shifting  nature  of  our  notions,  both  as  regards  intension 
and  extension,  through  their  continued  modification,  that 
we  exercise  more  reserve  and  distrust.  For  this  reason, 
the  intellectual  caiition  of  mature  age  is  contrasted  with 
the  haste  and  frequent  error  of  younger  life. 

The  distinction  between  concepts  to  which  belief  is  attached 
and  those  which  do  not  call  it  forth,  is  clearly  illustrated  in 

1  Seep.  179.  ^  Seep.  267. 


JUDGMENT.  283 

the  Stoic  doctrine  of  conception.  Chrysippus  used  the  phrase 
''common  concepts"  {koivcxi  evvoiai)  to  designate  the  first 
rough  draughts  of  abstraction  from  the  data  of  perception. 
As  these  are  subjected  to  more  exact  definition  and  inspection 
(in  science),  some  of  them  carry  necessarily  with  them  our  in- 
tellectual assent,  or  belief  in  their  reality.  It  is  in  this  assent 
that  conception  proper  (KaraXr/ipi? — Zeno)  takes  its  rise. 
This  ''conceptual  presentation"  {(pavraaia  KataXrfTtriKi'f) 
carries  with  it  a  feeling,  or  consciousness,  of  its  agreement  with 
its  object.' 

§  3.  Judgment. 

Its  Nature.  The  second  great  stage  in  the  formal 
development  of  the  thought  function  is  judgment.  In 
the  judgment,  the  discovery  and  assertion  of  relations 
between  mental  states  and,  through  them,  between  the 
things  they  represent,  becomes  thoroughly  free  and  con- 
scious. It  proceeds  fundamentally  upon  the  basis  of 
conception,  for  its  elements  are  concepts  in  different 
stages  of  growth.  In  its  broadest  definition,  therefore. 
Judgment  is  the  mental  assertion  of  the  degree  of  relation- 
ship arrived  at  in  some  one  stage  of  the  process  of  concep- 
tion. 

This  will  be  illustrated  in  some  detail  in  the  treat- 
ment of  the  kinds  of  judgment : "  it  suffices  here  to  give 
a  general  example.  John  is  a  man,  is  a  judgment.  It 
asserts  that  the  general  concept  man  has  reached  that 
stage  of  development  in  extension  or  generalization  that 
it  includes  the  single  concept  John  :  or,  to  express  the 
same  relation  conversely,  this  judgment  asserts  that  the 
single  concept  John  has  reached  such  a  stage  of  develop- 
ment in  intension  that  its  essential  attributes  are  those 
of  the  general  concept  man.  That  is,  by  a  psychological 
assertion,  the  qualities  of  the  concept  man  are  passed 
over  to  the  concept  John,  as  a  new  increment  to  its  in- 

'Cf.  Zeller,  Oreek  Philosoplty  (Holt,  N.  Y.),  pp.  235-6. 
'go,  below. 


284  THOUGHT. 

tension.  The  expression  of  identity  between  the  two, 
therefore,  is  merely  the  sign  of  this  mental  movement. 
Calling  the  sum  of  the  intensive  marks  already  gathered 
up  in  the  logical  subject,  a,  and  the  marks  now  added  by 
the  judgmental  assertion,  h,  the  psychological  formula 
of  judgment  becomes, 

a  is  (=)  «6.' 

Law  of  Identity.  The  sign  (=),  in  this  formula,  is  used 
as  equivalent  to  the  copula  is ;  since,  in  the  categori- 
cal judgment,  the  fact  of  identity  already  found  inherent 
in  the  concept,  becomes  a  conscious  principle  of  reason- 
ing, in  the  form  of  the  Laio  of  Identity  or  Non-contradic- 
tion. The  formula  exhibits  the  constant  endeavor  of  the 
mind  to  attain  truth  by  the  law  of  identity.  In  the  first 
member  of  the  equation  of  identitj^  a  means  the  reality 
denoted  by  the  concept,  in  the  second  member  a  denotes 
the  former  concept  of  this  reality ;  h  denotes  the  addi- 
tion which  this  former  concept  must  undergo  to  be  true 
to,  or  identical  with,  the  new  experience  of  a.  As  Lotze  * 
points  out,  the  act  of  judging  takes  place  only  after  this 
new  experience,  so  the  subject  is  also  modified,  and  the 
law  of  identity  vindicated.  Expressed  in  language,  a 
judgment  is  called  a  Proposition. 

The  contrast — as  in  the  treatment  of  conception — between 
this  account  of  judgment  and  the  definition  of  the  formal 
logics,  i.e.,  "judgment  is  the  assertion  of  agreement  and 
disagreement  between  notions,"  is  sufficiently  great.  The 
latter  definition  answers  the  purposes  of  the  traditional  logic, 
but  gives  no  insight  into  the  psychological  genesis  of  judgment. 
And  even  from  a  logical  point  of  view,  it  seems  to  be  insuffi- 
cient, in  that  it  reduces  all  the  relations  to  one,  resemblance. 
This  will  be  spoken  of  later. 


'  Cf.  Lotze,  Logik,  §§  52-55,  and  Bradley,  Princ.  of  Logic,  pp.  25-37 
and  29;  also  Jevons,  Principles  of  Science,  pp.  49-50. 
2  Loc.  cit.,  §58. 


UNITY  OF  THE  JUDGMENT.  285 

Unity  of  the  Judgment.  We  are  led  by  the  above  to 
see  that  the  essential  content  of  judgment  is  not  two 
notions  at  all,  but  one,  a  notion  of  relation.  The  relation, 
as  one,  is  itself  a  notion  and  a  mental  unit,  being  the 
product  of  the  judging  activity,  however  true  it  is  that 
its  data,  when  considered  apart  from  judgment,  are 
themselves  mental  units.  This  is  readily  shown  by 
throwing  the  judgmental  product  into  the  form  of  the 
modified  notion  ah  above.  For  example,  the  judgment, 
the  clog  is  fierce,  considered  psychologically-,  amounts  to 
the  adding  of  the  quality  fierce,  h,  to  the  marks  of  dog, 
a,  and  the  product,  ah,  is  the  single  concept,  fierce  dog. 
Under  this  aspect,  it  corresponds  to  the  real  object, 
which  is  one.  As  far  as  the  content  is  concerned,  the 
judgment  is  not  distinguished  either  from  the  presenta- 
tion or  the  concept : '  they  are  all  different  stages  in  the 
progressive  growth  of  apperception.  This  unity  of  the 
judgment,  as  a  mental  product,  is  further  seen  ^  in  simple 
judgments  of  existence,  i.e.  giants  exist;  where  the  logi- 
cal predicate  is  not  an  attribute  or  mark,  but  simply  ex- 
presses the  fundamental  assumption  of  all  judgment, 
belief  in  reality.  This  unitary  aspect  of  judgment  brings 
prominently  into  view  its  justification  as  a  great  example 
of  the  synthetic  activity  of  apperception.  The  essential 
feature  of  judgment,  in  contrast  with  conception,  is 
therefore  this,  that  it  sets  forth  in  a  conscious  contem- 
plative way  the  actual  stage  of  the  thought  movement. 
It  brings  out  and  emphasizes  the  belief  which  we  found 
immanent  in  the  concept  in  its  progressive  stages.  In 
the  generalizing  of  the  concept,  this  belief  was  present,  as 
each  new  percept  was  brought  within  its  range  :  and  in 
the  judgment  each  such  act  of  esoteric  belief  becomes 
explicit,  John  is  a  man,  James  is  a  man,  etc.     Belief  is 


^  See  Brentano,  Psychologie,  i.  p.  272. 
2  Ihid.,  p.  276. 


286  THOUGHT. 

tlierefore  necessary  to  judgmeut,  and  constitutes  its  dis- 
tinguishing mark.  It  is  here,  in  its  belief  force,  rather 
than  in  its  content,  that  judgment  is  a  distinct  mental 
act.  This  belief  is  an  immediate  reference  to  reality  in 
all  cases,  whether  it  be  justihed  by  fact  or  not ;  that  is, 
to  some  reality  apart  from  the  law  of  its  own  inherent 
process.  It  may  be  reality  in  the  external  world  {horses 
are  quadrupeds),  reality  in  literature  {Dinah  Morris  is  a 
Christian),  reality  in  legend  {mermaids  sing),  or  reality 
in  the  mind  {sensations  are  affective  states).  In  all  these 
cases,  there  is  the  assertion  of  a  truth,  a  reality,  a  rela- 
tional consistency  of  concepts,  which  is  believed  to  be 
valid  universally  in  the  legitimate  sphere  of  its  assertion, 
whether  nature,  literature,  or  the  mind.  We  shall  revert 
to  this  more  fully  in  discussing  categorical  and  hypo- 
thetical judgments. 

The  doctrine  that  all  knowledge  is  judgment  (Wundt) 
seems  to  find  both  its  explanation  and  its  answer  in  the  distinc- 
tion between  judgment  and  presentation,  on  the  ground  of 
belief.  If  by  judgment  we  mean  simple  intellectual  assent, 
the  recognition  of  data,  as  when  I  discover  the  resemblance 
between  a  new  perception  and  a  reproduced  image,  or  the  fact 
of  spiritual  synthesis  wherever  found  (Laurie),  then  its  dis- 
tinction from  knowledge  is  done  away ;  but  we,  then,  must 
find  some  other  term  for  the  case  of  the  conscious  assertion 
of  the  movement  of  assent,  as  when  I  pronounce  the  new 
percept  the  man  I  saw  yesterday.  This  latter  is  true  judg- 
ment: and  the  distinction  is  further  supported  by  the  fact 
already  stated,  that  in  oi-dinary  experience  in  consciousness, 
belief  is  so  natural  and,  so  to  speak,  naive,  that  it  is  quite  lost 
in  the  knowledge  aspect,  the  presentative  value  of  the  experi- 
ence. It  is  only  when  tliere  is  sojue  logical  or  useful  reason 
for  assertion,  that  the  belief  becomes  a  matter  of  conscious- 
ness at  all,  and  judgment  takes  place. 

In  regard  to  the  nature  of  this  primitive  belief,  it  is  not 
our  purpose  here  to  inquire,  except  so  far  as  to  indicate  the 
futility  of  empirical  solutions.  As  to  the  association  theory 
(James  Mill,  Spencer),  it  is  sufficiently  refuted  by  a  member 
of  the  empirical  school  (J.  S,  Mill).  Mr.  Bain's  doctrine  that 
belief  consists  in  "motive  influence"  is  thoroughly  met  by 


PARTS  OF  THE  PROPOSITION.  287 

Mr.  Bradley/  following  Brentauo.*  Psychologically,  tlio  po- 
sition of  Stuart  Mill  seems  impregnable,  that  ''the  distinction 
(between  a  reproduction  simple  and  an  assertion  of  reality) 
is  ultimate  and  prim9rdial."  '^ 

Parts  of  the  Proposition.  The  expressed  judgment, 
or  proposition,  may  be  said  to  be  made  up  of  three  parts 
or  terms :  the  subject,  that  conception  of  which  the  rela- 
tion in  question  is  asserted  ;  the  predicate,  that  concept 
w^hich  is  asserted  to  bear  this  relation  to  the  subject ; 
and  the  copula,  that  concept  which  expresses  the  kind 
of  relation  asserted  between  subject  and  predicate.  In 
the  judgment.  Napoleon  conquered  Europe,  these  three 
parts  are  seen  in  the  usual  order,  subject,  copula,  predi- 
cate. 

The  copula  serves,  in  connecting  the  subject  and 
predicate,  to  express  any  relation  which  the  mind,  in  its 
apperceiving  function,  is  capable  of  discovering  between 
concepts  :  and  in  virtue  of  the  possibilities  of  language, 
any  relation  between  things  which  can  be  a  subject  of 
human  knowledge.  The  method  of  this  connection  is 
directly  asserted.  Hence  the  reduction  of  all  the  possi- 
ble relations  of  the  judgment  to  one,'  resemblance,  or 
identity,  is  both  psychologically  vicious  and  logically 
arbitrary,  and  the  verbal  means  of  resort  to  accom- 
plish it,  are  evidence  of  its  untruth.  Napoleon  conquered 
Europe,  becomes  for  logical  treatment,  Napoleon  is  one  of 
those  ivho  conquered  Europe.  That  is,  the  relation  clearly 
expressed  between  Napoleon  and  Europe  is  changed 
into  another  between  Napoleon  and  other  generals  (those 
who  conquered  Europe)  :   and  the  entire  psychological 

1  Loc.  cit.  p.  19.  *  Loc.  cit.  p.  268. 

"  Note  on  James  Mill's  Analysis  of  the  Phenom.  of  the  Human  Mind, 
I.  p.  412.  Cf.  foregoing  positions  of  the  present  work.  That  the  dis- 
tinction is  not  due  to  different  degrees  of  vividness  or  liveliness  (Hume) 
in  the  mental  state,  is  too  apparent  to  need  contradiction. 

■*  So  the  formal  logicians,  from  Aristotle  down. 


288  THOUGHT. 

meaning  of  tlie  copula,  as  tlie  expression  of  a  given  rela- 
tion, is  perverted.  Whatever  may  be  the  necessities  of 
the  Aristotelian  logic  in  this  regard,  the  true  psychologi- 
cal bearing  of  the  judgment  should  not  be  lost  sight  of. 
Its  character,  as  the  assertion  of  the  varied  products  of 
the  conscious  manifestation  of  the  most  essential  process 
of  the  inner  life,  should  remain  clearly  before  us.'  The 
content  of  judgment  is  the  apperceptive  construction  of 
relations,  in  all  their  variety;  its  reference  to  reality  is  its 
differentia.  Neither  the  content  nor  the  differentia  can 
be  disregarded. 


§  4.  Possible  Eelatioi^s  aSsekted  ix  Judgment. 

The  Predicaments.  Assuming  thus  that  the  judgment 
is  the  sufficient  vehicle  of  all  assertion,  we  are  led  to  ask,, 
what  are  the  general  relations  or  kinds  of  predication 
which  the  mind  asserts  among  the  objects  of  its  concep- 
tion. These  relations  considered  in  their  widest  gener- 
ality are  called  Predicaments,^  or  predicates.'  There  are 
two  methods  by  which  we  may  arrive  at  a  classification  of 
the  predicaments  ;  *  first,  by  an  actual  empirical  enumera- 
tion of  the  meanings  of  sentences,  and  second,  b}'  the  use 
of  a  classification  of  namable  things — the  process  of 
naming  having  reference  to  the  qualities  which  luay  be 
made  the  matter  of  predication. 

This  problem  is  an  old  one,  as  many  suppose  that  Aristotle 
had  it  in  mind  in  enumerating  his  categories.    It  is  probable, 

•  With  this  position.  Sidgwick,  Spencer  {Psych.,  sect.  6,  ch.  viii),  and 
Wundt  {Logik,  i.  pp.  53  and  170)  are  in  full  sympathy,  even  from  the 
standpoint  of  pure  logic.  When  a  piece  of  interpretation  is  so  wide  of 
its  true  mental  foundation,  it  is  to  be  strongly  suspected,  even  though, 
through  the  liexibility  of  language,  it  can  be  made  self-consistent.  Sidg- 
wick would  properly  generalize  the  copula  bj'  employing  some  such 
sign  as >  to  express  simply  the  fact  of  relation. 

«  Mill.  3  Bain.  *  Cf.  Bain,  Logic,  p.  102. 


P8YCH0L0OIGAL  PREDICAMENTS.  289- 

however,  that  his  purpose  was  metaphysical,  rather  than  logi- 
cal: the  enumeration  of  the  kinds  oi*  reality  which  can  be 
asserted  of  things,  in  opposition  to  Plato's  doctrine  that  reality 
dwelt  only  in  the  ''idea."  But  these  kinds  of  reality  must 
coincide  with  the  general  forms  of  predication,  and  his  cate- 
gories may  be  considered  a  rough  classification  of  the  pre- 
dicaments. His  categories  are,  substance,  quantity,  quality, 
relation,  place,  time,  property  (sxeiv,  habitus),  attitude 
{KeicrOai,  situs),  active  state,  passive  state.  Kant's  famous 
table  of  categories  has  an  entirely  different  end  in  view, 
although  he  criticises  Aristotle  from  the  standpoint  of  his  own 
problem : '  the  enumeration  of  the  a  priori  forms  of  the  rea- 
son. Other  classifications  are  Mill's — existence,  coexistence, 
succession,  resemblance,  causation  ; ''  Bain's — coexistence,  suc- 
cession, quantity ;  ^  McCosh's — identity,  comprehension,  re- 
semblance, space,  time,  quantity,  active  property,  causation.* 

Psychological  Predicaments.  Proceeding  to  the  classi- 
fication with  reference  first  to  mind  and  body  taken  to- 
gether, and  then  separately,  w^e  have  the  following  classes 
of  relations,  which  are  purely  psychological. 

I.    Universal   Predicaments :   relations  which  can  be 
asserted  of  either  mind  or  body, 
time 

coinherence  (Mill,  Bain) 
time. 

space  (as  mediated  through  time) 
'  genus  and  species 
essence  and  property 
whole  and  parts 
quantity 

proportion  (beauty) 
i  resemblance 

4.  Resemblance <  identity 

(  difference 

5.  Causation cause  and  effect 

6.  Design utility   (Wundt,"  Herbart,  Ward) 

'  Kritik  d.  R.  V.,  Erdmann,  p.  99.         ■•  Cognitive  Powers,  p.  15. 
2  Logic,  p.  823.  '  McCosh's  CompreJiension. 

»  Logic,  p.  656.  «  Loc.  cit.,  ii.  303. 


1.  Coexistence . . . 

2.  Succession  . . . , 

3.  Subordination' 


290  THOUGHT. 

Upon  this  classification,  it  may  be  remarked  that 
Subordination,  as  including  quantity,  cannot  be  reduced 
to  Resemblance,  with  Mill,  nor  can  Resemblance  be  re- 
duced to  Quantity,  with  Bain :  also  that  Identity  is  made  a 
case  of  comjDlete  Resemblance,  and  that  Existence,  while 
truly  a  predicament,'  is  still,  as  Bain  claims,  a  necessary 
presupposition  of  all  predication — a  belief  postulate — 
and  cannot  be  included  strictly  in  the  psychological 
predicaments. 

II.  Object  Predicaments:  relations  asserted  of  body 
only. 

'  color 
sound 
touch 
smell 
taste 
temperature 

III.  Subject  Predicaments :  relations  asserted  of  mind 


cr  (  extension 

bpace . .  1   , 


spacial  quality  of  sensation 


-I     p  ]'  j  sensation  (aflective) 


•only. 

^  emotion 

2.  Intellect ....  strong  and  weak 

o     TT/-77  i  strong  and  weak 

(  good  and  evil 

IV.  Subject-  Object  Predicament :  relations  asserted  of 
mind  and  body  taken  together. 

Knowledge — the  conscious  psychological  relation  of 
subject-object. 

Knowledge  is  a  psychological  predicament  only  to 
the  developed  self-consciousness.  It  assumes  the  differ- 
entiation of  self  and  the  object,  and  the  direct  conscious- 
ness of  the  relation  sustained  in  the  act  of  knowledge. 
The  assertion  of  this  relation  gives  us  a  judgment  under 
this  predicament. 

'  Locke,  Essay,  bk.  4. 


METAPHYSICAL  PREDICAMENTS.  291 

Metaphysical  Predicaments.  As  lias  been  said  above, 
the  common  judgments  of  existence,  while  truly  cases  of 
direct  predication,  proceed  upon  the  fundamental  pos- 
tulate of  belief  or  trust  in  the  validity  of  knowledge. 
They  transcend,  therefore,  the  determinations  of  the 
psychological  processes  and  rest  in  the  ultimate  nature 
of  things.  The  problem  of  existence  is  a  metaphysical 
problem.  The  same  may  be  said  also  of  the  relation  of 
subject-object,  when  viewed  in  its  absoluteness.  The 
knowledge  relation  exists  before  the  reflective  conscious- 
ness apprehends  it,  and  its  psychological  assertion  is  ac- 
cidental to  its  reality.  Hence  we  have  two  metaphysi- 
cal predicaments. 

1.  Being — transcendental  relations  of  existence. 

2.  Knoidedge — absolute  relation  of  subject  and  object. 
To  these  two  general  classes  of  relations,  correspond 

the  two  great  departments  of  metaj)hysics,  Ontology  and 
Gnosiology. 

On  this  general  scheme,  it  may  be  remarked,  in  addition 
to  what  has  been  said,  first,  that  in  making  existence  a  meta- 
physical predicate.  Bain  is  supported  against  Mill's  insertion 
of  existence  in  the  universal  predicaments,  and  it  further  dis- 
poses properly  of  existence,  as  Bain  fails  to  do.'  Second,  the 
treatment  of  knowledge  as  belonging  in  both  classes  avoids 
the  ambiguity  it  sustains  in  the  usual  classifications.  The  re- 
sults of  our  analysis  may  be  stated  in  the  following  table : 
Predicaments. 

Psychological  Metaphysical 


Universal  Subject    Object     Subject-Object 


Coexistence        Feeling    Space  Knowledge  Existence 

Succession  Intellect  |  ^i 

Subordination    Will  Reflective    Absolute 

Resemblance 

Causation 

Design 

*  On  the  controversy  as  to  whether  existence  is  a  real  predicate  at 
all,  that  is,  whether  the  existential  judgment  has  more  than  one  term, 
see  below,  §  5,  pp.  293  and  298. 


292  THOUGHT. 


§  5.  Kinds  of  Judgment. 

I.  According  to  Intension.  Judgments  may  be  consid- 
ered in  tlieir  internal  intensive  structure  as  being  of  two 
kinds  :  Analytic  and  Synthetic.  Psychologically,  these 
aspects  of  the  judgment  indicate  dilierent  stages  in  the 
intensive  development  of  the  concept.  The  analytic 
judgment  consists  in  an  expansion  of  the  subject  in  an 
assertion  whose  predicate  has  been  before  included  in  the 
intensive  marks  of  the  subject.  For  example,  trees  have 
trunks,  is  an  analytic  judgment,  since  the  intensive  com- 
plex represented  by  the  word  trunk  is  a  necessary  part  of 
concept  tree,  and  its  assertion  is  merely  an  expansion  of 
that  concept.  This  form  of  judgment,  therefore,  repre- 
sents the  development  of  the  concept  in  the  stage  of 
abstraction  called  above  anah%sis.  The  vague  first-notion 
tends  toward  definition  and  differentiation,  by  the  drop- 
ping of  accideutui  marks,  and  the  confirmation  and  as- 
sertion of  those  found  to  be  essential.  The  sj-nthetic 
judgment,  on  the  other  hand,  is  the  product  of  the  build- 
ing up  or  synthetic  process  of  abstraction.  It  asserts 
predicates  before  undiscovered,  or  unincluded  in  the 
notion  as  before  made  up.  For  example,  coius  are 
ruminating  animals,  is  a  synthetic  judgment.  The  quality 
of  rumination  is  added  to  the  notion  cow,  as  a  mark. 
The  addition  of  marks  thus  tends  to  the  wider  develop- 
ment of  concepts,  and  by  it  the  range  of  the  analytic  pro- 
cess is  extended  :  for  the  fixing  of  additional  marks  adds 
additional  predicates.  Thus  synthetic  judgments  are 
constantly  passing  into  analytic.  To  the  naturalist,  the 
ruminating  quality  is  essential  to  the  notion  cow,  and  the 
judgment  which  asserts  it  is  analytic. 

This  distinction  may  be  viewed  also  from  the  side  of 
extension,  the  predicate  sustaining  the  relation  of  class- 
subordination  to  the  subject. 


KINDS  OF  JUDGMENT.  293 

The  interpretation  of  negative  judgments  further  illus- 
trates the  psychological  ground  of  the  distinction  between  syn- 
thetic and  analytic  predications.  A  negative  analytic  judg- 
ment, in  logic,  is  impossible,  simply  from  the  fact  that  that 
which  is  denied  of  the  subject  cannot  result  from  an  analysis 
of  it:  thus  the  proposition,  birds  are  not  parts  of  trees,  cannot 
be  called  analytic,  for  the  reason  that  the  finished  concept 
tree  excludes  the  finished  concept  bird  and  no  analysis  of  the 
notion  tree  takes  place.  Yet  a  negative  analytic  judgment,  is 
possible,  looked  at  from  the  side  of  the  psychological  move- 
ment. It  is  by  the  analysis  of  our  concepts,  that  the  acci- 
dental is  discovered  and  rejected  by  negation.  For  example, 
the  child  first  observes  trees  with  birds,  and  it  is  only  after 
he  lias  seen  the  trees  without  birds  that  he  can  rectify  his  no- 
tion tree,  by  depriving  it  of  the  quality  of  the  growth  birds. 
In  this  case,  the  very  origin  of  the  negation  is  found  in  the  ne- 
cessity of  an  analysis  and  rectification  of  the  notion  tree. 

The  negation  of  a  synthesis — which  covers  all  negative 
judgments  in  logic — answers  to  the  psychological  process,  also, 
iu  all  cases  except  those  mentioned  above,  in  which  the  nega- 
tion expresses  the  result  of  an  analysis. 

The  continuous  growth  of  concepts,  through  the  formation 
of  successive  synthetic  judgments,  is  seen  in  the  process  of  edu- 
cation. The  pupil's  conception  of  the  thing  in  hand  is  en- 
riched by  all  the  added  predicates  of  his  instructor's  fuller 
knowledge. 

II.  According  to  Belief:  1.  Categorical  Judgments. 
The  simplest  form  of  mental  assertion,  in  which  an  af- 
firmation or  negation  is  made,  is  tlie  categorical  judg- 
ment. As  has  been  seen,  it  is  the  typical  form  of  the 
conceptual  process,  since  it  is  the  result  of  an  instinctive 
belief  in  the  truth  of  the  processes  of  mind.  The  cate- 
gorical judgment  may  be  either  synthetic  or  analytic. 
Special  forms  of  such  assertion  are  the  Existential  judg- 
ment and  the  Disjunctive  judgment. 

a.  The  Existential  Judgment  rests  upon  a  deeper  men- 
tal movement  than  either  analysis  or  synthesis,  and  rep- 
resents the  assertion  of  belief,  already  spoken  of  as 
the  differentia  of  judgment,  under  a  more  limited  form. 
It  goes  beyond  belief  in  the  consistency  and  adequacy  of 
concepts  and  their   relations,  that   is,  beyond  the  real 


294  THOUGHT. 

reference  wliicli  all  judgmeut  supposes,  and  attaches  it- 
self to  belief  in  the  external  reality,  in  nature,  of  what  the 
concepts  represent.  We  here  pass  from  the  assertion  of 
truth  for  the  mind  to  the  assertion  of  truth  for  itself ; 
from  the  assertion  of  truth,  to  the  assertion  of  fact ;  from 
the  judgment,  the  moon  causes  lunacy,  which  is  true  in 
tradition,  for  the  mind,  to  the  judgment,  the  moon  exists, 
which  is  true  in  fact,  for  itself. 

Law  of  Suflacient  Reason.  Not  only  is  the  existential 
judgment  a  deeper  mental  movement,  but  it  is  often  a 
more  discursive  movement.  While  it  brings  out  only 
the  natural  tendency  to  believe  in  the  facts  of  mind,  it 
supposes  some  question  aroused,  and  its  refutation, 
through  what  we  call  evidence.  There  is  no  psychologi- 
cal meaning  in  the  judgment  mermaids  exist — whatever 
the  logical  necessity  for  the  statement  be, — unless  I  have 
some  reason  to  doubt  their  existence.  The  judgment 
rests  therefore  upon  the  removal  of  this  doubt  by  evi- 
dence. Here  we  are  brought  face  to  face  with  the  con- 
scious working  of  a  great  law  of  the  reason,  which  has 
already  appeared  in  its  unapprehended  force,  regulating 
and  making  consistent  the  content  of  representation,  i.e. 
the  law  of  Siifficient  Beason.  In  the  judgment  of  exist- 
ence, the  ground  or  reason  for  the  first  time  becomes 
intelligent,  as  itself  a  notion,  and  a  notion  of  that  which 
gives  validity  to  the  unified  products  of  its  perceptual 
and  conceptual  syntheses.  We  have  found  the  idea  of 
synthetic  unity  arising  from  perceptual  synthesis,  with 
a  confirming  reference  to  reality  or  unity;  the  same  idea 
further  brought  out  and  idealized  in  its  content  by  con- 
ceptual synthesis,  without  this  means  of  confirmation, 
but  with  other  conceptual  safeguards  in  the  general  op- 
erations of  thought.'  The  reference  to  reality,  in  the  one 
case,  and  the  external  removal  of  doubt,  in  the  other,  both 

'  See  p.  281. 


HYPOTHETICAL  JUDGMENTS.  295 

afford,  in  the  two  processes,  sufficient  reason  for  tlie  in- 
stinctive movements  of  belief.' 

h.  The  Disjunctive  Judgment  is  a  form  of  categorical 
statement,  in  which  a  disjunction,  or  assertion  of  alterna- 
tives, expresses  the  belief  value  of  the  underlying  reason. 
That  is,  the  ground  of  the  statement  is  of  such  a  nature, 
that  more  than  a  single  relation  among  the  concepts  in- 
volved may  be  possible.  The  assertion,  therefore,  has 
reference  to  all  these  possible  cases.  For  example,  this 
man  is  either  a  minister  or  a  laivyer,  is  a  disjunctive  judg- 
ment, the  reason  of  its  assertion  being  adequate  to  either 
conclusion,  say  the  dress,  manner,  conversation,  of  the 
person  involved.  Further  search,  or  clearer  definition  of 
the  ground  of  the  assertion,  eliminates  some  of  these  al- 
ternatives, and  the  judgment  takes  the  regular  categori- 
cal form. 

2.  Hypothetical  Judgments.  The  hypothetical  judg- 
ment stands,  with  reference  to  belief,  midway  between  the 
ordinary  assertion  of  the  analytic  and  synthetic  judg- 
ments, and  that  of  the  existential.  The  two  kinds  of  in- 
tensive judgments  mentioned  express  only  belief  in  the 
truth  of  the  conceptual  relations  brought  out  in  analysis 
or  synthesis ;  the  existential  judgment  expresses  onl}^ 
belief  in  a  reality  corresponding  to  the  conceptual  prod- 
uct :  but  the  hypothetical  judgment  has  reference  to  both 
these  phases  of  belief.  In  the  hypothetical,  the  ground 
or  sufficient  reason  is  cited,  as  the  mental  condition  upon 
which  belief  in  the  stated  relation  goes  out.  For  ex- 
ample, the  statement,  If  the  morals  of  the  people  are  cor- 
rupt, the  Republic  loiU  not  live,  is  a  hypothetical  judgment. 
The  belief  in  the  proposition  (synthetic)  the  Republic  will 
not  live,  rests  upon  the  belief  (existential)  in  the  proposi- 
tion the  morals  of  the  people  are  corrupt.     The  failure  of  this 

'  For  further  account  of  the  principles  of  Identity,  Sufficient  Reason, 
etc.,  see  Chap.  XV. 


296  THOUGHT. 

belief,  in  the  sufficient  reason,  or  antecedent,  removes  the 
ground  of  belief  in  the  result,  or  consequent,  and  the 
mind  is  left  in  a  state  of  uncertainty  as  to  the  truth  of 
the  consequent. 

Relation  of  these  Forms  to  One  Another.  The  distinc- 
tion between  judgment  and  proposition  should  be  care- 
fully observed  in  weighing  the  preceding  classification. 
The  forms  of  judgment  are  by  no  means  correctly  ex- 
pressed in  the  corresponding  propositions.  The  cate- 
gorical proposition  has  a  much  wider  range  than  the 
categorical  judgment,  including  a  large  class  of  judg- 
ments which  are  distinctly  hypothetical.  All  incomplete 
inductive  propositions,  as  earthquakes  are  of  volcanic 
origin,  represent  hypothetical  judgments.  The  reason 
of  their  assertion  includes  the  conditional  experience  of 
future  cases.  Further,  all  particular  synthetic  proposi- 
tions, as  some  men  are  poets,  carry  the  hypothesis  that  the 
some  spoken  of  be  the  some  of  actual  fact — a  hypothe- 
sis which  is  present  in  the  psychological  act.  In  the 
last  statement,  we  have  a  general  test  of  a  categorical 
j)roposition.  Does  its  assertion  include  any  mental  con- 
dition or  reservation,  whose  non-fulfilment  prevents  the 
judgment  ?     If  so,  the  judgment  is  hypothetical. 

We  have  not  space  to  discuss  the  very  important  question, 
are  all  categorical  propositions  hypothetical  ?  Herbart'  holds 
that  they  are,  resting-  the  proof  on  the  general  hypothesis  of 
existence,  which  categorical  statements  involve.  This  is  true; 
yet  this  hypothesis,  as  has  been  seen,  constitutes  the  differentia 
of  all  judgment,  categorical  and  hypothetical  alike,  and  under- 
lies the  validity  of  all  knowledge.  It  is  a  primary  movement 
of  belief,  and  comes  into  consciousness  neither  in  the  categori- 
cal proper  nor  the  hypothetical,  and  cannot  be  legitimately 
used  as  a  point  of  distinction  between  them.  Drobisch,^  who 
writes  from  the  Herbartian  standpoint,  admits  this.  The  fur- 
ther limitation^  of  categorical  judgments  to  singular  proposi- 

'  Werke,  i.  92.  '  Logik,  §  49. 

2  Bradley,  loc.  cit.,  book  1,  chap.  ii. 


RELATION  OF  JUDGMENTS  TO  ONE  ANOTHER.      297 

tions  overlooks  :  a.  Universals  which  carry  their  own  univer- 
sality, intuitions  which  are  valid  for  psychology  whatever  ontol- 
ogy may  do  with  them  ;  and  b.  Abstract  analytic  propositions, 
as  gold  is  yellotv,  which  are  true  independent  of  factual  ex- 
istence.' The  further  denial  of  categorical  force  to  the  sin- 
gular analytic  proposition,  this  hook  is  red,  from  a  "  higher 
analysis/'  is  false ;  since  the  psychological  growth  of  this 
judgment  does  warrant  "  the  common  and  most  ruinous  super- 
stition" that  Mr.  Bradley' condemns,  i.e.  that  "analysis  is 
no  alteration  and  we  have  to  do  with  divisible  existence  in 
this  case."  The  percept  is  a  synthetic  product  whose  elements 
exist  as  differentiated  experiences  in  consciousness,  apart  from 
their  particular  synthesis  ;  and  the  analysis  is  simply  the  asser- 
tion of  a  given  stage  in  the  complexity  of  perception.  And 
we  do  not  separate  the  quality  apart  from  the  whole  in  exist- 
ence, but  only  in  thought.  That  is  to  say,  the  singular 
analytic  judgment  is  categorical,  though  not  existential  ;  it 
expresses  truth,  but  not,  as  far  as  we  know,  fact. 

The  same  distinction  between  proposition  and  judg- 
ment must  also  be  borne  in  mind  in  considering  the 
hypothetical  judgment.  The  underlying  mental  move- 
ment, in  cases  of  conditional  statement,  may  be  either 
categorical  or  hypothetical.  Every  hypothetical  proposi- 
tion may  have  a  categorical  meaning.  It  may  carry  the 
assertion  of  a  background  or  quality  which  makes  the 
conditional  dependence  possible.^  For  example,  in  the 
statement,  If  the  morals  of  the  people  are  corrupt,  the  Be- 
public  unll  not  live,  I  assert  categorically  my  belief  in  a 
certain  quality  or  character  as  belonging  to  rej)ublics ; 
the  simple  fact  of  the  fulfilment  or  non-fulfilment  of  the 
condition,  in  a  particular  case,  being  disregarded.  On  the 
other  hand,  in  the  statement,  If  you  are  wet,  you  ivill  catch 
cold,  the  meaning  is  a  simple  condition  with,  ordinarily, 
no  categorical  reference.  From  the  standpoint  of  judg- 
ment, simply,  this  last  sentence  is  hyj)othetical.  The  or- 
dinary method  of  the  logics,  of  reducing  hypothetical  to 

■  Cf.  Bosanquet,  Knowledge  and  Reality,  p.  34. 
'  Loc.  cit.  p.  95. 
^Bradley,  loc.  cit.  p.  87. 


298  TEOUQET. 

categorical  statements,  shows  tlie  flexibility  of  language 
in  propositions,  but  has  no  meaning  whatever  for  the 
judgment.  To  change  the  statement,  if  there  he  a  droughty 
the  grass  loill  die,  to  this,  the  cases  of  drought  are  cases  of  th^ 
grass  dying,  is  not  to  change  the  conditional  nature  of 
the  judgment  one  whit.  It  amounts  to  saying,  given 
cases,  or  if  there  be  cases.  Either  the  resulting  judgment 
remains  conditional  in  force,  or  it  is  not  equivalent  to 
the  original. 

The  true  relation  of  the  two  kinds  of  judgment  is 
therefore  one  of  coordination.  While  many  categorical 
statements  are  psychologically  hypothetical,  and  many 
conditional  statements  are  psychologically  categorical, 
still  there  remains  a  -puYe  type  of  each,  which  cannot  be 
resolved  into  the  other.  In  the  words  of  Drobisch,  "  it 
follows  as  little  that  the  categorical  can  be  derived  from 
the  hypothetical  as  the  reverse.  The  two  forms  express 
essentially  difierent  meanings."  * 

The  existential  is  the  purest  t^^pe  of  categorical  judg- 
ment, since  the  notion  existence  is  here  a  true  predi- 
cate." It  is  only  after  reflection  and  questioning  upon 
the  primitive  belief  in  reality,  that  the  mind  goes  out  in. 
its^positive  assertion.  There  is  here,  therefore,  an  added 
fact,  a  becoming  conscious  of  the  reality  of  the  concept, 
which  is  not  taken  into  account  by  the  theory  which  de- 
nies true  predicative  force  to  the  existential  judgment.' 
The  is  of  the  existential  judgment  there  is  snch  a  thing  as 
virtue,  expresses  more  than  the  is  of  the  ordinary  cate- 
gorical, virtue  is  praiseiuorthy.  The  former  is  has  a  refer- 
ence to  fact  which  the  latter  has  not.  This  becomes 
evident  in  the  attempt  to  reduce  all  categoricals  to  the 
existential  form.    The  judgment  a  man  is  sick  is  not  equiv- 


Logik,  §  49. 

'  See  Sigwart,  Logik,  pp.  73-75. 
'Herbart,  Brentano,  Trendelenberg. 


REASONING:  ITS  NATURE  AND  KINDS.  209 

alent  to  there  is  a  sick  man.'     The  former  may  be  true  in 
fiction,  tradition,  mythology  :  the  latter  is  true  in  fact." 

The  disjunctive  judgment  has,  in  addition  to  the  cate- 
gorical statement  of  belief,  by  which  we  have  classified 
it,  also  a  hypothetical  reference.  The  categorical  asser- 
tion extends  only  to  the  entire  disjunction,  and  rests  sus- 
pended in  reference  to  the  single  alternatives,  the  ground 
of  the  alternatives  not  being  called  in  question.  There  is, 
however,  a  direct  mental  tendency  to  further  assertion, 
by  the  erection  of  one  of  the  alternatives  into  an 
hypothesis,  when  the  judgment  takes  on  a  distinctly 
hypothetical  form.  It  is  this  hypothetical  bearing  of  the 
disjunction  that  gives  ground  for  the  laws  of  inference 
from  the  disjunctive  judgmepit.  Its  proper  classification 
as  categorical  is  seen,  however,  in  the  disjunctive  force 
of  the  abstract  universal  judgment,  bodies  are  colored, 
which  may  be  written  in  disjunctive  form,  by  supplying 
the  real  disjunction  which  the  predicate  leaves  in  the 
mind,  bodies  are  either  red,  or  blue,  or  green,  etc. 

§  6.  Eeasoning. 

Its  Nature  and  Kinds.  The  consummation  of  the 
elaborating  activity  of  mind  is  reached  in  Eeasoning. 
Reasoning  has  already  been  mentioned  as  the  highest 
form  of  the  uniting  and  relating  power  of  apperception, 
which  makes  possible  perception,  conception,  and  judg- 
ment. The  function  being  the  same  mentally  as  that 
already  seen  in  the  two  preceding  stages  of  the  thought 
process,  we  look  for  the  difi'erencing  peculiarity  in  the 
content,  the  data  between  which  these  apperceptive  rela- 
tions are  mentally  reconstructed.  In  respect  to  content 
or  data,  we  have  arisen  from  the  sensation  to  the  syn- 
thetic   percept,  from  the  percept  to   the   concept   and 

'  The  same  is  true  of  Brentano's  other  examples,  loc.  cit.  p.  283. 
''  So  Kant,  Mill,  and  the  Port  Royal  Logic. 


300  THOUGHT. 

the  judgment :  we  now  deal  with  judgments,  building 
them  into  processes  which  in  their  logical  statement  take 
a  twofold  form,  called  Deduction  and  Induction.  The 
nature  and  essential  function  of  these  two  forms  of  rea- 
soning may  be  briefly  spoken  of. 

I.  Deduction :  the  Syllogism.  Psychologically,  the 
syllogism  may  be  defined  as,  The  apperceptive  act  ivliereby  a 
relation  is  asserted  betiveen  tivo  concepts  in  consequence  of  the 
previous  assertion  of  the  same  relation  between  each  of  these 
two  concepts  and  a  third. 

The  parts  of  the  syllogism  thus  brought  out  are  desig- 
nated as  follows :  the  two  relations  first  asserted  are 
called  premises,  major  and  minor  ;  the  two  concepts  be- 
tween which  the  resulting  relation  is  asserted,  terms, 
major  and  minor,  and  the  concept  to  which  they  sustain 
respectively  the  relations  of  the  premises,  the  middle 
term  :  the  resulting  judgment  is  further  called  the  con- 
clusion.    For  example  : 

Major  premise — All  men  are  liable  to  error. 
Minor  premise — The  president  is  a  man. 
Conclusion —  The  president  is  liable  to  error. 
Major  term — Quality  of  being  liable  to  error. 
Minor  term — The  23resident. 
Middle  term— Man. 

From  this  definition,  it  appears  that  the  unit  of  syllo- 
gistic construction  is  the  judgment,  although  in  logic  the 
whole  process  is  a  matter  of  the  comparison  of  con- 
cepts by  means  of  the  middle  term.  It  is  by  the  judg- 
ment, as  a  psychological  movement,  that  both  the  major 
and  minor  terms  are  related  to  the  middle  term  in  the 
premises,  and  it  is  by  the  judgment  that  their  relation  to 
each  other  is  made  clear  in  the  conclusion. 

The  fact  that  the  product  of  the  reasoning  process  is 
the  judgment,  shows  further  that  the  mental  act  is  the 


INTERPRETATION  OF  THE  SYLLOGISM.  801 

same  as  in  conception  ;  that  is,  that  there  is  not  a  further 
mental  synthesis,  in  kind.  The  function  of  reasoning  is 
the  multiplication  and  transformation  of  judgments,  not 
the  derivation  of  new  mental  forms,  nor  the  building  up 
of  new  ideal  products.  Keasoniug  is,  therefore,  a  process 
of  enrichment  of  our  mental  stores,  through  the  going 
out  of  belief,  over  a  wider  range  of  fact,  and  into  deeper 
penetration  of  its  meaning.  The  implications  of  former 
beliefs,  which  were  vague  or  dimly  apprehended,  are  un- 
folded, conceptions  remote  and  disconnected  are  brought 
into  the  general  harmony'  of  inner  truth,  in  relations  be- 
fore quite  unremarked.  Truth  is  widened,  knowledge  is 
systematized,  details  are  concatenated,  and  the  most 
essential  self-realization  of  mind  is  forwarded  and  made 
actual. 

Conceptual  Interpretation  of  the  Syllogism.  We  may 
further  define  the  syllogism  in  such  a  way  as  to  show 
the  growth  of  the  concept  in  it,  remembering  what 
has  been  said  as  to  the  unity  of  the  judgment :  Syllo- 
gism is  the  apperceptive  act  whereby  ive  reach  a  new  stage 
in  the  groivth  of  a  concept,  in  consequence  of  its  tivofold 
modification  in  the  judgment. 

As  the  former  definition  looks  at  the  syllogism  from 
the  side  of  its  expression,  this  looks  at  it  from  the  side 
of  its  conceptual  meaning.  Its  apparent  strangeness 
vanishes  as  soon  as  we  refer  the  syllogism  to  the  doc- 
trine of  conception. 

We  have  seen  that  the  product  of  judgment  is  only 
the  concept,  of  which  predication  is  made,  modified  by 
the  addition  of  new  marks :  a  becomes  ah.  Thus  arises 
the  major  premise.  In  the  minor  premise  the  concept 
ah,  or  middle  term,  is  further  modified  by  the  addition  of 
c,  minor  term  ;  that  is,  ah  becomes  ahc.  The  conclusion 
is  then  simply  the  statement  of  the  result,  that  a  has 
become  ahc  : 


302 


THOUGHT. 


a  is  (=)  ab  ; 

(1)  ah  is  (=)  ahc  ; 
lience  a  is  (=)  abc. 

John  is  (John)  man  ; 

(2)  (John)  man  is  (John  man)  mortal; 
hence  John  is  (John  man)  mortah 

This  simply  means  that  the  reality  John  requires 
that  I  add  to  my  notion  John,  the  marks  of  man,  and 
the  marks  of  man  further  carry  with  them  the  mark  mor- 
tality. So  that  my  concept  John  must  hereafter  carry 
with  it  the  marks  of  man  including  the  mark  mortality. 
The  process  exhibits  again  the  stri^-ing  of  the  mind  to 
preserve  the  identity  of  conceptions  through  new  expe- 
rience.' 

Meaning  of  the  Premises :  Kinds  of  Syllogism.  This 
general  view  of  the  syllogism  enables  us  to  see  at  once 
the  meaning  of  the  premises  in  reference  to  the  result- 
ing judgment.  Taken  together,  they  constitute  the  suf- 
ficient reason  upon  which  the  movement  of  belief  de- 
pends. Stated  in  the  above  form,  they  go  to  make  up 
a  Categorical  Syllogism.  But  the  truth  of  the  conclu- 
sion depends  upon,  or  is  conditioned  upon,  the  truth  of 
the  jDremises  ;  in  other  words,  we  believe  the  former  be- 
cause we  believe  the  latter.  Consequently,  the  three- 
fold assertion  of  the  syllogism  may  be  put  in  the  shape 
of  a  complex  conditional  proposition,  the  antecedent 
(reason)  being  a  double  assertion,  and  the  consequent 
(result)  being  a  single  assertion,  in  respect  to  two  of  the 
foregoing  concepts.  Thus  the  above  syllogism  is  the 
conditional  judgment :  If  all  men  are  liable  to  error  and 
the  president  is  a  man,  the  president  is  liable  to  error. 
But,  beyond  this  statement  of  reason  in  the  premises, 
there  is  in  the  syllogism  given,  also,  an  implied  belief  in 


'  Cf .  Jevons,  Princ.  of  Science,  p. 


KINDS  OF  SYLLOGISM.  303 

the  truth  both  of  the  reason  and  the  conclusion.  In  ac- 
tual thought,  the  premises  themselves  rest  upon  suffi- 
cient ground  and  so  are  believed.  Consequently  we 
may  have  a  direct  statement  of  belief  in  the  truth  of  the 
premises  :  "  All  men  are  liable  to  error  and  the  president  is 
a  man."  Now  we  may  combine  these  two  latter  expres- 
sions of  belief  in  a  new  form,  the  Hypothetical  Syllogism, 
as  follows  : 
Major  premise — If  all  men  are  liable  to  error  and  the 

president  is  a  man,  the  president  is 

liable  to  error. 
Minor  premise — But  all  men  are  liable  to  error  and  the 

president  is  a  man. 
Conclusion —       Hence  the  president  is  liable  to  error. 

The  hypothetical  syllogism,  therefore,  arises  from 
the  supplying  of  the  movement  of  belief  hidden  in  the 
categorical  syllogism,  just  as  we  found  the  hypothetical 
judgment  to  arise  from  the  statement  of  the  ground  of 
belief  in  the  categorical  judgment.  The  categorical  syl- 
logism precedes  the  hypothetical,  for  the  reason  that 
belief  precedes  its  conscious  grounding ;  but,  for  the 
reason  that  belief  is  present  in  the  categorical  as  an  hy- 
pothesis, whose  removal  invalidates  the  conclusion,  we 
claim  that,  in  conscious  thinking,  the  hypothetical  is  the 
more  profound  and  fundamental  form. 

As  compared  with  this  natural  reduction  of  the  categorical 
to  the  hypothetical  syllogism,  tiie  methods  to  accomplish  the 
reverse  found  in  the  logics  are  strained  and  arbitrary.  The 
reduction  of  the  hypothetical  to  the  categorical  is  accomplished 
by  another  of  those  ingenuities  of  language  for  which  the 
Aristotelian  logic  is  famous.  Instead  of  the  hypothetical  if, 
the  categorical  the  case  of,  the  circumstances  of,  are  used, 
forms  of  expression  categorical  enough  in  form,  but  as  strictly 
conditional  in  meaning.  It  is  only  necessary  to  observe  the 
belief  attitude  of  the  mind  toward  the  two  forms,  if  it  rain, 
and  the  case  of  its  raining,  to  see  that  there  is  no  difference 
whatever,  and  that  the  real  mental  hypothesis  remains  the 
same  as  before  the  reduction. 


304  THOUGHT. 

Value  of  the  Syllogism.  The  general  value  of  the 
syllogism,  as  an  instrument  of  inference  and  discovery 
of  new  truth,  is  disputed  from  the  various  standpoints  of 
the  theory  of  knowledge.  The  questions  it  involves  be- 
long to  general  philosophy,  rather  than  to  psychology. 
Yet  we  may  say  that  two  great  views  are  held,  based  re- 
spectively upon  an  experiential  and  an  intuitive  theory 
of  knowledge.  According  to  the  former,'  since  all 
knowledge  arises  from  experience  and  finds  its  highest 
certainty  in  a  wide  enumeration  of  instances,  the. syllo- 
gism constructed  in  extension  is  a  jpetitio  principii.  The 
conclusion  is  contained  in  the  major  premise,  and  hence 
adds  nothing  to  our  knowledge.  I  have  no  right,  for 
example,  to  say  that  all  men  are  liable  to  error,  unless 
I  have  actually  known  all  men  to  err,  in  which  case  I 
must  have  known  the  president  to  err,  and  my  conclu- 
sion is  given  in  the  major  premise.  Stated  in  the  in- 
tensive form  of  our  definition,  this  objection  runs  :  in 
stating  a  relation  between  the  major  and  middle  terms, 
which  shall  be  true  universally  of  the  middle  term,  I 
have  already  included,  in  that  statement,  all  of  that 
relation  which  the  middle  term  is  capable  of  sustain- 
ing, i.e.  its  relation  to  the  minor  term  :  that  is,  I  have 
made  the  said  relation  of  the  major  extend  to  the  minor 
term. 

If  we  admit  the  empirical  foundation  of  this  theory, 
it  is  true  that  the  syllogism  has  only  a  confirmatory  and 
illustrative  value,  as  is  seen  in  cases  in  which  the  major 
premise  derives  its  universality  from  an  exhaustive  sur- 
vey of  cases.  But  if  knowledge  is  not  all  experiential, 
if  universality  can  be  asserted  without  exhaustive  expe- 
rience, then  the  theory  breaks  down.  This  we  believe  to 
be  the  case  in  all  synthetic  judgments  which  cannot  be 
shown  to  have  been  derived  from  experience,  so-called 

'  Stuart  Mill. 


VALUE  OF  THE  SYLLOGISM.  305 

synthetic  judgments  a  priori.'  Such  a  universal  in  the 
major  premise,  with  a  fact  of  experience  in  the  minor, 
leads  to  a  conclusion  which  is  a  particular  application  of 
the  law  of  the  major.     For  example  : 

The  whole  equals  the  sum  of  all  its  parts  ; 

(1)  X,  y,  and  z  are  all  the  parts  ; 

hence  the  whole  equals  the  sum  of  x,  y,  and  z. 
Here  the  conclusion  is  an  absolute  gain  to  knowledge, 
being  in  no  sense  given  in  the  universal  a  priori  principle 
of  the  major. 

In  testing  syllogisms  in  this  regard,  we  have  only  to 
inquire  whether  the  minor  term  is  already  brought  into 
relation  to  the  middle  term  in  the  statement  of  the  ma- 
jor premise.  If  so,  the  minor  premise  can  be  dispensed 
with  altogether,  and  the  conclusion  is  self-apparent. 
This  can  be  shown  by  throwing  the  syllogism  into  the 
hypothetical  form  described  above.  Thus,  expressed 
categorically : 

All  in  this  room  are  students ; 

(2)  I  am  in  this  room  ; 
hence  I  am  a  student. 

Expressed  hypothetically  : 

If  all  in  this  room  are  students  and  I  am  in  this 
room,  I  am  a  student ; 
(a)    but  all  in  this  room  are   students  and  I  am  in 
this  room ; 
hence  I  am  a  student. 
Omitting  the  original  minor  premise,  I  am  in  this  room, 
from  both  premises  of  the  hypothetical,  we  have  : 

If  all  in  this  room  are  students,  I  am  a  student ; 

(&)    but  all  in  this  room  are  students  ; 

hence  I  am  a  student ; 

a   perfectly   valid  hypothetical  syllogism   showing  the 

original  was  a  petitio.     The  reason  is  seen  to  be  this, 

that  the  universal  major  in  (2)  was  derived  from  a  com- 

'  The  expression  is  from  Kant,  the  doctrine  common  to  intuitive 
thinkers  from  Aristotle  down. 


306  THOUGHT. 

plete  enumeration  of  cases.  But  applying  tlie  same  test 
to  the  former  syllogism  (1),  we  reacli  a  very  different  re- 
sult.    Expressed  categorically  : 

The  whole  equals  the  sum  of  all  its  parts ; 
(1)     X,  y,  and  z  are  all  the  parts ; 

hence  the  whole  equals  the  sum  of  x,  y,  and  z. 
Expressed  hypothetically  : 

If  the  whole  equals  the  sum  of  all  its  parts, 
and  X,  y,  and  z  are  all  the  parts,  then  the 
/  X         whole  equals  the  sum  of  x,  y,  and  z ; 

but  the  whole  does  equal  the   sum  of  all  its 

parts,  and  x,  y,  and  z,  are  all  the  parts  ; 
hence  the  whole  equals  the  sum  of  x,  y,  and  z. 
Now  omitting  the  minor  premise  of  (1),  as  before,  we 
have: 

If  the  whole  equals  the  sum  of  all  its  parts, 
(6)         then  the  whole  equals  the  sum  of  x,  y,  and  z 
{invalid) ; 
but  the  whole  equals  the  sum  of  all  its  parts ; 
hence  the  whole  equals  the  sum  of  x,  y,  and  z 
(invalid)  ; 
that  is,  we  have  no  information  whatever  about  x,  y,  and 
z.     The  reason  being  that  the  ground  of  the  original  ma- 
jor premise  is  not  an  enumeration  of  cases,  as  in  (2),  but 
rational  necessity. 

Scientific  Hypothesis.  The  psychological  reduction 
of  the  categorical  to  the  hypothetical  syllogism  also 
illustrates,  at  the  same  time  that  it  is  confirmed  by,  the  use 
of  the  Scientijic  Hypothesis.  An  hypothesis,  in  science, 
is  a  formal  proposition  put  forth  as  an  explanation  of  a 
w^hole  class  of  phenomena,  from  its  apparent  application 
to  a  limited  number  of  cases  under  that  class.  It  is  uni- 
versal in  form,  but  not  in  meaning  ;  its  successful  appli- 
cation to  new  cases,  or  under  new  variations,  giving  it  a 
wider  range  and  higher  probability.     The  universal  ma- 


INDUCTION.  307 

jor  premise  of  a  syllogism  is  often — indeed  always,  wlien 
experiential  and  not  a  perfect  induction — sucli  an  hy- 
pothesis, and  lieuce  its  only  true  expression  is  hypotheti- 
t-al.  The  object  of  the  syllogism  is  the  ajiiilication  of 
the  hypothesis  to  a  new  case  :  the  deduction  thus  made 
is  then  tested  b}'  actual  observation,  and  the  hypothesis 
in  so  far  confirmed. 

The  hypothesis,  we  have  said,  rests  upon  actual  ex- 
perience and  is  derived  from  it.  Experience  is,  there- 
fore, gathered  up,  solidified,  and  universalized  in  the  hy- 
pothesis. We  are  led  to  ask  by  what  mental  process  or 
function  this  is  accomplished  :  how  is  experience  held 
together,  its  meaning  rationalized,  and  made  logically 
available  ?  This  leads  up  to  the  second  great  kind  of 
reasoning. 

§  7.  Induction. 

II.  Induction.  What  conception  does  for  judgment, 
in  its  gathering,  epitomizing,  and  relating  activity,  this 
induction  does  for  higher  elaboration,  or  thought.  The 
function  of  conception  in  abstraction  and  generalization 
is  that  of  defining  experience  :  concepts  are  definitions, 
more  or  less  correct,  of  what  is  and  must  be  in  experi- 
ence. Its  ideal  unity  is  a  unity  of  individual  applica- 
tion, and  beyond  this  its  synthetic  process  cannot  go. 
The  function  of  induction,  on  the  contrary,  is  that  of 
rationalizing  experience.  It  proceeds  u]oon  the  basis  of 
conception  as  aflfording  what  is  and  must  be  in  experi- 
ence, and  goes  forward  to  what  might  and  shall  be.  It 
is  a  higher  rational  generalization  of  the  judgmental  re- 
lations of  concepts.  In  its  very  nature  as  depicting 
possible  relational  truth,  it  is  prophetic  of  future  experi- 
ence, thus  tending  to  universal  statement  in  the  hypoth- 
esis.'    The  instinctive  movement  of  belief,  which   has 

1  "It  is  the  distinguishing  characteristic,"  says  De  Gerando,  "of  a 
lively  and  vigorous  conception,  to  push  its  speculative  conclusions 


308  THOUGHT. 

confronted  us  already  in  the  form  of  trust  in  the  truth 
of  representations  and  in  the  validity  of  the  concept, 
here  also  leads  us  beyond  concepts,  as  the  sum  of  experi- 
ences, and  tells  us  what  to  expect.  Its  unity  also  is  a 
temporary  and  progressive  unity,  changing  into  higher 
forms,  as  new  experiences  are  brought  under  its  ration- 
alizing treatment. 

This  form  of  expectation,  or  mental  advance  into  future 
experience,  arises  from  the  rational  principles  which  we 
have  already  found  in  conception,  identity  and  suffi- 
cient reason.  The  principle  of  identity  applies  to  rela- 
tional as  well  as  to  conceptual  truth.  The  reestablish- 
ment  of  an  identical  form  of  relational  states,  is  recog- 
nized as  an  identical  external  experience,  and  the  rela- 
tional concatenation  of  the  first  experience,  which  offered 
its  sufficient  reason,  is  necessarily  held  to  be,  wdien 
again  presented,  sufficient  reason  for  the  same  external 
experiences  again.  Upon  this  law  of  sufficient  reason,  in 
the  form  of  mental  expectancy,  and  its  wide  justification 
in  experience,  is  based  the  principle  of  the  Uniformity  of 
Nature.  This  law,  which  expresses  the  external  fact  that 
the  same  causes  invariably  produce  the  same  effects, 
is  the  rational  basis  of  induction,  as  the  laws  of  identity 
and  sufficient  reason  are  of  deduction.' 

Relation  of  Induction  and  Deduction.  The  two  proc- 
esses of  induction  and  deduction  do  not  exclude  or  in- 
validate each  other,  but  are  the  united  engine  of  discov- 
ery and  proof.  The  first  debt  of  knowledge  is  to  expe- 
rience, which  is  taken  up  in  conception,  and  cast  into  the 
rational  form  of  hypothesis  or  empirical  law,  by  induc- 
tion.    These  first  stages  in  the  growth  of  thought  give 

somewhat  beyond  their  just  limits." — Des  Signes  et  I'Art  de  Penser, 
Introd. 

'  On  the  nature  of  induction  and  its  canons,  Mill's  great  contribu- 
tion to  logic,  see  his  Logic,  bk.  3. 


PROOF.  309 

US  a  point  of  rational  elevation  for  again  exploring  the 
varieties  of  experience,  and  bringing  new  classes  of  fact 
under  our  conquest  by  deduction.  Thus  there  is  a  con- 
stant action  and  reaction  between  the  two  processes  of 
reasoning :  one  leading  us  from  the  particular  to  the 
general,  the  other  from  the  general  back  to  the  particu- 
lar. And  for  each  such  excursion,  we  are  richer  in  our 
mental  store. 

Further,  both  the  processes  of  reasoning  have  their 
basis  and  guiding  rule  in  the  principles  of  reason  sjjoken 
of,  called  in  formal  logic,  Laics  of  Thought.  It  is  onl}^  as 
experience  is  brought  into  conformity  with  the  princi- 
ples of  identity  and  sufficient  reason  that  it  is  rational- 
ized and  made  thinkable  in  forms  of  unity,  which  are 
true  in  their  special  applications  to  nature.  These  prin- 
ciples are  spoken  of  more  fully  in  the  consideration  of 
the  Rational  Function. 

§  8.  Proof. 

Proof  is  the  inverse  process  of  inference.  In  the  syl- 
logism and  in  induction,  we  are  given  premises,  the  suf- 
ficient reason,  to  find  the  conclusion,  the  result :  in  proof, 
on  the  contrary,  we  are  given  a  conclusion,  or  thesis,  to 
find  its  sufficient  reason,  or  ground.  For  example,  given 
the  thesis  the  president  is  liable  to  error,  it  is  proved  by 
finding  the  sufficient  reason,  all  men  are  liable  to  error  and 
the  president  is  a  man.  The  essential  nature  of  proof, 
therefore,  consists  in  establishing  belief,  or  giving  reality 
to  a  thesis. 

The  adequacy  of  the  ground  thus  reached  is  tested 
by  throwing  it  into  the  regular  forms  of  reasoning : 
either  deductively,  as  in  a  syllogism,  concluding  to  the 
thesis ;  or  inductively,  by  raising  the  thesis  to  the  rank 
of  an  hypothesis  and  concluding  to  the  particular  cases 
under  it.  Thus  the  thesis,  poets  are  liable  to  error,  may 
be  proved  by  this  deduction  : 


310  THOUOHT. 

All  men  are  liable  to  error ; 

poets  are  men  ; 

hence  poets  are  liable  to  error; 
or  inductively,  by  stating  the  thesis  as  hypothesis  : 

Poets  are  liable  to  error  ; 

Tennyson,  Wordsworth,  etc.,  are  poets  ; 
hence  Tennyson,  etc.,  are  liable  to  error; 
the  conclusion  being  then  tested  in  experience  to  verify 
the  hypothesis. 

Deductive  proof  alone  gives  complete  certainty,  since 
the  ground  is  some  rational  or  thoroughly  established 
principle.  Its  province  is  the  proof  of  singulars,  or  of  sub- 
ordinate laws.  Inductive  proof,  on  the  other  hand,  never 
reaches  absolute  conclusiveness,  except  in  perfect  induc- 
tions, and  is  of  use  in  establishing  general  and  higher 
laws.  It  covers  proof  by  analogy,  testimony,  circumstan- 
tial proof,  and  other  forms.' 

§  9.  Ideal  Product  of  Thought. 

As  a  process  of  relational  synthesis,  thought  brings 
into  clearer  light  and  greater  definiteness  the  ideal  prod- 
ucts of  perception  and  representation  ;  since  these  oper- 
ations here  become  self-conscious  and  rational.  We 
come  through  thought,  also,  to  the  apprehension  and 
statement  of  the  principles  of  Reason  which  underlie 
and  regulate  all  mental  movement.  The  fundamental 
forms  of  Reason,  as  far  as  they  belong  to  intellect,  have 
already  been  noted  in  the  foregoing  discussion.  These 
are  Identity  and  Sufficient  Reason.  Their  more  particu- 
lar treatment  is  reserved  for  the  account,  in  the  next 
chapter,  of  the  Rational  Function. 

On  conception,  consult:  Porter,  Hum.  Int.,  pp.  388-430;  McCosh, 
Logic;  Taine,  Intelligence,  pt.  1,  bk.  1,  ch.  ii-iii,  and  pt.  2,  bk.  4, 
ch.  I;    George,  Psych.,  p.  499;   Waitz,  Lehrhuch,  §  48;  Drobisch, 

'  On  proof  in  general,   see   Sidgwick's  excellent  chapter  in   his 

Fallacies. 


IDEAL  PRODUCT  OF  TEOUOHT.  311 

Login,  §§  13-38;  Herbart,  Lehrbuch,  S§  179-193;  Fortlage,  System 
d.  Psyeh.,  §33;  Sigwart,  Logik,  §§40-44,  75-78,  and  6-8;  Lotze, 
Logic,  I,  ch.  i;  Trendelenberg,  Logische  Untersuchungen,  §  15; 
Wundt,  Logik,  i,  pt.  3;  Ueberweg,  System  d.  Logic,  pt.  3;  Striimpel, 
Oi'undriss  d.  Logik,  ch.  iv;  Mill,  Exam,  of  Hamilton,  ch.  xvii. 

On  the  relation  of  conception  to  language :  Miiller,  Science  of 
Lang.;  Whitney,  Lang,  and  Study  of  Lang.;  Porter,  Hum.  Int.,  pt. 
3,  ch.  IV;  Locke,  Essay,  hk.  3;  Calderwood,  Mi7id  and  Brain,  ch.  x; 
Lotze,  Mic7vkosnius,  bk.  5,  ch.  iii;  and  the  Logics  generally.  On  the 
general  psychology  of  language,  consult  also  Perez,  First  Three  Years 
of  Childhood,  pp.  336-364;  Kussmaul,  Storungen  der  Sprache  ;  Laz- 
arus, Das  Leben  der  Seele,  ii.  pp.  87-345 ;  Preyer,  The  Mind  of  the 
Child,  in  loc. 

On  realism  and  nominalism ;  Rabier,  Psych.,  p.  307;  Bowen, 
Mod.  Philosophy,  ch.  viii;  Sully,  Psych.,  p.  347;  Mill,  Exam,  of 
Hamilton,  ch.  xVii;  Taine,  in  loc;  Volkmann,  Lehrhuch,  ii.  p.  359. 

On  judgment:  Porter,  Hum.  Int.,  p.  430;  Drobisch,  Psych. .^ 
§§63-64,  and  Logik,  §§39-53  ;  Sigwart,  Logik,  §§18-19  and  36-37; 
Lotze,  Logik,  I,  ch.  iii;  Bradley,  Principles  of  Logic,  bk.  1;  George,^ 
Logik,  ch.  1.4;  Trendelenberg,  Log.  TJntersuch.,  ii,  §§14-16;  Wundt, 
Logik,  I,  pt.  3;  Laurie,  Metaph.,  pt.  3;  Sigwart,  Logik,  §§9-38; 
Ueberweg,  Logic,  pt.  4;  Spencer,  Psych.,  pt.  6,  ch.  i-ix;  Striimpel, 
Ch'und.  d.  Logik,  ch.  vii-xiii;  Hodgson,  Time  and  Space,  ch.  vii. 

On  proof:  Drobisch,  Logik,  §§  31-48;  Sidgwick,  Fallacies,  pt.  1; 
Lotze,  Logic,  bk.  4-5;  (Belief)  George,  Logik,  p.  400;  Encyc.  Bri- 
tann.,  art.  Belief;  (Hypothesis)  Lotze,  Logic,  II,  ch.  viii;  Naville,  La 
Logique  de  V Hypothi.se;  Venn,  Mind,  in.  43;  Ueberweg,  Logic,  pt. 
5;  (Belief)  Sully,  Sensation  and  Intuition,  iv. 

071  reasoning :  George,  Logik,  p.  463;  Porter,  Hum.  Int.,  pp. 
439-469;  Mill,  Logic,  pp.  117-136;  Waitz,  §§48-50;  Sigwart,  Logik, 
§§55-59;  Bosanquet,  Knotvledge  and  Reality ;  Lotze,  Logic,  I,  ch.  iii; 
Bradley,  Princ.  of  Logic,  bk.  3-3;  Trendelenberg,  Log.  TJntersuch.., 
§§  14-18;  Wundt,  Logik,  i,  pt.  4;  Sigwart,  Logik,  §§  49-59;  Binet, 
La  Psychologie  du  Raisonnement;  (Hist,  of  Logic)  Ueberweg,  Logic, 
Introd. ;  Prantl,  Gfeschichte  der  Logik ;  (Induction)  Sigwart,  Logik, 
§§  93-103;  Wundt,  Logik,  II,  ch.  i;  Bowen.  Inductive  Logic;  Striim- 
pel, G'7'undriss  d.  Logik,  ch.  xiv-xviii;  Diihring,  Logik,  II,  ch.  il. 

Further  Problems  for  Study : 

Nominalism  and  conceptualism; 
Theories  of  judgment; 
Theories  of  syllogism; 
Scientific  method; 
Formal  logic ; 
Nature  of  proof; 
Burden  of  proof. 


THE  RATIONAL  FUNCTION. 


CHAPTER  xy. 

REASON. 

Definition.  The  second  great  function  of  the  mind 
in  its  knowledge  activity  is  reason.  The  rational  func- 
tion is  contrasted  with  the  apperceptive  function  in  the 
absence  of  the  element  of  process,  which  constitutes  the 
essential  nature  of  the  latter.  Apperception  is  a  pro- 
cess, through  which  the  material  of  acquisition  passes  in 
preparation  for  the  higher  uses  of  mind.  Reason,  on  the 
contrary,  is  not  a  process,  as  the  more  special  term,  in- 
tuition, given  to  it,  implies.  It  conditions  and  underlies 
all  mental  processes.  It  is  the  nature  of  mind  itself  as 
it  reveals  itself  in  consciousness.  Accordingly,  by  rea- 
son, in  its  broadest  sense,  is  meant :  The  constitutive,  regu- 
lative principle  of  mind,  so  far  as  it  is  apprehended  in  con- 
sciousness through  the  presentative  and  discursive  operations, 

§  1.  Reason"  as  Constitutive  of  Mind. 

By  the  constitution  of  a  thing  is  meant  its  intimate 
nature,  that  which  makes  it  what  it  is,  and  without  which 
it  would  not  persist  as  itself.  The  ultimate  question  of 
philosophy  relates  to  the  constitution  of  things.  This 
question  can  be  answered  from  experience,  only  so  far 
as  experience  appears  to  reach  and  reveal  the  whole  ac- 
cessible area  of  the  manifestation  of  the  thing  in  ques- 
tion. As  has  been  before  contended,  experience  in  con- 
sciousness is  the  only  approach  we  have  to  the  phenom- 

010 


REASON  CONSTITUTIVE  AND  REGULATIVE.        313 

enal  manifestations  of  mind ;  consequently,  as  far  as 
knowledge  can  go  with  the  question  as  to  the  constitu- 
tion of  mind,  the  emergence  in  consciousness  of  the  men- 
tally essential  is  our  only  hope  of  solution. 

Further,  considering  the  normal  exhibition  and  devel- 
opment of  mind  in  general  to  be  that  which  we  find  uni- 
versal and  internally  truthful  in  man :  we  have  the  right 
to  conclude,  that  whatever  in  consciousness  can  be 
shown  to  be  absolutely  necessary  to  this  manifestation 
and  development,  is  constitutive  of  mind.  The  question 
of  the  reason,  therefore,  becomes  :  what  in  our  mental  life 
is  absolutely  essential  ?  What,  if  removed,  would  wreck 
the  mental  life  ? 

To  illustrate,  without  anticipating  the  results  of  later 
analysis,  the  principle  of  identit}^  above  recognized,  may 
be  cited.  This  principle  is  a  law  of  reason,  inasmuch  as 
it  underlies  all  development  of  mind  from  the  general 
sensibility  up  to  the  logical  operations.  Perception, 
memory,  imagination,  thought,  all  would  be  impossible 
if  there  were  not,  in  the  original  constitution  of  mind,  an 
inflexible  law  that  the  same  is  always  the  same  and  never 
different,  and  this  is  this  and  not  that. 

§  2.  Keason  as  Kegulative  of  Mind. 

In  its  regulative  aspect,  the  reason  comes  more  clear- 
ly into  consciousness  as  setting  limits,  prescribing  chan- 
nels, and  differentiating  elements  in  the  developed  men- 
tal life.  The  regulative  aspect,  however,  is  only  an  as- 
pect ;  for  such  principles  are  as  truly  constitutive  as 
anything  in  the  nature  of  mind  which  does  not  rise,  as 
they  do,  in  consciousness  to  control  and  direct  our  activ- 
ities. Both  aspects  are  unified  in  the  original  basis  of 
mind  itself.  Yet,  in  the  regulative  aspect,  the  reason 
passes  through  its  transition  to  the  form  of  knowledge. 
The  modes  of  reason  become  the  form  into  which  the 


314  REASON. 

material  of  acquisition  is  cast.  That  whicli  constitutes 
mind  what  it  is,  thus  passes  into  function  upon  a  con- 
tent, and  it  is  in  function  alone  that  the  mind  becomes 
aware  of  its  own  nature. 

The  regulative  aspect  of  the  reason  is  exemplified  in 
the  intuition  of  power,  as  it  arises  in  the  exercise  of  at- 
tention. The  necessary  exercise  of  power  in  attention 
renders  possible  the  conception  of  cause,  in  connection 
with  all  the  apperceptive  products  of  our  perception. 

§  3.  Keason  as  Knowledge  :  Ixtuition^. 

The  knowledge  aspect  of  reason  is,  however,  that  with 
which  we  have  more  strictly  to  do.  Reason  considered 
simply  as  truth,  or  as  the  essence  of  mind,  does  not  enter 
into  the  range  of  empirical  science.  But  its  value  as 
knowledge  is,  if  what  has  been  said  is  true,  inestimable. 
The  presence  of  necessary  rational  principles  in  the 
mind,  taken  with  the  immediate  awareness  of  self  which 
consciousness  presents,  gives  to  all  knowledge  thus  pre- 
sented, characteristics  singular  and  unique.  Inasmuch 
as,  taken  in  its  constitutive  aspect,  it  reveals  the  neces- 
sary nature  of  mind,  and  taken  in  its  regulative  aspect,  it 
controls  all  the  special  activities  of  mind,  reason  has  a 
universal  and  categorical  function,  as  the  foundation  of 
the  structure  of  thought.  We  come,  therefore,  to  look 
at  reason  as  Intuition :  and  intuition  may  be  considered 
first  as  a  mental  act,  condition,  or  source,  and  second, 
as  a  mental  product. 

I.  Intuition  as  a  Mental  Act.  The  distinction  between 
intuition  as  an  act,  and  as  a  product  or  acquisition,  is  as 
important  as  that  between  any  mental  act  and  its  prod- 
uct. Yet  by  tlie  term  act  we  are  not  to  understand 
process.  As  has  been  said,  reason  is  never  a  pro- 
cess.    It  is  an  act  only  inasmuch  as,  like  consciousness. 


INTUITION  AS  A  MENTAL  ACT.  315 

it  has  an  immediate  revelation  to  make,  and  this  revela- 
tion is  at  one  time  of  one  principle,  at  another  time,  of 
another. 

The  parallel  between  intuition  as  an  act,  or  mental 
condition,  and  consciousness,  in  its  higher  forms,  may  be 
further  remarked. 

1.  Intuition  is  immediate.  Like  consciousness,  in- 
tuition is  a  matter  of  immediate  cognizance  or  aware- 
ness. It  is  necessarily  so  in  its  nature,  as  knowledge, 
since  the  content  of  its  revelation  is  not  derived  from  a 
sphere  external  to  itself ;  its  content  is  of  the  nature  of 
mind  itself.  Knowledge  attained  from  the  world  is  medi- 
ated through  an  organ  or  process.  For  the  perception 
of  things  in  space,  we  need  senses,  apperception,  memo- 
ry, as  processes ;  and  for  the  perception  of  intellectual 
truth,  historical,  esthetic,  we  need  the  apperceptive  and 
discursive  faculty.  But  for  the  apprehension  of  rational 
truth,  no  such  mediation  is  necessary  or  possible.  It  is 
true  that  it  is  only  in  such  processes  that  rational  truth 
reaches  consciousness  :  but,  on  the  other  hand,  it  is  only 
as  the  reason  is  operative,  that  these  processes  are  possi- 
ble. The  processes  of  mind  are  not  means  to  intuitive 
apprehension,  they  are  the  sphere  of  the  manifestation 
of  reason  as  truth,  and  of  its  apprehension  as  knowledge. 

The  immediateness  of  intuition  is  seen  in  the  word 
itself,  the  Latin  in  and  tuor,  meaning  to  look  upon  at 
once  or  immediately.  The  rise  of  such  a  principle  and 
its  apprehension  through  a  process,  yet  not  because  of 
the  process,  is  seen  in  the  rise  of  the  notion  of  space,  of 
which  we  have  already  treated  at  length. 

The  immediateness  of  intuition  tends  at  once  to  ob- 
scure rational  truth,  at  the  same  time  that  it  makes  it 
the  most  secure  and  certain  of  all  knowledge.  Knowl- 
edge, as  has  been  seen,  proceeds  by  differencing,  subor- 
dinating, and  classifying.  Attention,  as  a  relating  activ- 
ity, brings  truth  to  a  logical  interdependent  whole.     All 


316  EEASON. 

this  is  impossible  with  the  early  revelatious  of  reason. 
Being  a  matter  of  immediate  awareness,  rational  truth 
cannot  be  related,  subsumed,  or  classified  with  reference 
to  any  mediating  or  corroborating  principle  apart  from 
itself.  Intuition  cannot  be  defined  for  the  same  reason 
that  consciousness  cannot  be  defined. 

2.  Intuition  is  a  necessary  postulate  of  knowledge. 
While  itself  knowledge,  intuition,  like  consciousness, 
underlies  and  makes  possible  all  knowledge.  Conscious- 
ness, as  universal  form,  arises  in  the  act  of  sentience  and 
presentation ;  so  reason  takes  on  incipient  manifestation 
in  the  same  earl}^  facts  of  the  dawning  mental  life.  The 
origin  of  both  is  wrapped  in  the  inscrutable  mystery 
which  envelops  all  origins — the  veil  of  modesty  beneath 
which  nature  hides  the  throes  of  her  productive  travail. 
But  that  reason  is,  even  here,  latent,  implicit,  in  knowl- 
edge, is  revealed  in  the  early  activities  of  child  life,  as 
they  are  at  first  adjusted  to  the  conditions  of  the  living 
environment.  And  this  presupposition  continues 
throughout  subsequent  development,  becoming  more 
consciously  integral  to  intelligence,  as  the  laws  of  its 
mental  morphology  are  realized  in  the  higher  life. 

The  postulates  of  reason  are  well  exemplified  in  the 
law  of  right  and  wrong  which  attaches,  as  an  additional 
fact,  to  the  intellectual  character  of  a  consideration  or 
motive.  The  most  developed  analysis  of  the  judgment 
of  moral  quality  fails  to  resolve  it  into  elements  less 
original,  and  it  must  be  recognized  as  an  implicit  prin- 
ciple of  reason,  coincident  in  its  rise  with  the  growth  of 
consciousness  itself. 

§  4.  Intuition  as  Mental  Product. 

II.  Considered  as  acquirements  of  knowledge,  the  in- 
tuitions are  late  mental  products.  They  arise  from  the 
reflective  consciousness  in  its  scrutiny  and  criticism  of 


INTUITION  AS  MENTAL  PRODUCT.  317 

itself.  B}'  its  own  relating  and  dividing  apperceptive 
activity,  it  distinguishes  between  form  and  content,  be- 
tween itself  and  its  acquired  material,  and  holds  up  to 
view  the  principles  of  its  activity.  The  form  of  knowl- 
edge thus  becomes  content,  while  yet  remaining  form,  by 
self-knowledge,  that  marvellous  property  of  mind.  It  is 
only  as  they  are  products  that  a  science  of  the  intuitions 
is  possible.  All  original  principles,  however  constitu- 
tive and  regulative  in  their  nature,  and  however  opera- 
tive in  the  mental  life,  must  first  be  seized  upon  as  con- 
tent, bent  in  upon  themselves,  as  the  objects  of  their  own 
operation,  before  their  isolation  can  be  reached  and 
their  characteristics  discovered.  When  this  act  of  isola- 
tion is  performed,  we  find  rational  principles  character- 
ized by  two  great  peculiarities. 

1.  Intuition  is  of  tJw  universal :  that  is,  its  product  has 
reference  to  an  accompanying  universal  element  of  con- 
tent. The  intuition  arises,  as  has  been  said,  in  connec- 
tion with  a  process,  and  is  the  law  of  this  process,  apart 
from  the  particular  objects  upon  which  the  process  is 
exercised.  It  is  only  the  universal  aspect  of  the  pro- 
cess, not  its  particular  application,  which  the  reason 
reveals.  But  this  universal  aspect  must  find  parallel 
justification  in  the  universal  nature  of  the  object  which 
the  process  bespeaks.  However  seemingly  individual, 
therefore,  the  object  of  experience,  whether  thing,  event, 
relation,  it  becomes  to  us  rationally  productive  only  as 
it  has  universal  significance  or  meaning :  a  meaning 
which  attaches  to  all  things,  events,  relations,  that  may 
enter  into  the  same  mental  process.  All  strictly  partic- 
ular incidents  of  experience  are  accidental  and  meaning- 
less for  the  reason. 

For  example,  all  purely  affective  states  of  sensation, 
as  sweet,  odorous,  pleasurable,  have  no  rational  mean- 
ing, except  as  they  are  synthesized  in  some  perceptual 
unit,  an  orange,  an  apple.     It  is  in  the  synthetic  process, 


318  REASON. 

not  in  the  particular  content,  that  the  rational  laws  of 
apperception  are  revealed.  And  the  particular  product, 
orange,  apple,  is  again  unproductive  of  a  higher  reach 
of  rational  truth,  unless  it  be  given  general  or  universal 
meaning  in  the  concept. 

2.  Intuition  is  categorical.  Further,  rational  truth  is, 
in  its  nature,  categorical.  As  a  revelation  of  what  is  in 
mind  and  of  what  must  be  in  knowledge,  it  is  uncondi- 
tional in  its  communication  of  itself.  The  primitive 
form  of  belief,  which  was  found '  to  accompany  the  ear- 
liest advances  of  mind  in  childhood,  here  finds  its  ra- 
tional explanation.  Sense-perception  is  believed  in, 
memory  is  trusted,  the  reports  of  the  constructive  im- 
agination are  given  full  credence,  by  this  principle  of  the 
mental  life.  Conditions  and  hypotheses  grow  up  and 
are  justified,  only  as  the  mind  departs  from  the  area  of 
its  primitive  certitude,  and  weighs  the  conflicting  testi- 
mony of  other  voices  than  its  own.  Here  we  are  con- 
fined to  the  single  voice  ;  and  whatever  we  may  discover 
as  to  its  truthfulness  to  external  fact,  we  find  no  uncer- 
tainty attaching  to  its  reports  of  our  own  internal  life. 

The  categorical  nature  of  rational  truth  is  clearly 
seen  in  the  axioms  of  number  and  space,  as  employed  in 
mathematics,  and  the  law  of  dut}^,  the  "  categorical  im- 
perative," which  admits  no  questioning  or  excuse. 

§  5.  Sphere  and  Kinds  of  Intuition. 

The  constitutive  and  regulative  aspects  of  reason  ex- 
tend necessarily  throughout  the  mental  life  and  do  not 
terminate  with  the  intellectual  function.  Accordingly, 
the  sphere  of  intuition  embraces  also  feeling  and  will. 
In  the  present  connection,  however,  we  are  concerned 
only  with  the  reason  as  it  reaches  formulation  through 
the  activities  of  intellect,  except  so  far  as  its  principles 

'  See  pp.  246  and  248. 


SPHERE  AND  KINDS  OF  INTUITION.  319 

are  of  identical  nature  in  the  three  great  divisions  of 
the  mental  life.  Leaving  for  future  discussion  the  ques- 
tion of  the  value  of  the  intellectual  intuitions  for  feeling 
and  will,  we  find  underlying  the  entire  mental  life  a  sin- 
gle Universal  Intuition.  Considering,  further,  the  prin- 
ciples of  reason  in  relation  to  the  varied  activities  of  the 
intellectual  function,  and  naming  such  intuitions  after 
the  analogy  of  these  activities,  we  find  the  intellectual 
intuitions  to  be,  first,  Intuitions  of  Sense,  and,  second, 
Intuitions  of  Intelligence.^ 

I.  Universal  Intuition:  Being.  The  categorical  sig- 
nificance of  the  reason  attains  complete  conscious  reali- 
zation in  the  universal  intuition  of  being.  It  is  the 
primitive  postulate  of  consciousness  in  all  its  forms,  af- 
fective, presentative,  volitional.  It  is  fundamental  to  all 
knowledge,  yet  inexplicable  in  terms  of  knowledge.  It 
is  equally  present  in  the  ready  and  unconscious  accept- 
ance of  sense-perception,  in  the  conscious  consent  to 
the  reality  of  the  concept,  in  the  existential  assertion 
of  the  judgment.  It  is  a  rational  principle  of  the  em- 
pirical consciousness,  whatever  its  place  be  in  meta- 
physical theory. 

II.  Intuition  of  Sense :  Percepts  or  Cognitions.     The 

fact,  of  sense-intuition,  arising  as  the  finished  result  of 
sense-perception,  has  already  been  spoken  of.  It  was 
viewed,  in  the  former  connection,  merely  as  an  empirical 
fact,  and  given  its  due  place  in  the  development  of 
thought.  We  are  here  concerned  with  its  value  and 
meaning  for  the  reason. 

Unity.  In  sense-intuition,  the  manifold  of  sensation 
is  found  unified  and  universalized.     The  process  of  its 

'  The  rational  accompaniments  of  feeling  and  will  are  treated  in  the 
consideration  of  those  aspects  of  the  mental  life. 


320  REASON. 

accomplishment  is  perception.  Its  unity  is  first  an  ideal 
unity,  through  which  the  unity  of  the  external  thing  of 
perception  is  interpreted  and  reconstructed  :  but  this 
ideal  unity  is  in  so  far  concealed  in  the  potential  unfolding 
of  the  process  of  perception,  that  it  seems  to  arise  con- 
sciously by  abstraction  from  the  unity  of  the  thing. 
Such  a  derivation  of  the  principle  of  unity  is  impossible. 
The  unity  of  a  thing  could  never  be  known,  as  such,  un- 
less the  multiplicity  of  its  affective  manifestations  were 
seized  upon  and  unified  by  the  rational  jjrinciple  of  the 
perceptive  process,  and  thrown  into  the  form  of  a  uni- 
tary percept.  The  intuition  of  a  thing,  in  nature,  is  uni- 
versal, therefore,  since  it  is  the  typical  application  of  a 
rational  principle  to  a  definite  sense  content.  This 
rational  principle  is  that  of  unity. 

Poiver.  The  act  of  attention  by  which  the  construc- 
tion of  a  thing  in  perception  is  possible,  involves,  as  has 
been  said,  an  essential  feeling  of  effort,  found  nowhere 
else  in  the  mental  life.  Yet  it  is  only  as  this  attentive 
activity  accompanies  all  the  operations  that  they  are 
possible.  The  princij)le  of  successful  effort,  or  of  power, 
therefore,  arises  in  the  mental  life,  regulative  of  the 
energy  of  the  whole.  The  principle  of  power,  like  that  of 
unity,  it  is  readily  seen,  takes  its  rise  in  the  subjective 
side  of  the  perceptive  process  ;  but  it  is  only  as  it  is  real- 
ized in  an  objective  law  as  an  effect,  or  movement,  that 
the  regulative  principle  becomes  apparent  as  knowledge. 
The  subsequent  intuition  of  external  power  or  force 
may  be  construed  as  a  transition  from  the  subjective 
to  the  objective  aspect  of  this  experience,  A  second 
principle  of  sense  intuition  is  therefore  power. 

Extension  and  Duration.  In  the  processes  of  local- 
ization in  space  and  time,  we  have  found  *  forms  of  con- 
struction into  which  the    entire  material  of  the  sense 

1  See  pp.  120  and  179. 


INTUITIONS  OF  INTELLIGENCE.  321 

function  is  cast.  The  necessary  presence  of  these  forms 
has  already  been  spoken  of.  They  are  regulative  of  our 
perception  of  the  external  world  of  things  and  events. 
They  take,  in  concrete  perception,  the  form  of  extension 
and  duration,  and  are  additional  intuitions  of  sense. 

The  principles  of  reason  thus  found  to  be  regulative 
in  the  sensitive  function  ma}^  be  designated  as  intuitive 
joercepts  or  cognitio7is,^  having  reference  both  to  the  per- 
ceptive process  through  which  they  reach  consciousness, 
and  to  their  own  nature  as  in  turn  material  for  higher 
forms  of  rational  truth.  The  derivation  of  these  higher 
forms  appears  in  connection  with  the  higher  processes 
of  mind. 

III.  Intuitions  of  Intelligence.  1.  Concepts  or  Beliefs. 
The  analogy  between  perception,  as  typical  of  the  apper- 
ceptive processes  in  general,  and  conception,  has  already 
been  pointed  out.  Conception  departs  from  the  correc- 
tives of  reality,  and  establishes  a  unitary  product  of  its 
own  through  the  universal  element  in  reproduction. 
The  passage  from  the  singular  percept  to  the  general 
concept  is,  however,  not  accidental :  it  is  mediated 
through  the  constructive  imagination,  which  reveals  a- 
principle  of  universal  construction,  while  still  busy  only 
with  particular  elements  of  content. 

End,  the  Unlimited.  The  constructive  imagination,, 
we  have  seen,  is  ungoverned  either  by  the  tests  of  ex- 
ternal truth  or  by  the  regulative  laws  of  conceptual  com- 
position. Yet  in  its  principle  of  movement  it  cannot 
escape  its  own  rational  form.  The  universal  element  it 
reveals  is  end,  or  purpose.  It  is  inherent  in  the  selective 
attention,  the  feeling  of  fitness,  which  culminates  in  the 


^  McCosh  gives  the  following  threefold  division  of  the  intuitions 
under  the  terms,  Cognitions,  Beii^,  and  Judgments.  See  his  First 
and  Fundamental  Truth. 


322  REASON. 

perfect,  and  in  progressive  construction,  whicli  culmi- 
nates in  the  unlimited. 

Identity.  The  products  of  the  constructive  imagina- 
tion are  further  universalized  in  conception.  The  ra- 
tional laws  of  conception  appear  in  certain  character- 
istics of  the  product,  which  are  intuitive  truths  wider  in 
generality  than  the  rational  percepts  of  sense.  The 
percept  of  unity,  released  from  the  individual  conditions 
of  the  perception  of  things,  reveals  its  universal  character 
by  the  intensive  modifications  it  undergoes  in  reproduc- 
tion. Unity  thus  becomes  broadened  and  deepened,  and 
in  its  successive  applications  to  a  content,  is  ap^jrehended 
as  identity.  Identity  is  a  rational  principle  expressing 
the  recurrence  of  the  same  mental  factor  in  consciousness. 

Cause,  Self,  Substance.  The  intuition  of  jiower,  like- 
wise, suffers  the  same  universalizing  modification.  Pass- 
ing from  the  attentive  exercise  of  mental  power,  by 
recurring  instances,  we  reach  the  concept,  cause.  Further, 
the  identical  experiences  of  inner  causation  lead  us  to 
apprehend  the  sameness  of  the  self,  a  rational  concept 
appearing  early  in  the  mental  life,  and  the  basis  of  the 
developed  exercises  of  knowledge.  Generalization  from 
self  and  the  permanent  cause  in  the  world  without,  which 
recurs,  like  self,  in  our  experience,  leads  to  the  rational 
concept,  substance. 

Space  and  Time.  Extension  and  duration  also  are 
freed  from  their  reference  to  a  concrete  perceptual  con- 
tent, and  become,  in  the  development  of  thought  toward 
the  universal,  space  and  time. 

2.  Judgments.  By  the  thought  operations,  which 
follow  in  the  progressive  development  of  apperception, 
products  of  the  highest  universality  are  reached.  The 
simple  fact  of  identity  upon  which  conception  proceeds, 
gives  place  to  the  broader  establishment  of  the  relations 
given  in  judgment.     The  relational  activity  in  its  fullest 


INTUITIONS  OF  INTELLIGENCE.  323 

form  now  brings  into  our  self-reflection  the  assertive 
forms  of  reasoning.  Tlie  rational  grounds  of  this  pro- 
cedure are  again  wider  reaches  of  the  principles  already 
discovered.  Intuition  takes  on  the  form  of  the  opera- 
tion it  accompanies,  and  the  reason  announces  itself  in 
Jvdgment. 

Axioms  of  Mathematics.  Judgments  of  reason  take 
their  root  in  the  perceptual  or  conceptual  forms  of 
reason.  Here  we  formulate  the  axioms  of  space  and 
number,  utilized  in  geometry  and  general  mathematics. 

Judgments  of  Time,  Quantity,  and  Causation,  have  a 
similar  rational  origin,  from  the  concepts  time,  space, 
cause. 

Axioms  of  Logic.  Thus  arise,  also,  the  developed 
forms  of  the  discursive  or  thought  operations,  which  have 
already  been  seen  in  their  psychological  genesis.*  They 
are,  first,  the  Law  of  Identity,  and,  second,  the  Law  of 
Sufficient  Beason.  The  law  of  identity  is  the  absolute 
generalization  of  the  concept  of  identity.  As  a  rational 
principle  it  has  complete  universality.  In  Kke  manner, 
the  law  of  sufficient  reason  announces  the  principle,  of 
which  the  concept  of  cause  is  a  more  partial  and  partic- 
ular intimation.  The  concept  of  cause,  upon  which  the 
law  of  effect  is  based,  becomes  the  logical  law  of  ground, 
upon  which  inference  is  based. 

Judgments  of  Design,  the  Infinite.  The  laws  of  the 
constructive  imagination  lead  on  to  rational  formulation 
in  judgment.  The  concept  of  end  is  universalized  for 
thought  in  the  rational  principle  of  design.  The  concepts, 
also,  of  the  unlimited  and  the  perfect  find  their  generali- 
zation and  expression  in  the  postulate  of  the  infinite. 

§  6.  FijfAL  Objects  of  Intuition. 

The  rational  principles  thus  briefly  pointed  out  may 
be   considered  with   reference  to  three  great  objects  of 

>  See  p.  310. 


324  REASON. 

knowledge,  in  tlie  final  apprehension  of  wliich  tliey  are 
organized  in  a  dependence  among  themselves.  These 
great  centres  of  rational  convergence  are  the  World,  Selfy 
and  God.  The  ultimate  end  of  knowledge  is  the  com- 
prehension of  self  in  relation  to  the  world  and  God :  the 
comprehension  of  the  universe  as  a  system,  of  the  self 
as  realization  of  reason  in  its  energetic  reconstruction  of 
the  world,  and  of  God  as  the  final  rational  demand  alike 
of  reason  in  itself,  and  of  the  world  of  its  completed  re- 
construction. 

I.  Intuition  of  the  World.  As  the  data  of  sensation, 
in  its  presentative  aspect,  are  gathered  up  and  universal- 
ized in  perception,  by  the  laws  of  its  rational  procedure  ; 
so  the  entire  area  of  rational  intuition,  in  its  external 
realization,  is  swept,  for  the  organized  intuition  of  the 
world.  The  world  as  a  whole,  a  system,  is  the  integra- 
tion of  reason  in  its  application  to  an  external  content. 
The  isolation  of  principles  finds  here  its  reverse  law. 
And  the  external  world,  in  its  unity  of  many  parts  and 
laws,  becomes  one  in  thought,  as  it  is  in  fact. 

II.  Intuition  of  Self.  The  laws  of  the  inner  world 
undergo  a  corresponding  unification,  with  reference  to 
self,  the  centre  of  all  knowledge  and  of  all  being,  as  far 
as  it  is  construed  as  knowledge.  Self  is  the  point  of 
departure  in  the  first  instance,  and  the  point  of  approach 
in  the  last  instance,  by  the  refiex  movement  of  self-con- 
scious reason. 

III.  Intuition  of  God.  The  final  conceptive  product 
or  ultimate  generalization  of  reason,  proceeds  out  from 
the  world  and  self,  and  seeks  a  further  unifying  postu- 
late. This  final  unity  is  adumbrated  in  the  unity  of  the 
apperceptive  process,  the  identity  of  the  reasoning  pow- 
ers, and  the  instability  of  all  the  complexes  constructed 
in  experience.     Unity,  identity,  constructive  infinity,  end. 


INTUITION  OB'  OOD.  325 

cause,  perfection,  categorical  being — all  lead  on  by  the 
necessary  progression  of  intellect,  through  the  conditions 
and  limitations  of  finite  mind,  to  the  intuition  of  the  ab- 
solute and  unconditioned  subject,  God. 

We  thus  reach  a  return  of  reason  to  self-conscious- 
ness :  a  return  which  is  also  mediated  through  feeling  and 
will.  The  universal  intuition  being,  is  given  its  deepest 
meaning  in  the  universal  postulate  of  reason,  God. 
Through  the  strife  and  incompleteness  of  our  entire  inner 
life,  the  goal  of  all  emerges :  the  infinite  Self,  to  which 
knowledge  is  intuition,  and  existence  is  reason. 

On  reason,  consult :  McCosh,  Intuitions  of  the  Mind,  inductively 
investigated,  and  First  and  Fundamental  Truth ;  Waitz,  Lehrhuch 
der  Psychologie,  §§  46,  53,  54  ;  Jivobi&Gh, Psychologie,  §§  112,  113,  and 
Logik,  §§  54-60  ;  Porter,  Hum.  Intellect,  pt.  4 ;  Hickok,  loc.  cit.  p. 
117  ;  Sigwart,  Logik,  §§  23-25  and  32  ;  Mansel,  Metaphysics,  p.  248; 
Wundt,  Logik,  i,  pt.  6  ;  Laurie,  Metaphysica  nova  et  vetusta,  pt.  5  ; 
Morell,  Outlines  of  Psychology,  pt.  5  ;  Lotze,  Microcosmus,  bk.  2, 
ch.  IV,  and  Logic,  II,  eh.  v;  Hodgson,  Time  and  Space,  ch.  vii,  3, 
and  vni ;  Bradley,  Principles  of  Logic,  bk.  1,  ch.  v. 

Further  Problems  for  Study  : 

Tests  of  intuitive  truth  ; 
Experiential  theory  of  intuition  ; 
Hegelian  doctrine  of  absolute  reason  ; 
Intuition  and  evolution  ; 
Validity  of  intuition. 


INDEX. 


Abstraction— as  a  mental  state, 
72;  as  a  condition  of  the  imag- 
ination, 273. 

Activity — mental  contrasted  with 
physical,  5;  unity  of  a.  of  the 
mental  functions,  40. 

Adaimo?i — on  belief,  260. 

Advantages — of  external  observa- 
tion, 17. 

Affective — self-reference  of  the  a. 
states,  36;  as  opposed  to  presen- 
talive  states,  62. 

After-image — nature  of,  95-96;  in 
memory,  11,  146. 

Agraphia — 207. 

Aids — to  reproduction,  167-8. 

Albert — on  hypnotism,  73. 

American  Journal  of  Psychology — 
article  on  hypnotism,  73;  on 
Miiller,  109;  on  Lange,  113;  on 
Brewer,  133;  on  association  of 
sounds  and  colors,  209. 

Ampere — on  chemical  composi- 
tion, 101. 

Analogy — between  physical  and 
mental  force,  99-100;  between 
association  and  chemical  com- 
position, 100-102. 

Analysis — mental  a.,  102;  of  per- 
ception, 117;  of  sense-intuition, 
138;  as  stage  in  conception,  273- 
275;  analytic  judgment,  292. 

Animal — a.  psychology,  15;  refer- 
ences on  a.  psychology,  34. 


Answer — to  arguments  on  the  un- 
conscious, 47-58. 

Apperception  —  as  distinguishing 
the  mental,  4;  as  active  con- 
sciousness, 64;  definition  of,  65; 
references  on,  79;  division  of 
the  a.  function,  80;  a.  function, 
82;  reinstatement  of  a.  in  recog- 
nition, 176-177;  association  jis 
a.,  201;  a.  in  imagination,  241; 
a.  in  thought,  271. 

Ap>petence — in  imagination,  228- 
230. 

Application — as  a  mental  state,  78. 

Archiv  filr  Anat.  und  Phys. — ar- 
ticle by  Fich,  95. 

Archive  de  Zool.  exper. — article  by 
Delage,  132. 

Area — of  consciousness,  65. 

Arguments — for  the  unconscious, 
46-58;  for  identity  of  presenta- 
tive  and  representative  states, 
147-151;  on  associative  laws  of 
imagination,  220-223. 

Aristotle — on  consciousness,  44;  on 
material  residues,  153;  on  laws 
of  association,  194;  on  imagina- 
tion, 213;  on  identity  as  relation 
of  judgment,  287;  on  the  cate- 
gories, 289. 

Assimilation  (tive)  —  in  illusion, 
256;  a.  association,  207. 

Association — argument  from  a.  for 
the  unconscious,  55;  as  aid  to 
327 


328 


INDEX. 


Association — (Continued). 

i-eproduction,  168;  definition  of, 
192;  relation  to  memory,  192; 
physical  basis  of,  193-194;  secon- 
dary laws  of,  194-197;  by  conti- 
guity, 195-200;  by  resemblance, 
195-197  ;  reduction  of  resem- 
blance to  contiguit}',  196-197; 
by  contrast,  198-199;  universal 
law  of:  correlation,  200-202; 
as  integration  of  states,  191-192; 
law  of  preference  in,  202-203; 
danger  of  free  association,  203; 
forms  of,  204-210;  unitary,  206; 
assimilative  and  disparate,  207; 
motor  a.,  208-209  ;  complex, 
converging,  diverging,  209-11; 
references  on,  211-212 ;  a.  in 
sense-intuition,  139;  a.  as  condi- 
tion of  imagination,  21,4. 
Attention  —  (69-80) ;  argument 
from  a.  for  the  unconscious,  50 
effect  of  a.  on  consciousness,  51 
a.  as  active  consciousness,  64 
definition  of,  69  ;  as  mental 
energj%  69;  reflex  a.,  70;  a.  in  the 
hypnotic  state,  71;  voluntary  a., 
71;  bearing  of,  in  the  mental 
life,  72-77;  relation  of,  to  sensa- 
tion, 72,  112;  eflfect  of  a.  on 
duration  of  sensation,  73,  112; 
relation  to  movement,  73-75; 
relation  to  intellect,  75;  to  feel- 
ing, 76;  to  the  bodily  functions, 
77,  170;  references  on,  79;  train- 
ing of,  77;  habits  of,  77;  a.  as 
condition  of  retention,  163;  of 
reproduction,  167;  a.  in  sense- 
intuition,  138;  a.  as  indicating 
position  in  time,  184-185;  a.  in 
dreams,  185;  a.  in  imagination, 
230-232. 

Bain — on  empirical  laws,  32;    on 
consciousness  as  change,  48,  51; 


Bain — (Continued), 
relative  theory  of  consciousness, 
59;  on  muscular  sense,  90-91; 
on  .space  perception,  136;  on  the 
physical  basis  of  memory,  162; 
on  association  by  resemblance, 
197;  on  the  theory  of  belief, 
286;  on  the  predicaments,  288- 
292. 

Baldwin — on  relation  of  psychol- 
ogy to  metaphysics,  8;  exposi- 
tion of  Beaunis,  28;  on  Weber's 
law,  109;  experiments  in  psy- 
chometry,  109-117 ;  experience 
in  a  dream,  207. 

Basis — physical  b.  of  mind,  29-30; 
physical  b.  of  memory,  161. 

Beaunis — on  nervous  inhibition, 
28;  on  the  muscular  sense,  89. 

Belief— b.  and  conception,  279, 
280,  •281;  b.  and  illusion,  247; 
b.  and  judgment,  293-299;  asso- 
ciation theory  of,  296;  b  as  in- 
tuitive, 321. 

Beneke — on  intensity  of  conscious- 
ness, 48. 

Berkeley — on  perception  of  dis- 
tance by  the  eye,  127;  on  associ- 
ation, 199;  on  class  images,  278. 

Bernard  (CI.) — on  sensibility,  82. 

Bernhardt — on  the  muscular  sense, 
89. 

Bernstein — on  the  five  senses,  92- 
93. 

Binet — on  the  unconscious,  58;  B. 
(and  Fere)  on  touch  in  the  hyp- 
notic state,  97. 

Body — functions  of  b.  and  the  at- 
tention, 77;  perception  of,  126. 

Bosanquet — on  categorical  judg- 
ments, 297. 

Bouillier — on  retention,  153. 

Bradley — on  idea  of  time,  181;  on 
association  by  resemblance,  197; 
on  trust  in  mental  states,   254; 


INDEX. 


829 


Bradley — (Continued). 

on  the  law  of  identity  in  judg- 
ment, 284;  on  the  theory  of 
belief,  287. 

Brain — as  condition  of  mind,  2; 
operation  of  trepan,  4;  localiza- 
tion in  the  b.,  114;  capacity  of , 
158-159;  associative  connections 
in,  193. 

(Magazine) — article    by    De- 

meaux,  91. 

Breritano — on  nature  and  method 
of  psychology,  1;  on  observa- 
tion, 11,  23;  on  the  physiologi- 
cal method,  32;  on  judgments, 
285,  298. 

Brewer  —  on  the  semicircular 
canals,  133. 

Broca — speech  centre,  4. 

Brown — on  recognition,  176  ;  on 
suggestion,  192  ;  on  association 
by  resemblance,  197 ;  on  emo- 
tion in  association,  199  ;  on  men- 
tal energy,  226  ;  on  constructive 
imagination,  233. 

Brown-Sequard — on  the  muscular 
sense,  90. 

Canals — function  of  semicircular 
c,  132-183. 

Cardaillac — on  distinction  of  pre- 
sentation from  representation, 
147. 

{Jarpenier — on  unconscious  cere- 
bration, 56;  on  illusions,  252, 
259;  illusion  due  to  dreams,  261. 

Categorical — c.  syllogism,  302;  c. 
judgment,  292. 

Cattell — on  attention  in  psychome- 
try,  113. 

Causation — principle  of  c.  applied 
to  the  unconscious,  46-50 ;  as 
law  of  association,  201. 

Change — as  basis  of  consciousness, 
59-61. 


Characteristics — general  c.  of  mind, 
43-79. 

Charcot — on  associative  connec- 
tions in  the  brain,  193;  on 
pathology  (mental),  244. 

Cheselden — case  reported  by,  127. 

Christ — appeals  to  test  of  incon- 
gruity, 268. 

Classification — of  mental  states, 
35-42;  completeness  of,  36-37; 
unity  of  c.  in  consciousness, 
40-41;  references  on,  42;  of 
sensations,  85;  of  intuitions, 
323. 

Coexistence — association  by,  204- 
210. 

Color — sensations  of,  94-96;  c. 
blindness,  95. 

Composition — by  imagination,  218- 
220. 

Comptes  Bendus — article  by  Cyon, 
132-133. 

Comte — on  identity  of  psychology 
and  physiology,  2. 

Conception  (272-283)— process  of, 
272-276;  products  of,  276;  c.  as 
discovery  of  relations,  277;  rela- 
tion of,  to  language,  277;  use  of 
images  in,  278;  relation  to  reality 
and  belief,  279-281,  282;  unity 
of,  282;  references  on,  310-311; 
intuitive  c,  321. 

Conceptualism  (280-281). 

Conditions — mental  c.  of  retention, 
163. 

Conduct — element  in  conscience, 
37. 

Confusion — of  presentation  and 
representation,  149. 

Conscience — not  a  separate  func- 
tion, 37. 

Consciousness — contrasted  with 
movement,  3;  complex  states  of, 
5;  as  defining  psychology,  8;  as 
association,  9;  as  reflection,  10, 


330 


INDEX. 


Consciousness — (Continued). 
143;  unity  of  sources  in  c,  18; 
as  method,  22;  as  mental  char- 
acteristic, 43-68;  nature  of,  43; 
c.  and  the  unconscious,  45-58; 
not  a  power,  44,  not  an  organ, 
44;  least  c,  45,  52;  relative 
theory  of,  58-63;  c.  of  self,  143; 
simple  and  reflective,  63;  as 
differentia  of  self,  63;  area  of, 
63;  forms  of,  64;  passive  c,  64, 
69;  active  c,  64,  69,  71;  devel- 
opment of,  66;  self  c,  davv^n  of, 
67;  references  on,  67-68. 

Constructive — c.  imagination,  226- 
243. 

Content — of  consciousness,  60. 

Contiguity — as  secondary  law  of 
association,  194-198. 

Continuity — mental  c,  159-160;  c. 
of  representation  in  association, 
191. 

Contradiction — law  of  c.  in  repre- 
sentation, 267. 

Contrast — in  association,  198-200. 

Convergent — c.  association,  209. 

Correlation— ]&w  of,  201-202. 

Gorti — fibres  of,  93. 

Cournot — on  sensations  of  sound, 
93. 

Cowles — on  insistent  ideas,  71. 

Criticism — of  the  experimental 
method,  29-31;  of  theories  of 
retention,  156. 

Cyon  (filie  de) — on  semicircular 
canals,  132-133. 

Czermak — on  local  signs,  134. 

Dakwin — on  duration  of  sensa- 
tion, 110;  on  the  effects  of  rep- 
resentation, 148. 

Drtto— physical  d.  for  the  percep- 
tion of  space,  122;  synthesis  of 
space  data,  126;  d.  for  the  per- 
ception of  time,  182-185. 


Deceptions — of  perception,  143. 

Deduction — as  psychological  meth- 
od, 20;  as  a  kind  of  reasoning, 
300-307;  as  proof,  310. 

Definition — of  perception,  116;  of 
judgment,  283;  of  association, 
200;  of  syllogism,  300;  of  reason, 
302. 

De  Gerando — on  the  hypothesis, 
307. 

Delage — on  the  semicircular 
canals,  132. 

Delbmif—on  impossibility  of  meas- 
uring sensation,  108. 

Demeaux — case  reported,  on  the 
muscular  sense,  91. 

Descartes — on  the  physical  basis  of 
memory,  155. 

Design — in  association,  201 ;  as  pre- 
dicament, 290;  as  intuition,  323. 

Detection— oi  illusions,  266-269. 

Development — of  consciousness,  66; 
of  the  physical  organism,  67;  of 
the  organic  in  memory,  169;  of 
the  idea  of  identity,  281. 

Dewey — on  feeling  of  interest  iu 
association,  224. 

Difference — consciousness  as  feel- 
ing of  d.,  59-61, 

Differentia — consciousness  as  d.  of 
self,  63. 

Differentiation — as  stage  in  the  pro- 
cess of  perception,  118-120. 

Difficulties — in  psychology,  8-10. 

Discursive — d.  function  distin- 
guished, 81. 

Disparate — d.  associations,  207- 
209. 

Dissociation — d.by  imagination,  18. 

Distinction — d.  time  in  psychom- 
etry.  111;  between  the  recogni- 
tion of  object  and  image,  172- 
173. 

Distraction— n&  a  mental  state,  70. 

Divergent — d.  association,  209. 


INDEX. 


331 


Division — of  psycliological  system 
according  to  method  (table),  31; 
of  matter  of  psychology,  41; 
references  on,  42. 

Donaldson — on  the  temperature 
sense,  97. 

Drohiscli — on  recognition,  174;  on 
detached  images,  221;  on  class 
images,  278;  on  categorical  judg- 
ments, 296,  298. 

Dumond — on  the  physical  basis  of 
attention,  170. 

Duration — of  mental  states,  4;  of 
sensation,  85,  109,  117;  effect  of 
d.  upon  the  intensity  of  sensa- 
tion, 113;  as  empty  time,  180; 
units  of  d.,  185-186. 

Ear — feeling  of  equilibrium  aris- 
ing from  e.,  132. 

Effect— \?iyf  of  partial  e.,  46-50; 
identical  e.  of  presentation  and 
representation,  147. 

Effort — sensations  of,  89. 

Egger — on  the  organic  iu  memory, 
170. 

Emotion — in  imagination,  239;  illu- 
sion due  to  e.,  264. 

Empirical  (cism) — e.  psychology, 
1;  ofspace,135;of  time,186-187. 

Encyclopcedia  Britannica  —  article 
by  Ward,  36,  182;  by  Adamson, 
260. 

End — unity  of  e.  of  mental  func- 
tions, 40. 

Energy — mental  e.  in  attention, 
69,  70;  in  recognition,  178. 

Epicurus — on  memory,  146. 

Equilibrium — from  the  ear,  132. 

Errors — in  psychology,  8-10;  of 
observation,  12,  25;  of  observ- 
ing only  the  mature  mind, 
14. 

Escort — mental  e.  as  a  test  of  illu- 
sion, 267. 


Esquirol — on  distinction  between 
illusion  and  hallucination,  255. 

Evolution — of  mind,  105. 

Existential — e.  judgment,  293-294, 
298. 

Exner — on  sound  intensities,  50. 

Expectation — as  leading  to  illusion, 
252;  in  induction,  308. 

Experience — relation  of,  to  experi- 
ment, 28;  e.  as  ground  of  classi- 
fication, 36  ;  revival  of  experi- 
ences in  memorj%  152;  truthful- 
ness of  ordinary,  253. 

Experitneni — in  psychology,  7;  as 
method,  21,  25-31;  internal  e., 
26-27;  external  e.,  27-29;  as  de- 
pendent on  experience,  28;  im- 
possible in  higher  powers,  29; 
subordination  of,  to  observation, 
30;  in  psychometry,  110-113. 

Extension — in  conception,  22-24. 

Extenmv—e.  association,  206. 

Facts — contrast  between  mental 
and  physical  f.,  2-6;  mental  f., 
1;  division  of  mental  f.,  41; 
classification  of  mental  f.,  35- 
42;  three  great  classes  of  f.,  36; 
f.  of  memory  as  argument  for 
the  unconscious,  54;  f.  of  asso- 
ciation and  the  imconscious,  55; 
f.  of  habit  and  the  unconscious, 
56. 

Faculty — defined,  35. 

Familiarity — feeling  of,  172. 

Fancy  (224-226)— relation  of  f.  to 
reality,  225. 

Fatigiie — due  to  attention,  69. 

Fechner — on  after-images,  96;  on 
the  logarithmic  law  of  sensa- 
tion, 107. 

Feeling — as  class  of  mental  facts 
36;  effect  of  attention  on  f.,  76, 
f.  of  familiarity,  172;  f.  of  fit- 
ness in  the  imagination,  232-234. 


332 


INDEX. 


Fere— on  sensori-motor  excitation, 
74. 

Ferrier — on  the  muscular  sense, 
89;  on  cerebral  localization,  114; 
on  the  semicircular  canals,  132. 

Fickle — on  the  feeling  of  freedom 
in  reproduction,  147. 

Fkk — on  color-blindness,  95. 

Fitness — feeling  of  f.  in  the  imag- 
ination, 232-234. 

Folk — f.  psychology,  15;  refer- 
ences on  f .  psychologj',  34. 

Foi'ce — reduction  of  the  physical  f . 
to  unity,  99-100;  mental  f.  re- 
duced to  unity,  99;  f.  of  associa- 
tion, 210-211. 

Fortnightly  Meviexo  —  article  by 
Huxley,  2. 

Franz — case  reported  by,  127. 

Function — three  great  f.,  36;  unity 
of  f.  in  consciousness,  40;  in- 
tellectual  f.  distinguished,  SC- 
SI; f.  of  combination,  191;  en- 
larging and  diminishing  f.  of 
fancy,  224-225. 

Galton  —  on  mental  imagery, 
168;  on  color  associations,  209; 
on  generic  images,  275. 

Generalization — in  conception,  275. 

George — on  relative  theory  of  con- 
sciousness, 59;  on  fixed  ideas, 
70;  on  unconscious  imagination, 
222  ;  on  scientific  imagination, 
233;  on  imagination  and  thought, 
240;  on  intension  of  concepts, 
274. 

Gerdy — on  nature  of  sensation,  S2. 

Glass — on  estimation  of  time,  108. 

Goc?— intuition  of,  324. 

Goethe — imaging  power  of,  149. 

Goldschneider  —  on  pressure-spots, 
96. 

Gratacap — on  feeling  of  freedom 
in  reproduction,  165. 


Griesinger — on  mental  pathology, 

244;  on  causes  of  illusion,  252. 
Grotenfelt — on  Weber's  law,  109. 
Ground — of  association,  142. 
Gurney— on  telepathy,  269. 

Habit — argument  from  h.  for  the 
unconscious,  56;  law  of  physio- 
logical h.,  57;  h.  of  attention, 
78;  retention  as  a  psychological 
h.,  153;  retention  as  physiologi- 
cal habit,  and  proof  of  same, 
156-160;  physiological  h.  as  a 
condition  of  reproduction,  164; 
same  as  basis  of  recognition, 
174. 

Hagen — on  relative  theory  of  con- 
sciousness, 59;  on  illusions,  252. 

Hall — on  muscular  sense,  90;  on 
space  perception,  123. 

Hallucination  (255,  259) — of  mem- 
ory, 262. 

Hamilton — on  the  veracity  of  con- 
sciousness,8;  on  consciousness  (na- 
ture of),  44;  on  the  unconscious, 
47,  55;  on  sensation,  83,  84-85; 
on  latent  images,  152,166;  on  area 
of  consciousness,  204;  on  class 
images.  278;  on  logical  realism, 
280.^ 

Hartley — on  animal  spirits,  163. 

Hartmann  —  on  the  unconscious, 
45,  46;  on  cerebral  excitation,  49. 

Hearing — sensations  of,  92. 

HelrnhoUz — argument  for  uncon- 
scious, 52;  on  color  sensations, 
94;  on  nerve  transmission,  110. 

Herbart — on  relation  of  psychology 
to  metaphysics,  8;  on  faculties, 
35;  on  the  unconscious,  46;  on 
the  threshold  of  sensation,  107 
theory  of  space  perception,  133, 
135;  on  retention,  155;  on  the 
categorical  judgment,  296;  on 
existential  judgment,  298. 


INDEX. 


333 


Hering — theory  of  color,  95;  on  the 
impossibility  of  measuring  sensa- 
sation,  108. 

Herseliel — illusions  of,  259. 

History — of  psychology  (references) 
34. 

Hobbes — on  association  by  resem- 
blance, 197. 

Horwicz — on  emotion  in  associa- 
tion, 199. 

Hume — on  identical  nature  of  pre- 
sentation and  representation,  147; 
on  class  images,  379;  on  nomin- 
alism, 280. 

Huxley — on  distinction  between 
movement  and  consciousness,  2; 
on  the  double  aspect  theory,  5. 

Hypnotism  —  aXteniion  in  the  h. 
state,  71;  h.  and  disease,  73; 
motor  phenomena  of,  75;  illu- 
sion in  the  h.  state,  150. 

Hypothesis  —  h.  as  psychological 
method,  21,  31-33;  scientific  h., 
236-237;  in  reasoning,  306-307. 

Hypothetical — syllogism,  303;  judg- 
ment, 295. 

Idea — insistent  i.,  1,  70;  develop- 
ment of  i.  of  identity,  281;  of 
space,  133;  of  synthetic  unity, 
140;  of  self,  144,  179;  of  per- 
sonal identity,  179;  of  time,  188; 
the  suggesting  i.  in  association, 
192;  association  of ,  192;  continu- 
ance of  the  suggesting  i.,  211;  i. 
of  the  infinite,  242. 

Identity— oi  presentation  and  rep- 
resentation: i.  in  illusion,  249; 
development  of  idea  of,  281 ;  law 
of,  254,  302;  as  ideal  product  of 
thought,  310;  intuition  of.  322. 

Illusion  (244-269)  —  as  showing 
identity  of  presentation  and  rep- 
resentation, 150,  249;  nature  of, 
244-249;   grounds    of,    249-355; 


Illusion — (Continued). 
kind  of,  255-259;  detection  of 
266-269;  relation  of  i.  to  mental 
pathology,  244-246;  general  char- 
acter of,  246-249;  relation  to  be- 
lief, 247;  representative  nature 
of,  248;  due  to  interpretation, 
249 ;  absence  of  internal  stimulus 
in,  249;  organic  stimulus  in,  251; 
mental  predisposition  to,  252- 
254;  i.  proper,  255-259;  assimi- 
lation in,  256-357;  physical  as- 
pect of,  257;  elements  of  reality 
in,  258;  i.  of  ijresentation  and 
representation,  260-265;  i.  of 
recognition,  261;  of  time,  261- 
362;  of  memory,  262-263;  of  self- 
consciousness,  264-365;  of 
thought,  365;  diminished  inten- 
sity as  test  of  i.  266;  locality,  as 
test  of,  266-267;  escort  as  test  of, 
267-269;  references  on,  269. 

Image — distinctness  of,  151;  sub- 
conscious i.,  155;  power  of  imag- 
ing, 168;  distinction  between 
image  and  object  in  recognition, 
172;  generic  i.,  275;  use  of  i.  in 
conception,  278. 

Imagination  (213-243) — passive  i., 
213-226;  material  of ,  213;  condi- 
tions of,  214-217;  modes  of  pas- 
sive i.,  218-220;  dissociation  in, 
218-220;  composition  by,  230; 
laws  of  passive  i.,  330-334;  of 
active  i.,  341;  i.  by  contiguity 
and  resemblance,  330-323;  law 
of  preference  in,  223;  i.  as  fancy, 
334-336;  active  or  constructive  i., 
336-343;  analysis  of.  327-334; 
native  appetence  in,  337;  prefer- 
ence in,  338-330;  selective  atten- 
tion in,  330-333;  feelingof  fitness 
in,  333-334;  kinds  of,  334-340; 
scientific  i.,  335-338;  relation  of 
scientific  i.  to  reality,   336;  by- 


334 


INDEX. 


Imagination — (Continued). 

pothesis  in,  236;  aesthetic  i.,  238- 
240;  relation  of  i.  to  thought, 
240-242;  ideal  product  of,  242- 
243;  physical  basis  of,  214-215; 
references  on,  243. 

Imitative — faculty,  74. 

Incongruity — as  test  of  illusion,  267. 

Induction — as  psychological  meth- 
od, 20-21;  as  a  kind  of  reasoning, 
307-311;  i.  vs.  deduction,  308-309. 

Infant  —  psychology,  16;  i.  con- 
sciousness, 62;  references  on  i.- 
psychology,  32. 

Infinite — idea  of,  242-243;  intuition 
of,  323. 

Innervation — sensation  of,  89. 

Insistent — ideas,  70. 

Instinct — in  animals,  15. 

Integration — in  association,  191-2, 
201. 

Intellect — classification  of  the  func- 
tions of,  36;  relation  of,  to  atten- 
tion, 75-76;  division  of,  80. 

Intension — of  concepts,  272-274. 

Intensity — of  mental  states,  4;  i.  as 
a  condition  of  memory,  163;  i.  of 
stimulus  as  an  aid  to  reproduc- 
tion, 167;  i.  as  indicating  posi- 
tion in  time,  183-184;  as  a  test  of 
illusion,  266. 

Intention — in  imagination,  229-230. 

Intuition— oi  sense,  138-141,  319; 
motor  i.,  140;  ideal  product  of, 
140;  i.  as  a  mental  act,  314;  as  a 
mental  product,  316;  as  imme- 
diate knowledge,  315;  as  a  nec- 
essary postulate  of  knowledge, 
316;  as  universal  in  its  meaning, 
317;  as  categorical,  318;  sphere 
and  kinds  of,  318;  universal  i., 
319;  intuitive  percepts,  319;  con- 
cepts, 321;  judgments,  322;  i.  of 
the  world,  self,  God,  324-325; 
references  on,  325. 


Involuntary — attention,  70. 

James — on  the  muscular  sense,  89; 
on  muscular  perception  of  space, 
122,  129;  on  units  of  time,  186. 

Janet  (Paul) — on  space  perception, 
129. 

(Pierre)— on  the  unconscious, 

58. 

Jastrow — on  dreams  of  the  blind, 
66,  168. 

Jei'ons — on  method,  20;  on  law  of 
identity  in  judgment  and  syllo- 
gism, 284,  302. 

Jo  uffroy— on  the  faculties,  35;  on 
consciousness,  43. 

Journal  of  Speculative  Philosophy — 
article  by  James,  186. 

Judgment  (283-299) — nature  of, 
283-284;  unity  of,  285-286;  pos- 
sible relations  asserted  in,  288- 
291;  kinds  of,  292-299;  negative 
j.,  293;  2,  priori  j.,  304;  intuitive 
j.,  322. 

Justification — of  classification  of 
mental  functions,  36. 

Kant — as  illustrating  errors  of  ob- 
servation, 14;  on  the  uncon- 
scious, 45;  on  sensation  as  op- 
posed to  perception,  84;  on  the 
impossibility  of  measuring  sensa- 
sation,  108:  on  nativism  of 
space,  134;  on  idea  of  synthetic 
unity,  141;  on  time  form,  180, 
187;  on  imagination,  220;  K.'s 
categories,  289;  on  d  priori  judg- 
ments, 304. 

Kant — (Continued). 

Kepler — K.'s  laws,  102. 

Kinds — of  constructive  imagina- 
tion, 234;  of  judgment,  292;  of 
reasoning,  299;  of  intuition,  318. 

Knowledge — function  of,  80  ;  pre- 
dicaments of,  291;   intuition  as 


INDEX. 


335 


Knowledge — (Continued). 

postulate  of,  316;  reason  as  k., 
314. 

Krafft-Ebing — on  mental  pathol- 
ogy, 244;  on  fixed  ideas,  70. 

Krausse — elements  of  K.  in  the 
skin,  97. 

Kries — on  theories  of  color,  95;  on 
distinction  time,  111. 

Lachelier — on  the  classification 

of  the  senses,  84. 

Ladd — on  physiological  psychol- 
ogy, 37;  on  attention,  77;  on  the 
muscular  sense,  89;  on  psycho- 
physics,  107,  38-39;  onpsychora- 
etry,  113;  on  organic  theory  of 
memory,  165.    . 

Latige  (N.) — on  attention  in  psy- 
chometry,  113. 

JLa7igtiage —as  mental  growth,  18; 
function  of  naming  in  sense- 
intuition,  140;  1.  and  conception, 
277;  1.  not  a  separate  function, 
37. 

Laurie — on  attention,  65,  117;  on 
judgment  as  spiritual  synthesis, 
286. 

Law — empirical  1.  in  psychology, 
21;  1.  of  nature,  31;  psycho-physi- 
cal 1.,  33-33;  1.  of  association, 
194;  of  imagination,  230,  242; 
of  contradictory  representation, 
267;  of  identity  in  judgment, 
284;  of  sufficient  reason,  294. 

Le  Conte — on  sight,  93,  95. 

Lehmann — experiments  on  associ- 
tion,  177,  197. 

Leibnitz — on  the  unconscious,  45, 
46;  on  the  theory  of  unity  of 
mind,  100;  on  composition  of 
colors,  105;  on  retention,  153, 
155. 

Leices—OVL  the  double  aspect  theory, 
5;  on  the  unconscious,  55,  56, 


Lewes — (Continued). 

57-58;  on  sentience,  58,  82;  on 
the  muscular  sense,  89;  on  the 
physiological  effects  of  represen- 
tation, 148;  on  the  Nussbaumer 
case,  309;  on  association,  222;  on 
emotion  in  illusions,  264. 

Limitations — on  the  experimental 
method,  29-31;  of  experiment 
in  psychometry,  113. 

Lipps — on  temporal  signs,  183. 

Local — memory,  189;  signs,  123. 

Localization — cerebral,  114;  1.  of 
sounds,  131;  1.  in  time,  143;  ideal 
product  of  temporal  1.,  188;  ref- 
erences on,  115;  1.  in  space, 
120-133;  1.  in  time,  179-189;  il- 
lusions of  1.  in  time,  161,  162; 
1.  as  test  of  illusions,  366;  dis- 
tinction between  1.  and  projec- 
tion of  an  image,  367. 

Locke — on  consciousness,  43-44;  on 
animal  spirits,  163;  on  recog- 
nition, 173;  on  perception  of 
time,  187. 

Logic — relation  to  psj'chology,  371; 
1.  of  conception,  374;  1.  of  judg- 
ment, 284. 

Logical — memory,  189. 

Lotze — on  distinction  between  the 
mental  and  the  physical,  4,  6; 
on  local  signs,  53,  123-134;  on 
the  unconscious,  46,  60;  on  at- 
tention, 76 ;  on  the  spiritual 
activity  of  relation,  65,  277;  on 
class  images,  379;  on  the  law  of 
identity  in  judgment,  384;  on 
space  perception,  122;  on  cor- 
relative association,  203. 

Maine  de  Biran — on  the  uncon- 
scious, 45;  on  the  muscular  sense, 
91. 

Malebi'ancJie — on  the  physical  ele- 
ment in  memory,  155. 


336 


INDEX. 


Mansel— on  the  relative  theoiy  of 
consciousness,  62;  on  intelligible 
relations,  279. 

Mantagazza —  on  the  transforma- 
tion of  mental  force,  99. 

Martineau — on  the  relating  func- 
tion, 65. 

Mass — massive  sensations,  109;  m. 
of  sensation,  106-109. 

Material  —  of  the  imagination, 
213. 

Materialism — claims  that  psychol- 
ogy is  a  chapter  of  physiol- 
ogy, 2. 

Maudsley — identification  of  physi- 
ology and  psychology,  2;  on  the 
physiological  method,  31;  on  ef- 
fects of  disease,  158;  on  con- 
fusion between  presentation  and 
representation,  149;  on  the  physi- 
ology of  speech,  278. 

Maury — on  attention  during  sleep, 
185. 

Maxwell  {Q.) — on  chemical  compo- 
sition, 101. 

Mayer — on  illusions,  252. 

McCosh — on  distinction  between 
the  physical  and  the  mental,  4; 
on  the  limitations  of  the  experi- 
mental method,  29;  on  knowl- 
edge as  positive,  63;  on  the 
relating  power,  65;  on  sensation 
vs.  perception,  84;  on  recogni- 
tion, 175;  on  time  perception, 
187;  on  correlative  association, 
202;  on  Cheselden  case,  127;  on 
Trinchinetti  case,  130;  on  the  in- 
finite, 243;  on  the  symbolic 
power,  278;  on  the  predicaments, 
289;  on  intuition.  321. 

Measurement  —  application  of,  to 
mental  states,  3;  m.  of  duration 
and  intensity  of  mental  states,  4. 

Mechanical — nature  of  reflex  at- 
tention, 71. 


Meclianism — of  muscular  sense,  90; 
of  hearing  and  sight,  92-93. 

Meissner — M.'s  elements,  in  the 
skin,  97;  on  local  signs,  124. 

Memory  (145-190)— as  psychologi- 
cal source,  11;  as  method,  23; 
m.  as  supporting  the  uncon- 
scious, 54;  physical  basis  of,  161; 
development  of  the  organic  in 
m., 169-170;  m.  as  mental  growth, 
170-171;  kinds  of,  local,  logi- 
cal, 189;  m.  as  condition  of  im- 
agination, 214;  nature,  145-146; 
definition  of,  151-152;  m.  as  re- 
tention, 152-164;  references  on, 
189-190. 

Mental — m.  facts  measured,  4;  sub- 
jective nature  of  m.  facts,  5;  m. 
disease,  17;  m.  continuity,  159- 
160;  m.  conditions  of  retention, 
163;  memory  as  ni.  growth,  170- 
171;  m.  reconstruction  of  time, 
181-188;  of  space,  121-122;  in- 
tuition as  a  m.  act,  314. 

Metaphysics — relation  of,  to  psy- 
chology, 7;  metaphysical  pre- 
dicaments, 291. 

Method — psychological  m.,  20-34; 
principles  of  scientific  m.,  20-22; 
deduction  and  induction  as  m., 
20;  joint  or  synthetic  m.,  20; 
stages  of  m.,  21;  observation  as 
m.,  21,  22-25;  experiment  as,  21, 
25-31;  hypothesis  as,  21,  31-33. 

Mill  {J.) — on  aesthetic  imagination, 
238;  on  association  theory  of  be- 
lief, 254,  286. 

Mill  (J.  S.) — on  complexitj'  of  the 
mental  life,  9;  on  state  of  psy- 
chological study,  30;  on  talent 
images,  166;  on  connotation  of 
concepts,  273;  on  class  images, 
278-279;  on  association  theory  of 
belief,  286;  on  predicaments, 
288-292;  on  theory  of  syllogism. 


INDEX. 


337 


Mill  (J.  S.)— (Continued). 

304;  on  consciousness,  44;  on  the 
unconscious,  47;  on  time  of 
cerebral  series,  56;  on  habits  of 
attention,  78;  on  composition  of 
colors,  105;  on  theory  of  space 
perception,  185,  13(3;  on  hy- 
pothesis, 338;  on  induction,  308. 

Mind  (periodical)— article  on  Beau- 
nis,  89;  art.  by  Hall,  90;  art  by 
Donaldson,  97;  art.  by  Ward, 
109;  art.  on  Cyon,  132. 

Modes — of  passive  imagination, 218. 

Morris — quotation  from  Kaut,  141. 

Movement — m.  inapplicable  to  men- 
tal states,  2;  relation  to  attention, 
73-75;  function  of  m.  in  space 
perception,  123;  m.  in  sense  in- 
tuition, 139;  motor  intuition, 
140;  m.  in  development  of  con- 
sciousness, 66. 

Milller  (F.  C.)— on  Weber's  law, 
109;  on  the  physical  effects  of 
representation,  148. 

Nativism— of    space,    122,    134 ; 

of  time,  186-187. 
Nature — laws    of,    21;  uniformity 

of,  22,  808;  linal  appeal  to,  22. 
Naville — on    perception    of   space 

by  the  eye,  129. 
Negative — n.  judgment,  293. 
Newton — imaging  power  of,  149, 

237;  illusions  of,  259. 
Nicolai — illusions  of,  259. 
Nominalism— logical   n.,   280-281; 

references  on,  311. 
Nunnely — case  reported  by,  127. 
Nussbaumer — case,  208. 

Object — distinction  between  of 
and  image  in  recognition,  172; 
o.  predicaments,  290. 

Objection — to  the  physiological 
theorv  of  retention,  157-160. 


Observation— external,  13-14,  24- 
25;  distinction  between  external 
and  internal  o.,  13-14;  o.  as 
method,  21,  22-25;  internal  o., 
22-24. 

Open  Cowri— article  by  Binet,  58. 

Organic — development  of  o.  in 
memory,  169;  o.  sensations,  88. 

Paccini — P.  's  elements  in  the  skin, 
97. 

Paffe— on  sensibility,  39. 

Passive — p.  imagination,  214-226. 

Pathology — mental  p.,  16,  18;  proof 
from  p.  of  dispositions  in  the 
brain,  160-161;  relation  of  p.  to 
illusions;  244. 

Paulhan— on  inherited  motor  ten- 
dencies, 159;  on  the  organic  in 
memory,  169. 

Perception — of  sense,   116-144;  ar- 
gument from  p.  for  the  uncon- 
scious,   52;    deiinition    of,    116 
analysis  of,   117;  simple  as  op- 
posed  to  acquired  p.,   116-117 
synthetic   p.,    117;  p.  of   space 
120-133:  data   for  p.   of  space 
122;  movements  in  p.  of  space 
123;  local  signs  in  p.  of  space 
123-124;  p.  and  the  unconscious 
141;   deceptions  of,    143;   p.   of 
time  by  the  ear,  188;  references, 
on,  144. 

Perez — on  the  development  of  con- 
sciousness, 66. 

Personality — p.  in  attention,  70. 

Philosophische  8/udien — article  by 
Lange,  113;  by  Lehmann,  177. 

Physiology — contrasted  with  psy- 
cholog3%  2;  relation  to  psychol- 
ogy, 6-7;  p.  psychology  (table), 
83;  p.  aspect  of  illusion,  251. 

Pisa — tower  of,  48. 

Plato— on  retention,  152;  P.  as  a 
logical  realist,  280. 


338 


lyDEX. 


Pleasure  and  Pain — as  sensations, 
83,  85. 

Popular  Science  Monthly — article 
by  White,  244. 

Porter — on  imagination,  237;  on 
realism  and  nominalism,  280. 

Predicaments— 2m-Z9)2. 

Predisposition — to  illusion,  252- 
254. 

P)'eference — association  by  p.,  202- 
203;  in  passive  and  constructive 
imagination,  223,  228. 

Presbyterian  Review — article  by 
Baldwin,  109. 

Presentation  (82,  145) — p.  con- 
trasted with  affective  states,  62; 
division  of  the  function  of,  80. 
element  of,  in  sensation,  84-97; 
p.  of  foreign  body,  129;  as  op- 
posed to  representation,  147; 
antecedents  of,  147;  confusion 
of  p.  with  representation,  149; 
illusions  of  p.,  260. 

Princeton  Review — article  by  Bald- 
win, 28. 

Problems — for  futher  study,  42, 
68,  79,  115,  144,  190,  212,  243, 
269,  311. 

Product — ideal  p.  of  localization, 
133;  of  recognition,  179;  of  tem- 
poral localization,  188;  of  imagi- 
nation, 242;  of  conception,  276; 
of  thought,  310;  intuition  as 
mental  p.,  316. 

P/w/(309-310)— references  on,  311. 

Proposition  (284)— parts  of,  287. 

Psychiatry — 16,  245. 

Psychology — definition  of,  1-8;  sub- 
ject-matter of,  1;  sources  of,  1, 
11;  relation  to  physiology,  6-7;  to 
natural  science,  7;  to  metaphys- 
ics, 7;  difficulties  and  errors  in,  8, 
10;  folk  p.,  15;  animal  p.,  15; 
child  p.,  16;  abnormal  p.,  16; 
method  of,  120-134;  experiment 


Psychology— {Coniinned). 

in,  25-31;  physiological  p.,  27, 
31;  relation  of,  to  logic,  271;  ref- 
erences on  nature  of,  33;  on 
method  of,  134. 

Psychometry  (109-117)— place  in 
(table  of)  psychological  system, 
31;  references  on,  114. 

Psychophysics  (106-109)— place  in 
(table  of)  psychological  system, 
31;  references  on,  115. 

Quality — of  sensation,  85;  proof 
of  specific  q.  of  sensation,  98- 
106. 

Quantity — of  sensation,  85,  106, 
109. 

Rabier — on  nature  and  method 
of  psychology, 1;  on  animal  sen- 
sation, 3;  on  local  signs,  125;  on 
advantages  of  external  observa- 
tion, 17-18;  on  classification,  38; 
on  the  unconscious,  47;  on  space 
perception,  53,  35-36;  on  the 
affective  element  in  sensation, 
85;  on  the  muscular  sense,  88, 
91;  on  unity  of  mind,  98;  on 
identical  nature  of  presenta- 
tion and  representation,  147;  on 
recognition,  175;  on  dissociation; 
219;  on  attention  in  imagina- 
tion, 230;  on  primitive  belief, 
254. 

Radestock — on  consciousness  in 
sleep,  61;  on  illusion  due  to 
dreams,  263. 

Rational — r.  psychology,  1;  r. 
function  distinguished,  80. 

Realism— \og\ch\,  280-281;  refer- 
ences on,  311. 

Reason  (312-325)— law  of  suffi- 
cient r.,  294,  310;  definition  of, 
312;  r.  as  constitutive  of  mind, 
312-313;     r.    as     regulative    of 


INDEX. 


839 


Reason — (Continued). 

mind,  313-314;  as  knowledge  or 
intuition,  314-325. 

lieality — elements  of  r.  in  illusion, 
258;  relation  of  fancy  to  r.,  225; 
of  imagination  to,  236;  of  con- 
ception to,  279. 

Reasoning  (299-311) — nature  and 
kinds,  299;  deductive  r.,  300- 
307;  inductive  r.,  307-310;  ref- 
erences on,  311. 

Remgnilion  (172-179) — nature  of, 
172-173;  theories  of,  173-178;  r. 
due  to  return  of  image,  173; 
due  to  satisfaction  of  physical 
habit,  174;  due  to  time  percep- 
tion, 175;  due  to  reinstatement 
of  apperceptive  relations,  176- 
177;  subjective  element  of,  178; 
ideal  product  of,  179;  illusions 
of,  261. 

Reconstruction — mental  r.  of  space, 
121-122;  of  time,  181-188. 

References — on  nature  and  method 
of  psychology,  83-34;  on  rela- 
tion of  mind  and  body,  34;  on 
child  psychology,  34;  on  ani- 
mal psychology,  34;  on  race 
psychology,  34;  on  history  of 
psychology,  34;  on  classification 
and  division,  42;  on  conscious- 
ness and  the  unconscious,  67-68; 
on  attention  and  apperception, 
79;  on  perception,  144;  on  space 
perception,  144;  on  time  percep- 
tion and  localization,  190;  on 
memory,  189-190;  on  associa- 
tion, 211,  212;  on  imagination, 
243;  on  illusions,  269;  on  con- 
ception, judgment,  proof,  rea- 
soning, 311;  on  the  reason, 
325. 

Reflection— S.S  psychological  source, 
9;  disturbing  effects  of,  10;  as 
method,    23,   24;    as   couscious- 


Reflection — (Continued), 
ness,  63;   as  self -consciousness, 
143;  ideal  product  of,  144. 

Reflex — r.  attention,  70. 

Reid — on  the  faculties,  35;  on  con- 
sciousness, 43;  on  touch  sensa- 
tions, 96;  on  distinction  between 
presentation  and  representation, 
147,  149;  on  recognition,  175; 
on  perception  of  time,  187. 

Relation— oi  psychology  to  physi- 
ology, 6;  of  mind  and  body,  28, 
(references)  34;  r.  theory  of  con- 
sciousness, 58-63;  consciousness 
as  r.  between  subject  and  object, 
51;  r.  theory  of  knowledge,  63; 
r.  in  apperception,  65;  r.  in- 
volved in  association,  201-2;  r. 
of  fancy  to  reality,  225;  r.  of 
psychology  to  logic.  271-272; 
of  scieutitic  imagination  to  real- 
ity, 23u;  conception  as  discovery 
of  r..  277;  r.  of  scientific  imagi- 
nation to  thought,  240;  r.  of 
language  to  conception  and 
thought,  277;  r.  asserted  in 
judgment,  288;  r.  of  forces  of 
judgment  to  one  another,  296- 
299.^ 

Renouvier — on  relative  theory  of 
consciousness,  62. 

Repetition — as  condition  of  mem- 
ory, 163;  as  condition  of  associa- 
tion, 210. 

Rejjresentation  (tive),  145;  r.  states 
as  referring  to  objects,  36;  divi- 
sion of  the  r.  functions,  80;  na- 
ture of  r.,  146-147;  r.  opposed 
to  presentation,  147;  antecedents 
and  effects  of,  147;  confusion 
of  r.  with  presentation,  149; 
continuity  of,  in  association,  191; 
r.  nature  of  illusional  states,  246, 
248. 

Repi'oduction — primary    condition 


340 


INDEX. 


Reproduction — (Continued). 

of,  164;  supplementaiy  condi- 
tion of,  1G5-166;  physical  basis 
of,  1G4-166;  secondary  aids  to, 
167-168,  r.  as  mental  growth; 
170-171;  illusions  of,  260. 

Resemblance — as  secondary  law  of 
association,  195-198. 

Resistance — sensations  of,  89. 

Retention  (153-164) — theories  of, 
153-160;  metaphj^sical  theory  of, 
153;  r.  as  psychological  habit, 
153;  subconscious  theory  of, 
155-156;  physiological  theory  of, 
157-163;  mental  conditions,  163; 
r.  as  mental  growth,  170-171. 

Revue  Philosopliique — article  by 
Janet,  58;  by  Ribot,  70;  by 
Mantagazza,  99;  by  Dumont, 
170. 

Revue  Scientifique — article  by  Max- 
well, 101. 

Ribot — on  experiment  in  psychol- 
ogy, 7;  on  limitations  of  experi- 
ment, 29;  on  faculties,  35;  on 
attention,  70,75;  on  local  signs, 
125;  on  memory,  157,  160;  on 
illusions  of  memory,  261. 

Robertson  (C.) — on  perception  of 
space,  121. 

Rolando — lissure  of,  in  the  brain, 
114. 

Sachs — on  the  muscular  sense, 
310. 

Savart—Q.'s  wheel,  47,  49,  50, 102, 
104. 

Sc7iiff— on  cerebral  localization, 
114. 

Schopenhauer — on  the  unconscious, 
45. 

Science — of  psychology,  1;  scienti- 
fic imagination,  335-238. 

(periodical) — 207. 

Scottish  Psychologists — on  the  un- 


Scottish  Psychx)logists — (Continued), 
conscious,  45;  on  the  perception 
of  time,  187. 

Self^s.  consciousness  as  differen- 
tia of  self,  63;  recognition  of  s., 
178-179;  illusions  of  s. -con- 
sciousness, 264-265;  intuition  of 
s.,  333. 

Sensations  (81-115) — relation  of, 
to  attention,  72-73;  duration  of, 
73,  109-114;  nature  of,  82;  con- 
trasted with  impression,  83;  af- 
fective and  presentative  elements 
in,  84;  meanings  of  the  word  s., 
83-83;  characters  of,  85;  com- 
plexity of,  86;  organic  s.,  88;  s. 
of  smell,  86;  of  taste,  87;  of 
muscular  sense,  88-91;  of  hear- 
ing, 92;  of  sight,  93;  of  effort, 
resistance,  innervation  89;  of, 
color,  94r-96;  proof  of  specific  s., 
98-106;  quantity  of,  106-109; 
extensive  or  massive  s.,  109; 
tone  of,  114;  localization  in  the 
brain,  114;  references  on,  114- 
115. 

Senses — as  means  of  knowing  mat- 
ter, 4. 

Sensitive  —  s.  function  distin- 
guished, 81. 

Sensori-motor  —  connection,  161- 
162. 

Sentience — Lewes  on,  58. 

Sidgwick — on  illusions  of  thought, 
265,  310;  on  predicaments,  288. 

Sight — sensations  of ,  93;  visual  per- 
ception of  space,  127-129;  of 
distance,  130-131. 

Signs— local  s.,  123;  temporal  s., 
183. 

Sigwart — on  conception,  274;  on 
categorical  judgment,  298. 

Sleep  —  consciousness  during,  61; 
attention  during,  185;  s.  as  illus- 
trating free  association,  216. 


INDEX. 


341 


Smell  (86-87). 

Socrates — method  of,  275. 

Sound — sensations  of,  92;  localiza- 
tion of  s.  sensations,  131. 

Sources — of  psychology,  1,  11;  in- 
ternal s.,  11;  external  s.,  12-18; 
unity  of  s.  in  consciousness,  18. 

Space — argument  for  the  uncon- 
scious from  s.  perception,  52; 
perception  of,  120-133;  data  for, 
122;  movement  and  local  sign 
in  perception  of,  123-124;  na- 
tivism  of,  132,  134;  references 
on  s.  perception,  144. 

J^eec?i— located  in  Broca's  convolu- 
tion, 3,  114. 

■Spencer — on  space  perception,  123; 
on  law  of  habit,  57;  on  relative 
theory  of  consciousness,  59,  62; 
on  perceived  vs.  real  difference, 
60;  on  sensation  of  resistance, 
90,  92;  on  reduction  of  mental 
force  to  unity,  100,  101,  102;  on 
nervous  shocks  as  mental  units, 
103;  on  evolution,  105;  on  the 
organic  in  memory,  169;  on  im- 
agination and  thought,  240;  on 
association  theory  of  belief,  286. 

■Stufjes — of  the  thought  process, 
272. 

Starr  —  on  the  physiology  of 
speech,  278. 

States— x\ix\.\\xG  of  revived  s.,  147; 
illusional  s.,  244-269. 

St. Augustine — on  retention,  152. 

Stewart — on  the  faculties,  85;  on 
consciousness,  43;  on  time-per- 
ception, 187;  on  association  by 
resemblance,  196. 

Stimulus — accumulated  s.,  49-50, 
53-54;  new  s.  in  reproduction, 
165;  absence  of  internal  s.  in 
illusion,  249,  organic  s.  in  il- 
lusion, 251;  self  s.  of  sight,  251. 
Stoic — doctrine  of  imagination,  213, 


Stoic — (Continued). 

255;     doctrine    of     conception, 
283. 

Subconscious — s.  image  in  reten- 
tion, 155;  nature  of,  57. 

Subject — relation  of  s.  and  object, 
61. 

Subjective — s.  nature  of  mental 
states,  6;  s.  element  of  recogni- 
tion, 178;  s.  aspect  of  imagina- 
tion, 217. 

Subordination — in  association,  201; 
as  a  predicament,  288. 

Substance — of  the  soul,  45. 

Substitution — of  sensations,  105. 

Succession — as  time,  180;  associa- 
tion by,  204-206. 

Suggestion — s.  and  association,  192. 

Sully — on  inner  observation,  23; 
on  education  of  attention,  77; 
on  psycho-physics,  108;  on  pre- 
perception,  113 ;  on  synthetic 
perception,  117;  on  local  signs, 
124,  125;  on  perception  of  time, 
187;  on  rhj'thm  in  sound,  188;  on 
illusion  of  special  senses,  248;  on 
sub-expectation,  252;  on  illusion 
of  presentation,  260,  261;  of  self- 
consciousuess,  265. 

Syllogism  —  definition  of,  300; 
conceptual  interpretation  of, 
301;  meaning  and  kinds  of,  302; 
categorical  s  ,  302;  value  of, 
304;  hypothetical,  303. 

Synthesis — synthetic  judgment, 
292;  s.  perception,  117;  as  stage 
in  conception,  275-276. 

Systemic — sensations,  88. 

Table — of  association,  206;  of 
psychology,  according  to  meth- 
od, 30. 

Taine— on  the  unconscious,  46, 
47,  49  ;  on  composition  of 
mind,    101,    102;   on    memory 


342 


INDEX. 


Taine — (Continued). 
157;   on   association  by  resem- 
blance,   197;    on   perception  as 
hallucination,  247. 

Taste — sensations  of,  87  . 

Telepathy — Gurney  on,  2G9. 

Temperature — t.  sense.  97. 

TeU—oi  syllogism,  305,  306;  of 
illusion,  266-269. 

Theoi'y — of  \inity  of  composition  of 
mind,  98-106;  double  aspect  t., 
5;  t.  of  space  perception,  133; 
of  consciousness,  56;  of  time 
perception,  186-188. 

Thought  (270-311) — general  nature 
of,  270-272;  stages  of,  273;  ideal 
product  of,  310;  references  on, 
310-311;  apperceptive  nature  of, 
271;  not  a  function  of  body,  3; 
division  of  the  t.  function,  81; 
illusions  of,  265;  laws  of,  309. 

Time — as  measurement  of  mental 
states,  4;  perception  of,  in  recog- 
nition, 175;  localization  in,  179, 
189;  mental  reconstruction  of, 
181-188;  data  for  time  percep- 
tion, 182-185;  t.  indicated  by 
intensity,  183-184;  t.  indicated 
by  movements  of  attention,  184- 
185;  theories  of  time  perception, 
186-188;  perception  of  t.  by  the 
ear,  188;  idea  of  t.,  188;  refer- 
ences on,  190;  measurement  of, 
psychometry,  109-117. 

Tone — of  sensation,  85,  114. 

louch  (96-99)— tactual  space,  126. 

Training — of  attention,  77. 

Trendelenberg — on  the  existential 
judgment,  298. 

Trinchinetti — casereported  by,  130. 

Tuke — case  reported  b}^  256. 

Type — concept  as  t.,  280. 

Unconscious — consciousness  and 
the  u.,   48-58;    the  u.  as  sub- 


Unconscious — (Continued), 
stance    of    the    soul,    45;    psy- 
chological meaning  of  the  u., 
46;  perception  and  the  u.,  141; 
references  on  the  u.,  68. 

Vniformity—oi  nature,  22,  308;  of 
connection  between  mind  and 
body,  28. 

Units — of  duration,  184-185;  ner- 
vous shocks  as  mental  u.  103. 

Unity —of  psychological  sources  in 
consciousness,  18;  of  the  three 
great  classes  of  mental  facts,  in 
consciousness,  40-41;  u.  arising 
from  apperception,  66;  u.  in  at- 
tention, 70;  theory  of  u.  of  com- 
position of  mind,  98-106;  u.  of 
mental  forces,  99;  nervous 
shocks  as  mental  units,  103;  idea 
of  synthetic  u.,  140,  281;  idea 
of  numerical  u.,  141;  unity  of 
mind,  159-160;  unitary  associa- 
tion, 208;  u.  of  the  concept, 
281;  u.  of  the  judgment,  285. 

Utility — of  the  hypothesis  of  un- 
conscious mind,  57;  utilitj^of  an 
image  in  conception,  278. 

Variation — in  mental  functions, 
38,  39. 

Visual — field  of  consciousness, 
64. 

Volkmann — on  attention,  76;  on 
representations  as  functions,  154; 
on  recognition,  173;  on  percep- 
tion of  time,  187;  on  construc- 
tive imagination,  230;  on  im- 
agination and  thought,  240;  on 
Stoic  doctrine  of  imagination, 
255;  on  assimilation  in  illusion, 
257;  on  illusions  of  self-con- 
sciousness, 265;  on  localization 
as  opposed  to  projection,  267; 
on  abstraction,  274. 

Voluntary — attention,  71. 


INDEX. 


343 


Waitz — on  relation  of  psj'chology 
to  metaphysics,  8;  on  movement 
in  sense-intuition,  139;  on  reten- 
tion, 153;  on  latent  images,  15G; 
on  cerebral  associations,  215;  on 
the  play  of  images  in  concep- 
tion, 275. 

Ward — on  classification,  36;  on 
consciousness,  44;  on  retention, 
153;  on  mental  reconstruction 
of  time,  182;  on  duration  and 
succession,  185;  on  abstraction, 
274. 

Weie?'— W.'slaw,  4,  106-109,  (in- 
terpretation of)  108-109;  on  the 
muscular  sense,  90;  on  sensation 
circles,  96,  125. 

Will — class  of,  36;  characterized 
by  effort,  37;  first  exercise  of, 
66. 

White — on  illusions,  244. 

Wolfe — on  association  by  resem- 
blance, 197. 

World — intuition  of,  324. 

Wandt — on  double  aspect  theory, 
5;  on  unity  of  mind,  33;  on  the 
unconscious,  46,  142;  on  accu- 
mulated stimulus,  50;  on  feelings 
of  innervation,  53;  on  physical 
dispositions,    56;    on  appercep- 


TFiiwdi— (Continued), 
tion,  66,  77;  on  motor  aspects  of 
attention,  77;  on  muscular 
sense,  90;  on  theories  of  color, 
95;  on  chemical  composition, 
101;  on  unity  of  composition  of 
mind,  106;  on  interpretation  of 
Weber's  law,  109;  on  distinction 
time.  111;  on  space  perception, 
122;  on  local  signs,  123,  125; 
on  disease  of  eye-muscles,  128; 
on  retention,  53;  on  mental 
habit,  154,  160;  on  physical 
basis  of  reproduction,  167;  on 
associative  connections  in  the 
brain,  193;  on  simultaneous  as- 
sociation, 206;  on  active  and 
passive  imagination,  226,  241; 
on  sense  deceptions,  247;  on  ap- 
perceptive nature  of  thought, 
271;  doctrine  that  all  knowledge 
is  judgment,  286. 

Young — theory  of  color,  94-95. 

Zeller — on  the  Stoics,  283. 

Zeno — conception,  283. 

Zeitschrift  filr  Volkerpsychologie, 
15. 

Zullner — argument  for  the  uncon- 
scious, 52. 


I 


THE  AMERICAN  SCIENCE  SERIES. 


The  principal  objects  of  the  series  are  to  supply  the  lack — in 
some  subjects  very  great — of  authoritative  books  whose  princi- 
ples are,  so  far  as  practicable,  illustrated  by  familiar  American 
facts,  and  also  to  supply  the  other  lack  that  the  advance  of  Sci- 
ence perennially  creates,  of  text-books  which  at  least  do  not 
contradict  the  latest  generalizations.  The  scheme  systemati- 
cally outlines  the  field  of  Science,  as  the  term  is  usually  em- 
ployed with  reference  to  general  education,  and  includes 
Advanced  Courses  for  maturer  college  students.  Briefer 
Courses  for  beginners  in  school  or  college,  and  Elementary 
Courses  for  the  youngest  classes.  The  Briefer  Courses  are  not 
mere  abridgments  of  the  larger  worlcs,  but,  with  perhaps  a 
single  exception,  are  much  less  technical  in  style  and  more 
elementary  in  method.  While  somewhat  narrower  in  range 
of  topics,  they  give  equal  emphasis  to  controlling  principles. 
The  following  books  in  this  series  are  already  published : 

THE  HUMAN  BODY.     By  H.  Newell  Martin,  Professor  in 

the  Johns  Hopkins  University. 
Advanced  Course.     8vo.     655  pp. 

Designed  to  impart  the  kind  and  amount  of  knowledge  every 
educated  person  should  possess  of  the  structure  and  activities 
and  the  conditions  of  healthy  working  of  the  human  body. 
While  intelligible  to  the  general  reader,  it  is  accurate  and  suffi- 
ciently minute  in  details  to  meet  the  requirements  of  students 
who  are  not  making  human  anatomy  and  physiology  subjects  of 
special  advanced  study.  The  regular  editions  of  the  book  contain 
an  appendix  on  Reproduction  and  Development.  Copies  without 
this  will  be  sent  when  specially  ordered. 

From  the  Chicago  Tribune:  "  The  reader  who  follows  him  through 
to  the  end  of  the  book  will  be  better  informed  on  the  subject  of 
modern  physiology  in  its  general  features  than  most  of  the  medical 
practitioners  who  rest  on  the  knowledge  gained  in  comparatively  an- 
tiquated textbooks,  and  will,  if  possessed  of  average  good  judgmenr 
and  powers  of  discrimination,  not  be  in  any  way  confused  by  state- 
aients  of  dubious  questions  or  conllicting  views." 


2  THE  AMERICAN  SCIENCE  SERIES. 

THE  HUMAN  ^OXy< .—CottWiued. 

Briefer  Coursci     i3mo.     364  pp. 

Aims  to  make  the  study  of  this  branch  of  Natural  Science  a 
source  of  discipline  to  the  observing  and  reasoning  faculties, 
and  not  merely  to  present  a  set  of  facts,  useful  to  know,  which 
the  pupil  is  to  learn  by  heart,  like  the  multiplication-table. 
With  this  in  view,  the  author  attempts  to  exhibit,  so  far  as  is 
practicable  in  an  elementary  treatise,  the  ascertained  facts  of 
Physiology  as  illustrations  of,  or  deductions  from,  the  two  car- 
dinal principles  by  which  it,  as  a  department  of  modern  science, 
is  controlled, — namely,  the  doctrine  of  the  "  Conservation  of 
Energy"  and  that  of  the  "  Physiological  Division  of  Labor."  To 
the  same  end  he  also  gives  simple,  practical  directions  to  assist 
the  teacher  in  demonstrating  to  the  class  the  fundamental  facts 
of  the  science.  TJie  book  includes  a  chapter  on  the  action  upon 
the  body  of  stimulants  and  narcotics. 

From  Henry  Sy-WKLL,  Fi-ofessor  of  Physiology,  University  of  At  ichi- 
gan  :  "The  number  of  poor  books  meant  to  serve  the  purpose  of 
text-books  of  physiology  for  schools  is  so  great  that  it  is  well  to 
define  clearly  the  needs  of  such  a  work:  I.  That  it  shall  contain  ac- 
curate statements  of  fact.  2.  That  its  facts  shall  not  be  too  numer- 
ous, but  chosen  so  that  the  important  truths  are  recognized  in  their 
true  relations.  3.  That  the  language  shall  be  so  lucid  as  to  give  no 
e.KCUse  for  misunderstanding.  4.  That  the  value  of  the  study  as  a 
discipline  to  the  reasoning  faculties  shall  be  continually  kept  in  view. 
I  know  of  no  elementary  text-book  which  is  the  superior,  if  the 
equal,  of  Prof.  Martin's,  as  judged  by  these  conditions." 

Elementary  Course.     i2mo.     261  pp. 

A  very  earnest  attempt  to  present  the  subject  so  that  childrea 
may  easily  understand  it,  and,  whenever  possible,  to  start  with 
familiar  facts  and  gradually  to  lead  up  to  less  obvious  ones. 
The  action  on  the  body  of  stimulants  and  7tarcotics  is  fully  treated. 

From  W.  S.  Perry,  Supointeudent  of  Schools,  Ann  Arbor,  Mich.: 
"  I  find  in  it  the  same  accuracy  of  statement  and  scholarly  strength 
that  characterize  both  the  larger  editions.  The  large  relative  space 
given  to  hygiene  is  fully  in  accord  with  the  latest  educational  opinion 
and  practice;  while  the  amount  of  anatomy  and  physiology  comprised 
in  the  compact  treatment  of  these  divisions  is  quite  enough  for  the 
most  practical  knowledge  of  the  subject.  The  handling  of  alcohol 
and  narcotics  is,  in  my  opinion,  especially  good.  The  most  admira- 
ble feature  of  the  book  is  its  fine  adaptation  to  the  capacity  of  younger 
pupils.  The  diction  is  simple  and  pure,  the  style  clear  and  direct,  and 
the  manner  of  presentation  bright  and  attractive." 


THE  AMERICAN  SCIENCE  SERIES.  3 

ASTRONOMY.    By  SiMON   Newcomb,  Professor  in  the  Johns 
Hopkins  University,  and  Edward  S.  Holden,  Director  of 

the  Lick  Observatory. 

Advanced  Course.     8vo.     512  pp. 

To  facilitate  its  use  by  students  of  different  grades,  the  sub- 
ject-matter is  divided  into  two  classes,  distinguished  by  the  size 
of  the  type.  The  portions  in  large  type  form  a  complete  course 
for  the  use  of  those  who  desire  only  such  a  general  knowledge 
of  the  subject  as  can  be  acquired  without  the  application  of  ad- 
vanced mathematics.  The  portions  in  small  type  comprise  ad- 
ditions for  the  use  of  those  students  who  either  desire  a  more 
detailed  and  precise  knowledge  of  the  subject,  or  who  intend  to 
make  astronomy  a  special  study. 

From  C.  A.  Young,  Professor  in  Princeton  College  :  "  I  conclude 
that  it  is  decidedly  superior  to  anything  else  in  the  market  on  the 
same  subject  and  designed  for  the  same  purpose." 

Briefer  Course.     i2mo.     352  pp. 

Aims  to  furnish  a  tolerably  complete  outline  of  the  as- 
tronomy of  to-day,  in  as  elementary  a  shape  as  will  yield  satis- 
factory returns  for  the  learner's  time  and  labor.  It  has  been 
abridged  from  the  larger  work,  not  by  compressing  the  same 
matter  into  less  space,  but  by  omitting  the  details  ot  practical 
astronomy,  thus  giving  to  the  descriptive  portions  a  greater 
relative  prominence. 

From  The  Critic:  "The  book  is  in  refreshing  contrast  to  the 
productions  of  the  professional  schoolbook-makers,  who,  having  only 
a  superficial  knowledge  of  the  matter  in  hand,  gather  their  material, 
without  sense  or  discrimination,  from  all  sorts  of  authorities,  and 
present  as  the  result  an  indigesta  moles,  a  mass  of  crudities,  not  un- 
mixed with  errors.  The  student  of  this  book  may  feel  secure  as  to 
the  correctness  of  whatever  he  finds  in  it.  Facts  appear  as  facts,  and 
theories  and  speculations  stand  for  what  they  are,  and  are  worth." 

From  W.  B.  Graves,  Master  Scientific  Department  of  Phillips 
Academy  :  "  I  have  used  the  Briefer  Course  of  Astronomy  during  the 
past  year.  It  is  up  to  the  times,  the  points  are  put  in  a  way  to  inter- 
est the  student,  and  the  size  of  the  book  makes  it  easy  to  go  over  the 
subject  in  the  time  allotted  by  our  schedule." 

From  Henry  Lefavour. /a/^  Teacher  of  Astronomy,  Willistnn  Semi, 
naty  :  "  The  impression  which  I  formed  upon  first  examination,  that 
it  was  in  very  many  respects  the  best  elementary  text-book  on  the 
subject,  has  been  confirmed  by  my  experience  with  it  in  the  class- 
rcom." 


4  THE  AMERICAN  SCIENCE  SERIES. 

ZOOLOGY.    By  A.  S.  Packard,  Professor  in  Brown  Univer- 
sity. 
Advanced  Course.    8vo.    719  pp. 

Designed  to  be  used  either  in  the  recitation-room  or  in  the 
laboratory.  It  will  serve  as  a  guide  to  the  student  who,  with  a 
desire  to  get  at  first-hand  a  general  knowledge  of  the  structure 
of  leading  types  of  life,  examines  living  animals,  watches  their 
movements  and  habits,  and  finally  dissects  them.  He  is  pre- 
sented first  with  the  facts,  and  led  to  a  thorough  knowledge 
of  a  few  typical  forms,  then  taught  to  compare  these  with 
others,  and  finally  led  to  the  principles  or  inductions  growing 
out  of  the  facts. 

From  A.  E.  Verrill,  Professor  of  Zoology  in  Yale  College:  "  The 
general  treatment  of  the  subject  is  good,  and  the  descriptions  ot 
structure  and  I'.ie  definitions  of  groups  are,  for  the  most  part,  clear, 
concise,  and  not  so  much  overburdened  by  technical  terms  as  in  sev- 
eral other  n.anuals  of  structural  zoology  now  in  use." 

Briefer  Course.     i2mo.     334  pp. 

The  distinctive  characteristic  of  this  book  is  its  use  of  the 
o3/eci  method.  The  author  would  have  the  pupils  first  examine 
and  roughly  dissect  a  fish,  in  order  to  attain  some  notion  of 
vertebrate  structure  as  a  basis  of  comparison.  Beginning  then 
with  the  lowest  forms,  he  leads  the  pupil  through  the  whole 
animal  kingdom  until  man  is  reached.  As  each  of  its  great 
divisions  comes  under  observation,  he  gives  detailed  instruc- 
tions for  dissecting  some  one  animal  as  a  type  of  the  class,  and 
bases  the  study  of  other  forms  on  the  knowledge  thus  obtained. 

From  Herbert  Csborn,  Professor  of  Zoology,  lo-va  Agricultural 
College:  "  I  can  gladly  recommend  it  to  any  one  desiring  a  work  of 
such  character.  While  I  strongly  insist  that  students  should  study 
animals  from  the  animals  themselves, — a  point  strongly  urged  by 
Prof.  Packard  in  his  preface, — I  also  recognize  the  necessity  of  a 
reliable  text-book  as  a  guide.  As  such  a  guide,  and  covering  the 
gi-ound  it  does,  I  know  of  nothing  better  than  Packard's." 

First  Lessons  in  Zoology.     i2mo.     290  pp. 

In  method  this  book  differs  considerably  from  those  men- 
tioned above.  Since  it  is  meant  for  young  beginners,  it  de- 
scribes but  few  types,  mostly  those  of  the  higher  orders,  and  dis- 
cusses their  relations  to  one  another  and  to  their  surroundings. 
The  aim,  however,  is  the  same  with  that  of  the  others;  namely, 
to  make  clear  the  general  principles  of  the  science,  rather  than 
to  fill  the  pupil's  mind  with  a  mass  of  what  may  appear  to  him 
unrelated  facts. 


THE  AMERICAN  SCIENCE  SERIES.  5 

ZOO\-0(y<—Co}itmued. 

From  Science  : — The  style  is  clear,  and  the  subjects  made  interest- 
ing. The  student's  mind  is  not  confused  by  a  mass  of  details,  or  by 
unsatisfactory  descriptions  of  a  large  number  of  specimens  which  he 
can  never  expect  to  see,  much  less  examine;  but  the  brief  slcetches  of 
a  few  of  the  most  important  forms  will  awalien  in  him  a  desire  for 
wider  knowledge.  The  figures  are  numerous,  averaging  almost  one 
to  each  page  ;  yet  they  are  so  well  selected  that,  while  one  grudges  so 
much  space,  he  finds  few  which  he  would  omit. 

BOTANY.     By  Charles  E.   Bessey,  Professor  in  the  Univer- 
sity of  Nebraska. 
Advanced  Course.     8vo.     6ii  pp. 

Aims  to  lead  the  student  to  obtain  at  first-hand  his  Icnowi- 
edge  of  the  anatomy  and  physiology  of  plants.  Accordingly, 
the  presentation  of  matter  is  such  as  to,  fit  the  book  for  con- 
stant use  in  the  laboratory,  the  text  supplying  the  outline  sketch 
which  the  student  is  to  fill  in  by  the  aid  of  scalpel  and  micro- 
scope. 

From  J.  C.  Arthur,  Editor  of  The  Botanical  Gazette:  "The  first 
botanical  text-book  issued  in  America  which  treats  the  most  important 
departments  of  the  science  with  anything  like  due  consideration. 
This  is  especially  true  in  reference  to  the  physiology  and  histology  of 
plants,  and  also  to  special  morphology.  Structural  Botany  and  clas- 
sification have  up  to  the  present  time  monopolized  the  field,  greatly 
retarding  the  diffusion  of  a  more  complete  knowledge  of  the  science." 

Essentials  of  Botany.     i2mo.     292  pp. 

A  guide  to  beginners.  Its  principles  are,  that  the  true  aim  of 
botanical  study  is  not  so  much  to  seek  the  family  and  proper 
names  of  specimens  as  to  ascertain  the  laws  of  plant  structure 
and  plant  life ;  that  this  can  be  done  only  by  examining  and 
dissecting  the  plants  themselves ;  and  that  it  is  best  to  confine 
the  attention  to  a  few  leading  types,  and  to  take  up  first  the 
simpler  and  more  easily  understood  forms,  and  afterwards  those 
whose  structure  and  functions  are  more  complex.  The  latest 
editions  of  the  work  contain  a  chapter  on  the  Gross  Anato?ny 
0/  Flmvering  Plants. 

From  J.  T.  Rothrock,  Professor  in  the  University  of  Pennsylva' 
nia  :  "  There  is  nothing  superficial  in  it,  nothing  needless  introduced, 
nothing  essential  left  out.  The  language  is  lucid  ;  and,  as  the  crown- 
ing merit  of  the  book,  the  author  has  introduced  throughout  the  vol- 
ume '  Practical  Studies,'  which  direct  the  student  in  his  effort  to  see 
for  himself  all  that  the  text-book  teaches," 


6  THE  AMERICAN  SCIENCE   SERIES. 

CHEMISTRY.     By  Ira  Remsen,  Professor  in  the  Johns  Hop- 
kins University. 
Advanced  Course.     8vo.     828  pp. 

The  general  plan  of  this  work  will  be  the  same  with  that  of 
the  Briefer  Course,  already  published.  But  the  part  in  which 
the  members  of  the  different  families  are  treated  will  be  con- 
siderably enlarged.  Some  attention  will  be  given  to  the  lines 
of  investigation  regarding  chemical  affinity,  dissociation,  speed 
of  chemical  action,  mass  action,  chemical  equilibrium,  thermo- 
chemistry, etc.  The  periodic  law,  and  the  numerous  relations 
which  have  been  traced  between  the  chemical  and  physical 
properties  of  the  elements  and  their  positions  in  the  periodic 
system  will  be  specially  emphasized.  Reference  will  also  be 
made  to  the  subject  of  the  chemical  constitution  of  compounds, 
and  the  methods  used  in  determining  constitution. 

Introduction  to  the  Study  of  Chemistry.     i2mo.     389  pp. 

The  one  comprehensive  truth  which  the  author  aims  to  make 
clear  to  the  student  is  the  essential  nature  of  chemical  action. 
With  this  in  view,  he  devotes  the  first  208  pages  of  the  book  to 
a  carefully  selected  and  arranged  series  of  simple  experiments. 
in  which  are  gradually  developed  the  main  principles  of  the  sub- 
ject. His  method  is  purely  inductive  ;  and,  wherever  experience 
has  shown  it  to  be  practicable,  the  truths  are  drawn  out  by 
pointed  questions,  rather  than  fully  stated.  Next,  when  the 
student  is  in  a  position  to  appreciate  it,  comes  a  simple  account 
of  the  theory  of  the  science.  The  last  150  pages  of  the  book 
are  given  to  a  survey,  fully  illustrated  by  experiments,  of  the 
leading  families  of  inorganic  compounds. 

From  Arthur  W.  Wright,  Professorin  Yale  College  : — The  student 
is  not  merely  made  acquainted  with  the  phenomena  of  chemistry,  but 
is  constantly  led  to  reason  upon  them,  to  draw  conclusions  from  them 
and  to  study  their  significance  with  reference  to  the  processes  oi 
chemical  action — a  course  which  makes  the  book  in  a  high  degree  dis- 
ciplinary as  well  as  instructive. 

From  Thos.  C.  Van  Nuys,  F?vfessor  of  Chemistry  in  the  Indiana 
University : — It  seems  to  me  that  Remsen's  "Introduction  to  the 
Study  of  Chemistry"  meets  every  requirement  as  a  text  or  class  book. 

From  C.  Les  Mees,  Professor  of  Chemistry  in  the  Ohio  University: 
— I  unhesitatingly  recomm.end  it  as  the  best  work  as  yet  published  for 
the  use  of  beginners  in  the  study.  Having  used  it,  I  feel  justified  in 
saying  this  much. 


THE  AMERICAN  SCIENCE  SERIES.  7 

C  H  E  M I  ST  R  X—ContviueJ. 

Clements  of  Chemistry.     i2mo.     272  pp. 

Utilizes  the  facts  of  every-day  experience  to  show  what  cliem- 
istry  is  and  how  things  are  studied  chemically.  The  language 
is  untechnical,  and  the  subject  is  fully  illustrated  by  simple  ex- 
periments, in  which  the  pupil  is  led  by  questions  to  make  his 
own  inferences.  The  author  has  written  under  the  belief  that 
"a  rational  course  in  chemistry,  whether  for  younger  or  older 
pupils,  is  something  more  than  a  lot  of  statements  of  facts  of 
more  or  less  importance;  a  lot  of  experiments  of  more  or  less 
beauty;  or  a  lot  of  rules  devised  for  the  purpose  of  enabling 
the  pupil  to  tell  what  things  are  made  of.  If  the  course  does 
not  to  some  extent  help  the  pupil  to  think  as  well  as  to  see  it 
does  not  deserve  to  be  called  rational." 

Chase  Palmer,  Professor  in  the  State  Normal  School,  Salem.  Mass.: 
— It  is  the  best  introduction  to  chemistry  that  I  know,  and  I  intend  to 
put  it  into  the  hands  of  my  pupils  next  Fall. 

A.  D.  Gray,  Instructor  in  Spjingfield  {Mass.)  High  School : — Neat, 
attractive,  clear,  and  accurate,  it  leaves  little  to  be  desired  or  sought 
for  by  one  who  would  find  the  best  book  for  an  elementary  course  in 
our  High  Schools  and  Academies. 

GENERAL  BiOLOGY.  By  William  T.  Sedgwick,  Professor 
in  the  Mass.  Institute  of  Technology,  and  Edmund  B.  Wil- 
son, Professor  in  Bryn  Mawr  College.  Pari  I.  8vo.  193  pp. 
This  work  is  intended  for  college  and  university  students  as 
an  introduction  to  the  theoretical  and  practical  study  of  bi- 
ology. It  is  not  zoology,  botany,  or  physiology,  and  is  intended 
not  as  a  substitute,  but  as  a  foundation,  for  these  more  special 
studies.  In  accordance  with  the  present  obvious  tendency  of 
the  best  elementary  biological  teaching,  it  discusses  broadly 
some  of  the  leading  principles  of  the  science  on  the  substantial 
basis  of  a  thorough  examination  of  a  limited  number  of  typical 
forms,  including  both  plants  and  animals.  Part  First,  now 
published,  is  a  general  introduction  to  the  subject  illustrated 
by  the  study  of  a  few  types.  Part  Second  will  contain  a  de- 
tailed survey  of  various  plants  and  animals. 

W.  G.  Farlow,  Professor  in  Harvard  University,  Cambridge,  Mass. : 
— An  introduction  is  always  difficult  to  write,  and  I  know  no  work  in 
which  the  general  relations  of  plants  and  animals  and  the  cell-struc- 
ture have  been  so  well  stated  in  a  condensed  form. 


8  THE  AMERICAN  SCIENCE   SERIES. 

POLITICAL   ECONOMY.    By  Francis  A.  Walker,  President 

of  the  Massachusetts  Institute  of  Technology. 
Advanced  Course.     8vo.     537  pp. 

"The  peculiar  merit  of  this  book  is  its  reality.  The  reader  is 
brought  to  see  the  application  of  the  laws  of  political  economy 
to  real  facts.  He  learns  the  extent  to  which  those  laws  hold 
good,  and  the  manner  in  which  they  are  applied.  The  subject 
is  divided,  as  usual,  into  the  three  great  branches  of  production, 
exchange,  and  distribution.  An  interesting  and  suggestive 
book  on  consumption  is  added,  which  serves  to  bring  in  con- 
veniently the  principles  of  population.  The  last  part  of  the 
volume  is  given  to  the  consideration  of  various  practical  appli- 
cations of  economic  principles  to  such  questions  as  those  of 
Banking,  Cooperation,  Trades'  unions,  Strikes,  Bimetallism,  and 
Protection." — The  Boston  Advertiser . 

Briefer  Course.     i2mo.    402  pp. 

The  demand  for  a  briefer  manual  by  the  same  author  for  the 
use  of  schools  in  which  only  a  short  time  can  be  given  to  the 
subject  has  led  to  the  publication  of  the  present  volume.  The 
work  of  abridgment  has  been  effected  mainly  through  excision, 
although  some  structural  changes  have  been  made,  notably  in 
the  parts  relating  to  distribution  and  consumption. 

From  Richard  T.  Ely,  Professor  in  the  yokns  Hopkins  University : 
— "  Let  one  who  proposes  to  teach  political  economy  master,  first  of 
all,  F.  A.  Walker's  Political  Economy." 

From  the  Christian  Union: — "  Professor  Walker  is  not  only  an 
authority  in  his  department,  but  he  is  an  admirable  teacher.  His  de- 
finitions are  remarkably  clear;  and  though  he  throws  out  of  his  cal- 
culations all  other  than  merely  economic  considerations,  he  does  so 
avowedly,  and  continuedly  reminds  the  student  that  other  considera- 
tions do  exist — a  respect  for  ethics  not  always  paid  by  preceding 
writers  in  the  same  field.  He  is  also  more  modern,  and  shows  a 
more  lively  appreciation  of  the  living  facts  of  to-day,  than  most 
writers  of  text-books  on  the  subject  " 

From  The  Academy,  London: — "  With  the  merits  of  brevity  and 
clearness,  it  combines  those  of  forcible  statement  and  original 
thought.  In  a  condensed,  yet  readable  shape,  it  presents  all  the 
chief  doctrines  hitherto  ascertained  in  political  economy;  and  sum- 
marizes with  great  fairness  the  arguments  on  both  sides,  on  those 
facts  which  are  matters  of  debate  rather  than  doctrine." 

HENRY  HOLT  &  CO.,  PUBLISHERS,  N.  Y. 


